In re the Supervised Estate of: Delbert W Waara, Deceased.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0543

In re the Supervised Estate of: Delbert W Waara, Deceased.

Filed January 31, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-PA-PR-04-1430

Michael Kemp, Paul D. Funke, Hansen, Dordell, Bradt, Odlaug & Bradt, P.L.L.P., St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant John Rodriguez)

Stewart C. Loper, Stewart C. Loper, P.A., Mi nneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Glen
Waara)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presid ing Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this probate case, appellant argues that the district court erred by allowing
respondent to make an objection in 2018 to th e value of an item listed in the inventory of
the estate, which was filed in 2006. We agree with appellant and conclude that the 2006
value became final in the ab sence of respondent’s objection or appeal at that time.
Therefore, we reverse and remand.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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FACTS
Delbert W. Waara died intestate in 2004. Delbert Waara’s surviving spouse, Mary
Lou Waara, petitioned for appointment as personal representative of her husband’s estate.
Mary Lou Waara and Delbert Waara had one child together, respondent Glen Waara, who
was an adult at the time of Delbert Waara’s de ath. Mary Lou Waara also had three other
sons, one of whom is appellant John Rodrigu ez. The district court scheduled the matter
for a final probate hearing and mailed notices of the hearing to Mary Lou Waara and Glen
Waara. After the hearing, on December 20, 2004, the distri ct court appointed Mary Lou
Waara as the personal representative of Delbert Waara’s estate.
On September 13, 2006, Mary Lou Waar a filed several documents closing the
probate matter. She submitted the inventory of Delbert Waara’s estate, which included just
two items: (1) “4,863 I ssued Shares of Graco, Inc. Comm on Stock” valued at $31.62 per
share for a total of $153,768.06; and (2) $200 of personal prop erty described as
“[h]ousehold goods, furniture and miscellane ous personal property.” Mary Lou Waara
declared that “the Inventory and . . . its representations are true and complete,” and that the
two items were “a true and corr ect inventory at date of death values of all the property of
the Estate, both real and personal, which has come into [her] possession as Personal
Representative.”
Mary Lou Waara also submitted a final account on September 13, 2006, which
included the same two items and the same valu es for each. Under the heading “Interim
Distributions to Devisees and Heirs,” Mary Lou Waara listed $200 in personal property
and “4,863 Issued Shares of Graco, Inc. Common Stock,” valued at $153,768.06. On this
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document, Mary Lou Waara again declared the representations and contents to be true and
complete. Mary Lou Waara also filed a receipt for assets by distributee on September 13,
2006, in which she “ack nowledge[d] receipt from the Personal Representative of this
Estate, of the following assets in full: 4,863 Issued Shares of Graco, Inc. Common Stock,”
valued at $153,768.06 and $2 00 in personal property. Mary Lou Waara also filed a
statement to close the estate, in which she attested that she “[f]ully administered this Estate”
and “[i]nventoried the assets of the Estate and distributed them to the persons entitled to
them.”
At no point did anyone, including Glen Waara, object to the inventory, dispute any
of the documents filed or statements cont ained therein, or otherwise challenge the
administration or distribution of Delbert Waar a’s estate. Nor was any appeal taken from
any order of the district court. Beginning in 2006, statements and tax documents regarding
the Graco stock (later admitted into evidence at trial) refl ect the owner of the stock as
“Mary Lou Waara Personal Representative Est Delbert Waara.”
On July 30, 2015, Mary Lou Waara died, and R odriguez was subsequently
appointed personal representative of Mary Lou Waara’s estate. While handling Mary Lou
Waara’s estate, Rodriguez discovered that Mary Lou Waara transferred the Graco stock to
herself in her capacity as Delbert Waara’s personal representative, but she had not retitled
the assets to reflect her ownership of them in her individual capacity. On May 3, 2018,
Rodriguez filed a petition to be formally appointed as successor personal representative for
Delbert Waara’s estate for the purpose of retitling the assets in Mary Lou Waara’s name as
an individual. Only then could Rodriguez administer Mary Lou Waara’s estate as her
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personal representative. In the petition, R odriguez observed that after administrative
expenses, the total value of Delbert Waara’ s estate according to the 2006 document was
less than $150,000.
On July 13, 2018, the district court appointed Rodriguez as successor personal
representative for Delbert Waara’s estate. On July 31, 2018, Rodriguez submitted a
supplemental inventory, showing the same information as the 2006 inventory, including
the same two items: (1) “4,863 Issued Shares of Graco, Inc. Common Stock,” with a “Fair
Market Value” of $153,768.06; and (2) $200 in personal property. On July 31, 2018,
Rodriguez also filed a supplemental final account. This document listed the two items and
also included an “asset adjustment” of $861,863.94, reflecting the 2018 value of the Graco
stock. On July 31, 2018, Rodriguez also fi led a “Petition to Allow Final Account, Settle
and Distribute Estate,” requesting distribut ion of 100% of the tw o items to Mary Lou
Waara’s estate.
The district court scheduled the matter for a final probate hearing, and on October
16, 2018, Glen Waara objected to the supplemental final acco unt. Glen Waara objected
because the stock was incorrectly valued on the 2006 inventory.1 Glen Waara also objected
to the requested distribution of 100% of the stock to Mary Lou Waara’s estate because the
2018 value of the stock exceeded $150,000 . Rodriguez moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Glen Waara’s objection to the va lue of stock in the 2006 inventory was

1 The parties agree that the stock price listed on the 2006 inventory was inaccurate. They
agree that the total value of the 4,863 shares of stock was actually $196,562.46. The parties
also agree that, when including accrued divi dends, the total value in the 2006 inventory
should have been stated as $207,504.21.
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untimely and barred as a matter of law. The district court denied the motion, and the case
proceeded to trial.
Rodriguez and Glen Waara testified at the trial. Rodriguez acknowledged that Mary
Lou Waara never retitled the stock, but rece ived dividend checks during her lifetime.
Rodriguez also agreed that Glen Waara correctly valued the stock as of the date of Delbert
Waara’s death as $207,504.21. Glen Waara acknowledged that he did not object to the
2006 final account at the time. In August 2019, the district court revalued the Graco stock
and proceeded to redistribute it. The partie s disputed how the re distribution should be
calculated.2 After submission of a motion for am ended findings, several amended final
accounts, and amended objections, the district court issued its third amended order in
March 2021. Rodriguez appeals.
DECISION
Rodriguez argues that Glen Waara’s objection to the supplemental final account is
time-barred. We agree. Because Glen Waara did not object to or timely appeal the value
of the Graco stock listed in the 2006 inventory, the 2006 value became final, and the district
court erred in granting the objection.
Generally, courts enforce the finality of probate decisions:
Final decrees of the probate court are of great importance . . . .
It is to be presumed that they express the deliberate judgment
of that court upon the construc tion of wills where such direct
the disposition of property. Such decrees should not be
disturbed upon the mere say-so of the probate judge, years after

2 On appeal, Rodriguez also challenges the dist rict court’s decision to use the 2018 value
of the Graco stock to conclude that the es tate exceeded $150,000. Given our decision
below, we need not address appellant’s challenge to the redistribution of the estate.
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made . . . because there had been a previous order made without
proper consideration, and hence erroneous.

In re Turner’s Est., 233 N.W. 305, 306 (Minn. 1930), quoted in In re Est. of Nordlund, 602
N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. App. 1999), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 15, 2000).
The United States Supreme Court has likewise emphasized finality in probate cases
to avoid endless litigation:
If the determination of the probate court was wrong, [the
heir’s] remedy was to appeal fro m that determination. The
heirs were entitled to one day in court, but not to two. When a
probate court with jurisdiction ov er property for purposes of
administration, and for purposes of sale in certain cases, orders
and confirms a sale of the same, it is the right and duty of an
heir to litigate the propriety of su ch orders in that proceeding.
The heir cannot sit by, permit th e sale to be made, and then
bring another and a collateral action in another court to litigate
again the propriety of the sa le, and to procure a decree
declaring it to be void. Such a practice would place no end to
litigation.

Doran v. Kennedy, 237 U.S. 362, 368 (1915), quoted in Bengtson v. Setterberg, 35 N.W.2d
623, 629 (Minn. 1949) (rejecting collateral attack on a probate distribution and stating that
the decree of a probate court is binding “w hether right or wrong” unless reversed or
modified on appeal); see also Loo v. Loo , 520 N.W.2d 740, 743-44 (Minn. 1994) (noting
that “the underlying principle that an adjudication on the merits of an issue is conclusive,
and should not be relitigated, clearly applies” even when res judicata, collateral estoppel,
and law of the case do not apply “in a technical sense”); Rickert v. Wardell, 170 N.W. 915,
916 (Minn. 1919) (rejecting collateral attack on a probate distribution and stating that the
decree of the probate court—even if erroneous—is “binding and conclusive until reversed
on appeal or set aside by some proper proceeding”).
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More specifically, Minnesota statutes limit a person’s time to object to the value of
the stock listed in an inventory or a final account: “The right of any distributee to object to
the proposed distribution on the basis of the kind or value of asset . . . terminates if the
distributee fails to object in writing received by the personal representative within 30 days
after mailing or delivery of the proposal.” Minn. Stat. § 524.3-906(b) (2020).3 In addition,
a person can challenge the probate court’s dete rmination of value through an appeal, but
not after the passage of six months’ time. Minn. Stat. § 525.712 (2020). In the absence of
any objection and in the absence of any appeal , the value of an asset cannot be relitigated
in a subsequent proceeding, whether the va lue of the asset is “right or wrong.” See
Bengtson, 35 N.W.2d at 629; Rickert, 170 N.W. at 916; cf. Dieseth v. Calder Mfg. Co., 147
N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. 1966) (stating that “[e]ven though the decision of the trial court
in the first order may have been wrong, if it is an appealable order it is still final after the
time for appeal has expired”); Johnson v. Johnson, 902 N.W.2d 79, 83 (Minn. App. 2017)
(citing this aspect of Dieseth).
In this case, Glen Waara made no objection to the value of the Graco stock or the
stock price listed, and his right to object terminated “30 days after mailing or delivery” of
the 2006 inventory and the 2006 final account. See Minn. Stat. § 524.3-906(b). Mary Lou
Waara filed a statement attesting that all assets had been distributed and closed the estate,
and Glen Waara did not challenge the proc eedings or appeal any aspect of the 2006
proceedings within six months’ time. See Minn. Stat. § 525.712. The value of the Graco

3 We cite the most recent version of the rele vant statutes because they have not been
amended in relevant part since the 2006 proceedings.
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stock, and the stock price listed in the 2006 proceedings, whether right or wrong, became
final after the 6-month time to appeal passed. The supplemental inve ntory, filed on July
31, 2018, listed the Graco stoc k as “4,863 Issued Shares of Graco, Inc. Common Stock,”
with a fair market value of $153,768.06. Because the 2 018 description and value are
identical to what was stated in the 2006 inventory, Glen Waara had no right to object to or
litigate the value of the Graco stock in 2018.
We observe that, in fact, the 2006 invent ory, the 2006 final account, and the 2006
receipt for assets by distributee all reflected th e same incorrect value of the Graco stock.
In addition, we observe that because the Graco stock was titled in Mary Lou Waara’s name
in her capacity as personal representative and not in her capacity as an individual, Mary
Lou Waara made at least two other incorrect st atements in 2006: she stated that she had
received the Graco stock in full in the 2006 receipt for assets by distributee; and she stated
that she “[f]ully administered th is Estate” and “[i]nventoried the assets of the Estate and
distributed them to the persons entitled to them” in the 2006 statement to close the estate.
To the extent Glen Waara argues that thes e false statements amount to fraud and
permit a challenge to the value of the Graco stock, we disagree for two reasons. First, Glen
Waara cites to no authority pe rmitting such objections, either generally or specifically,
when a successor personal repres entative is appointe d for a limited, ministerial purpose,
unrelated to the previously stated value of the asset. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d
461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n appeal erro r is never presumed. It must be made to
appear affirmatively before th ere can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error
rests upon the one who relies upon it.”). Second, the record in this case includes no
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evidence of fraud, as counsel conceded during oral argument to this court.4 Instead, there
is only evidence of inaccuracies and counsel ’s speculation regarding motive for the
inaccuracies. We decline to in terpret the deadline set forth in section 524.3-906(b) or
section 525.712 as including an unwritten exception. The statutory deadline precludes any
objection in 2018 to the 2006 value of the Graco stock.5
Because Glen Waara did not timely object to or appeal the value of the Graco stock
as part of the 2006 probate proceedings, his 2018 objection to the value of the stock is time-
barred. We reverse the district court’s decision to allow respondent’s objection and remand
to the district court for findings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

4 In this case, Glen Waara testified that he has “no idea” why Mary Lou Waara improperly
valued the shares, nor why she filed the final account and inventory. He also argued that
he had “no reason to know or even suspect that his mother was lying to him about the value
of the shares.” At oral argument before this court, counsel agreed that the record contains
only evidence of inaccurate statements.
5 Rodriguez also argues that such claims are precluded by res judicata, laches, and various
statutes of limitation. We agree that the st atutory framework in Minnesota provides for
lawsuits against a personal representative and that such claims may be barred by equitable
doctrines or any applicable statutes of limitations. See Minn. Stat. § 524.1-106 (2020)
(allowing claims alleging fraud within two years after discovery of the fraud); Minn. Stat.
§ 524.1-304 (2020) (allowing modification of a probate distribution upon a petition within
two years of discovery of fraud or misrepre sentation); Minn. Stat. § 524.3-1005 (2020)
(allowing claims against the personal representative for breach of fiduciary duty within six
months of filing a closing statement); Minn. Stat. § 524.3-1006 (2020) (barring heirs from
recovering property improperly distributed after the passage of either three years from the
decedent’s death or one year from the distribution). We need not determine whether Glen
Waara may properly bring such claims because none are before us and none were filed in
the district court.