Robert M. Hall, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0545

Robert M. Hall,
Relator,

vs.

Atrium Hospitality LP,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed December 20, 2021
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 43526751

Robert M. Hall, Chanhassen, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Atrium Hospitality LP, Alpharetta, Georgia (respondent employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge;
and Bjorkman, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Relator challenges t he decision of an unemployment-law judge ( ULJ) dismissing
his unemployment -benefits appeal after relator failed to appear for the appeal hearing.
2
Because we discern no abuse of discretion in the ULJ’s finding that relator lacked good
cause for failing to appear at the hearing, we affirm.
FACTS
On October 29, 2020, respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development (DEED) mailed relator Robert Hall a letter stating that he had
become ineligible for unemployment benefits and needed to repay $2,960 in overpaid
benefits. Hall appealed DEED’s determination and submitted written evidence asserting
that he was not overpaid benefits. He argued in his written submission that, because he did
not begin receiving severance pay until October 2020, the September unemployment
payments were proper and he should not be required to pay back the September benefit
payments.
DEED’s letter of ineligibility cited Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 3b (2020), which
states, in part, that applicants are not eligible to receive unemployment benefits if they are
receiving separation, severance, or bonus payments. The start of the ineligibility period is
not tied to the date payments are made by the employer, but is triggered as of the later date
of either the employment separation or “the date the applicant first becomes aware that the
employer will be making a payment .”1 Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 3b(b) (emphasis
added).
On November 5, DEED mailed the parties a notice scheduling a hearing in Hall’s
appeal for March 15, 2021. The notice of hearing stated that “[t]his hearing will be held

1 From the written documents submitted by relator, it appears that agreement for payment
of severance to relator was entered into in September 2020.
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by telephone conference call,” and that the ULJ would call Hall to participate in the
hearing. The notice included instructions for correcting the recipient’s telephone number,
rescheduling the hearing, or requesting accommodations for the hearing. DEED also
mailed a set of instructions along with the notice, which explained Hall’s “right s and
responsibilities regarding the hearing.” 2 DEED later mailed a notice to the parties on
November 20 rescheduling the appeal hearing to January 12, 2021.
The ULJ called Hall on January 12, 2021, at the time of his hearing and reached his
voicemail, where the ULJ left a message. The ULJ then calle d Hall a second time at a
different number and reached a different voicemail, where the ULJ did not leave a message.
The next day, on January 13, 2021, the ULJ issued an order dismissing Hall’s appeal,
stating that he was “considered to have failed to exhaust available administrative remedies”
for failing to participate in the hearing.
Hall submitted a request for reconsideration on January 17, 2021. In his request, he
explained that he failed to participate in the hearing because he “incorrectly thought that
because [he] had submitted a letter with evidence for the hearing that [he] did not need to
participate in the call.” On February 5, 2021, Hall submitted another written statement
with four more reasons for missing the hearing. These included (1) t hat Hall had already
submitted a letter and evidence, (2) that Hall was working on the day of the hearing, (3) that
Hall thought “that it was not a requirement to attend the hearing ,” and (4) that Hall’s

2 DEED included in its addendum a copy of what it asserts was the hearing guide it mailed
to Hall. But this guide was not included in the administrative record, and we do not rely
on it.
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“evidence will show that I do not owe the repayment amount.” Hall also stated that he had
“tried multiple times to reach the Appeals Office at the telephone number listed” and had
reached a recording every time. Finally, he noted that his hearing had been rescheduled
“at least one time.”
The ULJ denied H all’s reconsideration request on April 6, 2021, finding that Hall
had not shown good cause for missing the hearing. In a memorandum accompanying the
order, the ULJ explained that “[n]othing in the information provided, nor was Hall
instructed, that a written document could stand in place of his attendance for the hearing.”
The ULJ also stated that Hall “should have rescheduled” the hearing if needed, and that
Hall “has not shown that he acted with due diligence to participate in the hearing.” Hall
now appeals this denial, arguing that the ULJ should have reviewed the written evidence
he submitted or else granted him a second hearing.
DECISION
Under Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(b) (2020), “[i]f the appealing party fails to
participate in the hearing, th e [ULJ] has the discretion to dismiss the appeal by summary
decision.” The statute requires an appealing party to participate personally; “[s]ubmission
of a written statement does not constitute participation.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 1a(b). An appealing party who fails to participate may request reconsideration of the
ULJ’s decision to dismiss their appeal. Id., subd. 2 (2020). The ULJ must grant
reconsideration and order an additional hearing “if the party who failed to participate had
good cause for failing to do so.” Id., subd. 2(d). This court may reverse a ULJ’s decision
on reconsideration “if the substantial rights of [relator] may have been prejudiced” due to
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an error of law, a lack of substantial evidence, or other enumerated reasons. Id., subd. 7(d)
(2020). However, “[t]his court will not reverse a ULJ’s decision to deny an additional
evidentiary hearing to a relator who missed the evidentiary hearing unless the decision
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Petracek v. Univ. of Minn ., 780 N.W.2d 927, 929
(Minn. App. 2010).
Here, the ULJ reviewed Hall’s request for reconsideration and determined that he
had failed to show good cause for failing to participate. “Good cause,” in this context,
means “a reason that would have prevented a reasonable person acting with due dil igence
from participating in the hearing.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(d). In support of his
request for reconsideration, Hall stated that he did not know that he was required to attend
the hearing and was working at the time. The ULJ found that this was not good cause. The
ULJ found that “nothing in the information provided, nor was Hall instructed, that a written
document could stand in place of his attendance for the hearing.” The ULJ also reasoned
that Hall did not try to reschedule the hearing and thus did not show that he “acted with
due diligence to participate.”
We discern no abuse of discretion in the ULJ’s decision. This court has held that
similar decisions by ULJs were not an abuse of discretion. In Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc .,
this court affirmed a ULJ’s decision that a party who missed a hearing because of a work
conflict had not shown good cause. 721 N.W.2d 340, 345 (Minn. App. 2006). We noted
that the party who failed to participate “neither attempted to reschedule the hearing nor
demonstrated that a request for time off work to attend the hearing was denied.” Id.
Similarly, in Petracek, this court upheld a ULJ’s determination that a party being in jail
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was not per se good cause for missing a hearing, noting again that the individua l made no
attempt to reschedule the hearing. 780 N.W.2d at 929 -30. Both cases reflect that “good
cause” requires something more than a showing of mere unavailability, such as attempts to
participate or attempts to reschedule.
Hall argues on appeal that “ there are many reasons why a reasonable person can
miss a phone call.” He reiterates that he was unavailable due to work, and also alleges for
the first time on appeal that “the phone call was blocked due to an anti-spam feature on his
Apple iPhone.” But as Skarhus and Petracek make clear, mere unavailability is not the
same as good cause, absent some additional showing of attempts to participate or
reschedule. Although Hall asserts that it was difficult to call DEED due to the high volume
of calls during the pandemic, he does not claim that he ever tried to reschedule the hearing
or that he tried to respond to the missed calls from the ULJ. And we may not consider the
“anti-spam feature” argument, as our review of the ULJ’s decision is limited to the r ecord
that was before the ULJ. 3 See Fay v. Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev. , 860 N.W.2d 385, 390
(Minn. App. 2015) (declining to consider reasons for failure to participate that were not
provided to the ULJ). On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the ULJ in
determining that Hall did not show good cause for failing to participate.

3 Even if this court were to consider the anti -spam feature argument, it still would not
necessarily constitute good cause. Cf. Wilson v. Rebar, No. A16-0930, 2016 WL 7438848,
at *2 (Minn. App. Dec. 27, 2016) (affirming ULJ’s decision that technical issues with a
party’s phone were not good cause for missi ng a hearing); Mohamed v. Indus. Staffing ,
No. A09-944, 2010 WL 607664, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 23, 2010) (affirming ULJ’s
decision that a party’s bad cell signal was not good cause for missing a hearing).
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Hall also argues that the ULJ should have considered the written evidence that he
submitted, rather than dismissing the appeal solely based on the missed phone call. But
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(b), gives the ULJ the discretion to dismiss an appeal if the
appealing party fails to participate. “Submission of a written statement does not constitute
participation.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(b). Hall also conceded in his
reconsideration request to the ULJ that his participation was required. Without a showing
of good cause as described above, there is no statutory requirement that the ULJ grant Hall
a new hearing, and there was no abuse of discretion by the ULJ in declining to do so.
Finally, Hall makes substantive arguments regarding his eligibility for
unemployment benefits. Those arguments, however, are beyond the scope of this appeal.
This court is limited to reviewing the ULJ’s decision on reconsideration, which here
focused solely on Hall’s failure to participate in the hearing. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7(a) (2020) (providing that this court reviews “the [ULJ’s] decision on
reconsideration”); see also Eley v. Southshore Invs., Inc. , 845 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Minn.
App. 2014) (declining to “consider the merits of DEED’s ineligibility determination” in
appeal over good cause for failure to participate). Because the ULJ did not address Hall’s
substantive arguments—and was not required to do so after Hall’s failure to participate—
we do not address those issues here.
Affirmed.