Dianne Strohmayer, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0561

Dianne Strohmayer,
Relator,

vs.

A&E Care Services,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed December 6, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 43100995-3

Dianne Strohmayer, North Branch, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Joseph B. Nierenberg, Nierenberg Employment Law, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent employer)

Anne B. Froelich, Munazza Humayun, Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge that she is ineligible
for unemployment benefits because she quit her employment and no statutory exception
applies. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Dianne Strohmayer quit her job with respondent A&E Care Services (the
employer), a healthcare organization. Relator later applied for unemployment benefits
through respondent Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED).
DEED determined that relator was eligible for unemployment benefits. The employer
appealed DEED’s determination of eligibility. The matter proceeded to a hearing before
an unemployment-law judge (ULJ). We first summarize the facts based on the testimony
presented at the hearing about the circumstances of relator’s quit , and we then explain the
ULJ’s determinations after the hearing.
In April 2020, relator’s son passed away. She had previously lost another son a few
years earlier. Following the loss of her second son, relator began to experience depression
and anxiety, and she felt that she “just couldn’t function.” The employer approved relator
to take a leave of absence from work under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) .
Relator’s FMLA leave began on April 23, 2020, and was to last for 12 weeks. The
employer sent relator a letter saying that her leave would end on July 20, 2020, and that
she was expected back to work on that date. The employer had limited contact with relator
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during her leave of abs ence, and most communication came from the human resources
(HR) manager and relator’s supervisor about paperwork needed for the FMLA leave.
On July 16, 2020, during the last week of her FMLA leave, relator sent her
supervisor a text saying that she was qui tting. Relator’s text stated, “I’m suffering with
severe depression and anxiety. I feel due to these conditions that I am unable to perform
my job duties and daily functions because of it. I will have [the employer’s] equipment
returned by the end of Ju ly 2020.” The parties dispute what happened next. Relator’s
supervisor told the ULJ that she called relator the same day she received the text message
and tried to persuade relator not to quit. The supervisor testified that she asked relator if
she was sure she wanted to quit and if she needed anything, and she told relator that the
employer could work with relator if she needed more time off. According to the supervisor,
relator responded that she needed to quit for herself and her grandson, and she to ld the
supervisor that she would find a part -time job closer to home when she was ready to go
back to work. Relator, however, told the ULJ that this phone conversation never took
place.
Relator admitted that she did not ask the employer for an extension o f the leave of
absence after the end of the 12-week period. When asked why she did not request more
time off, relator responded that she “didn’t know that that was possible.” Relator explained
that she had been told to come back to work on July 20 and was “under the assumption that
was it.” The HR manager told the ULJ that the employer could have extended relator’s
leave and allowed her to take more time off. The HR manager also said that the employer
kept relator’s position open and did not fill the position until January 2021.
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After the hearing, the ULJ issued findings of fact and a decision, determining that
relator was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The ULJ found more credible the
testimony of relator’s supervisor and the HR manager, finding that relator’s supervisor
called relator after receiving relator’s text saying she was quitting. In crediting the
testimony of the supervisor and the HR manager over relator’s testimony, the ULJ reasoned
that the supervisor and HR manager “had a clear rec ollection of events surrounding
[relator’s] separation from employment,” while relator “was grief stricken during the time
in question, and her memory of events was less reliable.”
The ULJ noted that an applicant who quits employment is ineligible for
unemployment benefits unless an exception applies. The ULJ considered two exceptions:
a quit for medical necessity and a quit for a good reason caused by the employer. The ULJ
determined that the medical -necessity exception did not apply because relator did not
request other accommodations before quitting, even though the employer was willing to
help her. The ULJ also determined that the good -reason-caused-by-employer exception
did not apply because the employer did not change any conditions of relator’s employment,
and relator admitted that she quit her job because she believed she could not perform her
duties. The ULJ concluded that the determination caused an overpayment in
unemployment benefits to relator of more than $15,000.
Relator requested reconsideration of the ULJ’s decision. She mainly disputed the
ULJ’s finding that her supervisor called her after she quit, and she insisted that the
employer never discussed additional accommodations with her. The ULJ issued an order
affirming the d ecision. The ULJ determined that a preponderance of the evidence
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supported her earlier finding that relator’s supervisor contacted relator when she quit and
tried to persuade her to stay. The ULJ reasoned that relator “had a very poor recollection
of events during her testimony” and that “[t]he ULJ made an appropriate credibility finding
as to why [the supervisor’s] testimony was accepted over [relator’s] statements.”
Relator appeals by certiorari.
DECISION
Relator challenges the ULJ’s determination that she is ineligible for unemployment
benefits. When reviewing the ULJ’s decision, we may affirm the decision or remand for
further proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020). Alternatively, we may
reverse or modify the ULJ’s decision when the r elator has been prejudiced because the
decision, among other things, is affected by an error of law or not supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Id., subd. 7(d)(4)-(5).
We review the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the dec ision.
Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016). We will not disturb
those findings “as long as there is evidence in the record that reasonably tends to sustain
them.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc. , 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 201 1). Whether the
ULJ’s findings show that the applicant meets a statutory exception to ineligibility for
quitting employment is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Peppi v. Phyllis
Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 2000) (ap plying de novo review
to determine whether applicant met exception for a quit for good reason caused by
employer).
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I. The ULJ did not err by crediting the testimony of relator’s supervisor over
relator’s testimony.
Relator first argues that the ULJ clearly erred by finding that relator’s supervisor
called her and offered to accommodate her after relator texted saying she was quitting.
Relator maintains that the ULJ should have credited relator’s testimony that the p hone
conversation never took place, rather than accepting the testimony of her supervisor.
Given our standard of review on appeal, we cannot reverse the ULJ’s credibility
determination. We view the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the
decision, and we defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations. White v. Univ. of Minn.
Physicians Corp., 875 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Minn. App. 2016). The ULJ explained why she
found the supervisor more credible: relator “was grief stricken during the time in question,
and her memory of events was less reliable.” While relator disputes that her memory was
unclear, we have repeatedly refused to reweigh credi bility determinations when the ULJ
has given a reasoned explanation for the decision. See Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless Servs.,
Inc, 726 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. App. 2007) (affirming ULJ’s credibility determination
when findings were supported by substantial evidence); Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc. , 721
N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006) (deferring to ULJ’s determination that applicant’s
testimony was not credible). We therefore must accept the ULJ’s finding crediting the
testimony of relator’s supervisor that she called relator and offered an accommodation.1

1 Relator also argues that the ULJ did not fulfill her duty to reasonably assist relator with
the presentation of evidence and the proper development of the record. She argues that the
ULJ failed to fully develop the record because she did not request a copy of relator’s May
2020 doctor’s letter diagnosing her illness. But the doctor’s letter was not relevant to the
ULJ’s decision. Instead, the ULJ based her decision on the circumstances surrounding
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II. The ULJ did not err by determining that relator did not meet the medical -
necessity exception.
Relator challenges the ULJ’s determination that she was ineligible for
unemployment benefits because she quit and did not meet the medical -necessity
exception.2 A person who quit s employment is ineligible for unemployment benefits
unless an exception applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2020). Relator argues that
she meets the medical-necessity exception. To meet this exception, an applicant must show
that she quit her employment “because the applicant’s serious illness or injury made it
medically necessary that the applicant quit.” Id., subd. 1(7). But this exception applies
only “if the applicant informs t he employer of the medical problem and requests
accommodation and no reasonable accommodation is made available.” Id.
Here, the ULJ determined that relator did not meet this exception because she did
not request other accommodations before quitting, even though the employer was willing
to grant one. Substantial evidence in the record supports this determination. Shortly before
her FMLA leave was to expire, relator texted her supervisor saying she was quitting.
Relator acknowledged that she did not request an extension of the leave of absence before
quitting, saying that she “didn’t know that that was possible.” But the HR manager testified
that relator could have extended her leave of absence beyond the time allowed under the

relator’s quit in July 2020. The record shows that the ULJ properly developed all facts
relevant to her decision.
2 Relator frames this issue as whether there are “genuine issues of material fact” concerning
relator’s serious illness. This is the standard for reviewing a grant of summary judgment
and does not apply to this case. See DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69-70 (Minn. 1997)
(explaining summary -judgment standard). Instead, we review whether substantial
evidence supports the ULJ’s decision. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5).
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FMLA.3 Relator’s supervisor testified that she called relator after receiving the text and
told her that the employer was willing to work with her if she needed more time off. As
explained above, we defer to the ULJ’s credibility determination that this conversation
between relator and her supervisor took place. The record therefore supports the finding
that relator did not request an additional accommodation after her FMLA leave expired ,
that the employer offered an accommodation after relator said she was quitting , and that
relator rejected it and decided to quit anyway . The ULJ did not err by determining that
relator did not satisfy all the requirements of the medical-necessity exception.
III. The ULJ did not err by determining that relator did not meet the exception for
a quit for a good reason caused by the employer.
Finally, relator argues that the ULJ erred by determining that relator did not meet
the exception for a quit because of a good reason caused by the employer under Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 1(1). To satisfy this exception, the applicant’s reason for quitting must
be one that: (1) is directly related to the employment and for which the employer is
responsible, (2) is adverse to the worker, and (3) would compel an average, reasonable
worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remain in the employment. Id., subd. 3

3 In her brief, relator states that the employer “was only going to allow 12 weeks under
[the] FMLA and nothing else would be provided for accommodation as [r elator] failed to
furnish a death certificate to prove [relator’s] own medical illness.” The record does not
support this assertion. Relator appears to be basing her argument on a response the
employer made in a DEED questionnaire before the hearing. In that response, the employer
stated that relator had exhausted 12 weeks of FMLA leave , and it also noted that the
employer never received a death certificate for her son even though the employer requested
one several times. We do not read this statement as saying that added leave was contingent
on relator providing a death certificate. Moreover, the HR manager’s testimony at the
hearing—which the ULJ credited and which we must accept on appeal —contradicts
relator’s assertion.
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(2020). Relator argues that she meets this exception because she believed that , after her
son’s death, her continued employment with the employer would harm her physical and
mental health.
We note that relator has forfeited this argument because she raises it for the first
time on appeal. This court does not consider matters not presented to and considered by
the ULJ. Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1982); see also Peterson v. Ne.
Bank—Minneapolis, 805 N.W.2d 878, 883 (Minn. App. 2011) (applying Thiele in an
unemployment-benefits appeal). Nor may a party raise the same issue litigated below but
under a different theory. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. Here, the ULJ, in her initial decision,
considered whether relator could satisfy the exception that she quit for a good reason
caused by the employer . B ut the ULJ did not consider the particular theory that relator
raises on appeal. And in her request for reconsideration, relator did not challenge that part
of the ULJ’s decision. Because relator failed to raise this argument before the ULJ, the
argument is not properly before this court.
Even if we were to consider relator’s argument, the record does not support that she
would satisfy the good-reason-caused-by-employer exception. The record lacks evidence
to support relator’s assertions, and it does not show that the employer took any action
adverse to her that would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit. Relator cannot
show that she quit for a good reason caused by the employer.
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For these reasons, the ULJ did not err by determining that relator was not entitled
to unemployment benefits because she quit her employment and no statutory exception
applies.
Affirmed.