Beth A. Layeux, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0573

Beth A. Layeux,
Appellant,

vs.

Dedicated Logistics Services, LLC,
Respondent.

Filed December 27, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Kirk, Judge*
Dissenting, Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-20-6852

Darron C. Knutson, New Brighton, Minnesota (for appellant)

Holly M. Robbins, Lauren E. Clements, Littler Mendelson P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of
respondent. Because we conclude from the record that this case presents genuine issues of
material fact for trial, we reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
FACTS
Appellant Beth A. Layeux was hired by respondent Dedicated Logistics Services,
LLC (DLS) as an accounts receivable analyst on January 30, 2018. She was interviewed
for the position by the accounting operations manager who told her she would be working
in a friendly and relaxed atmosphere where she would have flexibility to perform the work
in her own manner . DLS company policy allowed employees to take unlimited vacation
time and personal leave, subject to their supervisors’ approval. Layeux accepted the
salaried position at DLS and chose a work schedule from 8:00 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. At the
start of employment, Layeux needed to complete her employee data which contained a spot
for employees to list known disabilities and accommodations. Layeux suffers from
diagnosed anxiety and depression disorder which, when exacerbated by stress, causes
insomnia. Layeux did not identify the disorders on the employee data form, nor did she
request an accommodation upon starting employment.
Layeux initially performed her work very well, and quickly reduced the backlog of
accounts receivable. On a few occasions shortly into her employment, Layeux was late for
work because of appointments, traffic, oversleeping, or feeling sick, but would notify her
supervisor in advance via email or text. Layeux’s absences from work became more
3
frequent beginning in early June 2018 due to severe dental problems which eventually led
to a full extraction of all her teeth. Layeux’s tardiness or absences during this time were
often on short notice, but she nearly always provided notice to her supervisor if she would
be more than 15 minutes late.
On June 13, Layeux emailed her supervisor with details about her dental procedures,
explaining the impact on her anxiety and depression. The email stated in relevant part:
“This past week has been a struggle for me. I have had non-stop horrible pain, swelling,
that awful extraction, lack of sleep, and no solid food besides noodles. I have anxiety and
depression, and I am feeling overwhelmed.” Layeux apologized for missing work,
explaining that her anxiety caused her to overanalyze the text message from her supervisor.
She requested two days off “to take a mental health break.”
Shortly after sending the email in June, Layeux’s supervisor started emailing her up
to twenty times a day and the two began disagreeing on work styles. Layeux sat in a cubicle
near three other employees and, in her deposition, testified that her supervisor would
comment loudly on her work in front of others, making her upset and disrupting her
workflow. She asserted that the constant interferences exacerbated her anxiety and
depression. She became increasingly concerned after learning that her supervisor had
contacted her clients without her knowledge. Layeux testified that her supervisor would
record her arrival times and would criticize her in front of others when she arrived late,
though other employees did not face the same criticism if they were tardy.
To resolve these issues and prevent disruptions during the workday, Layeux
suggested that she and her supervisor hold private weekly meetings to discuss client
4
accounts and address non-urgent work matters to limit the email inquiries during the week.
According to her deposition testimony, Layeux told her supervisor that his constant emails
aggravated her anxiety, and she hoped their meetings would reduce the numerous daily
disruptions. Her supervisor agreed, and they met weekly for about a month in late June to
early July. But by late August, the emails from her supervisor again increased.
In August 2018, Layeux was tardy three days which she attributed to traffic and an
issue with a neighbor in texts and emails to her supervisor. As a result, on August 27 her
supervisor issued a disciplinary report, which Layeux signed. To make up for her tardiness,
Layeux agreed to work during her lunch break and to stay late when needed to ensure she
reached a 40-hour workweek. Her tardiness continued into September when she was again
late on two or more occasions due to traffic and sickness. But Layeux continued to provide
notice via email, text, or phone call to her supervisor.
On October 16, Layeux emailed her supervisor stating that their weekly meetings
did not seem to be effective and asked for a meeting with him and a human resources (HR)
representative to work through the issues they were having at work. Her supervisor replied
that he would try to get a meeting scheduled later that same day. After hearing nothing
from her supervisor or HR for six days, Layeux emailed her supervisor on October 22 to
ask about the status of the meeting. Her supervisor replied that he had not yet heard back
from HR. In her deposition, Layeux testified that she was up all night with anxiety and
worry and, as a result, was late to work the next day by over an hour. She testified that she
spoke with a coworker about how the pressure to get a meeting with HR was worsening
her anxiety and insomnia and making it difficult to come into work.
5
On October 24, Layeux was called into a disciplinary meeting with her supervisor.
Mr. Sayther, a third party from the sales department whom Layeux had consulted with in
the past, was also present.1 Layeux was told that DLS would be imposing a one- day
suspension without pay because of her tardiness the day before . The disciplinary note
stated: “Beth came in to work yesterday (10/23/2018) after 9:30 when she has a start of
8:00 a.m. Beth has been excessively late 3 times now on 8/27/18, 10/15/18, and now again
on 10/23/18. Next offense will result in termination.” Layeux questioned how it was
possible that the disciplinary meeting with her supervisor and a third party was set up so
quickly when she had requested a meeting with a third party over a week prior. Mr. Sayther
responded that he was unaware of her request for a meeting. Layeux did not sign the
disciplinary note but agreed to serve the one-day suspension. She again verbally requested
a third-party meeting and explained that she wanted the meeting to discuss how her
working conditions could be changed to fit her needs. Her supervisor stated they could
have the meeting that same day but Layeux requested some time to prepare for it.
Later in the afternoon of October 24, despite her request for preparation time, a
meeting with Layeux, her supervisor, and an HR representative took place. Layeux tried
to explain why she requested the meeting but was cut off by the HR representative who
stated the sole purpose of the meeting was to discuss the imposition of her suspension.
Layeux expressed her frustration that she felt she was being denied a meeting with HR to
discuss the difficulties she was facing at work. The HR representative stated she was not

1 The district court order incorrectly states this meeting occurred on October 23 but the
disciplinary meeting and meeting with HR both occurred on October 24.
6
aware that Layeux requested a meeting to resolve issues between her and her supervisor.
After the meeting, Layeux reached out to set up a meeting with Mr. Sayther from the sales
department with whom she felt comfortable discussing work issues.
Layeux served her one-day suspension on October 25 but testified in her deposition
that her depression and anxiety spiraled throughout the day and she could not leave her
bed. Layeux emailed Mr. Sayther to postpone their meeting, and the meeting was pushed
to October 29. During their meeting, Layeux explained to Mr. Sayther that, despite
multiple requests, she was still unable to get a meeting with HR. He advised her to email
HR directly, and she immediately did so. The HR representative then scheduled a meeting
with Layeux and her supervisor for October 31. In her deposition, Layeux testified that by
this time in her employment, her relationship with her supervisor was very poor and she
wanted the meeting with HR to discuss how her issues at work exacerbated her insomnia,
anxiety, and depression. But on October 30, Layeux arrived 6 minutes late to work and
DLS terminated her employment.
Layeux filed two claims against DLS in district court under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act (MHRA) for disability discrimination and failure to reasonably accommodate
a disability, but she later dropped the disability-discrimination claim. DLS moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the company was unaware of her need for an
accommodation.
The district court held a hearing on DLS’s motion for summary judgment.
Following the hearing, the d istrict court granted DLS’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that Layeux did not put DLS on notice that she needed an accommodation for
7
her disability and “a fact[-]finder has no authority to second- guess DLS’s judgment in
terminating her.” In its decision, the district court noted that “[i]t is truly unfortunate for
Ms. Layeux that she was six minutes late on October 30, the day before her meeting with
HR in which she might have made clear how her disability was affecting her work and that
she need ed an accommodation.” Because the district court concluded that DLS was
unaware of Layeux’s need for a reasonable accommodation, the district court did not
address whether DLS failed to accommodate Layeux. Layeux now appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment.
DECISION
Layeux argues that the district court improperly granted summary judgment because
whether DLS was aware of her depression and anxiety disorder and failed to make a
reasonable accommodation presents a question of material fact. Summary judgment is
appropriate when the record as a whole shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ.
P. 56.01. Summary judgment should not be granted “when reasonable persons might draw
different conclusions from the evidence presented.” Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38,
42 (Minn. 2017). On appeal from summary judgment, we review de novo whether there
are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application
of the law to the facts. Commerce Bank v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773
(Minn. 2015). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom
summary judgment was granted. Id.
8
Under the MHRA, it is an unfair employment practice of employers with a certain
number of employees “not to provide a reasonable accommodation for a job applicant or
qualified employee with a disability” unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on
the employer. Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 6 (2020). Thus, to maintain a reasonable
accommodation claim, Layeux must establish that DLS knew of her disability and failed
to make a reasonable accommodation for that disability. The district court determined that
although DLS conceded knowledge of Layeux’s disability, the company did not know her
attendance problems resulted from her disability, and Layeux failed to put DLS on notice
that she needed an accommodation. The district court determined that summary judgment
was proper because a fact-finder lacks the authority to second-guess DLS’s judgment in
terminating Layeux. We disagree.
The record in this case is sufficient to establish genuine issues of material fact as to
whether DLS knew of Layeux’s disability and her need for an accommodation. We reach
that conclusion based on the following evidence, viewed—as we must—in the light most
favorable to Layeux. In her deposition, Layeux asserted that she told her supervisor and
colleagues about how her depression and anxiety disorder caused insomnia, and her email
in June specifically put her employer on notice of her anxiety disorder and need for mental
health breaks. She also asserted that her supervisor’s constant emails starting in June
aggravated her anxiety and insomnia, and she specifically requested the weekly meetings
with him as an attempt to resolve non-urgent work matters to calm her anxiety.
Layeux testified that she requested a meeting with HR through her supervisor at
least twice with the purpose of explaining the causes for her tardiness and absences as it
9
relates to insomnia caused by anxiety and depression disorders. In total, Layeux made five
requests in one month to meet with HR to discuss a potential accommodation at work. The
first request occurred on October 16 when she emailed her supervisor asking for a meeting
with a third party to work out the issues she was having at work. The second request
occurred on October 22 after Layeux still had not heard back about the meeting with HR.
The third request happened on October 24 during a disciplinary meeting. The fourth
request occurred on the afternoon of October 24 after Layeux discovered HR was not even
aware of her request for a meeting. And finally, Layeux made a request to HR directly on
October 29 and was successful in getting a meeting scheduled. But Layeux did not have a
chance to discuss potential accommodations because she was terminated a day before the
meeting was set to occur. As noted by the district court, if DLS had timely offered Layeux
the opportunity for the meeting, she might have made clear how her disabilities affected
her work, and her need for an accommodation. Instead, her supervisor, and HR at the initial
meeting, arguably stonewalled her ability to have a meeting to address her concerns.
In Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortg. Banking, the Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected the notion that an individual requesting a reasonable accommodation at work must
specifically tie the request to the disorder or disability. 632 N.W.2d 534, 547- 48 (Minn.
2001). In Hoover, the plaintiff told her supervisors that she suffered from fibromyalgia
and described its effect on her ability to work. Id. at 548. The plaintiff further claimed
that two days before her termination, she informed her supervisor that she was planning to
obtain assistance for completing her work. Id. The court held that was enough to survive
a motion for summary judgment. Id. In this case, the evidence in the record may be slightly
10
less than it was in Hoover and is primarily circumstantial, but it is enough to establish
genuine issues of material fact as to whether DLS knew of Layeux’s disability and her
efforts to obtain an accommodation. Where different inferences can be drawn from the
circumstances alleged in the record, we must let the fact-finder decide which inference the
evidence supports. See Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort, LLC, 964 N.W.2d 613, 629 (Minn.
2021) (explaining that a plaintiff may rely solely on circumstantial evidence to establish
causation in a negligence action).
On a motion for summary judgment, the facts and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from those facts must be resolved in Layeux’s favor. While Layeux did not
specifically request an accommodation for her disorder as did the employee in Hoover, the
record contains enough evidence supporting reasonable inferences that Layeux was
seeking an accommodation for her disorders and that her supervisor and HR realized why
she wanted a meeting and acted in concert to stonewall her requests for the meeting. A
strong inference of pretext could be drawn from her discharge from employment after being
just six minutes late the day before her finally scheduled meeting with HR where she would
have likely asked for an accommodation. Thus, we conclude that a factual issue exists that
should be resolved by the trier of fact at trial. For these reasons, the district court erred in
granting DLS’s motion for summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
D-1

JOHNSON, Judge (dissenting)
Layeux seeks to hold DLS liable for an alleged failure to make reasonable
accommodations for her disability. But Layeux did not ask DLS to make an
accommodation for her disability. Layeux cannot prevail on her claim unless she can prove
that DLS knew of both her disability and her need for a reasonable accommodation for the
disability. The evidence in the summary-judgment record is insufficient to prove that DLS
had the requisite knowledge. Thus, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.
A.
The relevant provision of the MHRA states that “it is an unfair employment practice
for an employer . . . not to make reasonable accommodation to the known disability of a
qualified disabled person.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 6(a) (2020).1 The evidence
required to prove such a claim is best illustrated by Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage
Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 2001). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that her former
employer failed to reasonably accommodate her fibromyalgia disability. Id. at 542. The
employer argued that it did not have a duty to make a reasonable accommodation because
the employee “never requested a reasonable accommodation in that she never tied her
requests for [an accommodation] to her fibromyalgia.” Id. at 547. The supreme court did

1 This sentence was amended in 2021 to provide that “it is an unfair employment practice
for an employer . . . not to provide a reasonable accommodation for a . . . qualified
employee with a disability.” 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 11, art. 3, § 13, at 66
(codified at Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 6(a) (Supp. 2021)). In addition, a new sentence
was inserted into the same subdivision that requires an employer to “initiate an informal,
interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.”
Id. Neither party has questioned the applicability of the 2020 revision of the statute to this
case.
D-2

not question the employer’s premise that an employee must communicate the connection
between a request for an accommodation and the employee’s disability. See id. at 547-48.
Rather, the supreme court rejected the employer’s argument because the employee had
offered voluminous evidence (which is described in detail below) that she had told the
employer that she was disabled and that she needed an accommodation “as a result of” her
disability. See id. at 548. Consequently, there is no basis for the statement in the majority
opinion that the Hoover court “rejected the notion that an individual requesting a
reasonable accommodation at work must specifically tie the request to the disorder or
disability.” See supra at 9.
Both parties rely on federal caselaw interpreting the reasonable-accommodation
provision of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § § 12101-
12213 (2018). At oral argument, Layeux’s attorney agreed that the requirements of federal
caselaw are equivalent to the requirements of Minnesota law. The parties’ reliance on
federal caselaw is consistent with the supreme court’s frequent practice of seeking
guidance from federal courts’ interpretations of similar federal anti-discrimination statutes
when interpretating the MHRA. See, e.g., Kolton v. County of Anoka , 645 N.W.2d 404,
407-11 (Minn. 2002) (interpreting disability provisions of MHRA in conformity with
federal courts’ interpretations of ADA). In this case, the relevant provision of the MHRA
is very similar to ADA provisions stating that an employer shall not “discriminate against
a qualified individual on the basis of disability” and that discrimination includes “not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . employee.” 42 U.S.C.
D-3

§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) . Accordingly, it is appropriate for this court to refer to federal
caselaw for guidance.2
Under well-developed federal caselaw, a disabled employee who wants a reasonable
accommodation must inform the employer of the existence of his or her disability, the
limitations that arise from the disability, and the need for an accommodation. Rask v.
Fresenius Med. Care, 509 F.3d 466, 470 (8th Cir. 2007); Cannice v. Norwest Bank N.A.,
189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1999); Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212,
1217 (8th Cir. 1999); Wallin v. Minnesota Dep’t of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681, 689 (8th
Cir. 1998); Miller v. National Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 629-30 (8th Cir. 1995). Furthermore,
if “the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable accommodations, are not
open, obvious, and apparent to the employer, as is often the case when mental disabilities
are involved,” then “the initial burden rests primarily upon the employee . . . to specifically
identify the disability and resulting limitations, and to suggest the reasonable
accommodations.” Rask, 509 F.3d at 470 (quotation and emphasis omitted). A request for
an accommodation “need not contain any magic words” but it “must be sufficient to convey
to the employer that the employee is requesting that his disability be accommodated.”

2 This is so notwithstanding McBee v. Team Industries, Inc., 925 N.W.2d 222 (Minn. 2019),
in which the supreme court declined to refer to federal caselaw because the federal caselaw
was based not on the ADA itself but on a federal regulation relating to the ADA, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3) (2018). Id. at 227-28. In this case, however, the federal regulation
concerning reasonable accommodation is silent with respect to the issue on appeal: what
an employee must do or say to request an accommodation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (2021).
The EEOC has issued interpretive guidance on that issue, see 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9
(2021), but the EEOC’s interpretive guidance is “not controlling upon the courts,” Young
v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 224-25 (2015); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139
S. Ct. 2400, 2414-18 (2019).
D-4

Lowery v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 244 F.3d 654, 660 (8th Cir. 2001). Stated differently,
“An employee cannot expect an employer to read her mind expecting it to know she wants
a particular accommodation.” Burke v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 28 F. App’x 604, 607
(8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
In light of this well-developed caselaw, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit repeatedly has affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the ground that
the plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to prove that the employer knew of the employee’s
disability, the employee’s need for an accommodation, and the nexus between them. For
example, in Wallin, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not provide enough
information to his employer because he “ made no connection between [his] requests and
his disabilities.” 153 F.3d at 689 (emphasis added). In Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957 (8th
Cir. 2002), the court stated that “the employer must know of both the disability and the
employee’s desire for accommodations for that disability.” Id. at 962 (emphasis add ed)
(quotation omitted). In other cases too, the Eighth Circuit has affirmed grants of summary
judgment because, in each case, the plaintiff failed to submit evidence that the employer
knew both that the employee was disabled and that the employee requested an
accommodation for the disability. See Rask, 509 F.3d at 470-71; Cannice, 189 F.3d at 726-
28; Mole, 165 F.3d at 1217-18; Miller, 61 F.3d at 629-30.
B.
Layeux’s evidence does not satisfy the standard described above. To prove that
DLS knew that she had a disability, Layeux relies on a single e-mail message that she sent
to her supervisor on June 13, 2018, more than four months before the end of her
D-5

employment. She wrote that she would be absent for two days while she recovered from a
complicated dental procedure and, in addition, made a passing reference to anxiety and
depression. She was unable in her deposition to identify any other occasion when she
informed her supervisor that she suffered from anxiety or depression, that she had been
treated by a medical provider for anxiety or depression, or that she was taking prescription
medications. In numerous other e-mail and text messages during Layeux’s employment,
she provided various other excuses for her absences or tardiness, such as a headache, a sore
throat, a fever, doctor and chiropractor appointments, a lost contact, traffic delays due to a
crash, and a spilled recycling bin. Nonetheless, DLS has conceded for purposes of
summary judgment that it knew of Layeux’s disability.
Layeux contends that she was entitled to two forms of reasonable accommodation:
a more flexible schedule and weekly meetings with her supervisor. Layeux acknowledges
that she did not refer to her disability— anxiety and depression—in her communications
concerning these alterations to her job. In her deposition, she was asked whether she ever
had requested that her supervisor give her “flexibility to help deal with [her] depression,
anxiety disorder, and insomnia.” She answered in the negative. She also was asked
whether there was “anybody at DLS who you think understood that you were requesting a
meeting [with human resources] that was somehow related to a disability?” She answered,
“Not that I am aware of.”
In light of this evidence, the district court accurately stated that Layeux “never
connected for DLS her attendance issues wit h her disability” and “never informed her
supervisor or anyone else at DLS that” a more-flexible schedule and weekly meetings with
D-6

her supervisor were “accommodations to minimize exacerbation of her depression and
anxiety.” In other words, she never requested a reasonable accommodation for her
disability.
C.
In her appellate brief, Layeux concedes that she “did not in so many words tell [her
supervisor] or DLS’s Human Resources department: ‘ I need an accommodation for my
depression and anxiety disorder.’” Indeed, Layeux’s evidence is dramatically different
from the evidence presented by plaintiffs in other cases whose reasonable-accommodation
claims survived summary judgment.
For example, in Hoover, the supreme court concluded that the employee had
requested an accommodation for her disability. 632 N.W.2d at 547-48. The supreme court
reached that conclusion because the employee had “informed [her supervisor and her team
leader] about her fibromyalgia and its effect on her ability to work”; had “told [her
supervisor] at least eight times that she needed assistance because of her health”; had “tried
to make it very clear to [her supervisor] that [she] had fibromyalgia,” “how it affected” her,
and that she “needed special help”; and, two days before her termination, had “told [her
supervisor] that she needed support help because of her health and was going to the
personnel department to obtain it.” Id. at 548. Layeux’s evidence is not nearly as extensive
or as detailed.
Layeux cites Kowitz v. Trinity Health, 839 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2016), for the
proposition that employees are required only to “provide the employer with enough
information that, under the circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of both
D-7

the disability and desire for accommodation.” Id. at 748 (quotation and alteration omitted).
But the facts of Kowitz illustrate that the standard is not as low as Layeux suggests. The
Kowitz court reversed a grant of summary judgment to the employer on the ground that the
employee had “presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether she requested an accommodation.” Id. at 747. The evidence showed that the
plaintiff in Kowitz suffered from a degenerative spine disease, had previously taken a three-
month leave of absence for neck surgery, had submitted paperwork after her leave with
doctor-imposed restrictions on her physical activities, had “notified her supervisor in
writing that she was unable to complete [a required] certification until she had been cleared
to do so by her doctor,” had “advised her supervisor that she had an appointment scheduled
with her doctor in a few days, and would inform [the supervisor] of her clearance that day,”
and had left her supervisor a voice- mail message stating that she needed four months of
physical therapy before she could complete the required certification. Id. at 744, 747.
Again, Layeux’s evidence falls far short of the evidence that was presented in Kowitz.
Layeux has not cited any reasonable-accommodation case in which a plaintiff has
survived summary judgment based on evidence of a request for an accommodation that is
similar to her own evidence.
D.
The majority opinion reasons that, even if Layeux is unable to identify particular
communications that imposed on DLS a duty to reasonably accommodate her disability, a
jury should be permitted to draw reasonable inferences from her circumstantial evidence.
See supra at 9-10. The majority opinion does not cite any authority for its reliance on
D-8

circumstantial evidence of a request for an accommodation. Circumstantial evidence is not
mentioned in Hoover or in any of the Eighth Circuit opinions cited above. If a plaintiff
seeking to prove a failure-to-accommodate claim does not have direct evidence that she
made a request for an accommodation, a jury should not be allowed to speculate about that
to which the plaintiff is unable to testify based on first- hand knowledge. To be sure,
circumstantial evidence may be used to prove a discriminatory motive in a discriminatory-
termination case. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 -100 (2003); Hoover,
632 N.W.2d at 542; Friend v. Gopher Co. , 771 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Minn. App. 2009).
Circumstantial evidence is appropriate in such cases because discriminatory
decisionmakers rarely confess to unlawful motives. See, e.g., Hester v. Indiana State Dep’t
of Health, 726 F.3d 94 2, 947 (7th Cir. 2013) ; Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463
F.2d 337, 352 (8th Cir. 1972) (revised part V), remanded on other grounds, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). But a discriminatory motive is not an element of proof in a claim of failure to
reasonably accommodate a disability. See McBee, 925 N.W.2d at 230-33; Hoover, 632
N.W.2d at 547-48.
In addition, the majority opinion strays beyond the relevant issues by discussing the
reasons for Layeux’s termination and suggesting that they are pretextual. See supra at 10.
If a plaintiff seeks to prove a discriminatory termination, the plaintiff may establish pretext
by proving that an employer’s non -discriminatory reason for its termination decision is
false and that the true reason is a discriminatory reason. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143-49 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
515 (1993); Hasnudeen v. Onan Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1996). But Layeux
D-9

has not alleged a discriminatory-termination claim, perhaps because DLS had warned her
only a few days before her termination that her “next offense will result in termination. ”
Thus, Layeux does not seek to prove that DLS ’s reasons for terminating her employment
are pretextual, and that issue is not relevant to her failure-to-accommodate claim.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.