State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0574

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Trinidad Jesus Garcia,
Appellant.

Filed April 4, 2022
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-CR-19-185

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County A ttorney, David Hemming, A ssistant County Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant was convicted of felony driv e-by shooting and felony unlawful firearm
possession. In this direct appeal, appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion by (1) admitting evidence of appellant ’s involvement in a previous shooting,
2
(2) denying appellant’s request to modify the cautionary jury instru ction regarding that
evidence, and (3) imposing an aggravated sentence on the basis that appellant is a
“dangerous offender” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 609 .1095, subd. 2 (2018). We
affirm.
FACTS
On March 1, 2019, M.S. was driving northbound on I-35 in Chisago County. M.S.
was traveling in the left-hand lane. As he passed a BMW in the right-hand lane, M.S. heard
a loud bang, and something hit the side of M.S.’s pickup truck. M.S. looked in the direction
of the noise and saw what appeared to be a bulle t hole in the door of his truck. M.S. then
called the police. While he was on the phone with the police, the BMW sped past M.S.,
began driving erratically on the snow-covered road, and went into a ditch.
During the incident, a state trooper was parked on the northbound side of I-35. The
trooper heard a complaint over dispatch of a shooting involving a BMW and observed in
his rear-view mirror as a BMW entered the center ditch of the interstate. The trooper and
another police officer approached the BMW, opened the driver’s door, and asked the driver
where the gun was located. The driver, later identified as appellant Trinidad Garcia, stated
that the gun was in his front pocket. The officers ordered Garcia to crawl out the front
passenger door of the car. Once Garcia was out of the car, the officers handcuffed Garcia
and removed a handgun from the front pocket of his sweatshirt.
Another officer arrived on the scene a nd observed a bullet hole in the passenger
door of M.S.’s truck. M.S. did not know the driver of the BMW, and there had been no
interaction between him and Garcia before the shooting.
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The state later charged Garcia with (1) second-degree assaul t with a dangerous
weapon in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2018), (2) drive-by shooting at an
occupied vehicle in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e (2018), and (3) possession
of a firearm by an ineligible person in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2018).
Evidence of Other Bad Acts
Before trial, the state filed notice that it intended to offer Spreigl
1 evidence of three
prior bad acts allegedly involving Garcia. Ga rcia moved the district court for an order
prohibiting the admission of that evidence, and the district court held a contested hearing
on the matter in July 2019.
Relevant to this appeal, the state pr esented testimony at the hearing about a
drive-by-shooting incident that occurred in West St. Paul on February 26, 2019. The state
first presented the testimony of the victim of that incident, N.B. N.B. testified that she was
driving to work in West St. Paul just before 7:00 a.m. on February 26. As she prepared to
make a U-turn, N.B. saw a black Buick in the opposite lane. The Buick was driving
towards her slowly. As the Buick drove past, the driver was “glaring” at her. After making
the U-turn, N.B. passed the Bu ick. She then reached a stop sign and stopped in the
right-hand turn lane. While she was stopped, the Buick came up on her left, stopping
slightly behind her in the left-hand turn lane. As she was getting ready to turn right, N.B.
“heard a big bang.” She looked over at the Buick and noticed that the passenger window

1 Spreigl evidence refers to evidence of prior crimes or other bad acts. State v. Kennedy,
585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998) (citing State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965)).
4
was rolled down. When she arrived at work about three minutes later, N.B. saw that there
was a bullet hole in the driver’s side rear door of her car, and she called the police.
N.B. testified that the black Buick invol ved in the shooting di d not have license
plates and had a “yellow paper” in the windo w, which she understood to mean that the
owner “got a new car and . . . [was] waiting to get their license plates.” She stated that the
driver of the black Buick was in his 20s, “mixed” race, light-skinned, and had dark, longer
hair. During her testimony, N.B. identified Garcia as the person she saw driving the black
Buick.
The state then presented testimony from a police investigator who investigated the
West St. Paul shooting. The investigator test ified that the bullet entered the rear driver’s
side door of N.B.’s car and we nt through the rear driver’s side seat. Officers recovered a
bullet fragment from the passenger side floor in the rear of N.B.’s car. The investigator
also obtained video footage of a nearby in tersection from the Minnesota Department of
Transportation (MNDOT), which showed a bl ack Buick passing thr ough the intersection
approximately five minutes after the shooting. The Buick matched the physical appearance
and direction of travel that N.B. described to police.
Several days later, the investigator saw a news story about the shooting incident
involving Garcia in Chisago County and noticed similarities between the Chisago County
and West St. Paul shootings. Believing Garcia might be a suspect in the West St. Paul
shooting, she searched for Garcia in several law enforc ement databases and learned that
Garcia had been involved in a traffic stop in St. Paul on February 15, 2019—11 days prior
to the West St. Paul shooting. The body-wo rn-camera footage of the traffic stop showed
5
that Garcia was driving a black Buick that ma tched the appearance of the Buick depicted
in the MNDOT video. The investigator stated that the physical appearance of Garcia from
the body-worn-camera footage was “very similar” to the description provided by N.B. after
the West St. Paul shooting. She testified that the traffic citation from the St. Paul traffic
stop showed that the Buick had a 21-day temporary tag in the window and no license plates.
The investigator testified that she obtai ned the vehicle identification number (VIN)
of the Buick from the St. Paul traffic stop an d found the Buick at a police impound lot.
The Buick had been impounded after it was found abandoned in a roadway a few hours
after the West St. Paul shooting on February 26. After obtaining a warrant, the investigator
searched the Buick and found several relevant items: two spent bullet casings, multiple bail
bond receipts bearing Garcia’s name, and a copy of the citation from the February 15 traffic
stop bearing Garcia’s name. The investigator submitted the bullet casings from the Buick
and the bullet fragment found in N.B.’s car fo r forensic analysis. The forensic analysis
showed that the handgun found on Garcia after the Chisago County shooting fired both the
bullet that was recovered from N.B.’s vehicle and one of the bullet casings found in the
Buick. At the Spriegl hearing, no witness testified as to whether Garcia had been convicted
of any crime related to the West St. Paul shooting.
Following the hearing, the district cour t issued a written orde r granting the state’s
request to admit Spreigl evidence of the West St. Paul shooting but denying its request to
present evidence regarding two other alleged inci dents. The district court concluded, in
relevant part, that the state had shown by clear and convincing evidence that Garcia
6
committed the West St. Paul shooting and th at the evidence was admissible to show
identity, intent, and common scheme or plan.
Garcia obtained new counse l and moved for reconsidera tion, arguing that N.B.’s
in-court identification of Garcia violated hi s right to due process and that, without that
identification, the state failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Garcia
committed the West St. Paul shooting. The di strict court issued a written order denying
the motion.
Jury Trial and Sentencing
The case proceeded to a jury trial on th e charges related to the Chisago County
shooting. The jury heard testimony pertai ning to the pending charges from several
witnesses: the victim of the Chisago County shooting, three police officers who responded
to the shooting, another officer who investigated that incident, a DNA scientist, a forensic
scientist, and a research scientist who specializes in gunshot-residue analysis. As Spreigl
evidence of the West St. Paul shooting, the state presented the testimony of N.B., the West
St. Paul police investigator, and a second forensic scientis t. Before each of the Spreigl
witnesses began their testimony, the district court provided the pattern cautionary jury
instruction concerning the admission of Spreigl evidence. The testimony of N.B. and the
investigator was consistent with the testimony they gave at the Spreigl hearing. At trial,
N.B. again identified Garcia as the driver of the Buick.
The jury found Garcia gu ilty on all three counts. The district court entered
judgments of conviction for the drive-by -shooting and unlawful-firearm-possession
counts.
7
The state sought an upward durational departure on the basis that Garcia meets the
requirements of the dangerous-offender statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 2. After a
separate Blakely proceeding,2 the jury found that Garcia is a “danger to public safety,” and
the district court found that the other statutor y requirements were met. The district court
then sentenced Garcia to 120 months’ imprisonment for the drive-by-shooting conviction,
an upward durational departur e and the statutory maximum sentence. The district court
imposed a concurrent 60-month sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm.
Garcia appeals.
DECISION
Garcia challenges his convictions and sent ence. He argues that the district court
abused its discre tion by (1) admitting Spreigl evidence of his invo lvement in the West
St. Paul shooting, (2) denying his request to modify the pattern cautionary jury instructions
regarding that evidence, and, in the alternative, (3) imposing an aggravated sentence based
on the dangerous-offender statute. We address each of Garcia’s arguments in turn.
I. The district court did not ab use its discretion by admitting Spreigl evidence of
the West St. Paul shooting.

Garcia first argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused
its discretion by admitting the evidence of the West St. Paul shooting. This court reviews

2 To impose an upward durational departure from the Minnesota Se ntencing Guidelines’
presumptive sentence, a district court genera lly must hold a proceeding in which a jury
finds the facts authorizing the departure. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04,
310 (2004) (noting exceptions where defendant stipulates to the relevant facts or consents
to judicial factfinding rega rding sentencing factors); State v. Shattuck , 704 N.W.2d 131,
140-42 (Minn. 2005).
8
a district court’s decision to admi t evidence of prior bad acts, or Spriegl evidence, for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Minn. 2014). The defendant
bears the burden of sh owing that an abuse of discreti on occurred and that the defendant
was prejudiced as a result. Id.
Evidence of a defendant’s other bad acts is “not admissible to prove the character
of [the] person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
But such evidence may be ad mitted for “other purposes, su ch as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparati on, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Id.; State v. Fardan , 773 N.W.2d 303, 315 (Minn. 2009). To admit Spreigl
evidence, the following conditions must be satisfied:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clearly indi cate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed
by its potential prejudice to the defendant.

State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 686 (Minn. 2006).

Here, Garcia focuses only on the cl ear-and-convincing-evidence factor.
Specifically, he argues that this factor wa s not met because the state relied on N.B.’s
in-court identification of him at the Spreigl hearing, which he c ontends violated his
due-process rights because it was a first-time in-court identification under circumstances
that were unnecessarily suggestive. He asserts that absent N.B.’s identification, the state
failed to prove by clear and convincing ev idence that he committed the West St. Paul
shooting.
9
The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard necessary to admit Spreigl evidence
requires the state to prove that “it is highly probable that th e facts sought to be admitted
are truthful.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 686. The standard requires “more than a preponderance
of the evidence but le ss than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jones ,
753 N.W.2d 677, 696 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). Based on the evidence presented
at the Spreigl hearing, we conclude that the district court properly dete rmined that clear
and convincing evidence demonstrated Garcia’s participation in the West St. Paul shooting.
We reach this conclusion even without considering N.B.’s in-court identification, and we
therefore do not reach Garcia’s due-process argument.
First, the evidence presented at the Spreigl hearing strongly connected Garcia to the
Buick involved in the West St. Paul shooting. N.B. testified at the Spreigl hearing that, at
the time of the shooting, she saw a black Buick that lacked license plates and had a “yellow
paper” in the window. Following the s hooting, police obtained a MNDOT video from a
nearby intersection that showed a black Buick crossing the intersection approximately five
minutes after the shooting. The Buick matched the physical description provided by N.B.
and was heading in the directi on N.B. described. Police also discovered that Garcia was
involved in a traffic st op while driving a Buick in St. Paul just 11 days prior to the West
St. Paul shooting. That Buick shared distin ctive characteristics with the Buick described
by N.B. and the Buick captured on the MNDOT video: it had no license plates, bore a
temporary tag in the window, and had a silver band on the back, and its windows were
darkly tinted. After the West St. Paul shoo ting, police located the Buick involved in the
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St. Paul traffic stop using its VIN, searched the Buick, and found multiple documents inside
bearing Garcia’s name.
Second, forensic analysis showed that the handgun found on Garcia after the
Chisago County shooting fired the bullet that was recovered from N.B.’s vehicle. That
analysis also connected the handgun found on Garcia to one of the bullet casings found in
the Buick. Third, the description provided by N.B. to police shortly after the West St. Paul
shooting matched Garcia’s general physical appearance. Based on this evidence from the
Spriegl hearing, we conclude that the distri ct court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that the state had shown by cl ear and convincing evidence that Garcia
committed the West St. Paul shooting.
Garcia contends that this evidence is insu fficient because it fail s to provide direct
evidence that Garcia was the person who shot at N.B.’s car. Garcia further argues that,
“[a]t the very least, without [N.B.’s] identification, the admission of the Spreigl evidence
becomes a close call, which requires that the evidence be excluded.” But the state can meet
the clear-and-convincing-evidence standa rd with circumstantial evidence, see
State v. Dewald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn. 1991 ), and the circumst antial evidence
connecting Garcia to the West St. Paul shooting does not present a close call. The evidence
presented at the Spreigl hearing, even without N.B.’s identification of Garcia, was
sufficient to meet the clear-and- convincing-evidence standard. The district court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting the eviden ce of the West St. Paul shooting as Spriegl
evidence.
11
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying Garcia’s request to
modify the pattern cautionary jury instruction regarding Spreigl evidence.

Garcia next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused
its discretion by denying his re quest to modify the pattern ju ry instruction regarding the
admission of Spreigl evidence. The refusal to provid e a requested jury instruction lies
within the discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that
discretion. State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2021).
Before trial, Garcia requested that the district court include language in the pattern
cautionary jury instruction regarding Spriegl evidence informing the jury that Garcia had
not been convicted of the West St. Paul shooting. Specifically, he requested that the district
court instruct the jury as follows:
You are about to hear evidence of allegations stemming
from February 26, 2019. This evidence is being offered for the
limited purpose of assisting you in determining whether the
defendant committed those acts w ith which the defendant is
charged in the complain t. This evidence is not to be used to
prove the character of the defendant or that defendant acted in
conformity with such character. In fact, the Defendant has not
been convicted of the allegatio ns you are about to hear.
Remember, the Defendant has th e presumption of innocence
and it will be the Stat e’s burden of provin g Defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt in this matter and the allegations
stemming from February 26, 2019 in a separate matter.

The defendant is not being tried for and may not be
convicted of any offenses other than the charged offenses. You
are not to convict the defendant on the basis of these allegations
stemming from February 26, 2019. To do so might result in
unjust double punishment.

(Emphasis added.) At a pretrial hearing, Garc ia’s attorney stated that it would be “more
fair” to Garcia to instruct th e jury as the defense requested because providing the pattern
12
Spreigl jury instruction would “make it sound like Mr. Garcia has already been convicted
of that crime.” At a subsequent hearing, the district court denied Garcia’s request.
At trial, the district cour t provided the following pattern cautionary jury instruction
for Spreigl evidence before each of the three Spreigl witnesses testified:
You are about to hear testimony, or be presented with evidence,
regarding acts of the defendan t which occurred on or about
February 26, 2019, in the City of West St. Paul, Minnesota.

This evidence is offered for the limited purpose of
assisting you in determining whether the defendant committed
those acts with which the defendant is charged in the
complaint. This evidence is not to be used to prove the
character of the defendant or that Defendant acted in
conformity with such character.

The defendant is not being tried for, and may not be
convicted of, any offense other than the charged offenses.
You’re not to convict the defendant on the bases of the
occurrences of February 26, 2019, in West St. Paul. To do so
might result in unjust double punishment.

See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 2.01 (Supp. 2021).
On appeal, Garcia argues that the distri ct court’s cautionary instruction “was
confusing and misled the jury into believing Garcia had b een found guilty of the West
St. Paul conduct.” In particul ar, Garcia takes issue with th e district court’s use of the
phrases “acts of the defendant” and “double punishment.” He contends that those phrases
“told the jury that Garcia committed the acts” and “that Garcia was already being punished
for the West St. Paul conduct.” He asserts that, without his “requested language clarifying
that these were ‘allegations’ for which the ‘Defendant has not been convicted’ and that he
maintained his presumption of innocence regarding the West St. Paul events, the jury was
13
left with the unfairly prejudicial impression that Garcia was guilty of the West St. Paul
shooting.”
A district court has “considerable latitud e” in selecting the language for jury
instructions. Montano, 956 N.W.2d at 649 (q uotation omitted). But jury instructions are
erroneous if they “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” State v. Fox ,
868 N.W.2d 206, 222 (Minn. 2015). This court reviews jury instructions “in their entirety
to determine whether th ey fairly and adequately explain the law.” State v. Moore ,
846 N.W.2d 83, 90 (Minn. 2014).
The pattern jury instruction provided by the district court did not confuse or mislead
the jury or materially misstate the law. Among the factors for admitting Spreigl evidence
is the requirement that the district court fi nd, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
defendant participated in the prior bad act. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 686. The district court’s
cautionary instruction was consis tent with that standard, incl uding its directions that the
Spreigl evidence related to “acts of the defendant” and that “convict[ing] the defendant on
the bases of the occurrences of February 26, 2019, in West St. Paul . . . might result in
unjust double punishment.” Neither of these statements stated or implied that Garcia had
already been found guilty of that prior conduct beyond a re asonable doubt. Read in its
entirety, the instruction appropriately direct ed the jury as to the limited purpose of
admitting the Spreigl evidence and cautioned the jury no t to consider the evidence for an
improper purpose. Because the district court’s cautionary instruction fairly and adequately
explained the law applicable to this case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying Garcia’s request to modify the pattern jury instruction.
14
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Garcia to an
upward departure on the basis that he is a dangerous offender.

In the alternative, Garcia argues that he is entitled to reversal of his sentence for
drive-by shooting because the di strict court abused its disc retion by imposing a sentence
that represented an upward durational departure. The presumptive sentence range for this
offense, considering Garcia’s criminal-history score of three, was 67 to 93 months. The
district court imposed a 120-month senten ce, which constituted th e statutory maximum
sentence. See Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e(b) (pro viding a maximum sentence of ten
years for a person convicted of drive-by sh ooting at an occupied motor vehicle). We
“review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence for
an abuse of discretion.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). A district
court abuses its discretion if its reasons for de parture are legally impermissible or there is
insufficient evidence in the record to justify the departure. Id.
The district court imposed an upward durational departure at the state’s request on
the basis that Garcia met the requirement s of the dangerous-offender statute, Minn.
Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 2. That statute aut horizes a district court to impose up to the
statutory maximum for an offender convicted of a felony violent crime if: (1) the offender
was at least 18 years old at the time the crime was committed; (2) the offender has two or
more prior convictions for violent crimes; a nd (3) the fact-finder determines that the
offender is a “danger to public safety .” Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 2; Neal v. State ,
658 N.W.2d 536, 543 (Minn. 2003).
15
Following the jury trial, the district court held a separate Blakely proceeding before
the jury on the state’s request for an upward departure based on this statute. The district
court instructed the jury that the state had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Garcia is a dangerous offender within the meaning of the statute. Garcia stipulated
that he was over 18 at the time of the Chisago County shooting. The state then presented
evidence of two prior offenses: a second- degree-assault conviction resulting from an
incident in Ramsey County in 2012 and a third-degree-assault conviction resulting from an
incident in Dakota County in 2017. The district court instructed the jury that, in deciding
whether the state met its burden, the jury could also consider the evidence presented during
trial. In other words, the jury could cons ider the West St. Paul shooting evidence.
Following the proceeding, the jury returned a special-verdict form finding that Garcia is a
“danger to public safety.” At the sentencing hearing, the district court determined that all
requirements of the dangerous-offender st atute were met and supported an upward
durational departure. Over Garcia’s objecti on, the district court imposed a 120-month
sentence for the drive-by-shooting conviction.
On appeal, Garcia does not dispute that the first two statutory factors were met—
(1) he was over 18 years old at the time the violent felony was committed and (2) he has
two prior convictions that qualify as violent crimes. Instead, Garcia’s argument is limited
to the third factor—that he is a “danger to p ublic safety.” He contends that the evidence
was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he is a danger to public safety. As both
parties acknowledge, we review a sentenci ng jury’s findings for sufficiency of the
evidence. State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. 2008). In conducting that review,
16
we engage in a painstaking ex amination of the record to determine whether a fact-finder
could reasonably find the facts necessary to depart. See State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356,
362 (Minn. 2016). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding.
See State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Minn. 2020).
When determining whether an offender is “a danger to public safety,” the fact-finder
may consider, in relevant part, “the offende r’s past criminal behavior, such as the
offender’s high frequency rate of criminal activity or juve nile adjudications, or long
involvement in criminal activity including juvenile adjudications.” Minn. Stat. § 609.1095,
subd. 2(2)(i). For the following reasons, we conclude that the evidence presented to the
jury was sufficient to support its finding that Garcia is a danger to public safety.
During the trial and the Blakely proceeding, the jury heard evidence of the following
prior criminal activities of Garcia: (1) the We st St. Paul shooting in 2019, which had not
resulted in a conviction; 3 (2) a third-degree-assault conviction resulting from an incident
in Dakota County in 2017 in which Garcia and an other individual broke into a person’s
house, broke the victim’s nos e, and knocked out one of the victim’s teeth; and (3) a
second-degree-assault conviction resulting from an incident in Ramsey County in 2012 in
which Garcia pointed a gun at a person at a motel and then fired shots into the air outside.
This evidence demonstrated that Garcia engaged in three prior incidents of violent, criminal
activity over the course of approximately nine years. Viewed in the light most favorable

3 On appeal, Garcia does not dispute that th e evidence of the West St. Paul shooting was
properly considered by the jury as evidence of criminal activity in determining whether he
is a danger to public safety.
17
to the jury’s finding, this evidence supports a determination that Garcia engaged in a high
frequency rate of criminal activity, which in tu rn supports the finding that Garcia is a
danger to public safety. We also note that the last incident, the West St. Paul shooting,
presents a serious public safety concern because it involved a random shooting.
For these reasons, we conclude that the evid ence is sufficient to support the jury’s
finding that Garcia is a danger to public safety. The district court therefore did not abuse
its discretion by determining that the requirements of the dangerous-offender statute were
satisfied and imposing the statutory maximu m sentence of 120 months for Garcia’s
drive-by shooting conviction.
Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
evidence of Garcia’s involvement in the West St. Paul sh ooting, instructing the jury with
respect to the admission of th at evidence, or imposing an upward durational departure on
the basis that Garcia is a dangerous offender.
Affirmed.