Jamia Lee Griffith, petitioner, Appellant,

1
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0575

Jamia Lee Griffith, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 22, 2021
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-18-20219

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Atto rney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
In this appeal from an order denying postconviction relief, appellant argues that the
district court erred by denying her petition for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw
her guilty plea to felony fifth -degree controlled-substance crime (1) because her plea was
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invalid due to counsel’s ineffective assistance in failing to investigate and advise her that
a probation violation in a separate case would prevent her from fulfilling her sentence and
(2) by finding that she was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel when the
district court rejected her sworn factual ass ertions and resolved disputed factual issues
against her without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2018, appellant Jamia Lea Griffith pleaded guilty to felony possession
of a controlled substance in Scott County. Prior to Griffith’s plea, her attorney recited on
the record the agreement Griffith had made with the state, which did not contain a condition
relating to substance-abuse treatment. After Griffith pleaded guilty, she told the district
court that she intended to en ter treatment following her jail time. The district court then
imposed a stay of imposition per the parties’ agreement and ordered Griffith to “get a
chemical dependency evaluation” and successfully complete all recommendations,
including any treatment recommendations. After Griffith had pleaded guilty, her attorney
informed the district court that she had custody holds for Washington and Wright Counties.
The district court told Griffith she needed “to set up probation,” and explained the
following:
Within 24 hours of your release from your last hold, you got to
get yourself to Scott County and check in with probation.
Because I need them to be able to have the releases that you
need to sign so I can get information about you and how you’re
doing in treatment.

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At the time of her plea, Griffith was on probation for an unrelated case in
Washington County. As a result of her plea in Scott County, Griffith was found in violation
of probation in that case and sentenced to serve 365 days in jail.
In July 2019, probation filed a probation -violation report alleging that Griffith had
failed to report to probation in Scott County and failed to complete the intake process. Per
the district court’s order, probation completed an intake on Griffith, and then she was
released from jail. Probation filed a second violation report in December 2019. The report
alleged that Griffith failed to follow through with rule 25 treatment recommendations, to
remain in contact with probation, to follow the instruc tions of probation, to refrain from
using non-prescribed drugs, to remain law abiding, and to report police contacts. At a
hearing, Griffith admitted to the violations, and the district court imposed the parties ’
“agreed disposition,” which included revocation of her stay of imposition. The court then
stayed execution of her sentence, continued her on probation, and imposed jail time upon
completion of which she would be discharged from probation.
In December 2020, Griffith filed a postconviction petition seeking to withdraw her
guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Griffith alleged that her attorney
failed to investigate and advise her that pleading guilty in Scott County would cause her to
violate her probation in Washington County. Griffith further alleged that she would not
have pleaded guilty in Scott County had she known of the consequences and that one of
the reasons she pleaded guilty was for the opportunity to attend treatment, which she was
unable to do because of the Washington County probation-violation sentence. The district
court denied Griffith’s petition. This appeal follows.
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DECISION

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Griffith’s
postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

Griffith argues that her attorney provided ineffective assistance by unreasonably
failing to investigate and advise her of whether her probation violation in Washington
County “would prevent her from fulfilling the direct sentencing consequences of the
present case.” She asserts that she would not have pleaded guilty if she knew a guilty plea
would constitute a probation violation and result in jail time, preventing her from entering
treatment. Therefore, Griffith contends that the postconviction court erred by finding she
was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel.
[W]hen we review a postconviction court’s denial of relief on
a claim of ineffective assistance of c ounsel, we will consider
the court’s factual findings that are supported in the record,
conduct a de novo review of the legal implication of those facts
on the ineffective assistance claim, and either affirm the court’s
decision or conclude that the court abused its discretion
because postconviction relief is warranted.

State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503-04 (Minn. 2013).
“A criminal defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once entered.”
Perkins v. State , 559 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn. 19 97). But a district court must allow a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Because ineffective assistance of counsel
may render a plea constitutionally inval id, Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 567, and “[a] manifest
injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid,” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.
2010), a guilty plea resulting from ineffective assistance of counsel may be invalid.
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To show ineffective assistanc e of counsel in the context of a guilty plea, the
appellant must demonstrate (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel ’s
deficient performance, appe llant would not have pled guilty. State v. Ellis -Strong, 899
N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotations omitted); see Strickland v. Washington ,
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). “ In considering ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claims,
appellate court s make a distinction between a ‘direct’ and ‘ collateral’ consequence
stemming from a guilty plea.” Id. An attorney’s performance is constitutionally deficient
when the attorney fails to advise a defendant of “direct consequences” of a guilty plea.
Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 540-41 (Minn. 2007). “Direct consequences are definite,
immediate, and automatic and are punitive and a part of a defendant’s sentence.” State v.
Brown, 896 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. App. 2017) (citations omitted). “[A] potential
probation-violation penalty in an unrelated case is not a direct consequence of a defendant’s
guilty plea and conviction.” State v. Brown, 896 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Minn. App. 2017).
The question on the first prong is whether appellant ’s attorney’s advice was within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 58 -59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985). Griffith argues that the “collateral
consequences” doctrine only applies to an attorney’s failure to advise, not to other types of
ineffective-assistance claims. Accordingly, Griffith argues that because her claim “[does]
not depend solely on a failure to advise,” but also on a claim that counsel failed to
investigate, the “collateral consequences” doctrine does not “categorically deny” her claim.
Griffith cites to Ellis-Strong in support of this argument. In that case, this c ourt held that
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affirmative misadvice on a collateral consequence of a conviction renders a guilty plea
constitutionally invalid and manifestly unjust when such misadvice amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel. 899 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. App. 2017) (emphasis added ). There,
counsel misinformed appellant of the length of his registration period as a predatory
offender. Id. at 539. This court determined that counsel’s affirmative misadvice was
objectively unreasonable , and thus, outside of the range of competence demanded of
criminal counsel. Id.
Unlike the appellant in Ellis-Strong, who was affirmatively misinformed about the
consequences of pleading guilty by counsel, Griffith only alleges her attorney failed to
investigate and advise her of the consequences her guilty plea could have in Washington
County. Because nothing in the record shows that counsel incorrectly informed Gr iffith,
counsel’s performance does not constitute affirmative misadvice and did not fall below
objective standards of reasonableness. Thus, it is not a valid basis for Griffith to withdraw
her guilty plea.
Griffith next argues that the consequence she fac ed in Washington County was a
direct, not collateral, consequence. However, in State v. Brown, this court held a potential
probation consequence of a guilty plea in an unrelated case is collateral. 896 N.W.2d at
561. There, appellant claimed that the po ssible probation -violation penalty —a life
sentence in another state—was a direct consequence of his guilty plea. Id. However, this
court explained that because the potential penalty did not flow “definitely immediately,
and automatically” from appellant’ s guilty plea, the consequence was collateral. Id.
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Because the appellant did not raise a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, this court’s
review was limited to whether the plea was rendered unintelligent. Id.
Like the appellant in Brown, Griffith’s sanction in Washington County did not flow
“definitely immediately, and automatically” from her guilty plea and was a collateral
consequence. As such, Griffith’s attorney’s failure to investigate and advise her of the
potential consequences of her g uilty plea in a different case are not constitutionally
deficient and did not fall below an objectively reasonable performance. Ellis-Strong, 899
N.W.2d at 536; s ee also Taylor v. State , 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (explaining
that “[a] defendant’s lack of awareness of a collateral consequence of a guilty plea does
entitle a defendant to withdraw it”).
Furthermore, review of the plea transcript does not comport with Griffith’s claim
that the district court promise d her that she could participate in treatment because of the
plea or that treatment was a condition of her probation. Rather, it was only after Griffith
pleaded guilty that s he told the district court that she planned to go to treatment. See
Mesiter v. S tate, No. A20 -0627 (Minn. App. Jan. 19, 2021) 1 (affirming district court’s
denial of postconviction plea withdrawal where there was “nothing in the record or plea
agreement to show that the state told appellant that he would be eligible for early -release
programming such that his guilty plea was induced by any such promise”). Also, while
Griffith alleges that she was unable to fulfill the treatment condition of her sentence in
Scott County, this misrepresents the record. Griffith was ordered to check in with Scott

1 We cite to this nonprecedential opinion for its persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
136.01, subd. 1(c).
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County probation within 24 hours of her release from her last hold. Therefore, her seven -
month jail sentence in Washington County did not prevent her from complying with the
conditions of her Scott County probation because she was required to c heck in with Scott
County within 24 hours of her release from Washington County , which she failed to do.
In fact, probation did not file the second violation report until approximately six months
after Griffith’s release from Washington County jail and fo ur months after the first
violation report was filed, giving her ample time to have complied with her Scott County
probationary conditions.
Because Griffith has not shown that her counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, we determine that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying her petition for postconviction relief. Leake v. State, 767 N.W.2d 5,
10 (Minn. 2009) (explaining that i f appellant fails to meet one prong of the analysis for
ineffective assistance of counsel, the other need not be analyzed).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary
hearing.

Griffith next argues that the district court erred by failing to accept her allegations
as true and improperly making credibility determinations against her when denying her
petition without a hearing. Specifically, she points to her affidavit in which she states that
she “thought that [she] would be released and start treatment soon after [her] guilty plea,”
and that she “was not aware that [her] plea in Scott County would affect [her] probation
status in the Washington County case.”
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“In determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required, a postconviction court
considers the facts alleged in the pe tition as true and construes them in the light most
favorable to the petitioner. ” Brown v. State , 895 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Minn. 2017). “An
evidentiary hearing is not required unless the petitioner alleges such facts which, if proved
by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would entitle him or her to the requested relief. ”
Id. We review the district court’s denial of a petition without an evidentiary hearing for an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 617.
Here, the district court found that
[N]othing in the plea petition or discussions with the Court
prior to [Griffith’s] plea suggests [Griffith] pled guilty because
she believed she would enter treatment. Instead, [Griffith]
likely knew of the consequences she faced in Washington
County for pleading guilty in Sco tt County. When the bail
study was completed in 2018, [Griffith] had a bail score of
61—a high score. See State v. Wiley , 420 N.W.2d 234, 237
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding defendant “with five criminal
history points, has had extensive exposure to the cri minal
justice system, a factor which may be considered in
determining whether a guilty plea is knowing and
intelligent.”). This undercuts her assertion she would have pled
“not guilty” but for her counsel ’s failure to advise of her the
possible Washington County consequences.

Our review of the record comports with the district court’s findings. Further, while Griffith
argues that an evidentiary hearing should have been held based on the second prong of the
Ellis-Strong analysis—that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient
performance, she would not have pled guilty —the district court was only required to find
that she failed to prove one of the prongs in order to deny her claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. See Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d at 536. Because we determine that the district
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court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Griffith failed to show her attorney’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, we also determine that the
postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied Griffith’s
postconviction petition and declined to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id.
Affirmed.