State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0581

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mario Patino,
Appellant.

Filed March 7, 2022
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-19146

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Following his conviction for first -degree assault, a ppellant argues that the district
court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and abused its discretion by
sentencing him to 176 months’ imprisonment. Appellant makes additional pro se
arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 8, 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Mario Patino
with attempted first-degree murder, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § § 609.185(a)(1) and 609.17,
subd. 4(1) (2018). In April 2020, the state amended the complaint to include two additional
charges: committing a crime for the benefit of a gang and second -degree assault with a
dangerous weapon, pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 609.229, subd. 2 , and 609.222, subd. 1
(2018), respectively.
In early October 2020, the state extended an offer to Patino to plead guilty to an
amended charge of first-degree assault, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2018).
The offer provided for a sentence in the range of 135 to 189 months , to be determined by
the district court at sentencing. Patino expressly stated that he understood the state’s offer
was that “we would argue for the 130’s, they would argue for the 180’s .” Patino rejected
the offer.
The following week, the state extended the same offer to Patino. At an October 16
hearing, Patino initially rejected the offer. The district court then engaged in a lengthy
exchange with Patino . During that exchange, the district court described the potential
3
consequence if Patino were to be convicted by a jury of the multiple charges and the manner
in which it would determine sentencing pursuant to the plea agreement. The district court
stated that to determine the appropriate sentence, it would rely, at least in part, on the
recommendation submitted by probation in the presentence investigation report (the PSI).
The district court emphasized that it did not know what sentence the PSI would recommend
and stated that the recommendation “might come in at 135 or it might come in at 189 or it
might come in saying, No way, Jose. He shou ld do 240. We just don’t know.” Patino
acknowledged that he understood the offer and stated, “[t]hank you for explaining [the plea
and sentencing process], your Honor. I think I got a better grasp of the situation now.”
Patino thereafter agreed to a ccept the state’s offer . Patino acknowledged that he
understood that “[t]he parties will . . . have the opportunity at the time of sentencing to
argue a range of 135 to 189 months.” Patino signed a plea petition, which provided that
the parties agreed to a prison sentence between 135 and 189 months.
At the guilty-plea hearing , Patino again acknowledged that the terms of the
agreement provided for a prison sentence between 135 and 189 months. After testifying
to the factual basis in support of his guilty plea, the district court accepted the plea and
encouraged Patino to be forthright and honest with probation in its preparation of the PSI
because the recommendation in the report will “ help me decide what to do about your
sentencing range, and I understand it’s 135 to 189.” The district court added that it “can’t
make any promises” about the length of the sentence that it would impose.
In early December 2020, the parties received the PSI, which included information
indicating that Patino was subject to a severe -violent-offender modifier under the
4
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines that augmented the presumptive sentenc ing range
upward by 18 months. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.G.14 (201 9). The PSI therefore
showed a presumptive sentencing range of 153 to 207 months—a range different than was
set forth in the plea agreement. The PSI recommended that Patino be sentenced to 176
months’ imprisonment.
On February 1, 2021, the district court held a sentencing hearing. Notwithstanding
the information set forth in the PSI regarding the upward -sentencing modifier, the state
asked the district court to honor the plea agreement . The parties argued for sentencing
pursuant to the agreed-upon range—the state requested that Patino be sentenced to a term
of 189 months and Patino argued for a sentence of 135 months. The district court sentenced
Patino to 176 months’ imprisonment, stating that “I’m going to follow what the
recommendations are in the presentence investigation report, and that’s 176 months.”
Patino appeals.
DECISION
Patino argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea or, in the alternative, that
the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to 176 months ’ imprisonment.
Patino asserts additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. We address each
argument in turn.
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I. Patino is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.
Patino argues that because the parties were unaware at the time they entered into the
plea agreement that an 18-month upward-sentencing modifier applied to his conviction, his
guilty plea was unintelligent and the product of a mutual mistake.1 We disagree.
“A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once it is
entered.” State v. Hughes, 758 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Minn. 2008). But a defendant must be
allowed to withdraw the guilty plea a t any time if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice occurs when a
plea is not constitutionally valid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “To
be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id.
The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. “The
defendant bears the burden of establishing the facts that support his claim that the guilty
plea is invalid.” State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017).
“A plea is intelligently made if the defendant understands the charges, understands
the rights that are waived by pleading guilty, and understands the consequences of the
plea.” Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 15 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing State v. Farnsworth,
738 N.W.2d 364, 372 (Minn. 2007)), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). To be intelligent,
the defendant must understand the maximum sentence that they can receive . State v.

1 Patino does not forfeit his manifest-injustice argument by raising it for the first time on
appeal. See Brown v. State , 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989) (explaining that “ [a]
defendant is free to simply appeal directly from a judgment of conviction and contend that
the record made at the time of the plea was entered is inadequate” to establish that a plea
was inaccurate, involuntary, or unintelligent).
6
Crump, 826 N.W.2d 838, 841 -42 (Minn. App. 2013) , rev. denied (Minn. May 21, 2013).
In other words, the defendant must have “knowledge that the sentence actually imposed
could be imposed.” State v. Rhodes , 675 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Minn. 2004) (quoting
Standards for Crim. Just. 14-2.1(b)(i)(C) (Am. Bar Ass’n 1999)).
Patino’s plea was not unintelligent because he fully understood the consequences of
his plea and received the benefit of his bargain. Patino was repeatedly advised of, and
expressly acknowledged, that the parties agreed to a sentencing range of 135 to 189
months’ imprisonment and that they could argue for either end of that range at sentencing.
The upward-sentencing modifier set forth in the PSI had no effect on the parties’
agreement. T he state requested that the district court adhere to the plea agreement; the
parties argued within the agreed-upon range at sentencing; the district court considered the
parties’ respective positions; and the district court imposed a sentence within th at range.
In other words, Patino understood the material terms of the plea agreement and received
the benefit of his bargain; namely, the opportunity to argue for a sentence of 135 months
and the imposition of a sentence within the range contemplated by the plea agreement.
Patino argues that “[t]here can be no dispute that the parties here made a material
and mutual mistake in identifying t he applicable presumptive sentencing range.” But our
de novo review of the record reveals no evidence showing that Patino entered into the
agreement because of this allegedly mistaken assumption or even that he was mistaken
about the applicable presumptiv e sentencing range. To that end, Patino fail s to meet his
burden to establish that his plea was invalid because of an alleged mutual mistake. See
7
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (“A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was
invalid.”).
In any event, the record shows that Patino asked to withdraw his plea for reasons
other than the allegedly mistaken assumption. The record reflects that Patino chose to
proceed with sentencing even after the PSI and the district court identified the
upward-sentencing mo difier. Patino stated that he was ready to “go forward” with
sentencing “with the box being wh at we agreed it to be ” and knowing that he would be
arguing for a sentence outside of the presumptive range. The state then began its sentencing
argument. During the argument, the prosecutor referred to Patino as “a known documented
gang member” who previously “gave up some p eople.” These statements “incite[d]”
Patino, and he exited the courtroom. When Patino returned, he then moved to withdraw
his guilty plea under the fair -and-just standard of Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2 ,
asserting that “the misrepresentations . . . about his character” justified withdrawal . The
district court found Patino’s motion to withdraw “disingenuous” and denied the motion,
finding that it would constitute “extreme prejudice to the State.”2
In addition, Patino understood that the district court would consider the information
in the PSI and recommendation from probation in determining the appropriate sentence.
The district court expressly informed Patino that the recommendation in the PSI could

2 We note that the mutual-mistake authorities cited by Pati no involve motions by a
defendant to withdraw a plea because of an alleged mutual mistake. See State v. DeZeler,
427 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1988); State v. Benson, 330 N.W.2d 879, 880 (Minn. 1983);
Hodges v. State, No. A13-2207, 2014 WL 3558335, at *4 (Minn. App. July 21, 2014), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2014) . These cases are inapposite because the record here does
not show that Patino moved to withdraw his plea because of any mistake.
8
exceed the agreed-upon sentencing range and that the probation officer may recommend a
sentence of, for example, 240 months, well in excess of both the agreed -upon range and
the presumptive sentence with the 18 -month upward enhancement. Patino thanked the
district court for explaining the sentencing process , accepted the state’s offer, and
proceeded to enter his guilty plea. Accordingly, the record shows that before entering his
guilty plea, Patino was fully informed that the district court would rely on the
recommendation of probation and the PSI could recommend a sentence in excess of the
agreed-upon range . Moreover, Patino ultimately received the benefit of his bargain, a
sentence within the agreed-upon range.
Finally, Minnesota caselaw confirms that Patino’s plea was not unintelligent
because he received the benefit of his bargain when he was sentenced within the
agreed-upon sentencing range. See, e.g. , State v. Brown , 606 N.W.2d 670, 675 & n.6
(Minn. 2000) (holding in relevant part that defendant’s plea was not unintelligent when the
district court later imposed an additional conditional-release term because defendant’s total
sentence remained less than the maximum sentence contemplated in the plea agreement);
Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d at 326 (“In situations where the addition of the conditional release
term would result in a sentence that exceeded the maximum executed sentence agreed to
in the plea bargain, we have held that the addition of the conditional release term violates
the plea agreement.”); State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 2000) (holding
that the later imposition of a conditional -release term rendered defendant’s plea invalid
because the additional sentence exceeded the maximum sentence contemplated by the plea
agreement). These authorities suggest that a plea resulting in the imposition of unexpected
9
consequences is not invalid when those unexpected consequences result in a sentence
within the maximum term contemplated by the plea agreement.3
Because Patino understood the maximum possible sentence that he could receive
under the plea agreement and the district court sentenced him within the agreed -upon
range, his plea was not mistaken or unintelligent and no manifest injustice occurred.4
II. The district court acted within its discretion by imposing a sentence within the
agreed-upon range.

Patino next argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence
of 176 months’ imprisonment. Patino specifically argues that “[a] sentence at the bottom
of the presumptive range is warranted due to ample evidence of Patino’s remorse, his

3 We also observe that the agreement Patino reached with the st ate afforded him a
significant benefit because he was able to argue for a sentence of 135 months and capped
his maximum sentence at 189 months. Had the parties negotiated an agreement including
the upward -sentencing modifier, the presumptive range would h ave increased by 18
months. These circumstances do not indicate manifest injustice to Patino.

4 Patino alternatively argues that “[i]t is fair and just to afford Patino the opportunity to
withdraw his plea for the same reasons Patino argues that his plea was unintelligent: the
plea was based on confusion and patent error regarding the presumptive sentencing range.”
See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. However, Patino did not raise this argument to the
district court and thus forfeits it. See State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 806 (Minn. 2016).
Although Patino argued at sentencing that the “misrepresentations made both about
his character but also about the events that led up to these—this case” made it fair and just
to allow Patino to withdraw his plea , h e did not allege that these “misrepresentations”
included the upward-sentencing modifier. Because Patino raises this argument for the first
time on appeal, it is forfeited.
We review forfeited issues for plain error. State v. Epps , 964 N.W.2d 419, 422
(Minn. 2021). To satisfy the plain -error doctrine, Patino must establish: “(1) an erro r,
(2) that was plain, and (3) that affected his substantial rights.” State v. Zinski, 927 N.W.2d
272, 275 (Minn. 2019). Here, any error did not affect Patino’s substantial rights because
he received the benefit of the bargain, and any error benefited rather than harmed him.
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acceptance of responsibility, his resolution of the case without trial, and his cooperation
with the court and the PSI.” We disagree.
District courts have broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
305 (Minn. 2014). “[W]e generally will not interfere with sentences that are within the
presumptive sentencing range.” State v. Freyer , 328 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Minn. 1982).
“[A]lthough we have the authority, if the circumstances warrant, to modify a sentence that
is within the presumptive sentence range, we generally will not exercise that authority
absent compelling circumstances.” Id.
We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. See
Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08. A district court “abuses its discretion when its decision is
based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley
v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011).
Here, the district court acted within its discretion by sentencing Patino to 176
months’ imprisonment—a sentence that comport ed with both the parties’ agreement and
the sentencing guidelines. The district court heard a rguments from both parties, declined
to adopt either party’s recommendation, and instead found that the recommended sentence
set forth in the PSI was “a fair sentence.” Nothing in the record supports Patino’s assertion
that the district court abused its d iscretion by imposing a 176 -month sentence , and we
therefore see no abuse of discretion by the district court.

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III. Patino’s pro se arguments are meritless.
Patino summarily asserts four additional issues in a pro se supplemental brief:
(1) violation of his sp eedy-trial rights; (2) erroneous admission of video evidence;
(3) erroneous denial of motions to exclude and dismiss; and (4) the failure to consider
additional motions to exclude and dismiss.
As to the speedy-trial issue, Patino waived this argument when he pleaded guilty to
the charges. See State v. Ford , 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986) (“A guilty plea by a
counseled defendant has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as
a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.”). As to the
remaining issues, Patino does not make any substantive argument or cite to any authorities
in support of these arguments. We decline to consider issues that are inadequately briefed.
State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn.
1997).
In addition, the record provides no basis to support Patino’s arguments. Patino bears
the burden of providing an adequate record. Mesenbourg v. Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d 489,
494 (Minn. App. 1995). The record must be “sufficient to show the alleged errors and all
matters necessary for consideration of the questions presented.” Truesdale v. Friedman ,
127 N.W.2d 277, 279 ( Minn. 1964). If the record is not sufficient to support review, the
appeal may be dismissed. Noltimier v. Noltimier , 157 N.W.2d 530, 531 ( Minn. 1968).
“When an appellant acts as attorney pro se, appellate courts are disposed to disregard
defects in the brief, but that does not relieve ap pellants of the necessity of providing an
adequate record and preserving it in a way that will permit review. ” Thorp Loan & Thrift
12
Co. v. Morse, 451 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 13, 1990).
Because the record contains no information regarding these claims, we are unable to assess
them.
Affirmed.