State of Minnesota, Appellant,

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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0590

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Angelo Oshea Umphress,
Respondent.

Filed January 10, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Larkin, Judge
Concurring specially, Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-19216

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Adam E. Petras , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kassius O. Benson, Fourth Dist rict Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, J udge; and Slieter,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
The state challenges the district court’s order granting a stay of adjudication after
respondent pleaded guilty to a criminal-sexua l-conduct offense. Because there was no
clear abuse of the prosecutorial charging fu nction under existing caselaw, we reverse and
remand for resentencing.
FACTS
In August 2019, appellant State of Mi nnesota charged respondent Angelo Umphress
with one count of first-degree criminal se xual conduct. Accordi ng to the complaint,
Umphress sexually abused his younger half-s ister periodically between 2007 and 2009,
when Umphress was 14 to 15 years old. The victim was four to six years old when the
abuse occurred. The sexual abuse included t ouching the victim all over her body and
forcing her to perform oral sex. The victim told her mother about the sexual abuse in 2018,
but her mother did not report it to the authorities. The victim told her father about the abuse
in March 2019, and he reported it to the police. The police interviewed Umphress, and he
admitted the allegations. The police described him as “extremely remorseful.” In January
2021, Umphress pleaded guilty as charged, without the benefit of a plea bargain.
A presentence-investigation report (PSI) was prepared for sentencing. The PSI
described Umphress’s childhood as “very disruptive,” noting that he was exposed to drug
trafficking, gang activity, violence, prostitution, and pornography in his home. Despite his
exposure to drugs and gang activity during his childhood, Umphress did not engage in such
activity. Umphress had no prior criminal history, other than an arrest for domestic assault

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in 2018, which did not result in a criminal charge. The PSI indicated that Umphress’s
mother once walked in to the room while Umphress was se xually abusing his half-sister.
Although his mother did not report his actions , Umphress realized that his behavior was
wrong and did not sexually ab use his half-sister again. The PSI recommended that the
district court stay an adjudication of guilt.
The district court ordered a stay of adjudi cation over the state’s objection. In doing
so, the district court concluded that there ha d been an abuse of the prosecutorial charging
function. The district court ordered that entry of judgment be stayed for five years, placed
Umphress on probation, required him to complete sex-offender treatment as a condition of
probation, and required him to register as a predatory offender. The state appeals.
DECISION
A stay of adjudication is a procedure in which “the district court, upon a defendant’s
guilty plea or a fact-finder’s determination of guilt, does not adjudicate the defendant guilty
but imposes conditions of probation.” State v. Martin, 849 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. App.
2014) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2014). “If a district court orders a
stay of adjudication, and if the defendant successfully completes probation, the defendant
avoids a criminal conviction.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review de novo “a district court
order that precludes adjudication of a defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 105.
I.
As a preliminary matter, the state contends that it is unclear whether the district
court convicted Umphress at the plea hearing. The state argues that it is therefore unclear
whether the district court could stay adjudication at the sentencing hearing. The state asks

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this court to clarify whether a district cour t should always postpone its acceptance of a
guilty plea whenever it considers a stay of adjudication, so as to avoid inconsistency in the
law.
If a defendant tenders a valid guilty plea, the district court may either “accept the
plea on the terms of the plea agreement, reject the plea, or defer its decision to accept or
reject the plea pending completion of a presentence investigation.” State v. Jeffries, 806
N.W.2d 56, 62 (Minn. 2011). A conviction occurs when a guilty plea is “accepted and
recorded by the court.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5(1) (2020). As the state points out,
caselaw is inconsistent regarding the precise words that a district court must use to accept
and record a guilty plea. The supreme court has noted that the words “convicted” and “I
accept your plea” are not “magic words that will always result in a conviction for double
jeopardy purposes.” Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 63. It also has stated that a formal judgment
of conviction may satisfy the requirement to record a guilty plea, but that method is not the
only method to do so. Id. Instead, a conviction occurs “when the district court accepts the
guilty plea and the acceptance is on the record.” State v. Nodes, 863 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn.
2015).
Here, the district court told Umphress, “I am going to find that you made a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary waiver of your trial rights and that you gave me a sufficient factual
basis to find you guilty, so I am going to accept your guilty plea. We will schedule this for
sentencing.” The district c ourt did not use any words indi cating that it was adjudicating
guilt at that time. Nor did it enter a formal judgment of conviction. Moreover, at the plea

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hearing, defense counsel told the district court that Umphress wa s seeking a stay of
adjudication, and the district court indicated that it would consider that issue at sentencing.
On this record, it is clear that the district court did not convict Umphress at the plea
hearing. Thus, it is not necessary for this court to settle any inco nsistencies in the law
regarding when a conviction occurs.
II.
The state contends that the district c ourt erred by staying adjudication over the
state’s objection. The legislat ure has provided that, except un der statutes not applicable
here or based on the agreement of the parties, “a court may not refuse to adjudicate the
guilt of a defendant who tenders a guilty plea . . . or who has been found guilty by a court
or jury following a trial.” Minn. Stat. § 609.095(b) (2020). A district court may not order
a stay of adjudication over a prosecutor’s objection unless there has been “a clear abuse of
discretion by the prosecutor in the exer cise of the charging function.” State v. Lee , 706
N.W.2d 491, 492 (Minn. 2005 ). “Generally, a prosecutor has broad discretion in the
exercise of the charging function and ordinarily, under the separation-of-powers doctrine,
a court should not interfere with the prosecutor’s exercise of that discretion.” State v. Foss,
556 N.W.2d 540, 540 (Minn. 1996).
History of the Standard
The Minnesota Supreme Court first considered a district court’s authority to stay an
adjudication of guilt over the state’s objection in State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn.
1996). In Krotzer, the state charged the defendant w ith third-degree criminal sexual
conduct after he engaged in consensual sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend when he was 19

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years old. 548 N.W.2d at 253. Both the girlfriend and the girlfriend’s mother opposed the
criminal prosecution. Id. at 253 n.2. The district court stayed adjudication over the state’s
objection. Id. at 253. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the stay of adjudication,
noting that there were “special circumstances” in the case, including that the district court
“strongly disagreed with the prosecutor’s decisi on to file charges” and “felt that justice
would not be served by giving [the defendant] a criminal record as a predatory sex
offender.” Id. at 254. The supreme court concluded that a stay of adjudication was within
the district court’s inherent judicial power and was “necessary to the furtherance of
justice.” Id. at 254-55.
Shortly after Krotzer, the supreme court decided Foss and clarified that “mere
disagreement by the [district] court with the prosecutor’s exercise of the charging
discretion” does not constitute “special circumstances.” Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541. Instead,
the supreme court held that the district court ca n use its inherent judicial authority to stay
adjudication “sparingly and only for the purpose of av oiding an injustice resulting from
the prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.” Id.
The supreme court later decided Lee and explained that the mere existence of “special
circumstances” did not permit a district court to stay adjudication. 706 N.W.2d at 496.
Here, the district court reached its decision in part by comparin g the facts of this
case to those of Krotzer. The state argues that Krotzer is factually distinct and that Foss
and Lee have called its validity into question. There is merit to the state’s argument that
Krotzer is no longer good law. See id. at 497 (Page, J., concurring) (stating that in Foss,
“we effectively overruled Krotzer”). Because the district court cannot order a stay of

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adjudication over the state’s objection unle ss there has been a clear abuse of the
prosecutorial charging function, the principal reasons listed in Krotzer—“special
circumstances,” strong disagreement with the decision to charge, and the interests of
justice—do not justify a stay of adjudication. We therefore apply the standard from Foss
and Lee: there must be a clear abuse of the prosecutorial charging function.
Caselaw provides guidance regarding circumstances that do not demonstrate a clear
abuse of the prosecutorial charging function. For instance, a defendant’s remorse and lack
of a criminal record cannot support a stay of adjudication, State v. Leming , 617 N.W.2d
587, 589-90 (Minn. App. 2000), nor can the collateral consequences of a conviction or the
benefits of avoiding those consequences, State v. Ohrt, 619 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn. App.
2000). The existence of “mitigating circumstan ces” may allow the district court to be
lenient at sentencing, but it does not justify a stay of adjudication. State v. Thoma , 569
N.W.2d 205, 208-09 (Minn. App. 1997), aff’d mem. , 571 N.W.2d 773 (Minn. 1997).
Similarly, a finding that the offense was less serious than typical may permit a more lenient
sentence, but it does not permit a stay of adjudication. Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541.
The District Court’s Reasoning
The district court relied on three circumst ances in concluding that there was a clear
abuse of the exercise of the charging function in this case:
(1) [Umphress] committed the offense as a juvenile, but he was
not charged until years later, as an adult and after the
opportunity for rehabilitation in stead of a conviction was no
longer possible; (2) [Umphress] has no criminal record; he has
not committed [a] similar offense or other offenses, and he has
chosen a law-abiding life desp ite the difficult and trying

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circumstances of his childhood; and (3) the stay of adjudication
is supported by the probation officer who completed the [PSI].
The second and third reasons are not proper grounds for a stay of adjudication. A
defendant’s lack of a criminal record ca nnot support a stay of adjudication. See Leming,
617 N.W.2d at 589. And the probation department’s recommended disposition is unrelated
to the exercise of the prosecutor’s charging function.
The district court’s first reason, however, presents a more difficult question. We
are not aware of an appellate case addressi ng circumstances similar to those here. The
issue does not involve collatera l consequences, mitigating ci rcumstances, or any other
circumstances that have been rejected as a ba sis for a stay of adjudication. Indeed, the
circumstances here are unique to our jurisp rudence regarding stays of adjudication:
Umphress committed an offense when he wa s 14 to 15 years old and now faces a
significantly harsher punishment than he likely would have received if the offense had been
reported when it occurred.
Minnesota’s Juvenile Justice System
At this point, a review of Minnesota’s juven ile justice system is useful. The relevant
statutes provide:
The purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or
adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety and
reduce juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity of the
substantive law prohibiting certain behavior and by developing
individual responsibility for la wful behavior. This purpose
should be pursued through means that are fair and just, that
recognize the unique characteristics and needs of children, and
that give children access to opportunities for personal and
social growth.

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Minn. Stat. § 260B.001, subd. 2 (2020) (emphasis added).
With certain exceptions, a “delinquent child” means a child who has violated any
state or local law. Minn. Stat. § 260B.007, subd. 6(a)(1) (2020). Ge nerally, the juvenile
court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child who is
alleged to be delinquent. Minn. Stat. § 260B.101, subd. 1 (2020).
However, “[w]hen a child is alleged to have committed, after becoming 14 years of
age, an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court may
enter an order certifying the proceeding for ac tion under the laws and court procedures
controlling adult criminal violations.” Minn . Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 1 (2020). And the
juvenile court may designate a proceeding involving a ch ild alleged to have committed a
felony offense as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution under certain circumstances
if the child was at least 14 years old at the ti me of the offense. Minn. Stat. § 260B.130,
subd. 1(1) (2020). If an extende d jurisdiction juvenile prosecution results in a finding of
guilt, the court imposes both a j uvenile disposition and a stayed adult criminal sentence.
Id., subd. 4(a) (2020).
If, as is the case here, an adult is allege d to have committed an offense before the
adult’s 18th birthday, and a crim inal complaint is filed after the adult’s 21st birthday, the
district court has original and exclusive ju risdiction over the proc eeding. Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.193, subd. 5(d) (2020).
Unlike the laws and procedures governing sent encing in adult criminal prosecutions,
dispositions in juvenile court are governed by the following principle:

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In a delinquency disposition the [district] court must
take the least drastic step necessary to restore law-abiding
conduct in the juvenile. To de termine what is necessary the
[district] court must balance the severity of the child’s
delinquency, and the severity of the proposed remedy. This
disposition must serve the best interests of the child . That is,
there must be evidence that th e aims of the law cannot be
satisfied without removal of th e child from home and that the
placement is suitable for the needs of the child.

In re Welfare of M.R.S. , 400 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Minn. App. 1987) (emphasis added)
(quotation and citations omitted); see also In re Welfare of C.A.R. , 941 N.W.2d 420, 422
(Minn. App. 2020) (stating that “the district court may not place a delinquent child out of
home unless that is the least drastic step necessary to restore law-abiding conduct”
(quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. May 19, 2020).
Moreover, subject to limited exceptions, no adjudication “upon the status of any
child in the jurisdiction of the juvenile cour t shall operate to impose any of the civil
disabilities imposed by conviction, nor shall a ny child be deemed a criminal by reason of
this adjudication, nor shall this adjudication be deemed a conviction of crime.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.245, subd. 1(a) (2020).
As to the circumstances here, if the un derlying offense had been reported when it
occurred—when Umphress was 14 to 15 years old—original jurisdiction would have been
with the juvenile court. Although the law would have allowed the state to move to certify
Umphress for prosecution as an adult or to prosecute him as an extended jurisdiction
juvenile, the state does not argue that those optio ns would have been utilized in this case.
In fact, at oral argument, the state indicated that in 2008, it received a referral alleging
similar sexual misconduct by Umphress and declined to file delinquency charges, deciding

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instead to address his conduct in the child-protection system. It is therefore fair to conclude
that Umphress likely would not have received a criminal conviction or faced a prison
sentence if his offense had been reported arou nd the time of its occurrence. But because
the offense was not reported and Umphress was not charged until he was almost 26 years
old, he could only be prosecuted as an adult. 1 Accordingly, instead of receiving an
opportunity for rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system , Umphress faced a criminal
conviction and a presumptive sentence of 14 4 months’ imprisonment for his conduct 12
years earlier, when he was 14 to 15 years old.
The disproportionality between those outco mes was an appropria te consideration
when deciding whether to charge the underlying offense. The American Bar Association
(ABA) has established standards of conduct for prosecutors, and the Minnesota Supreme
Court has stated, “We expect that prosecutors, as well as defense counsel, are aware of our
case law proscribing particular conduct as well as the standards of conduct prescribed by
the ABA.” State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294, 301 (Min n. 2006) (discussing the ABA
standards for prosecutors and defense counsel).
The ABA standards provide that, at a minimum, the prosecutor should file criminal
charges only if he or she reasonably believes that probable cause supports the charges.
ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function, Standard 3-4.3(a) (4th ed.
2017). But evidentiary support is not the only relevant factor. “In order to fully implement
the prosecutor’s functions and duties, includ ing the obligation to enforce the law while

1 There is no indication or suggestion that Um phress did anything to prevent the victim
from reporting the abuse or that he was otherwise responsible for the delayed report.

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exercising sound discretion, the prosecutor is not obliged to f ile or maintain all criminal
charges which the evidence might support.” Id., Standard 3-4.4(a). Other factors that the
prosecutor may consider include “whether the authorized or likely punishment or collateral
consequences are disproportionate in relation to the particular offense or the offender.” Id.
That factor is reasonably relevant to the charging decision in this case. Nonetheless,
existing caselaw does not establish that a clear abuse of the charging function results from
a decision to charge even though a disproportionate punishment will result. And given that
the Minnesota Supreme Court has tended to restrict, and not to expand, the district court’s
authority to stay adjudication over the state’s objection, we decline to expand that authority
in this case. See LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 159 (M inn. App. 2000) (stating
that this court “is limited in its function to correcting errors” and “cannot create public
policy”), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000).
Umphress argues that there was a clear abuse of the charging function because that
function includes both the state’s decision to bring charges and its decisions regarding any
ensuing plea negotiations. Accordingly, Umphress argues that this court must consider not
only the state’s decision to charge him, but also its refusal to agree to a stay of adjudication
during plea negotiations. Umphress cites State v. Streiff, 673 N.W.2d 831 (Minn. 2004),
and State v. Hart, 723 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 2006), in support of his position. But neither of
those cases involved a stay of adjudication. In Streiff, the issue was whether the district
court erred by accepting the defendant’s guilty plea to two lesser-included offenses under
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.07, over the prosecutor’s objection. 673 N.W.2d at 833. In Hart, the
issue was whether the state could refile a co mplaint and obtain a writ of mandamus to

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compel the district court to make a probable-cause determination on the refiled complaint
after a district court had dismissed the criminal complaint with prejudice and in the interests
of justice. 723 N.W.2d at 256.
Although Streiff and Hart refer to the charging and pl ea-bargaining functions and
state that a prosecutor has broad discretion when exercising those functions, it does not
follow that plea negotiations ar e a part of the charging func tion. Although that function
may include the decision whether to “maintai n all criminal charge s which the evidence
might support,” ABA Criminal Justice Standards , supra, Standard 3-4.4(a), we are not
persuaded that it includes decisions short of dismissal when plea bargaining. Thus, we do
not treat the prosecutor’s refusal to agree to a stay of adjudication as an exercise of the
charging function.
Conclusion
Given the unique circumstances of this case, one might understand the district
court’s desire to provide Umphress an opportunity to avoid a criminal conviction based on
his conduct when he was 14 to 15 years old. But existi ng caselaw does not support a
conclusion that the state clearly abused its di scretion in the exercise of the prosecutorial
charging function. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s stay of adjudication and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

JOHNSON, Judge (concurring specially)
I concur in the opinion of the court insofar as it applies State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d
491 (Minn. 2005), and concludes that the district court erred by staying adjudication of
guilt.
I write separately to note that I do not join my respected colleagues in their subtle
suggestion that there should be an expansion of the recognized bases for a judicial
declaration that a prosecutor's charging decision is a clear abuse of discretion. "As a
general rule, the prosecutor's decision whom to prosecute and what charge to file is a
discretionary matter which is not subject to judicial review absent proof by defendant of
deliberate discrimination based on some unjustifiable standard such as race, sex, or
religion." State v. Herme, 298 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn. 1980). To expand the existing
caselaw in the manner suggested in the opinion of the court would threaten the
constitutionally required separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches
of government. See Minn. Const. art. III, § 1; State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 540 (Minn.
1996); State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618,620 & n.3 (Minn. 1980) (dicta); see also State
v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 256-60 (Minn. 1996) (Coyne, J., dissenting).
If an expansion of the existing caselaw were considered, the ABA standards cited
in the opinion of the court would not support it. Those ABA standards have not been
adopted in Minnesota for purposes of limiting a prosecutor's discretion in making a
charging decision or objecting to a stay of adjudication. See Herme, 298 N.W.2d at 455
(citing ABA standards in support ofprosecutorial discretion). In addition, those standards
do not contemplate that a prosecutor could be forbidden from filing criminal charges if the
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charges are supported by probable cause. The standards state only that a prosecutor "may,"
in his or her discretion, consider various other factors that might cause the prosecutor to
refrain from filing otherwise appropriate charges. See ABA Criminal Justice Standards for
the Prosecution Function, Standard 3-4.4(a) (4th. ed. 2017). Furthermore, the ABA
standards cited in the opinion of the court are intended merely to assist prosecutors in
making their charging decisions; the standards are not intended to guide courts in reviewing
prosecutors' charging decisions. See id., Standard 3-1.l(b), (c).
In this case, the prosecutor clearly was within the bounds of prosecutorial discretion
in charging Umphress with a serious crime to which he had confessed. Umphress sexually
assaulted a young girl on multiple occasions, and she continues to suffer psychological
harm. Given the facts alleged in the complaint, which are consistent.with the record of the
plea hearing, the prosecutor reasonably decided to hold Umphress accountable by initiating
the only type of prosecution permitted by law given his age: a criminal action in district
court. See Minn. Stat.§ 260B.193, subd. 5(d) (2020).
When the case proceeded to sentencing more than a year after charging, the
prosecutor took a lenient approach by offering Umphress a plea agreement by which he
would have received a stay of imposition of sentence, which would have given him the
opportunity to avoid imprisomnent by completing probation. At the sentencing hearing,
the prosecutor clearly articulated the state's objection to a stay of adjudication. Yet the
district court ordered a stay of adjudication.
The district court's order cannot be reconciled with the plain language of the statute
that states that "a court may not refuse to adjudicate the guilt of a defendant" who has
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tendered a valid guilty plea, unless there is an "agreement of the parties" for a stay of
adjudication. See Minn. Stat. § 609 .095(b) (2020) ( emphasis added). The quoted text was
inserted into the statute two years after the supreme court issued its opinions in Krotzer and
Foss. See 1998 Minn. Laws ch. 367, art. 6, § 1, at 726. It appears that the legislature
amended the statute for the specific purpose of allowing prosecutors to prevent district
courts from ordering stays of adjudication based on "inherent judicial power," which was
the rationale identified in Krotzer and Foss. See Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 254-55; Foss, 556
N.W.2d at 540-41. 1 Since the 1998 amendment to section 609.095(b), however, this
court's opinions have assumed without explanation that the statute does not negate or limit
a district court's inherent judicial power or authority to order a stay of adjudication. See,
e.g., State v. Martin, 849 N.W.2d 99, 102-04 (Minn. App. 2014), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.
24, 2014); State v. Colby, 657 N.W.2d 897, 898-99 (Minn. App. 2003); State v. Ohrt, 619
N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn. App. 2000); cf State v. Lattimer, 624 N.W.2d 284, 292 (Minn.
1 The statutory text quoted above first appeared in a bill that was introduced in the
Minnesota Senate in February 1997 and referred to the Committee on Crime Prevention.
See S.F. 537, 1997 Reg. Sess. (as introduced); State of Minnesota, Journal of the Senate,
80th Sess. 205 (Feb. 13, 1997). At a subsequent committee hearing, the bill's primary
sponsor explained that the bill was a response to the supreme court's Krotzer opinion,
which she described as an "overstepping of the bounds," and she further explained that the
supreme court's invocation of "inherent judicial authority" gave rise to concerns about
"separation of powers." Hearing on S.F. No. 537 Before the Sen. Comm. on Crime
Prevention (Feb. 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Junge). The bill was passed by the Senate.
State of Minnesota, Journal of the Senate, 80th Sess. 6057 (Mar. 20, 1998). The
companion bill did not advance in the House of Representatives. See H.F. 644, 1997 Reg.
Sess. (as introduced). The text of S.F. 537 was incorporated into an omnibus criminal­
justice bill. See S.F. 3345, 1998 Reg. Sess., art. 6, § l(b) (3d engrossment). The omnibus
bill was passed by the Senate and the House and was signed into law by the governor. State
of Minnesota, Journal of the Senate, 80th Sess. 6309 (Apr. 1, 1998); State of Minnesota,
Journal of the House, 80th Sess. 8885-86 (Apr. 1, 1998); 1998 Minn. Laws ch. 367, at 795.
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App. 2001) (Kalitowski, J., dissenting), rev. denied (Minn. May 15, 2001). But that
assumption is questionable in light of the supreme court's most recent statement on
inherent judicial authority. See State v. MD.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 280-84 (Minn. 2013).
The state, however, has not argued that the district court's decision should be reversed on
the ground that it violates section 609.095(b). Accordingly, that issue is not before the
court.
In sum, I conclude, without qualification, that the prosecutor did not commit a clear
abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function and that the district court erred
by staying adjudication of guilt.
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