State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0596

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Douglas Wayne Young,
Appellant.

Filed August 22, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-11857

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal- Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Douglas Wayne Young appeals his convictions for first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, domestic assault by strangulation, and second-degree assault. He argues
that the district court abused its discretion by allowing respondent State of Minnesota to
introduce “voluminous evidence” of the victim’s injuries, which unfairly prejudiced the
jury’s consideration of his guilt. We affirm.
FACTS
In May 2020, Minneapolis police arrested Young after he assaulted J.B. in her
apartment. Young and J.B. had an on-and-off intimate relationship. Following the arrest,
the state charged Young with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.342,
subd. 1(e)(i) (Supp. 2019); domestic assault by strangulation, Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd.
2 (2018); and second-degree assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2018). The state also
filed a notice of its intent to seek an upward durational departure from the presumptive
sentence prescribed by the sentencing guidelines.
At Young’s jury trial, J.B. recounted a violent incident, during which Young
grabbed her by the neck; dragged her by the arm; hit her; choked her; threw her on the floor
and on her bed; threatened to hit her with a hammer; and threw the hammer onto the bed,
causing it to hit her face. J.B. also testified that Young knelt on her torso during the incident
and forced his penis into her mouth. According to J.B., she lost consciousness at times
during the assault.
3
Responding officers testified that, when they arrived at J.B.’s apartment, Young
came out of the building, shirtless and with his pants unzipped. Young told the officers
that they should take him to jail.
Medical providers testified about the extent of J.B.’s injuries, which included
bruising; cuts; swelli ng; petechiae; shoulder dislocation; and fractures of the clavicle,
humerus, hyoid, ribs, and transverse process. The state introduced 45 photographs of J.B.’s
injuries, which were taken by medical providers at the hospital. Additionally, the state
presented evidence from J.B.’s sexual assault exam. Swabs from J.B.’s mouth contained
sperm cells that were consistent with Young’s DNA profile.
During Young’s testimony, he acknowledged assaulting J.B. He also admitted to
sending apology letters to J.B., which he wrote after reviewing photographs of her injuries.
But Young testified that the sexual contact had been consensual.
The jury found Young guilty on all counts. The jury also found facts that aggravated
the criminal-sexual-conduct offense, specifically that Young fractured J.B.’s clavicle,
humerus, hyoid, ribs, and transverse process and caused J.B. to suffer a protracted and
disfiguring shoulder injury. 1 Based on these jury findings, the district court determined
that the first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offense was more serious than a typical
offense of this type and was committed with particular cruelty. The district court granted

1 At Young’s trial, the parties presented evidence relating to both guilt and the presence of
aggravating sentencing factors. But the district court did not provide the jury with
instructions and special interrogatories regarding the presence of aggravating factors until
after the guilty verdicts. The jury engaged in a second round of deliberations to determine
whether the state proved the aggravating factors. Young made no objection in the district
court to proceeding in this manner.
4
the state’s motion for an upward durational departure and sentenced Young to 312 months
in prison.
Young appeals.
DECISION
Young argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting “voluminous
evidence” of J.B.’s injuries over his objection. He challenges the scope of the evidence
regarding J.B.’s injuries—particularly 45 photographs taken by medical providers .
Because Young did not dispute that he assaulted J.B., he argues that the photographs were
irrelevant, cumulative, and unfairly prejudicial.
An appellate court reviews the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Minn. 2016). “A district court abuses
its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation omitted). The appellant must demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion in allowing the evidence and that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. Peltier,
874 N.W.2d at 802.
Evidence is relevant when it has “any tenden cy to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. Evidence that “logically tends
to prove or disprove a material fact in issue” is relevant. State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789,
797 (Minn. 2014). But relevant evidence may be excluded when “the danger of unfair
prejudice” substantially outweighs “its probative value.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. “Unfair
5
prejudice ‘does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate
probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from
the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.’” State v. Hahn, 799
N.W.2d 25, 33 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 197 n.3 (Minn.
1995)), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011). “Evidence that is probative, though it may
arouse the passions of the jury, will still be admitted unless the tendency of the evidence to
persuade by illegitimate means overwhelms its legitimate probative force.” State v. Schulz,
691 N.W.2d 474, 478-79 (Minn. 2005).
During the trial, Young made several objections to the evidence of J.B.’s injuries.
He first objected to testimony about J.B.’s injuries. Young argued that J.B.’s detailed
testimony about her injuries, and the testimony of medical providers about the extent of
J.B.’s injuries, was “irrelevant” to whether Young committed the charged offenses. The
district court overruled the objection to testimony about J.B.’s injuries, concluding that the
extent of the injuries corroborated the “brutality of the assault that [J.B.] had described.”
Young also objected to the state’s request to admit 45 photographs documenting
J.B.’s injuries. Although he agreed that the state could introduce photographs of J.B.’s
injuries through the testifying forensic nurse examiner, he argued that the sheer volume of
photographs that the state sought to admit would be cumulative and unfairly prejudicial.
The district court viewed the photographs and determined that “there are a lot of photos . . .
mostly because there are a lot of injuries.” While some of the photos depicted the same
injuries, the district court did not find those photos to be cumulative because they showed
“different zoom levels, which is important.” The district court observed that the wider
6
angled photos depicted the relationship between different injuries, whereas closeups
revealed the “exact nature of each individual injury.” Thus, the district court allowed the
state to introduce all 45 of the photographs of J.B.’s injuries.
Young now argues that the district court’s evidentiary rulings were an abuse of
discretion. He first contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the
state to admit extensive evidence regarding J.B.’s injuries during the “guilt phase” of the
trial even though that evidence was only relevant to the presence of aggravating factors,
which the jury considered separately.
2 But t he evidentiary portion of Young’s trial was
unitary—there was no “guilt phase” and “sentencing phase” of the trial, except that the jury
was presented with the special interrogatories concerning aggravating factors after they
reached their verdicts on the substantive offenses. And if Young is now indirectly arguing
that the district court erred in not bifurcating the trial, he has forfeited this argument. He
never moved the district court to bifurcate the evidentiary portion of the trial, and he did
not object to the unitary trial that occurred. See Rairdon v. State, 557 N.W.2d 318, 323

2 When the state provides notice of its intent to seek an upward durational departure, “[t]he
court must . . . determine whether to conduct a unitary or bifurcated trial.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 11.04, subd. 2(a). In making this determination,

the court must determine whether the evidence supporting an
aggravated sentence is otherwise admissible in the guilt phase
of trial and whether a unitary trial would unfairly prejudice the
defendant. The court must order a bifurcated trial if the
evidence supporting an aggravated sentence includes evidence
otherwise inadmissible at the guilt phase of the trial or if that
evidence would unfairly prejudice the defendant in the guilt
phase.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.04, subd. 2(b).
7
(Minn. 1996) (“Failure to object ordinarily forfeits a criminal defendant’s right to review,
although a defendant may obtain appellate review of and relief from plain errors affecting
substantial rights if those errors had the effect of depriving the defendant of a fair trial.”
(citation omitted)); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02 (providing that appellate courts may
review unobjected-to plain error when it affects a defendant’s substantial rights).
Young also argues that the evidence about the extent of J.B.’s injuries was not
relevant because he “never disputed that a physical altercation occurred” and none of the
charged offenses “required the state to prove a brutal assault.” We disagree. Young was
charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statutes section
609.342, subdivision 1(e)(i), which required the state to prove that Young caused J.B.
personal injury, and that Young used force or coercion to sexually penetrate J.B.
Moreover, despite Young’s admission that he assaulted J.B., the state still had the burden
of establishing that Young was guilty of the charged assault offenses beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Minn. 2019) (providing that the state
must prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt). The extent of
J.B.’s injuries was clearly relevant to Young’s guilt.
Finally, Young argues that even if evidence was relevant, the district court had a
duty to exclude it because it was unduly inflammatory. He contends the extensive evidence
of J.B.’s injuries undoubtedly “aroused the jury’s passions and diverted its attention from
deciding whether the state met its burden.” Here, the district court considered Young’s
argument that the sheer number of photographs was unfairly prejudicial. But the district
court ultimately determined that the photos were necessary to show J.B.’s actual injuries
8
and that their relevance outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice. See Hahn, 799
N.W.2d at 33 (“[P]hotographs are not rendered inadmissible just because they vividly
depict a shocking crime or incidentally tend to arouse the passions and prejudices of the
jurors.” (quotation omitted)); see also State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn. 1992)
(concluding that the district court has discretion over the admission of relevant
photographs); State v. Sullivan, 502 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Minn. 1993) (stating that a
photograph’s graphic nature cannot be the only reason for excluding it from evidence).
Likewise, the district court determined that J.B.’s testimony and the testimony of her
treating physician were relevant to the elements of the charged offenses, were not
cumulative, and did not unfairly prejudice Young.
The district court appropriately exercised its discretion in concluding that the
evidence of J.B.’s injuries was admissible. Thus, Young has not shown any error in the
district court’s evidentiary rulings.
But even if the district court did err in allowing this evidence, we cannot conclude
that the evidence significantly affected the jury’s guilty verdicts. “[A]n appellant who
alleges an error in the admission of evidence that does not implicate a constitutional right
must prove that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence
significantly affected the verdict.” Peltier, 874 N.W.2d at 802 (quotation omitted)
(discussing factors court considers when determining whether wrongfully admitted
evidence significantly affected the verdict). In deciding what effect erroneously admitted
evidence had on the verdict, the reviewing court considers “the manner in which the
evidence was presented, whether it was highly persuasive, whether it was used in closing
9
argument, and whether the defense effectively countered it.” Townsend v. State, 646
N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 2002).
Here, the state’s evidence against Young was strong. The testimony about the extent
of J.B.’s injuries and the photographs merely corroborated J.B.’s account of an incredibly
violent incident. And Young’s attorney specifically argued to the jury that it should not
allow the evidence of J.B.’s injuries “to impede [its] judgment” in determining whether the
state satisfied the burden of proving guilt. Given these circumstances, we cannot conclude
that there is any reasonable possibility that the evidence Young complains of here
significantly affected the verdict.
Affirmed.