State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0603

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kayla Catelyn Waltz,
Appellant.

Filed March 21, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-CR-19-515

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janice Nelson, Montevideo C ity Attorney, Matthew Haugen, Assistant C ity Attorney,
Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pr esiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In this appeal from her conviction for misdemeanor driving while impaired (DWI),
appellant Kayla Catelyn Waltz argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress the evidence and he r statements to the police because the police unlawfully
2
expanded a welfare check into a criminal investigation and interrogated her without
providing a Miranda warning. We affirm.
FACTS1
At approximately 11:00 p.m. on June 7, 2019, Montevideo police received a report
that a female driver was passed out in a runn ing car in a convenience store parking lot.
Three officers responded to the call. The firs t officer to arrive, a police sergeant, parked
his patrol car next to the car so as not to bl ock it. He approached the car and, after some
effort, awoke the unconscious driver—later identified as Waltz—by knocking on the
window and shining his flashlight into her eyes. While standing next to the car, the sergeant
smelled a potent odor of fresh marijuana. Once roused, Waltz rolled down the car window.
The sergeant observed an even more intense odor of marijuana mixed w ith an odor of
perfume or air freshener. He explained to Waltz that he was checking on her welfare, and
she responded that she was waiting for a friend. The sergeant requested identification, and
Waltz produced a valid Minnesota driver’s lice nse. During this brief interaction, the
sergeant did not observe anything unusual ab out Waltz’s speech or appearance. He
instructed her to “hang out” in her car while he checked her driver’s license.
Two other officers arrived together in a second patrol car. The sergeant asked them
whether they could smell the marijuana odor emanating from Waltz’s car. They
approached the car and confirmed that there was a strong marijuana smell. One of the
officers asked Waltz how she was doing and what she was doing.

1 The facts are derived from the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing on Waltz’s
suppression motions.
3
The sergeant instructed the o fficers to ask Waltz to exit the car and to search it to
ascertain “why the vehicle smel l[ed] like weed.” One officer asked Waltz to step out of
the car, and she complied. Then, in conversational tones, the two officers briefly inquired
about the marijuana smell. One officer asked Waltz whether they could search her car, and
she consented.2 As the officers searched the car, the sergeant explained to Waltz, “We’re
not trying to harass you or anything, you’ve ju st gotta understand that your vehicle reeks
of marijuana, so whether you revoke permission or not, we can still search it.”
The sergeant asked Waltz whether she had been using marijuana, and she admitted
to smoking a blunt3 a few hours before. Suspecting that Waltz was under the influence of
marijuana or a controlled substance, the se rgeant asked Waltz to perform some field
sobriety tests and conducted a preliminary br eath test, which revealed a zero alcohol
concentration. The sergeant arrested Waltz based on suspicion that she had been driving
while impaired and provided her with a Miranda warning.
Before handcuffing Waltz, the sergeant asked whether she had anything harmful on
her person, and Waltz produced two smoking de vices, one of which contained suspected
marijuana residue. During the search of Waltz ’s car, the officers found a plastic grocery
bag containing approximately ten grams of marijuana, an open cigarillo pack, and a
sandwich bag filled with what appeared to be tobacco from the cigarillos.

2 The discussion that occurred between the time Waltz was asked to exit her car and when
she consented to the search was approximately a minute and a half in duration.

3 A blunt is a cigarillo that contains marijuana instead of tobacco.
4
At the Chippewa County jail, the police obt ained a search warrant to take a blood
sample from Waltz for chemical testing. Wa ltz’s blood showed indicators of marijuana
use.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Waltz with three misdemeanors: operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20,
subd. 1(2) (2018); possession of marijuana in a motor vehicle, Minn. Stat. § 152.027, subd.
3 (2018); and possession of drug paraphernalia, Minn. Stat. § 152.092(b) (2018). Waltz
then moved to suppress the evidence of mariju ana that police seized from her car and her
admissions to the police that she had smoked marijuana. Following an evidentiary hearing,
the district court denied Waltz’s motions. Waltz then stipulated to the prosecution’s case
pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4, in order to obtain
appellate review of the district court’s order denying suppression. The district court found
her guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance,
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2), and sent enced her to 90 days in jail, staying the
execution of the sentence for one year.
Waltz appeals.
DECISION
Waltz argues that the police violated he r federal and state constitutional rights
during the encounter in the convenience store pa rking lot. She contends that they had no
basis to detain her for a crimin al investigation or to search her car once they determined
that she was not in distress. And she asserts that the poli ce unlawfully interrogated her
about her marijuana us e without providing a Miranda warning. Waltz argues that these
5
constitutional violations require suppression of the drug evidence found in her car and on
her person, the evidence of her impairment, her statements to the police, and any evidence
obtained as a result of her statements.
I. The police did not violate Waltz’s cons titutional rights by detaining her to
investigate suspected criminal activity or by searching her car for drugs.

In considering a challenge to a district c ourt’s pretrial ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence, appellate courts review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de
novo. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011). If the facts are not in dispute—
as is the case here—appellate courts apply de novo review to determine whether an
unreasonable seizure occurred. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 10
of the Minnesota Constitution, prohibit unreas onable searches and seizures. Warrantless
searches and seizures are unreasonable under both the state and federal constitutions unless
a recognized warrant exception applies. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474
(1971); State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). The state must show that an
exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn.
2003).
Waltz argues that the officers violated her state and federal constitutional rights by
seizing her without justifica tion and then searching her ca r. She does not challenge the
officers’ authority for the initial interaction, which she characterizes as a “welfare check.”
See State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 693 (Minn. App. 2012) (holding that a seizure does
not occur when an officer a pproaches a stopped vehicle fo r a welfare check). But she
6
contends that the welfare check escalated into a seizure when the officers asked her to exit
her car and questioned her about marijuana use. Moreover, she argues, the police
unlawfully expanded the scope of the seizure by searching her car.
We begin our analysis with a brief disc ussion of seizures. Not all encounters
between people and the police are seizures. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 390 (Minn.
1995); Klamar, 823 N.W.2d at 692. For example, wh en an officer walk s up to a parked
car and speaks with the driver, there is no seizure. State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756,
757 (Minn. 1980). “[A] seizure occurs when the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Cripps, 533 N.W.2d
at 391 (quotation omitted). In considering whet her there was a seizure, Minnesota courts
use the Mendenhall-Royer test: “a person has been seized if in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a r easonable person would have believed that he
or she was neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the
encounter.”4 Id.; see Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
In some circumstances, the police may seize an individual without a search warrant.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968 ). One exception to the warrant requirement permits
limited investigatory seizures. State v. Askerooth , 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004).

4 In California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991), th e United States Supreme Court
held that a seizure occurs under the Fourth Amendment when the police use physical force
or a person submits to a police show of auth ority. Our supreme cour t declined to follow
the Hodari D. holding, concluding that the Minnesota Constitution affords more protection
than the federal constitution. In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993).
7
Under this exception, a police officer may briefly detain an individual when the officer
“has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake,
744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000))
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). But an investigator y detention “may become invalid if it
becomes ‘intolerable’ in its ‘intensity or scope.’” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18). Thus, each subsequent intrusion “m ust be strictly tied to and
justified by the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible.”
State v. Wiegand , 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Mi nn. 2002). And to e xpand the scope of an
investigatory seizure, the police must have independent probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activ ity sufficient to justify th e subsequent intrusion. Id. (citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21).
Here, the district court concluded, and we agree, that the police had a reasonable
and articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified a limited investigatory detention.
Waltz was sleeping in a running car in a public place at 11:00 p.m. When the sergeant
approached the car, he smelled a strong odor of fresh marijuana. Waltz was difficult to
rouse; the sergeant was required to bang on the car window and shine his flashlight in her
eyes. The marijuana smell became more in tense when Waltz fina lly rolled her window
down. And the two other officers who arrived to assist with the in vestigation confirmed
that they could smell marijuan a even while standing three feet away from Waltz’s car.
Given these facts, the officers had reason to suspect that Waltz was driving while impaired
and that she possessed marijuana in a motor vehicle. Either of these suspicions provided a
basis for an investigatory detention. See State v. Doren, 654 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Minn. App.
8
2002) (stating that a car passenger’s “extra ordinary nervousness,” the smell of burned
marijuana emanating from the passenger’s location, and the passenger’s appearance of
being under the influence togeth er provide a reasonable articul able suspicion of criminal
activity), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003).
Waltz argues that even if the initial seizure was valid, the officers unlawfully
expanded the scope of the stop by searching her car. The state responds that the officers’
actions were permissible under another exception to the warr ant requirement—the
automobile exception.5
The automobile exception a llows police to search a vehicle, including closed
containers, when “there are facts and circ umstances sufficient to warrant a reasonably
prudent [person] to believe that th e vehicle contains contraband.” State v. Lester , 874
N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Determining whether there is probable
cause requires an objective inqu iry that evaluates the totality of the circumstances in a
particular case. Id. These circumstances include th e reasonable inferences that law
enforcement officers may make based on their training and experience. State v. Koppi, 798
N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011).
The state points out that “[t]he detec tion of odors alone, which trained police
officers can identify as being illicit, constitute s probable cause to search automobiles for
further evidence of crime.” State v. Pierce, 347 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. App. 1984); see

5 Although the evid ence shows that the officers asked Waltz if they could search the car
and she responded affirmatively, the state ha s never argued that Waltz consented to the
search.
9
also State v. Wicklund, 205 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 1973). And the state notes that under
current Minnesota law, the smell of marijuana provides probable cause for a vehicle search.
See State v. Schultz , 271 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 19 78) (stating that the automobile
exception applies when an officer smells marijuana emanating from a car).
While we do not disagree with the state’ s summary of the law, we note that the
factual circumstances here included more than an odor of marijuana. Again, Waltz was
found soundly sleeping in a running car near midnight. The car was parked in a
convenience store parking lot. When finall y awakened, Waltz said that she was meeting
someone. Three trained police officers sme lled a strong odor of marijuana—including
fresh marijuana—coming from the car. And Waltz admitted to smoking marijuana in the
car earlier. Based on all of these facts, the officers reasonably believed that the car would
contain contraband. Because th e officers had probable cause to search, their search was
lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
The investigatory stop and search of Wa ltz’s car, which were both justified by
exceptions to the constitutional warrant requirement, did not violate Waltz’s constitutional
rights. Thus, the district court did not err in denying her motion to suppress the evidence.
II. No Miranda warning was required before Waltz’s formal arrest because there
was no custodial interrogation.

Whether police questioning of a suspect was a custodial interrogation requiring a
Miranda warning is a mixed question of law and fact that appellate courts review de novo.
State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 167-68 (M inn. 2013). When the district court applied
the proper legal standard, the appellate court gives considerable deference to its resolution
10
of this fact-specific issue. Id. at 168; see also State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 31 (Minn.
2016) (holding same).
The requirement for a Miranda warning protects an individual’s Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). If
police fail to provide a Miranda warning at the outset of a custodial interrogation, a
suspect’s statements made during the interrogation are generally inadmissible. Id. at 479.
An interrogation is defined as “express que stioning or any words or actions on the
part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.” State v. Heinonen , 909 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2018) (quotations omitted).
And a “custodial interrogation” occurs when “questioning [is] initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into cu stody or otherwise deprived of his [or her]
freedom of action in any significant way,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, or “if, based on all
the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe
that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” State v.
Vue, 797 N.W.2d 5, 10-11 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Scruggs, 822
N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2012).
To determine if a person was in custody for the purpose of the Miranda requirement,
courts consider multiple factors, including whether the questioning occurred at the police
station, the individual’s freedom of movement was restrained, the individual made a highly
incriminating statement, there were multiple police present, and the police pointed a gun
at the suspect. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637. Factors th at suggest a person was not in
custody include brief questioning, a nonthr eatening environment, questioning at the
11
suspect’s home, explicit statemen ts that the suspect is not und er arrest, police allowing a
suspect to leave after a statement, and police permitting a suspect to make phone calls. Id.
The district court determined that the officers interrogated Waltz by asking her
about the marijuan a smell in her car, inqu iring whether there was marijuana in the car,
asking whether she had been smoking mariju ana, and questioning how much marijuana
she had used. But after considering the relevant factors, the district court concluded that
Waltz had not been in custody. Specifically, the district court found that Waltz was first
questioned while she was in her car; she wa s not questioned at the police station; her
freedom was not restrained to an extent suggesting she was under arrest; the police did not
block her car with their patrol vehicles; the officers did not use their emergency lights; she
was not handcuffed, pat-searched, or placed in a patrol vehicle before the questioning; the
questioning was very brief; the officers spoke to her in a nonthreatening manner, and one
of them even apologized for the investigation; the officers never touched their weapons;
the officers told her that she was not in custod y; and the officers were calm. The district
court acknowledged that some factors could support a finding that Waltz was in custody—
that she admitted smoking marijuana, that sh e was surrounded by three officers, and that
the sergeant had taken her driver’s license. However, it determined that those factors were
“not enough to support a conclusion that she was under arrest and that a Miranda warning
was required” because a reasonable person in her situation would not have believed that
she was under arrest.
In challenging the district court’s conclusi on, Waltz does not argue that its factual
findings are erroneous. Rather, Waltz argues that she was in custody because “[s]he was
12
questioned by multiple officers arriving in two squad cars about drugs in her vehicle, she
was questioned away from her vehicle, and she could not leave because [the sergeant] had
her [driver’s license].” But the district court considered these factors and determined that,
on balance, the other factors indicated that Waltz was not in custody. Because the district
court applied the correct legal standard and carefully weighed the relevant factors, we give
its determination considerable deference. See Sterling, 834 N.W.2d at 168 (“We grant
considerable, but not unlimited, deference to a [district] court’s fact-specific resolution of
[an issue regarding custody and the need for a Miranda warning] when the proper legal
standard is applied.” (quotations omitted)).
Waltz also argues that the supreme court’s decision in State v. Malik, 552 N.W.2d
730, 731 (Minn. 1996), compel s the conclusion that she was in custody when questioned
by the officers. In Malik, the supreme court held that an investigatory stop became the
functional equivalent of a custodial arrest when police patted down the suspect’s clothing,
locked him in a squad car, and asked him about drugs and alcohol in his car. 552 N.W.2d
at 731.6 But the circumstances in Malik were quite different. There, the suspect had a
revoked driver’s license and therefore was unable to independently leave the scene of the
traffic stop. Id. And the suspect was confined to the back of the officer’s patrol car. Id.

6 Waltz also cites a nonprecedential decision of th is court. This cour t is not bound by its
nonprecedential opinions but may consider them as persuasive authority. See Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions and order opinions are not
binding authority except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel, but
nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority .”) We have reviewed the
decision cited by Waltz and do not find it to be persuasive because the factual
circumstances in that case were dramatically different than those here.
13
Here, as the district court found, Waltz was not confined and the encounter with the officers
was brief and nonthreatening. Although the sergeant did take Waltz’s driver’s license, this
is a routine occurrence that alone is insufficient to convert an encounter between a motorist
and the police into the functional equivalent of a custodial arrest. See Minn. Stat. § 171.08
(2020) (stating that each person operating a moto r vehicle must be pr epared to display a
driver’s license to a police officer); Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d at 637 (listing six factors
suggesting a person is in custody).
Based on our independent review of the record, we agree with the district court that
Waltz was not in custody before she was fo rmally arrested. Because she was not in
custody, the officers’ questions did not c onstitute a custodial interrogation requiring a
Miranda warning. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Waltz’s motion to suppress
her statements and any evidence derived from those statements.
Affirmed.