Antonio Johnson, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0608

Antonio Johnson,
Relator,

vs.

Fitness International LLC,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed March 14, 2022
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 40565152-3

Antonio D. Johnson, Hopkins, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Fitness International, LLC, Richfield, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Empl oyment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Relator challenges an unemplo yment-law judge’s (ULJ) determination that he is
ineligible for unemployment benefits be cause he was terminated for employment
misconduct. Because the re cord supports the ULJ’s dete rmination that relator was
discharged for failing to notify his empl oyer about his absences, which constitutes
employment misconduct as defined by Minnesota law, we affirm.
FACTS
Relator Antonio Johnson began working as a full-time sales director for respondent-
employer Fitness Internati onal, LLC on February 17, 2020, and was discharged on
February 26, 2020. Johnson was scheduled to work shifts on February 24, 25, and 26.
However, he missed these shifts because he was arrested on February 23 and remained in
custody through February 26. Johnson did not contact, or ask anyone on his behalf to
contact, his employer about his absences. As a result, he was discharged by Fitness
International for “job abandonment” for missing three scheduled shifts without providing
notice for his absences.
Johnson applied for unemployment bene fits through resp ondent Minnesota
Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED), and in his application,
he stated that he “quit” because he “was de aling with the sudden death of [his] mother,”
and because of “a legal situation that kept [him] from work.” DE ED determined that
Johnson was ineligible for benefits because he “did not request accommodations for [the]
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serious illness of a family member prior to quitting.” Johnson appealed this determination
of ineligibility and the matter proceeded to a hearing before a ULJ.
During the hearing, the ULJ reviewed Johnson’s appeal statement. In that
statement, Johnson explained that he was di scharged from his employment “due to an
illegal pick up by the [M]inneapolis Police” and “a 36 hour hold” that did not lead to any
charges but did cause him to miss three scheduled shifts. The ULJ asked Johnson whether
he knew why he was arrested, and he first replied “no, I do not.” After further questioning
by the ULJ, Johnson revealed the alleged offense.
The ULJ asked Johnson about his mother’s death which he described in his initial
unemployment-benefits application. Johnson responded:
That didn’t have anything to do with my firing or the situation
to be honest. I put that initia lly because I was being prideful,
and I didn’t want to say I got fire [d] to be honest. I just put, I
put that I quit, and I put that wa s the reason. And again, that
was because I was being prideful , but that had nothing to do
with me not attending to my job. No, it had nothing to do with
me not being there.

When asked why he said he quit in his appli cation, Johnson responded, “again, because I
was being prideful” which wa s “a dumb, dumb, dumb mistake of mine, filled out the
paperwork wrong based upon my pridefulness.”
The ULJ asked Johnson whether he had “contact with anybody in [his] circle while
[he was] in jail,” and he responded:
A: Um, honestly, yeah. I called, I did talk to one person, one
person literally, but I, I did not, I thought I was going to be out
the next day. I did not, I did no t expect to be sitting in my
boxers and go to jail right at that moment. So, yeah, I did talk
to one person because I have to let somebody know I was alive,
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but I literally thought I was going to be out the next day. I
didn’t know that it was going to end up like that. But yeah, I
did talk to one person, yes.

Q: Okay. And it never, you never brought up maybe, um, they
could reach out on your behalf.

A: Um, I was, I was too pridef ul. I thought I was gonna get
out, you know.

Q: Okay. Okay.

A: I didn’t want my employer to know I was in jail.

Both Johnson and a fitness director, who appeared on behalf of Fitness International,
testified that it was Johnson’s responsibility to report a missed shift to Fitness International.
The fitness director testified that this was part of Johnson’s training.
After the hearing, the ULJ determined that Johnson was ineligible for
unemployment benefits because his absences without notice to his employer amounted to
employment misconduct. Johnson filed a request for reconsideration arguing that he was
terminated for “job abandonm ent,” not employment miscon duct, and challenging the
ULJ’s unfavorable credibility determination.
The ULJ, in the order affi rming the decision, concluded that “[t]he credibility
determination is supported by the evidence,” and as for Johnson’s job-abandonment claim,
“[t]he employer does not label these actions as employment misconduct under its own
definition, but the conduct is still employment mi sconduct under Minnesota
Unemployment Insurance Law.” Johnson appeals.

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DECISION
We may reverse or modify a ULJ’s decision determinin g eligibility for
unemployment benefits “if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced
because the findings, inferences, conclusion , or decision are . . . (5) unsupported by
substantial evidence in view of the hearing record as submitted; or (6) arbitrary or
capricious.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020).
An unemployment-benefits applicant is ineligible for benefits if “the applicant was
discharged because of employment misconduct.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2020).
“Whether an employee engaged in cond uct that disqualifies the employee from
unemployment benefits is a mixed question of fact and law.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc.,
796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). We review whether a particular
act constitutes disqualifying misconduct de novo. Id. And we review whether the applicant
engaged in the conduct “in the light most favor able to the decision” and will “not disturb
those findings as long as there is evidence in the record that reasonably tends to sustain
them.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“Employment misconduct means any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct,
on the job or off the job, that is a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer
has the right to reasonably expect of the em ployee.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a)
(2020). “As a general rule, re fusing to abide by an empl oyer’s reasonable policies and
requests amounts to disqualifying misconduct.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d
801, 804 (Minn. 2002). An employer generally “has a right to expect an employee to work
when scheduled.” Del Dee Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 390 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Minn. App. 1986)
6
(quotation omitted). “An employer can reasonably expect an employee to keep it apprised
of his whereabouts.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The ULJ concluded that Johnson was discharged for employment misconduct after
finding that “Johnson was absent from three work shifts without notice”; he “had the ability
to notify his employer, with the assistance of the person he was in contact with while
incarcerated, and intentionally failed to do so because of pride”; and “Fitness International
has a reasonable expectation for employees to provide notice regarding missed shifts
through any means possible.” The ULJ’s findi ngs and conclusion are supported by the
record.
Johnson was arrested and held in custody for three days during which he was
scheduled to work. Johnson did not contact Fitness Internati onal until after his release.
The fitness director testified that Johnson was trained to contact Fitness International about
missing a shift. Fitness International did not hear from Johnson or anyone on his behalf
and, as a result, he was discharged for “j ob abandonment.” Johnson spoke to someone
while he was in custody, but he chose not to contact Fitness International about his absences
due to his pride and because he did not want his employer to know about his arrest.
Johnson contends that, due to his arrest, he could not contact Fitness International
about his absences, and theref ore, the ULJ erred by conclu ding this was employment
misconduct. But the ULJ did not find Jo hnson’s contention credible. “Credibility
determinations are the exclusive province of the ULJ and will not be disturbed on appeal.”
Bangtson v. Allina Med. Grp. , 766 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Min n. App. 2009) (quotation
omitted). Nevertheless, if th e credibility of a witness “has a significant effect on the
7
outcome of a decision, the [ULJ] must set out the reason for crediting or discrediting that
testimony.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2020).
The ULJ found that “Johnson demonstrat ed some credibility issues” based on his
providing “false information” in his un employment-benefits a pplication and being
“evasive” about “the details of his arrest” which “[a]ffect[ed] his overall credibility.”
Ultimately, the ULJ found that “Johnson had an opportunity to have someone contact his
employer but he intentionally did not do so because of his pr ide. Johnson cited his pride
similarly when he described providing false in formation when he applied to benefits.”
Because the ULJ set out the r easons for discrediting Johnson, which the record supports,
we will not disturb the credibility determination. Bangtson, 766 N.W.2d at 332.
Johnson also argues that the ULJ erred because he was discharged for “job
abandonment,” not employment misconduct, based on Fitness International’s own
definitions. Johnson’s argument is unpersuasive. The statute’s definition of “employment
misconduct” is “exclusive and no other de finition applies.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 6(e) (2020); see also Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 458 (Minn.
2016) (concluding that the statutory definiti on is exclusive). As already discussed,
Johnson’s conduct constitutes employment mi sconduct and his empl oyer’s definition of
employment misconduct has no authority in this proceeding.1

1 Johnson also asks us to “acknowledge” that the ULJ “coerc[ed]” him and demonstrated
“bias” against him when asking for details about his arrest. This court will reverse a ULJ’s
decision for failure to conduct a fair heari ng only if the ULJ em ployed an unlawful
procedure or conducted the hearing in an ar bitrary and capricious manner. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d)(3), (6) (2020); see also Wichmann v. Trav alia & U.S. Directives,
Inc., 729 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Minn. App. 2007). The ULJ’s questions were proper in
8
In sum, the ULJ did not err in concludi ng that Johnson’s behavior amounted to
employment misconduct when he did not notify his employer about his absences.
Affirmed.

developing a full record. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a (2020) (requiring ULJ to
issue “written findings of fact, reasons fo r decision, and decisi on,” which requires a
developed record).