In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Richard Allen Smuda.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0610

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Richard Allen Smuda.

Filed November 1, 2021
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-PR-19-2580

Malcolm Whynott, Whynott Law Office, PLLC, Wadena, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Noah A. Cashman, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith, Tracy
M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
On appeal from his commitment as both a sexually dangerous person (SDP) a nd a
sexual psychopathic personality (SPP), appellant argues that the record does not support
the district court’s determinations that he (a) engaged in a course of conduct sufficient to
justify his commitment under the SDP and SPP statutes, (b) has a sexual, personality, or
other mental disorder or dysfunction that prevents him from exercising adequate control
2
over his sexual impulses , (c) is highly likely to engage in future harmful sexual conduct,
and (d) has an utter lack of control over his sexual impulses. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 12, 2020, respondent Becker County filed a petition to civilly commit
appellant Richard Allen Smuda as a n SDP and an SPP. Smuda was already under
commitment as a person with mental illness at the time the SDP and SPP petition was filed.
The fact summary below is taken from the testimony and evidence presented at Smuda’s
SDP and SPP commitment trial.
The first known sexual assault by Smuda occurred in North Dakota in August 1986,
when Smuda sexually assaulted K.J., a 20-year-old female. On the day of th at assault,
Smuda invited K.J. to go on a drive with him. While on the drive, Smuda suggested that
they “make love.” When K.J. refused, Smuda drove to a secluded area down a back road.
Smuda then pulled a knife on K .J., ordered her to remove her clothes, and forced her to
perform oral sex on him. Smuda held the knife near K.J.’s face throughout the assault .
Smuda then warned K.J. that, if she reported the incident to the police, he would “get her.”
Smuda was charged with sexual assault and was found guilty of the offense at a trial held
in March 1987 .1 Smuda was sentenced to serve time in the North Dakota State
Penitentiary.
After his release from prison, Smuda sexually assaulted T.Y., a 27-year-old female,
in Oc tober 1990 . T.Y. met Smuda in September 1989, and the two began a romantic

1 Smuda also pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance and
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.
3
relationship. In December 1989, Smuda physically assaulted T.Y. and gave her two black
eyes. He regularly beat her once or twice a month after that. In the summer of 1990, T.Y.
began meeting with a counselor from the Rape and Abuse Center . Smuda regularly beat
her after she returned from counseling.
On the evening of October 5, Smuda and T.Y. got into an argument after T.Y.
refused to let Smuda borrow her car. Smuda became up set, but a neighbor was able to
calm him down. Smuda then told T.Y. he wanted to go for a drive. Smuda forced T.Y.
into the car and drove her to a secluded location. He then struck her face, causing her nose
to bleed, and ordered her to eat her own blood. Smuda next ordered T.Y. to put her hands
in a plastic bag and eat the contents; T.Y. reached inside and discovered that the bag was
full of fresh human feces. Smuda forced her to eat some of the feces and “to put some of
the feces on his penis and to perform fellatio on him and lick the feces off his penis.”
Smuda beat T.Y. during the sexual assault and she suffered injuries to her face and chest ,
including bruises, a possible broken nose, and blurred vision in her right eye . The assault
lasted approximately five hours, after which Smuda warned T.Y. not to report what had
happened.
T.Y. moved out of the trailer she shared with Smuda after the assault, telling Smuda
she was going to a pawn shop, but she never returned. Smuda discovered where she was
living, went to the location, threatened to kill her, and brandished a knife. T.Y. obtained a
no-contact order, which Smuda violated within two days of being served with the order.
Approximately a week after Smuda was arrested, the jail staff where he was being held
searched his cell and discovered a long, rambling letter that described in graphic detail the
4
sexual assault against T.Y. The letter blamed T.Y. for the assault, using sexually graphic
and demeaning language. Smuda pleaded guilty to the sexual and physical assault. He
was sentenced to eight years in prison . Smuda was placed on supervised release in July
1994, but his release was revoked on multiple occasions based on his failure to remain law-
abiding. Smuda was ultimately discharged from prison in August 1998 after his sentence
expired.
Smuda’s lengthy history of mental illness predates his first criminal sexual assault.
Smuda was first admitted to the North Dakota State Hospital (NDSH) for treatment of
psychiatric symptoms in February 1985. Smuda was admitted at least 13 more times to
NDSH over the years for a variety of reasons. Smuda has consistently exhibited delusional
and paranoid behavior, repeatedly claimed to be Jesus Christ, and displayed disorganiz ed
and irrational thoughts such as claiming “he could create a human being from walnuts and
apples.” When experiencing his mental-health symptoms, he often became aggressive and
violent, and assaulted girlfriends, his mother, and grandmother on several occasions. Early
diagnoses attributed this behavior to his marijuana use, but he later received numerous
mental-health diagnoses including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, substance -use
disorders, and antisocial personality disorder. He was prescribed Hald ol and other
medications to help treat his delusions and psychosis.
Smuda has either been in prison or subject to civil commitment almost continuously
since his imprisonment for the sexual assault of K.J. in 1987. After his discharge from
prison in August 1998 for the sexual assault of T.Y., he was convicted of felony theft and
returned to prison in February 1999. He was civilly committed as mentally ill for various
5
periods between November 1999 and June 2001. In June 2001, he was again convicted of
felony theft and was returned to prison, where he remained until 2004 due to another
conviction for felony assault on a correctional officer. Then, from March 2004 until April
2011, Smuda was civilly committed to NDSH as a “sexually dangerous individual.”2 He
returned to prison in April 2011 after being convicted of assaulting an employee at NDSH.
His commitment as a sexually dangerous individual continued after his release from prison
in December 2015 . He remained civilly committed at NDSH as a sexually dangerous
individual until July 2019 , after the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district
court’s most recent recommitment order.3 Smuda never completed sex-offender treatment
during his commitment at NDSH.
While in prison and in civil commitment, Smuda repeatedly engaged in
inappropriate sexual behavior directed at female staff members. Smuda habitually exposed
himself and masturbat ed in the presence of female correctional staff. The first reported
instance of this behavior occurred in April 1999, when a female correctional officer

2 North Dakota’s sex -offender civil -commitment statute uses the terminology “sexually
dangerous individual.” N.D. Cent. Code § 25-03.3-01.8 (2020).

3 In May 2018, Smuda petitioned for discharge from his civil commitment at NDSH.
Following a hearing, the district court denied the petition. In denying the petition, the
district court cited Smuda’s refusal to take his medication on two occasions as evidence of
his inability to control his actions. Smuda appealed the denial of his petition for discharge,
and in June 2019, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that Smuda’s refusal to take
his medication as prescribed on two occasions did “not establish a serious difficulty
controlling behavior” and reversed the denial of Smuda’s discharge petition for “lack of
findings sufficient to conclude the due process requirement has been met.” In re R.A.S.,
930 N.W.2d 162, 164, 166 (N.D. 2019). A new petition to extend his commitment was not
filed and Smuda was released from NDSH.
6
reported that Smuda was masturbating while she was doing rounds, and that it was obvious
to her that he intended her to see his behavior. The district court identified dozens of
subsequent occasions over the course of the next decade and a half in which Smuda
repeated this behavior and either exposed himself or masturbated in the presence of female
staff. As a result of this behavior, Smuda was cited with and punished for sexual
harassment and indecent exposure on multiple occasions.
Smuda also wrote sexually graphic and inappropriate letters to female staff. In
October 1994, Smuda wrote two such letters to his former correctional therapist. And in
April 2001, Smuda sent a long, extremely graphic letter to a counselor at the North Dakota
State Penitentiary who had previously worked with Smuda. The counselor had not worked
with Smuda for over two years when he sent the letter. The counselor reported the letter
to the Fargo Police Department.
Smuda also has a long history of physically assaulting law -enforcement officers,
correctional officers, and state hospital employees. Between 1990 and 2012, Smuda was
convicted of at least four assaults against different officers and hospital staff members. For
example, in 2011, Smuda was sentenced to five and one-half years in prison after he was
convicted of physically assaulting an NDSH employee.
The relapse prevention plan developed by Smuda upon his discharge from NDSH
provided that he would return to Minnesota to live with his mother in Detroit Lakes and
would stay on his medications. Smuda did move to Detroit Lakes to live with his mother,
but soon began to exhibit bizarre behavior. For example, he was observed wandering into
several residential yards, was issued a trespass notice at a casino, and went into a local
7
bank, speaking irrationally and claiming that he was sticking up the bank . When law
enforcement responded to a call from the bank, Smuda informed them that he had stopped
taking his medication for bipolar disorder.
In early October 2019, less than three months after Smuda’s discharge from NDSH,
Smuda’s mother called law enforcement and told the m that Smuda was behaving
irrationally and throwing food around because he believed it was poison. She reported that
he had stopped taking his medication and requested that he be placed on a 72 -hour
psychiatric hold. Before law enforcement arrived at the residence, Smuda began stabbing
the refrigerator with a knife and scissors. Smuda put down the knife and scissors when law
enforcement arrived, but physically resisted going with the officers. Law enforcement
transported Smuda to a hospital, where Smuda began rambling about a family member who
he claimed visited him during the night and then vanished. Smuda also claimed that people
were trying to contact him through fluorescent lights.
A doctor applied for an emergency psychiatric hold pendin g the filing of a petition
to commit Smuda as a person with mental illness . Smuda was then transferred to a
psychiatric unit at a hospital, where he continued to exhibit delusional behavior and
indicated that he believed the world was ending. The district court civilly committed
Smuda as a person with mental ill ness on October 11, 2019 . The district court later
authorized the involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication and , in March 2020 ,
continued the civil commitment for an additional 12 month s. The SDP and SPP petition
was filed while Smuda was still under commitment as a person with mental illness.
8
After the SDP and SPP petition was filed in May 2020, the district court appointed
Dr. James Alsdurf as the first court-appointed examiner and, at Smuda’s request, appointed
Dr. James Gilbertson as the second court -appointed examiner. The hearing on the SDP
and SPP commitment petition was held in November 2020. Dr. Alsdurf, Dr. Gilbertson,
Smuda, Smuda’s mother, and Smuda’s brother all testified at the hearing.
Dr. Alsdurf testified that Smuda met the criteria to be committed as both an SDP
and SPP . Dr. Gilbertson was more guarded in his opinion and testified that it was
“arguable” that Smuda met the criteria for commitment as an SDP and SPP. Neither expert
opined that Smuda failed to meet the criteria for commitment under either the SDP or SPP
statutes. Smuda presented no expert testimony or reports in opposition to the court -
appointed examiners.
After the conclusion of the hearing, t he district court issued an order civilly
committing Smuda as both an SDP and SPP. In doing so , the district court found both
examiners to be credible, but found that Dr. Alsdurf was generally more credible . The
district court noted that Dr. Gilbertson had a previous relationship with Smuda from a prior
proceeding, incorrectly identified the cut -off age for conduct disorder as a precursor for a
diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder, and did not conduct a separate analysis of
individual risk factors when evaluating Smuda, whereas Dr. Alsdurf did not have a
previous relationship with Smuda, correctly identified the cut-off age, conducted a separate
analysis of ind ividual risk factors, used multiple risk -assessment instruments in his
evaluation, and more “clearly testified regarding Smuda’s risk and diagnoses.” Smuda
now appeals.
9
DECISION
I. The record supports the district court’s determination that Smuda meets the
statutory criteria for commitment as an SDP.

Smuda argues that the record does not support the district court’s determination that
he meets the criteria for commitment as an SDP. A person is a sexually dangerous person
if he:
(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct . . . ;
(2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other
mental disorder or dysfunction; and
(3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful
sexual conduct . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16(a) (2020). To satisfy the third requirement, there must be
evidence that the person is not just “likely” to engage in future acts of harmful sexual
conduct, but is “highly likely” to do so. In re Civil Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13,
20-22 (Minn. 2014).
We review a district court’s factual findings on the elements of the civil -
commitment statutes for clear error. In re Civil Commitment of Stone , 711 N.W.2d 831,
836 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2006). Appellate courts “will not
conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Commitment of
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted). As a result, an appellate
court must “fully and fairly consider the evidence, but so far only as is necessary to
determine [whether that evidence] reasonably tends to support the findings of the
factfinder.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted).
10
When the findings of fact are based “almost entirely on expert testimony, the
[district] court’s evaluation of credibility is of particular significance. ” In re Knops, 536
N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). But whether the evidence is sufficient to meet the statutory
requirements for commitment is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. In
re Civil Commitment of Crosby , 824 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 27, 2013).
Smuda challenges the district court’s determination r elating to all three of the
statutory requirements for commitment as an SDP. We address each of his arguments
below.
A. Course of Harmful Sexual Conduct
The first statutory requirement for commitment as an SDP is that Smuda “ has
engaged in a course of h armful sexual conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16(a)(1).
“Harmful sexual conduct” is defined as “sexual conduct that creates a substantial likelihood
of serious physical or emotional harm to another.” Id., subd. 8(a) (2020). A “course of
conduct” is defined by its ordinary meaning, which is a “systemic or orderly succession; a
sequence.” In re Civil Commitment of Ramey , 648 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn. App. 2002)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2002). To determine whether an offender
has engaged in a “course of harmful sexual conduct,” a court should consider “both conduct
for which the offender was convicted and conduct that did not result in a conviction. ”
Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 837.
Smuda concedes that his convictions for sexually assaulting K.J. and T.Y. “clearly
meet the presumption that the victims suffered physical or emotional harm” under Minn.
11
Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 8(b) (2020). But he argues that those two convictions were his only
“hands-on sexual offenses ” and that there are no subsequent “ allegations of hands -on
harmful sexual conduct” against him. He acknowledges that the “decades of treatment
records and prison logs” contain reports of “potentially offensive sexual behavior,” but
argues that “[n]one of these observed behaviors involved any physical contact or physical
harm.” He maintains that the district court’s finding that these behaviors were part of a
course of harmful sexual conduct is thus clearly erroneous.
We disagree. As noted above, the court may take into consideration not only
conduct that resulted in convictions , but also conduct that did not. Id. And there is no
requirement that the conduct must be “hands -on.” The definition of “[h]armful sexual
conduct” includes not only harmful conduct that creates a substantial risk of physical harm,
but also that which “creates a substantial likelihood of serious . . . emotional harm.” Minn.
Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 8(a). And, as this court has stated, “The standard is not that it must
create physical or emotional harm; rather, there must be a substantial likelihood of harm.”
Ramey, 648 N.W.2d at 269. Here, the record supports the district court’s finding that
Smuda’s conduct in repeatedly exposing himself and masturbating in front of, and writing
extremely graphic letters to , female staff created a substantial likelihood of emotional
harm.
Dr. Alsdurf, for example, testified how Smuda’s conduct in exposing himself and
masturbating in front of female staff communicated to the staff that Smuda was willing to
“ignore rules and ignore any kind of appropriate behavior ,” and that there was a “sense of
threat” attached to the behavior that “can really be quite tormenting and persistent for
12
people.” Dr. Alsdurf ultimately opined that he believed Smuda had engaged in a course of
harmful sexual conduct. This testimony was credited by the district court and supports the
finding that Smuda engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct. As an appellate court,
we defer to the credibility determinations of the district court and may not engage in
reweighing evidence. Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 839.
Finally, we note that Smuda has mostly been confined either in prison or in a secure
hospital setting since he was con victed of the sexual assault of T.Y. He thus lacked the
opportunity to commit additional “hands -on” assaults. See In re Pirkl, 531 N.W.2d 902,
909-10 (Minn. App. 1995) ( concluding individual who had been in prison for nine years
and thus had no recent sexual assaults , was nevertheless found to be at high risk for
committing future sexual violence if returned to the community), rev. denied (Minn. Aug.
30, 1995). And his sexual conduct directed at female staff while confined was consistent
for over a decade, supporting the finding that it constituted a “course” of conduct. We
therefore conclude that the record supports the district court’s determination tha t Smuda
engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct.
B. Sexual, Personality, or Other Mental Disorder or Dysfunction
The second requirement for commitment as an SDP is that the individual “ has
manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction.” Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.02, subd. 16(a)(2). The statute does not require that “the person has an inability to
control the person’s sexual impulses.” Id., subd. 16(b) (2020). Rather, the mental disorder
or dysfunction must prevent the individual from exercising adequate control over his sexual
impulses. In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 876-78 (Minn. 1999) (Linehan IV).
13
On the second requirement, t he district court found that “[b]oth doctors credibly
opined and testified that Smuda has mental, sexual, or personality disorders or dysfunctions
within the meaning of the statute and that he lacks adequate control of his sexual impulses.”
Dr. Alsdurf diagnosed Smuda with “Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type; Paraphilia,
NOS, and Non-consenting, Sadistic, Exhibitionist, and Coprophilic Features; Antisocial
Personality Disorder, with Additional Narcissistic Features; Alcohol Use Disorder by
History; Cannabis Use Disorder by History; Cannabis-Induced Psychotic Disorder; Brief
Psychotic Disorder by History; and Hypersexuality.” He also noted that Smuda exhibits
“extreme dysregulation when presented with opportunities to act out sexually no matter
how inappropriate or aggressive.” Dr. Gilbertson similarly diagnosed Smuda with a history
of coprophilia, a history of indecent exposure and paraphilic exhibitionism, antisocial
personality features, and substance -use disorders, and acknowledged that they impact ed
his sexual behavior. This credited testimony supports the district court’s finding, and we
therefore discern no error in the district court’s determination that Smuda met the second
requirement for commitment as an SDP.
C. Highly Likely to Engage in Future Harmful Sexual Conduct
To satisfy the third requirement for commitment as an SDP, the person must be
“highly likely” to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct in the future. Ince, 847 N.W.2d
at 20-22. To determine whether a person is highly likely to reoffend, a district court must
engage in a “multi -factor analysis.” Id. at 23. The multi -factor analysis includes
consideration of the following six factors, known as the Linehan factors:
14
(a) the person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
education, etc.); ( b) the person’s history of violent behavior
(paying particular attention to recency, severity, and frequency
of violent acts); (c) the base rate statistics for violent behavior
among individuals of this person’s backgro und ( e.g., data
showing the rate at which rapists recidivate, the correlation
between age and criminal sexual activity, etc.); (d) the sources
of stress in the environment (cognitive and affective factors
which indicate that the person may be predisposed to cope with
stress in a violent or nonviolent manner); ( e) the similarity of
the present or future context to those contexts in which the
person has used violence in the past; and (f) the person’s record
with respect to sex therapy programs.

Id. at 22 (quoting In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994) (Linehan I)). The
multi-factor analysis may include other relevant evidence and information and includes the
actuarial-assessment evidence used by the experts. Id. at 24. No single factor i s
determinative. In re Civil Commitment of Navratil , 799 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. App.
2011), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011).
Here, the district court made findings on each of the Linehan factors. The district
court ultimately found that the factors all supported a finding that Smuda was highly likely
to engage in future harmful sexual conduct. Both examiners also addressed the Linehan
factors in their reports , and the district court credited the opinions of the examiners that
Smuda was at a high likelihood to reoffend.
Smuda argues that the record does not support the district court’s finding because
Dr. Gilbertson testified that one of the instruments, the Static-99R, “was not able to make
any prediction as to Mr. Smuda’s likelihood to reoffend.” His argument focuses on the
third Linehan factor—the base rate statistics of violent behavior among other individuals
of the same background . But when addressin g this factor , the district court specifically
15
credited Dr. Alsdurf’s conclusion that such statistics do “predict a high likelihood to
reoffend in the future.” The district court found Dr. Alsdurf particularly credible and
persuasive “due to his use of mu ltiple methods of risk assessment, knowledge of the
instruments, and cohesion of his opinion.” Knops, 536 N.W.2d at 620 (stating that we
defer to the district court’s credibility determinations).
The district court’s determination is thus supported in th e record and we therefore
affirm the district court’s conclusion that Smuda met the statutory criteria for civil
commitment as an SDP.
II. The record also supports Smuda’s commitment as an SPP.
Smuda next challenges the district court’s determination that he met the statutory
criteria for commitment as an SPP. To commit a person as an SPP, the state must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the person (1) has such “conditions of emotional
instability,” impulsive behavior, “lack of customary standards of good judgment,” “failure
to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any of these
conditions, which render the person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to
sexual matters”; (2) has “a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters ”; (3) has “an
utter lack of power to control ” his sexual impulses; and (4) “as a result , is dangerous to
other persons.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 15 (2020). Smuda argues that the district
court clearly erred in concluding that he has “an utter lack of power to control” his sexual
impulses.4

4 Smuda further argues that the record does not support the district court’s determination
that he engaged in “a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters.” S muda combined
16
Minnesota caselaw has identified factors to consider in determining whether a
person has an “utter lack of power to control” his sexual impulses, including:
the nature and frequency of the sexual assaults, the degree of
violence involved, the relationship . . . between the offender
and the victims, the offender’s attitude and mood, the
offender’s medical and family history, the resu lts of
psychological and psychiatric testing and evaluation, and such
other factors that bear on the predatory sex impulse and the
lack of power to control it.

In re Blodgett , 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994). Other caselaw factors include the
person’s need for security, chemical-dependency issues, history of flight, and need for sex-
offender treatment. See Pirkl, 531 N.W.2d at 907-08; In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 375
(Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 1995); In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d
525, 529-30 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1994).
The district court analyzed the relevant factors and found that the factors supported
the determination that Smuda had an “utter lack of power to control” his sexual impulses.
The district court noted that Smuda continued to act out sexually even while being
confined. The district court’s conclusions are supported by the testimony of both
examiners, whose testimony the district court found to be “credible and persuasive” on this
issue.
We note that Smuda challenges the district court’s reliance on Dr. Alsdurf’s opinion
on the grounds that he believes Dr. Alsdurf’s opinion failed to place proper weight on the

this argument with his assertion that the record does not support the determination that he
engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct for purposes of commitment as an SDP.
We reject this argument for the same reasons expressed in section I.A. of this opinion.
17
facts that are helpful to Smuda. But as noted above, it is not for this court to reweigh
credibility determinations made by the district court. Knops, 536 N.W.2d at 620; In re
Civil Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn.
June 20, 2017). We therefore defer to the district court’s determination that Dr. Alsdurf’s
testimony was credible.
Finally, the district court did not just rely on the expert reports in reaching its
conclusion. The court, for example, expressed concern at Smuda’s lack of any insight into
his condition and how quickly he went off his medications and decompensated after his
release back into the c ommunity from his commitment at NDSH. 5 It took less than three
months before Smuda’s condition deteriorated to the point that his mother called law
enforcement and requested that he be placed on an emergency psychiatric hold. The district
court found that Smuda “minimized his behavior when he was off his medications in the
community in 2019” and that, less than three months after his release from NDSH, “he was
out of control, had a knife, and was stabbing appliances in his mother’s house.” The district
court also found it concerning that Smuda denied his history of sexual assaults at trial, and
refused to acknowledge that he is a sex offender or poses any risk of reoffense.
Based on the evidence in the record, we discern no error by the district court in
concluding that Smuda met the statutory criteria for civil commitment as an SPP.
Affirmed.

5 The district court specifically noted that “it only took Smuda two or three weeks to stop
taking his medications” after his release from NDSH. This occurred despite committing
in his own relapse prevention plan that he would stay on his medications.