Peter Devonn Crosby, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0622

Peter Devonn Crosby, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 22, 2021
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-7670

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramse y County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
In this appeal from an order denying postconviction relief in which appellant
challenged his sentence for second -degree intentional murder, appellant argues that the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward durational
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departure based on his argument that his intellectual disability mitigated his culpability.
We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2018, appellant Peter Devonn Crosby pleaded guilty to second -degree
intentional murder. The state agreed to limit its sentencing recommenda tion to 261
months’ imprisonment, the low end of the presumptive range, and Crosby reserved his right
to argue for a downward durational departure.
As part of the factual basis for his plea, Crosby testified that on September 29, 2017,
he and two of his cousins were drinking alcohol at a bar. While in the parking lot, Crosby
and one of his cousins began talking to the victim. Crosby testified that the victim “said
some things” about his cousin’s father who had recently passed that “were not pleasant
things.” Angered by the victim’s comments, Crosby shot him in in the back of the head,
knowing that it would kill him. Crosby stated that he shot the victim “because he was
being real rude about my uncle’s death.” Crosby also agreed that he knew he was kill ing
the victim and that he intentionally caused the victim’s death. Crosby then spent the night
at his cousin’s house. The next day, he traveled to his sister’s house in Wisconsin by taxi
and then returned to his home in Illinois. At some point, he threw the murder weapon into
Lake Michigan.
In December 2018, Crosby moved for a downward durational departure based on
the following grounds: (1) he lacked the capacity for judgment when he committed the
murder because of his mental impairment; (2) he was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of
the offense which mitigated his culpability; (3) his guilty plea saved time and expense; and
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(4) he demonstrated remorse and accepted responsibility. The state opposed the motion,
arguing for the low-end-of-the-presumptive-range prison sentence of 261 months.
In support of his motion, Crosby referenced his presentence psychological
evaluation in which the evaluator determined that he had an IQ of 64. The evaluator noted
that Crosby’s cognitive testing suggested that he ha d impairments related to intellectual
functioning. However, the evaluator questioned the veracity of the results based on his
opinion that Crosby may be over -endorsing his impairments. The evaluator gave a rule -
out diagnosis for borderline intellectual f unctioning and concluded that while Crosby
exhibited functioning generally consistent with an intellectual disability, the veracity of the
results was questionable.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court denied Crosby’s motion for a downward
durational departure and sentenced him to 261 months in prison. The district court noted
that the defense failed to “cite anything about the nature and seriousness of what [Crosby]
did that justifie[d] a departure.” Regarding Crosby’s request for a departure based on
mental impairment, the district court found that there was “no suggestion in the
record . . . or in [the psychological evaluator’s report] that [Crosby’s] intellectual
functioning was so impaired that it interfered with [his] capacity fo r judgment at the time
of the offense.” The district court noted that Crosby’s history of “gainful employment
including operating large machinery” suggests “some level of judgment and skill.” The
district court also found that the record was “devoid of a ny evidence that [Crosby] had an
impairment in [his] ability to understand and appreciate that [his] actions were wrong.”
After considering the psychological evaluator’s “concern about the veracity of [Crosby’s]
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interview and the testing results,” the district court concluded that Crosby did not have “an
extreme mental illness or mental impairment.”
In December 2020, Crosby filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the
district court abused its discretion by (1) denying his departure motio n because his
intellectual disability “clearly mitigated his culpability” and (2) imposing an unauthorized
fine of $50.00. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court vacated
the fine as unlawfully applied and denied Crosby’s motion f or a downward durational
departure. This appeal follows.
DECISION
The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Crosby’s
petition for postconviction relief.
Crosby argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by concluding that
he did not have a mental impairment; by evaluating his departure motion based on his
intellectual disability using standards developed for departure motions based on menta l
illnesses; and by concluding that he did not demonstrate a nexus between his impairment
and the offense.
“We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion. A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion
in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or
made clearly erroneous factual findings. Legal issues are reviewed de novo, but . . . we do
not reverse the postconviction court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Pearson
v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017) (citation, quotations, and alterations omitted).
5
“We ‘afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and
reverse sentencing decisions onl y for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto , 855
N.W.2d 303, 307 -08 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Spain , 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn.
1999)). “[A] sentencing court can exercise its discretion to depart from the guidelines only
if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present, and those circumstances provide a
substantial and compelling reason not to impose a guidelines sentence.” Id. at 308
(quotations and citations omitted). Only in a “rare” case will an appellate court reverse a
sentencing court’s refusal to depart. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
“The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for felony
offenses.” State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016) (citing Minn. Stat.
§ 224.09, subd. 5 (2 014)). “The sentencing guidelines seek to ‘maintain uniformity,
proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing ’ of felony crimes. ” Id.
(quoting Minn . Stat. § 224.09, subd. 5 (2014)). Accordingly, “departures from the
guidelines are disco uraged and are intended to apply to a small number of cases. ” Id.
(citing State v. Misquadace , 644 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. 2002)). The district court “may
depart from the presumptive sentence only when there are ‘identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances to support a departure. ’” Id. (quoting Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.D.1.). Durational departures “must be based on factors that reflect the seriousness of the
offense, not the characteristics of the offender.” Id. at 623-24 (citing State v. Chaklos, 528
N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 1995)).
Crosby argues that the sentencing guidelines include two mitigating factors relevant
to this appeal; first, when “the offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked
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substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed,” Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.2(a)(3); and second, where “other substantial grounds exist that tend to
excuse or mitigate the offender’s culpability, although not amounting to a defense. Id. at
2.D.2(a)(5).
To establish a mitigating factor based on a physical or mental impairment, a
defendant must establish the existence of a physical or mental impairment and demonstrate
that because of the impairment, the defendant “lacked substantial capacity for judgment
when the offense was committed. ” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(3). Crosby cites to
several cases in which courts have granted a downward durational departure based on t his
mitigating factor. State v. Martinson, 671 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Minn. App. 2003) (granting
a downward duration al departure where defendant suffered from “the psychosis of
paranoid schizophrenia ”); State v. Barsness , 473 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Minn. App. 1991)
(affirming downward durational departure where defendant was suffering from major
depression at the time of the offense); State v. Wall, 343 N.W.2d 22 , 25 (Minn. 1984)
(reversing district court’s imposition of upward durational departure where defendant had
a nearly 20 -year documented history of mental illness that included hospitalization and
civil commitment); State v. Hennum , 441 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Minn. 1989) (affirming
downward duration al departure where defendant suffered from alcohol dependence,
psychoneurotic depression, and an antisocial -personality disorder). However, unlike the
defendants in these cases who suffered from a mental illness, Crosby suffered from a low
IQ and nonspecific learning disability. Thus, these cases are not dispositive here.
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Crosby next cites to Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304 (2002) in support of his
argument that that a downward durational departure is appropriate because his “intellectual
disability constituted a substantial and compelling circumstance” supporting a downward
durational departure. In Atkins, the United States Supreme Court determined that the death
penalty is not appropriate for “mentally retarded” defendants because such a punishment
would be excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 321. In that case, the
Supreme Court explained that “subaverage intellectual functioning” alone is not enough to
reduce criminal culpability and that “significant limitations in adaptive skills such as
communication, self-care, and self-direction” that manifested before age 18 must also be
present. Id. at 318.
Crosby then cites to secondary authority, which proposed a three -prong test for
determining whether a defendant who has an intellectual disability should be subject to the
death penalty based on the holding in Atkins: “(1) significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning, (2) deficits in adaptive functioning, and (3) onset during the developmental
period.” See John H. Blume et. al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual
Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years After the Supreme Court’s Creation of a
Categorical Bar, 23 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 393, 400 (2014). Crosby explains that full -
scale IQ is the primary crit ical measure to the first prong. Crosby contends that his
psychological evaluation contains evidence related to all three prongs of the test because it
stated that he had a subaverage IQ and a nonspecific learning disability and that he started
receiving special-education services and social-security-disability payments in elementary
school. Thus, he argues that he demonstrated that he has an intellectual disability.
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Here, the postconviction court found that while Crosby established his low IQ, he
failed to establish a “deficit in adaptive functioning that impacted culpability or the
seriousness of the offense.” The court concluded that even under the test he proposed,
Crosby “is not a person with an intellectual/mental disability .” We agree with the
postconviction court and note that Crosby’s contention that his mental impairment supports
a downward duration al departure is further undermined by the psychological evaluator’s
conclusion that Crosby may have exaggerated his symptoms, making him question the
veracity of the evaluation results.
Crosby next argues that the postconviction court erred by evaluating hi s case using
standards that were developed for departure motions based on mental illnesses.
Specifically, he argues that the court erred in concluding that his intellectual disability was
not extreme enough to be considered a mitigating factor under the s entencing guidelines
because it incorrectly applied the standard articulated in State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d
703, 716 (Minn. 2007). In that case, the court stated that “[a]s to mental illness, we have
held that in order to constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, a defendant’s impairment
must be ‘extreme’ to the point that it deprives the defendant of control over his actions.”
Id. Crosby contends that this “standard” should not have been applied to his case because
it “expressly addresses mental illness and says nothing about intellectual disabilities.”
Thus, he contends that we should apply the three -prong test for intellectual disabilities
stated above rather than the McLaughlin standard.
However, the three -prong test for intellectual disabi lities has not been adopted by
the Minnesota Legislature or Supreme Court, and “the task of extending existing law” does
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not fall on this court. Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987), rev.
denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987); see In re Welfar e of J.P.-S., 880 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn.
App. 2016) (quoting this aspect of Tereault) (“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to
the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.”) . Furthermore, the
test proposed by Crosby is meant to address intellectual disabilities in the context of death-
penalty cases. Because that is not the issue here and because Minnesota does not have the
death penalty, we fail to see how Crosby’s proposed test is applicable to the facts at hand .
Therefore, we decline to apply Crosby’s proposed test here.
Furthermore, the record does not support Crosby’s contention that the district court
abused its discretion by applying the McLaughlin standard to this case. Rather, our review
is consistent with the district court’s finding that the record is “devoid of any evidence that
[Crosby] had an impairment in [his] ability to understand and appreciate that [his] actions
were wrong.” Crosby stated both that he knew the gunshots would kill the victim and that
he intended to kill him , undercutting his assertion that his intellectual disability impaired
his ability to understand or control his actions at the time of the offense.
Finally, the state argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Crosby’s request for a downward durational departure based on his intellectual disability
because an intellectual disability is an offender -specific characteristic. The state cites to
State v. Rund in support of this argument. 896 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2017). In Rund, the
defendant argued that his mental -health issues, among other reasons, justified the district
court’s downward durational sentencing departure. Id. at 534 -35. The supreme court
disagreed, stating in a footnote that “mental impai rment is an offender -related
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characteristic that cannot justify a downward durational departure.” Id. at 534 n.11. The
supreme court reversed the downward durational sentencing departure and remanded for
imposition of a presumptive sentence. Id. at 529.
Here, like the defendant’s mental -health issues in Rund, Crosby’s “intellectual
disability” is “an offender -related characteristic.” Id. at 534 n. 11. Therefore, Crosby’s
intellectual disability did not require the district court to impose a downward durational
departure.
Crosby argues that Rund does not apply to this case because “it is well -established
that substantially impaired judgment at the time of the offense is an offense -related
characteristic” and because the footnote in Rund is not sufficient to overturn that precedent.
Crosby acknowledges that his intellectual disability might factor into an offender -specific
dispositional departure analysis but argues that “it also relate[s] back to his offense because
it affected his capacity for judgment and accordingly, his culpability.”
The postconviction court considered this argument, finding that Crosby “offered
nothing but surmise and assumptions” regarding the impact of his diagnosis on his capacity
for judgment at the time of the offense. The postconviction court also stated that
A requirement that the impairment be “extreme” serves to
ensure a nexus between the condition and its impact on the
conduct leading to the offense. For purposes of the sentencing
guidelines and downward departure jurisprudence, the key is
not the impairing condition but how that condition manifested
itself at the time of the offense.

Our review of the record supports the postconviction court’s findings and
conclusion. Because Crosby has not established that this is the “rare case” in which this
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court should reverse the district court’s refusal to grant a sentencing departure, we
determine that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Crosby’s
petition for a downward durational departure. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
Affirmed.