Anthony Richmond, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0624

Anthony Richmond,
Relator,

vs.

Vanden Hoak Cleaning,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed February 28, 2022
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 43180317-3

Anthony Richmond, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se relator)

VandenHoak Cleaning, Minnetonka, Minnesota (respondent-employer)

Keri Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Department of Employment and Economic Development,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent-department)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Relator challenges the decision of an une mployment-law judge (ULJ) that relator
was ineligible for unemploymen t benefits because he was discharged for employment
misconduct. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Anthony Richmond worked as a commercial cleaner for respondent
VandenHoek Cleaning.1 Richmond’s assignment wa s at Creganna Medical, a
manufacturer of medical products, mainly cath eters. The products are manufactured in a
“clean room,” meaning that they have a particulate count in the environment. Before the
particles in the air are counted, the room must be free of dust accumulation.
Richmond cleaned the “dirty side” of the gowning room, which is the entryway to
the clean room where individuals put on a gown , booties, and a hairnet. He was also
required to complete a logbook when he cleaned in a clean room because Creganna had to
account to its customers. Va ndenHoek terminated Richmond after Creganna complained
that Richmond failed to adequately clean the gowning room or complete logbook entries.
Richmond established an unemploymen t-benefits account with respondent
Minnesota Department of Employment an d Economic Development (DEED). DEED
issued a determination of eligibility, which VandenHoek appealed.

1 The name of the employer is spelled differe ntly throughout the f ilings. The accurate
spelling appears to be VandenHoek.
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At a hearing before a ULJ, Matt Gulling, the owner and president of VandenHoek,
testified that he was Richmond’s superviso r. He stated that Richmond was a good
employee until Richmond requested to discuss his pay and the conversation did not go as
Richmond wanted. Several days later, Gulli ng received Creganna’s complaint regarding
Richmond’s job performance. Gulling attempted to talk to Richmond about the complaint.
Gulling testified that Richmond “listened to about half of what [Gulling] said, and then he
just kind of walked away.” About one week later, another supervisor attempted to talk to
Richmond. But Richmond also walked away from him. At that point, it was decided that
the employer was unable to communicate with Richmond to give him constructive
criticism.
Richmond testified that Gulling approached him to talk about the logbook, but not
cleaning. Richmond stated that he did no t walk away from Gulling because Gulling sent
him a text message. Richmond stated that he talked to the other supervisor about the issues
but stated that the conversation was difficult because his supervisor was “mumbling . . .
and pointing.” He claimed that his supervisors lied when they stated that he walked away
from them. Richmond stated that he did not have trouble cleaning and, although he did not
understand how to complete the logbooks correctly, he nonetheless completed them.
Richmond also stated that th is occurred during the pandem ic, and VandenHoek was not
doing its part to keep its employees safe.
The ULJ decided that Richmond was in eligible for unemployment benefits,
concluding that Richmond was discharg ed for employment misconduct because
VandenHoek had the right to reasonably expect Richmond to perform his work duties. The
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ULJ found that Richmond was not satisfied with the employer’s response to his complaint
about his pay. Soon after, Creganna comp lained about Richmond’ s work performance.
Supervisors attempted to address the issue with Richmond, but Ri chmond walked away
during the conversations. The ULJ found that, although Richmond disputed that he failed
to adequately perform his work duties, his testimony was not credible “because he did not
provide as much information or detail as [VandenHoek] did” and failed to provide evidence
to support his claim that the supervisors fals ely stated that Richmo nd walked away from
them.
Richmond requested reconsideration, cl aiming that he did his job well, his
supervisors lied when they asserted that he walked away from them, and the employer
failed to address COVID-19 related health c oncerns he raised. The ULJ affirmed the
decision. This certiorari appeal followed.
DECISION
When reviewing the decision of the UL J, this court may remand for further
proceedings, or reverse or modi fy it if the substantial rights of the relator have been
prejudiced because the findings, inferences, c onclusion, or decision ar e: “(1) in violation
of constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of th e statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
department; (3) made upon unlawful procedur e; (4) affected by other error of law;
(5) unsupported by substantial ev idence in view of the hearing record as submitted; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020).
This court views “the ULJ’s factual findi ngs in the light most favorable to the
decision, giving deference to the credibility determinations made by the ULJ. In doing so,
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we will not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when the evidence s ubstantially sustains
them.” Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc. , 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Min n. App. 2006) (citations
omitted).
An employee is ineligible for benefits if he “was discharged because of employment
misconduct.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2020). “Employment misconduct means
any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job, that is a serious
violation of the standards of behavior the em ployer has the right to reasonably expect of
the employee.” Id., subd. 6(a) (2020). “W hether an employee engaged in conduct that
disqualifies the employee from unemployment be nefits is a mixed que stion of fact and
law.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Whether a particular act constitutes disqualifying misconduct is reviewed de novo. Id. The
conclusion that the employee committed a partic ular act is reviewed in the light most
favorable to the decision and should not be disturbed so long as the conclusion is
reasonably supported by the evidence. Id.
“As a general rule, refusi ng to abide by an employer’s reasonable policies and
requests amounts to disqualifying misconduct.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d
801, 804 (Minn. 2002). When an employee knowingly violates an employer’s instructions
and directives, such action amounts to empl oyment misconduct because it is a willful
disregard of the employer’s interests. Id. at 806. “An employee [also] has the duty to meet
with the employee’s supervisor to discu ss complaints regardi ng the employee’s job
performance.” Snodgrass v. Oxford Props., Inc., 354 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Minn. App. 1984).
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Thus, an employee’s insubordination in refusing to cooperate with or take direction from
a supervisor may constitute disqualifying employment misconduct. Id. at 79-80.
The ULJ determined that Ri chmond was discharged for employment misconduct
because VandenHoek had the right to reasonably expect Richmond to adequately complete
his work duties and discuss performance issu es professionally. Based on caselaw, these
acts constitute disqualify misconduct.
The ULJ’s findings that Ri chmond committed the acts are supported by the
evidence. Gulling testified that Creganna complained that Richmond failed to adequately
clean the gowning room and se nt Gulling photographs of dust and failed to complete the
logbook. Richmond testified th at he cleaned adequately and completed the logbooks but
may not have completed them correctly.
The ULJ found Gulling to be more credib le than Richmond, specifically because
the performance issues surfaced after Richmond was not satisfied with discussions about
his pay. Additionally, Richmond was discha rged because the employer was unable to
communicate with him. The ULJ found Gulling to be more credible concerning this issue
because Richmond failed to explain why his supervisors would falsely claim that he walked
away from them during performance discussions. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a)
(2020) (stating that if witne ss credibility “has a significant effect on the outcome of a
decision, the [ULJ] must set out the reason for crediting or discrediting that testimony”).
Richmond claims that he was discharged because “he was concerned about his
health.” This appears to be a reference to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, he raised
this issue at the hearing before the ULJ but o ffered no evidence to sup port this assertion.
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Accordingly, there is no basis in the record for the ULJ to find t h a t R i c h m o n d w a s
discharged for a reason other than employment misconduct.
Affirmed.