In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0629

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:

J.H., Parent.

Filed November 1, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-JV-21-97

Zachary H. Johnson, Thomason, Swanson & Zahn PLLC, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for
appellant father J.H.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Jon P. Eclov, Assistant County Attorney,
Walker, Minnesota (for respondent Cass County Health, Human, and Veteran Services)

Kathleen Barta, Brainerd, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
SYLLABUS
A district court does not violate a pare nt’s procedural-due-process rights by not
allowing an extension of the permanency timeline solely base d on interruptions in social
services due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
2
OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After the district court extended appella nt-father J.H.’s time to work toward
reunification with his child—and shortly befo re a termination-of-parental-rights trial—
father began to regularly visit the child and work diligently towards sobriety. Father now
challenges the district court’s termination of his parental rights to the child. He argues that
the district court erred by determining that (1) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite
the family, (2) three statutory grounds for termination were met, and (3) termination is in
the child’s best interests. He also assert s that his procedural-due-process rights were
violated when the district c ourt failed to provide additional procedural safeguards during
the COVID-19 pandemic. We affirm.
FACTS
In this sad case, the facts are undisputed. Father and mother (who never married)
are the parents of C.S., who was born in Augu st 2019. When C.S. was born, he tested
positive for methamphetamine. Respondent Cass Co unty Health, Human, and Veteran
Services (the county) remove d him from mother’s custody. After the district court
adjudicated C.S. a child in need of protec tion or services, the county filed a petition to
terminate mother’s parental rights, which the district court later gr anted. A month after
father signed a recognition of parentage, the district court placed C.S. with father under the
county’s supervision. The goals of the resulting case plan were simple: father would ensure
safety and well-being for C.S. and participate in parenting classes.
3
Matters started smoothly. Father cooperat ed with his social worker, provided for
C.S.’s needs, and started parenting classe s. But then father tested positive for
methamphetamine. The county so ught custody of C.S. The district court, however,
ordered that if father tested negative for methamphetamine, he could maintain custody of
C.S. But if he tested positive, the county would take custody. Father tested negative and
so retained custody of C.S. In the meantime, the county updated father’s case plan to add
the goal of addressing father’s drug use.
Father’s negative testing was short lived . He continued to test positive for
methamphetamine and other substances. As a result, the county removed C.S. from
father’s home in early 2020, after the baby had spent almost four months in father’s care.
Father’s Treatment and Visitation Efforts in 2020
A second social worker took over father’s case and updated his case plan. Father
complied with some of that updated plan. 1 He completed chemical-dependency and
psychological assessments, participated in group chemical-dependency treatment sessions
and some individual treatment sessions, and attended supervised visits with C.S. But this
pattern changed with the onset of the C OVID-19 pandemic, wh ich made in-person
treatment and visitation impossible beginning in mid-March 2020. Fa ther then failed to

1 The goals of father’s updated case plan incl uded that he (1) demonstrate sobriety and
complete outpatient treatmen t; (2) provide basic necessities for himself and C.S.;
(3) understand the importance of stable mental health as it relates to parenting, including
completing a diagnostic assessment and following its recommendations; (4) show
parenting skills, including completing a paren ting assessment; and (5) cooperate with the
county.
4
consistently attend virtual ch emical-dependency treatment, did not comply with random
drug testing, and declined virtual visitation with C.S.
Because father declined virtual visitati on, he had no contact with C.S. from
March 18, 2020 until around July 9, 2020, a period of just under four months. 2 Whe n
in-person visitation resumed in July 2020, father visited C. S. only twice in July and
August due to his schedule. 3 And father had no visits with C.S. from September to
mid-December 2020, due to C.S.’s foster pa rents testing positive for COVID-19, father’s
schedule and positive drug tests, and father’s failure to respond to visitation offers.
One month after in-person visitation be came available, in-person chemical
dependency treatment also resumed in August 2020. But father missed two sessions and
was then discharged from the program. The discharge summary stat ed that father was
unamenable to further interventions. The second social worker tried to get father back into
treatment, but he refused. From October to December 2020, father inconsistently complied
with the random urinalyses program and tested positive for methamphetamine at least once.
Additionally, in November, father at the last minute told his social worker that he could
not attend the parenting capac ity evaluation scheduled for hi m. And although he had
requested a visit with C.S. around Christmas, he later refused visitation during the week of
Christmas. Father’s last reported methamphetamine use was December 25.

2 During this time period, the district court, upon the county’s recommendation, granted an
extension of the permanency timelines.
3 Further, although father was initially offered unsupervised vi sits, he tested positive for
methamphetamine in summer 2020, so the two visits he had were supervised.
5
County Files Petition to Terminate Father’s Parental Rights
After the county informed the district court and fath er that it would move forward
with a termination-of-parental-rights petition, the district court relieved the county of
making reasonable efforts toward reunificati on. But it stated that the county should
nevertheless help father if he asked for se rvices. The county th en filed a petition to
terminate father’s parental rights on January 15, 2021.4 By that time, C.S. had been out of
father’s care for 374 days. But after the count y filed its petition, father’s efforts toward
reunification changed. At father’s request , the county provided a parenting capacity
evaluation in February 2021. He voluntarily resumed chemical dependency treatment, and
his provider noted that his prognosis was “m ore promising than [ it] was the first time
around.” And he consistently tested ne gative for methamphetamine and started a
faith-based recovery program. Although visits had been suspended when the county
decided to file its termination petition, father was able to resume visitation with C.S.,
having five visits in February.5
Termination Trial
Nevertheless, the district court held a termination-of-parental-rights trial on
March 22 and 26, 2021. The county called seve n witnesses: the three social workers, the
parenting capacity evaluator, the guardian ad litem, the drug screen director, and the

4 Soon thereafter, a third social worker took over the case.
5 Visits were shortened because father failed to follow C. S.’s routines and C.S. had
behavioral issues after visitation.
6
visitation coordinator. Father testified a nd called his chemical dependency treatment
provider as a witness.
Two of the social workers, the parenti ng capacity evaluator, and the guardian ad
litem were asked whether they recommended th at the district court terminate father’s
parental rights. Each recommended termina tion. Their reasoning was similar: father
lacked stability, sobriety, and consistent contac t with C.S. throughout the county’s work
with him. The third social worker also noted that father did not seem sensitive to C.S.’s
needs during visitation, which contributed to her recommendation. The guardian ad litem
added that C.S. has special needs because of his early exposure to methamphetamine. In
addition to concerns about fath er’s inconsistency, she suppor ted termination of father’s
parental rights because father failed to address his mental health, C.S. will need significant
attention, C.S. has formed bonds with his fost er parents, and permanency for C.S. should
not be further delayed.
The county’s witnesses also testified about father’s compliance with his case plan,
noting that his participation was inconsistent . The drug screen director and visitation
coordinator described their efforts to coordinate testing and visitation for father, including
his unavailability and lack of engagement particularly from September to December 2020.
Father’s chemical dependency treatment provider explained that father’s motivation
waxed and waned during his first attempt at treatment, but that father, on his own initiative,
reenrolled in treatment in 2021 and had a better prognosis.
Finally, father testified that he has a stable job and was able to coordinate care for
C.S. while C.S. was in his custody. He adm itted his substance abuse but said that he did
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not use in C.S.’s presence or at the home. He stated that in-person group treatment sessions
helped him and that he had no positive drug tests while engagi ng in in-person treatment.
But he asserted that virtual treatment wa s less effective. He acknowledged using
methamphetamine again because he felt discouraged by his failure to complete treatment.
But he declared that he last used metham phetamine on December 25, 2020 and after that
“decided to make a change.”
With regard to visitation, father acknowledged that the frequency of his visits varied
and testified about his reasons for declining virtual visitation during the initial months of
the pandemic. Regarding visitation (or lack thereof) from September to December 2020,
he noted that there were two periods wher e visitation was suspended due to COVID-19,
but that he had also relapsed during this period.
District Court’s Order Terminating Father’s Parental Rights
In a detailed order, the district court ad opted the parenting capacity evaluator’s
findings from her report, in which the evaluator stated that father appeared to lack empathy
for how his behavior harmed C.S. and that father did not appear to try to make the changes
necessary until a “last ditch effort” after the termination petition was filed. And the district
court heavily relied on the guar dian ad litem’s testimony. Th e court determined that the
county proved by clear and convincing eviden ce that (1) father has neglected to comply
with his parental duties, (2) reasonable efforts have failed to correct the conditions leading
to C.S.’s placement outside father’s home, and (3) C.S. is neglected and in foster care.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (5), (8) (2020). Although it noted that father “loves
[C.S.] very much,” the court concluded that it is in C.S.’s best interests to terminate father’s
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parental rights and that the county made reas onable efforts to reun ite the family. It
therefore granted the county’s petition to terminate father’s parental rights. Father appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court clearly err by finding that the county made reasonable efforts
toward reunification?
II. Did the district court abuse its discreti on by determining that a statutory ground
exists for terminating father’s parental rights?
III. Did the district court abuse its discretion by determining that terminating father’s
parental rights is in the best interests of the child?
IV. Were father’s procedural-due-process rights violated by the procedures used in this
case?
ANALYSIS
A district court may terminate parental rights if (1) at least one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, (2) the county made reasonable
efforts to reunite the family, and (3) termination is in th e child’s best interests. In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b) (setting out statutory grounds for termination). In reviewing the district court’s
order terminating parental rights, we review the underlying findings of fact for clear error.
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385, 387. But we review the district court’s determinations of
whether a statutory ground for termination exists and whether termination is in the child’s
best interests for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. ,
805 N.W.2d 895, 901, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). And we
9
review the district court’s ultimate decision whether to terminate parental rights for an
abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn.
App. 2012). With these standards of review in mind, we turn to addr ess the issues father
raises on appeal.
I. The district court did not clearly er r by finding that the county made
reasonable efforts toward reunification.

Father argues that the district court erred by finding that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family. Specifically, he contends that the county made inconsistent
efforts, delayed updating father’s case plan, and should have offered a parenting capacity
examination sooner. He also asserts that th e pandemic detracted from the reasonableness
of the county’s efforts.
We begin our analysis of these claims with the definition of “reasonable efforts.”
When reasonable efforts are required, the district court must consider whether the services
offered were:
(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child;
(2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family;
(3) culturally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible;
(5) consistent and timely; and
(6) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020). The distri ct court must also co nsider how long the
county was involved and the quality of its efforts. In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C. ,
920 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. A pp. 2018). But what cons titutes “reasonable efforts”
depends on the facts of each case. Id. at 657. Again, we review that factual determination
10
for clear error. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 386-87 (indicating that we review the district court’s
finding whether the county made reasonable efforts for clear error).6
Here, the district court found that the co unty’s efforts included “case management
services, gas vouchers, parenting classes, a parenting assessment, Rule 25 assessments,
outpatient treatment, individual therapy, ra ndom testing, supervised and unsupervised
visits, foster care payments, medical assistan ce and WIC services.” It ultimately found
these services reasonable.
The record supports the district court’s finding. The county created three case plans
tailored to father’s needs at various times throughout the proceedings. It provided drug
testing services throughout its more-than-year-long work with father, facilitated chemical
dependency treatme nt, and helped keep father accounta ble in treatment. The social
workers throughout followed up with father regarding drug testing, even providing testing
at times. With regard to visitation, the county helped set up visitation with C.S. It made
referrals for parenting classes, a diagnos tic assessment, and chemical-dependency
assessments. And during the first portion of the pandemic, father was offered virtual
chemical-dependency treatment and virtual visitation with C.S. to maintain services despite

6 The Minnesota Supreme Court recently clarif ied the clear-error sta ndard, noting that it
applies across many contexts. In re Civil Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221
(Minn. 2021). In applying the clear-error st andard, we view the evidence in a light
favorable to the district court’s findings. Id. And we will not reverse unless, in view of all
of the evidence, “we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Id. (quotation omitted). Further, under the clear-error standard, we may not
reweigh evidence, engage in fact-finding, or reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22.
We therefore “need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or
demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [district] court.” Id. at 222.
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the pandemic. In May 2020, the county recommen ded that the district court extend the
permanency timelines to give father more time to work towa rds reunification. And after
father was discharged from chemical dependency treatment, the second social worker tried
to work with him to resume treatment. The district court did not clearly err by finding that
these efforts were reasonable.
To convince us otherwise, father emphasizes that three different social workers were
responsible for his case, that the second social worker maintained inconsistent contact with
him, and that the county failed to update his case plan promptly wh en the second social
worker took over the case. Although a more consistent caseworker might have been better,
the second social worker oversaw father’s case for almost a year, constituting the bulk of
the time in this case. And wh ile there was a two-month peri od when the second social
worker failed to contact father consistently, father’s other services continued.7
Father also argues that the county shoul d have offered a parenting capacity
evaluation earlier than February 2021. But the re cord reflects that an evaluation was
offered in November 2020, befo re the county filed the term ination petition. Yet father

7 Father cites to no legal authority supporting his argument that an updated case plan is
required upon a transition between social workers and has therefore forfeited this
contention. “An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any
argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal
unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith
& Sons Carpet Co. , 187 N.W.2d 133, 1 35 (Minn. 1971); see Braith v. Fischer ,
632 N.W.2d 716, 725 (Minn. App. 2001) (applying Schoepke in a family law appeal), rev.
denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001). And our inspecti on of this record reveals no obvious error
on this point.
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declined to participate. The time at which evaluations were offere d in this case do not
make the county’s efforts unreasonable.
Finally, in an overarching argument, father asserts that the pandemic generally
detracted from the reasonableness of the county’s efforts. In particular, he contends that
virtual chemical dependency treatment was ine ffective and therefore is not a “reasonable
effort.” But virtual treatment was limited to the early days of the pandemic. And it was
not unreasonable for the county to rely on service providers who worked within pandemic
restrictions. Further, father bears some resp onsibility for his failure to participate in
treatment consistently and adequately, even if it was more difficult to do so virtually.
In sum, the district court did not clearly err by determining that the county’s efforts
were reasonable given the unique circumstances of this case. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385;
see A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 655 (stating that “reasonable efforts” are fact-dependent).
II. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by determining that a statutory
ground exists for terminating father’s parental rights.

Father argues that because no testimony establishes that he neglected his child and
his present sobriety shows that he did not neglect his parental duties, the district court erred
by determining that a statutory ground for termination was met.
In reviewing this issue, we closely scru tinize the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a statutory ground fo r termination to determine wh ether the evidence is clear
and convincing. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. Here, the district court determined that three
statutory grounds were met, but we need only conclude that one ground is supported in
order to affirm. In re Welfare of P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. 2001). Considering
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the evidence supporting the ground of neglect of parental duties, we turn to examine that
statutory ground.
A district court may terminate parental rights if a parent has “substantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or negl ected to comply” with his parental duties and
either the county’s reasonable efforts failed to correct conditions that led to the termination
petition or further efforts wo uld be futile and un reasonable. Minn. Stat. 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2). We addressed the reasonable-efforts portion of this statutory ground above
and now consider the parental-duties element. Parental duties include providing for the
child’s physical needs, such as food, clothing, and shelte r, as well as other care and
supervision necessary to facilita te the child’s physical, mental, and emotional health and
development. Id. And a parent’s failure to comply with a reasonable case plan may
constitute evidence of neglect of parental duties. In re Child of Simon , 662 N.W.2d 155,
163 (Minn. App. 2003). When we review the evidence of neglect, we address conditions
at the time of the termination hearing and whet her they are expected to continue for the
foreseeable future. In re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980).
Here, the district court found that father failed to comply with several aspects of his
case plan. It stated that fa ther’s continued mental-health and chemical-health issues
showed neglect of his duties to C.S. and that he is presently unable to care for C.S. And it
determined that father’s chemical health and mental health were unaddressed based on his
absence from chemical-d ependency treatment, failure to engage in mental-health
treatment, and only recent resu mption of chemical-dependenc y treatment. The court
14
therefore concluded that the county established that father neglected his parental duties by
clear and convincing evidence.
The district court’s determination is supported in the record. Indeed, father does not
dispute that he declined mental-health services, was discharged from chemical-dependency
treatment after inconsistently attending and testing positive for controlled substances, and
at times failed to respond to the county’s efforts to facilitate visitati on and drug testing.
This behavior demonstrates noncompliance with much of his case plan, which is evidence
of neglect of his parental duties. See Simon , 662 N.W.2d at 163. Further, the
parenting-capacity evaluator testified th at father failed to acknowledge how his
inconsistency, mental health, and chemical dependency impacted C.S. And only when
faced with the county’s termin ation petition did father resume consistent efforts toward
reunification. These circumstances show that father has neglected to make the changes
necessary to be able to supervise and care for C.S. adequately.
Still, father points to his recent good progr ess in chemical dependency treatment.
But the district court’s finding that fathe r’s chemical health remained unaddressed until
recently is not disputed. Further, the guardian ad litem and third social worker testified
that they did not believe that father can maintain sobriety ab sent the structure of a case
plan. See Chosa, 290 N.W.2d at 769 (noting that we address whether conditions at time of
termination are expected to co ntinue into foreseeable future ). And father’s history of
inconsistency is relevant to determining whet her he might maintain his current level of
engagement. See id.; see also In re Welfare of J.L.L. , 396 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Minn.
App. 1986) (noting that “minimal improvement” may not overcome conclusion that “past
15
problems make . . . future performance as a parent uncertain”). We applaud father’s
progress, but in light of record evidence of fa ther’s inconsistency, we conclude that clear
and convincing evidence supports the district court’s determination that father neglected
his parental duties and that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the
termination petition. 8 The district court therefore di d not abuse its discretion by so
determining. Because we conclude that this statutory ground was met, we need not address
the other statutory grounds that the dist rict court also conc luded were met. See P.R.L.,
622 N.W.2d at 545.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that terminating
father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.

Father argues that C.S. is better off with his biological father and that the district
court failed to consider what father describes as his “tender interacti ons” with the child.
He asserts that termination of his parental rights is not in C.S.’s best interests.
In determining a child’s best interests, the district court must balance “(1) the child’s
interest in preserving the pare nt-child relationship; (2) the pa rent’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship; and (3) an y competing interest of the child.” A.M.C.,
920 N.W.2d at 657; see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (requiring a court addressing
whether to terminate parental rights to consider these factors). Competing interests of the
child may include a stable environment, health considerations, and the child’s preferences.

8 Father also argues that further reasonable efforts would not have been futile. But we need
not reach this issue, because the statute requires either that reasonable efforts failed to
correct certain conditions or further efforts w ould be futile. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2); see Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. 2008) (stating that
“or” is generally disjunctive).
16
In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992 ). If the child’s and parent’s
interests conflict, the child’s interests ta ke precedence. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.001,
subd. 2(a), .301, subd. 7 (2020).
Here, the district court found that father has an interest in parenting C.S. But it also
noted that father parented C.S. for only a shor t time and that father failed to engage with
visitation and treatment at numerous times throughout the proceedings. The district court
emphasized that C.S.’s exposure to methamphetamine damaged his nervous system so that
he does not respond to pain in the same way as other children. Thus, he will require
attentive and consistent care, as well as medical intervention. The district court also stated
that C.S. has been out of father’s home for mo st of his life, is thriving in his foster home,
and needs permanency. The district court therefore determ ined that it is in C.S.’s best
interests to terminate father’s rights.
Father does not dispute any of the dist rict court’s findings, and the record,
particularly the guardian ad litem’s testimony, supports those findings. As the district court
acknowledged, father clearly loves C.S. But due to his inconsistent parenting and treatment
efforts, his interest in parenting C.S. is lim ited. As the district court observed, this
18-month-old child has spent the vast majority of his days away from father. And even if
we discount the times when in-person vi sitation was impossible due to the peacetime
emergency and when C.S.’s fo ster parents contracted COVID-19, C.S.’s time outside the
home exceeded the perm anency timelines. A lthough terminating father’s rights may not
be best for father, and it is true that a child has an interest in having a relationship with his
biological parent, the district court appropriate ly considered C.S.’s needs and gave them
17
precedence. It therefore did not abuse its discretion by determining that it is in C.S.’s best
interests to terminate father’s parental rights.
IV. Father was not deprived of his procedural-due-process rights.
Father argues that adhering to the usua l termination timeline despite the pandemic
deprived him of his procedural-due-process rights. He argues that this court should read a
“force majeure” clause9 into the juvenile protection statut es that allows for an automatic
extension of the permanency timeline when circumstances outside of a parent’s control
hinder reunification efforts.
We begin our analysis by setting out the due-process standard that applies in
termination-of-parental-rights cases. Th e United States and Mi nnesota Constitutions
provide that no person may be “deprive[d] of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. The Due Process
Clause protects parents’ fundamental liberty interest in custody and care of their children.
In re Welfare of H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981). The amount of process due
before depriving a parent of this right varies with the circumstances of each case. Id. In
determining whether a parent was deprived of the parent’s procedural-due-process rights,
we balance: (1) the private interest affected by government action; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of that interest and the value of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the
government’s interest. In re Welfare of Children of B.J.B. , 747 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Minn.

9 A “force majeure” is an unanticipated and uncontrollable event, including an act of nature
such as a flood or hurricane, that prevents someone from doing something the person
agreed or planned to do. Black’s Law Dictionary 761 (10th ed. 2014).
18
App. 2008). We review a parent’s due proc ess claims in a termin ation-of-parental-rights
proceeding de novo. In re Welfare of Children of D.F. , 752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn.
App. 2008).
Here, father has a fundamenta l liberty interest in custod y and control of his child.
H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d at 825. C.S. has an interest in permanency and stability. In re Welfare
of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Minn. 2014). And the county has an interest in
protecting C.S., safeguarding his physical and psychological well-being, and promoting his
welfare. Id. at 134.
The remaining question is wh ether the alleged procedural inadequacy risked the
erroneous deprivation of father’s parental rights, and whether father’s proposed additional
procedures might have altered the outcome. The juvenile protection statutes already allow
the district court to continue a termination- of-parental-rights matter up to six additional
months. Minn. Stat. § 260C.204 (d)(1)(ii) (2020). And in Ju ne 2020, the district court
extended the timeline for six mo nths. This extension—and th e overall procedure in this
case—was adequate to protect father’s rights and father’s proposed procedure would not
have changed the outcome.
Finally, father’s argument asks this court to change existing law. But it is not our
role to do so. Cf. In re Tr. of Williams , 631 N.W.2d 398, 410 (M inn. 2001) (noting that
adopting exception to a rule in trusts context is for supreme court or legislature, not this
court, to announce), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2001). A decision whether to incorporate
a force majeure clause in the juvenile protection statutes involves a policy decision outside
the purview of this court. Cf. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 771 N.W.2d 538, 547
19
(Minn. App. 2009) (stating that allowing ex ception to child’s-interests-as-paramount
principle is policy decision not proper for this court). We therefore decline to do so.
DECISION
We conclude that the distri ct court did not clearly err by finding that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify father with C.S. Nor did the district court abuse its
discretion by determining that at least one statutory ground for termination, neglect of
parental duties, was met, and that it is in the best interests of C.S. to terminate father’s
parental rights. Finally, we hold that th e absence of an extension based solely on
interruptions in the services available to father due to the COVID-19 pandemic did not
violate father’s procedural-due-process rights.
Affirmed.