Miguel Lionel Garza, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0636

Miguel Lionel Garza, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Minh Van Tran Thi,
Respondent.

Filed June 20, 2022
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-17-1486

James C. Lofstrom, Lofstrom Law Office, P.C., Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Beau D. McGraw, McGraw Law Firm, P.A., Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In this appeal, father challenges the district court’s reversal of the parenting
consultant’s decision regarding which school the joint child of the parties would attend.
We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant-father Miguel Lionel Garza and respondent -mother Minh Van Tran Thi
are the parents of J.H.G. (the child), who was born in August 2009. The parties never
married and live separately. In May 2017, father served mother with a petition to establish
custody and parenting time , and m other filed a counterpetition. Following a lengthy
dispute, the parties reached agreement on all issues at a settlement conference in June 2019.
The district court issued an order for custody in July 2019 that was consistent with the
terms agreed upon by the parties. Relevant to this appeal, the order provided that the child
would attend school in Burnsville starting in the fall of 2019. The order also noted that the
parties agreed to the appointment of a parenting consultant “to resolve any conflicts arising
from custody decisions or parenting time disputes.”
By separate order, the district court appointed the agreed-upon parenting consultant.
The order set out the scope of the parenting consultant’s authority and a nonexhaustive list
of powers, which included the authority to “[d]ecide the appropriate school placement for
the child[].” The order allowed either parent to obtain district c ourt review of parenting -
consultant decisions and specified that the district court “shall review the decisions of the
[parenting consultant] using the abuse of discretion standard.”
In January 2020, mother made a request to the parenting consultant that the child be
transferred from Burnsville, where the child was attending fifth grade, to the Woodbury
school district for middle school, beginning with the 2020-21 school year. Father proposed
that the child continue to attend school in Burnsville. Both parents submitted written
arguments to the parenting consultant and mother provided a report from an expert she had
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retained that compared the quality of the Woodbury and Burnsville schools. The parenting
consultant spoke with one of the child’s teach ers, the child’s therapist, and the parties’
custody evaluator. The parenting consultant also had a psychologist interview the child
and report her general findings to the parenting consultant. In August 2020, the parenting
consultant issued a decision d etermining that the child would attend middle school in
Burnsville.
In September 2020, mother filed an emergency motion in the district court
challenging the parenting consultant’s decision . Mother requested that the district court
not follow the recommendations of the parenting consultant and instead order that the child
attend school in Woodbury effective immediately. The district court denied the request for
emergency relief. Mother requested reconsideration, but the district court again denied
emergency relief.
The district court held a hearing in December 2020 on mother’s challenge to the
decision of the parenting consultant . The parties made their arguments on school
placement for the child, but the district court determined that it needed more information.
As a result , the district court continued the motion hearing to allow time for in camera
review of the records from the psychologist who interviewed the child at the request of the
parenting consultant and from the child’s therapist. The district court held a second hearing
on mother’s motion in February 2021.
The district court issued an order in May 2021 reversing the decision of the
parenting consultant. The district court determined that the parenting consultant’s decision
is not in the best interests of the child. The district court then analyzed the best -interests
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factors set out in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2020), and determined that it is in the
best interests of the child to attend school in Woodbury. The district court granted mother’s
motion and ordered that the child attend Woodbury Middle School starting in the fall of
2021 and that the child is to remain in the Woodbury school district through her graduation
from high school. Father appeals.
DECISION
Father argues that the district court erred by reversing the decision of the parenting
consultant regarding which school the child is to attend . A district court ’s decision
concerning the school to be attended by a child is a custody determination that we rev iew
for an abuse of discretion. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 281-82 (Minn. 2008);
see Wolf v. Oestreich, 956 N.W.2d 248, 25 3 (Minn. App. 2021) ( noting that “[d]ecisions
regarding school choice are educational decisions within the ambit of legal custody”), rev.
denied (Minn. May 18, 2021). Our review is therefore “limited to whether the [district]
court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by
improperly applying the law.” Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985).
“A child’s best interests are the fundamental focus of custody decisions.”
Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 476 (Minn. App. 2000). The district court’s
factual findings “regarding the best-interest factors are reviewed for clear error.” Hansen
v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2018). The clear-error standard of review “does
not permit an appellate court to weigh the evidence as if trying the matter de novo” or “to
engage in fact-finding anew.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22
(Minn. 2021 ) (quotations omitted). Rather, appellate courts “fairly consider[] all the
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evidence” and determine whether “the evidence reasonably supports th e [district court’s]
decision.” Id. at 222.
Minnesota Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 1(a), provides that “[i]n evaluating
the best interests of the child for purposes of determining issues of custody . . . the court
must consider and evaluate all relevant factors ,” and the subdivision contains a
nonexhaustive list of factors for consideration. In determining that the parenting consultant
reached a decision that was not in the best interests of the child, the district court noted that
“based on the evidence, the [parenting consultant’s] report and recommendation did not
take into account the Child’s preference for Woodbury Middle School, her need and desire
for close friendships available to the Child at Woodbury Middle School, and the academic
benefits of a more superior curriculum to help the Child reach her fullest potential.” Thus,
the district court determined that the parenting consultant failed to consider relevant factors
when evaluating the best interests of the child. The district court conducted an independent
analysis that addressed each statutory best -interests factor and determined that the factors
weighed in favor of the child attending school in Woodbury.1

1 We note that the order appointing the parenting consultant provided that the district court
would review decisions by the parenting consultant using the abuse-of-discretion standard.
But this court has previously observed that “if the parenting consultant’s determination of
school attendance [is] not in the child []’s best interests, the decision [is] an abuse of
discretion, and the district court [cannot] adopt[] it.” Schultz v. Ruff, No. A14-1762, 2015
WL 4715189, at *4 (Minn. App. Aug. 10, 2015). Although Schultz is nonprecedential and
therefore only of persuasive value, see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), its holding
is consistent with the established principle that the “paramount issue” in custody -related
matters is always the best interests of the child. See Petersen v. Petersen, 206 N.W.2d 658,
659 (Minn. 1973). And a district court “must in every case exercise an independent
judgment” regarding best interests. Id.
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Father challenges the district court’s best -interests determination. He first argues
that the district court abused its discretion because the parties stipulated that the child
would attend school in Burnsville. Mother disputes this assertion and contends that the
stipulation only covered the child’s fifth grade year and left open for future resolution
which school the child would attend for middle school and high school. We need not
resolve this dispute because , while “considerable weight is given to stipulations
intelligently entered . . . , in determining question s of custody [,] the paramount issue
remains the welfare and best interests of the child[].” Petersen, 206 N.W.2d at 659. As a
result, “[t]he [district] court must in every case exercise an independent judgment and is
not bound by the stipulation.” Id. Thus, even if the parties previously agreed that the child
would attend school in Burnsville, the district court was not bound by such stipulation and
was instead required to conduct an independent best -interests analysis. See generally
Spratt v. Spratt, 185 N.W. 509, 510 (Minn. 1921) (stating that “[e]ven a written agreement
with reference to the custody of a child is not binding on the courts when the best interests
of the child is shown to require a disposition contrary to that provided under the
agreement”); Aumock v. Aumock, 410 N.W.2d 420, 421 (Minn. App. 1987) (rejecting
parents’ agreement to waive child support because doing so would be contrary to the best
interests of the children).
Father next arg ues that “[m]any of the [district] court’s findings [are] simply not
supported by the evidence.” As noted above, we review factual findings for clear error and
may not reweigh the evidence or “ engage in fact-finding anew.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at
221-22 (quotation omitted). Rather, we must consider the evidence presented and
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determine whether “the evidence reasonably supports the [district court’s] decision.” Id.
at 222.
Here, the record reasonably supports the district court’s findings and ultimate bes t-
interests determination. The district court found:
The heart of the issues for the Child is her need to
maintain a close circle of friendships, and enrollment in a
school district with strong academics that will allow her to
reach her full potential—which the Woodbury School District
can offer to the Child more so than the Burnsville School
District.

The district court acknowledged that the child needs stability, but also noted that the child
had attended school in the Woodbury school district before an d has close friends in th at
district. This finding is supported by the notes from the psychologist who interviewed the
child, which listed the child’s four close friends who attend school in Woodbury. By
contrast, the parenting consultant’s decision note s that the two children identified by the
child as friends from fifth grade in Burnsville would not be returning to the Burnsville
school district for middle school. The record also reveals that the child expressed feeling
anxiety over whether her friends will be there for her and be a constant in her life, which
supports the district court’s determination that attending a school district where she has
identified close friends would best serve her emotional needs.
The district court noted that it was not basing its finding solely on which school
offered better academics, but “which school is better for this Child’s educational and
personal needs.” The district court found that, “[g]iven the Child’s abilities, curio sities,
and desire to be challenged, the Child’s academic needs will be better met at Woodbury
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Middle School.” The district court also made note of the fact that the child is a strong
academic student and that Woodbury offer s a stronger academic challenge and the
opportunity to participate in more activities. Finally, the district court considered the
child’s description of her ideal school setting , including a quiet classroom, “ kind”
classmates, a locker and desk to store her personal items, and the abil ity to participate in
more extracurricular activities . Based on the evidence presented to the district court
concerning the attributes of the two schools, the district court determined that the
Woodbury school district would be the better fit for the chil d based on the child’s stated
preferences.
On this record, we discern no clear error in the district court’s factual findings, and
those findings reasonably support the determination that it is in the best interests of the
child to attend school in Woodbury. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion
in reversing the decision of the parenting consultant and ordering that the child attend
school in Woodbury.
Affirmed.