State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0640

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

D. V. L.,
Appellant.

Filed January 3, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Klaphake, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-94-061744

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Andrew C. Wilson, Britta Ann Torkelson, Wilson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant D.V.L. argues the district court erred by denying his expungement
petition on the basis that Minnesota’s expungement statute prohibits inherent-authority
expungement for people required to register as predatory offenders. Because the
expungement statute does not limit expungement under the judiciary’s inherent authority,
we reverse and remand to the district court.
DECISION
The district court denied appellant’s petition for an expungement under the court’s
inherent authority based on a statutory expungement prohibition in Minn. Stat. § 609A.02
(2020). We review a district court’s denial of an expungement request for an abuse of
discretion. State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Minn. 2013). There are two bases for
expungement of criminal records in Minnesota: statutory expungement under Minn. Stat.
§ 609A.01-04 (2020) (the expungement statute), and expungement under the judiciary’s
inherent authority. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279.
Expungement under the judiciary’s inherent authority is well-established and
derives from the Minnesota Constitution. State v. C. A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn.
1981); see also M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 280 (“The origin of judicial power in Minnesota is
our state constitution.”). The Minnesota Constitution divides the powers of government
into three distinct branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. Minn. Const. art. III, § 1.
No branch may use powers properly belonging to another unless the constitution expressly
provides for it. Id.; accord In re Welfare of J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn. 2013)
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(“[N]o branch of government may usurp or diminish the powers committed to another co-
equal branch of government.”). The supreme court has therefore held that expungement
based on the judiciary’s inherent authority “can be neither augmented nor diminished by
legislative acts” because “inherent judicial authority is derived from ‘the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers’ and ‘is grounded in judicial self-preservation.’” State v.
S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 279 (Minn. 2008) (quoting In re Clerk of Ct.’s Comp. for Lyon
Cnty., 241 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. 1976) ). Due to the same separation-of -powers
concerns, expungement by the judiciary’s inherent authority is limited only to expunging
the records kept by the judicial branch and does not include records held by executive-
branch agencies, “even when those records were created in the judiciary.” M.D.T., 831
N.W.2d at 282.
Here, the district court denied appellant’s petition for expungement under the
judiciary’s inherent authority based on section 609A.02, subdivision 4 of the expungement
statute. Because the legislature cannot infringe upon the judiciary’s inherent authority
granted by the constitution, the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the
expungement statute prohibited inherent-authority expungements in addition to statutory
expungements.
Even if the constitution did not prevent the legislature from infringing upon the
judiciary’s inherent authority to grant expungements, there is no evidence that the
legislature intended for the expungement statute to limit inherent-authority expungements.
We review the district court’s interpretation of the expungement statute de novo as it is a
question of law. State v. C.W.N., 906 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Minn. App. 2018). Here, the
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district court based its denial of appellant’s petition on section 609A.02, subdivision 4,
titled “Expungement prohibited,” which states, “[r]ecords of a conviction of an offense for
which registration [as a predatory offender] is required under section 243.166 may not be
expunged.” Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 4. Throughout the chapter, the expungement
statute refers to “expungement” without specifying statutory expungement or inherent-
authority expungement. Appellant argues that the district court erred because the plain
language of subdivision 4 indicates that the prohibition only applies to statutory
expungement and does not prohibit the district court from granting him an expungement
under its inherent authority.1 We agree. When referring to “expungement” the statute does
not specify statutory expungement, but reading the statute as a whole, “expungement”
refers to the type of expungement that the statute establishes: statutory expungement. The
statute does not address expungement under the judiciary’s inherent authority.
The supreme court has previously interpreted the expungement statute as referring
only to statutory expungement. See State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 257 (Minn. 2000)
(“There are two legal bases that provide for the expungement of criminal records: Minn.
Stat. ch. 609A (the expungement statute) and a court’s inherent expungement power.”) ;
M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279 (same). Minnesota courts have regularly analyzed whether
expungement was properly granted or denied under the judiciary’s inherent authority
despite finding that the petitioner was ineligible for statutory expungement. See Ambaye,

1 Appellant also argues that his conviction is not included in those prohibited by
subdivision 4. Because we conclude that subdivision 4 does not restrict judicial-authority
expungements—the only type of expungement appellant requested in his petition —we
need not address whether his conviction would be prohibited from statutory expungement.
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616 N.W.2d at 260-61 (after concluding that he was ineligible for a statutory expungement,
the supreme court reviewed Ambaye’s claim that his criminal record should have been
expunged under the district court’s inherent authority); State v. H.A., 716 N.W.2d 360, 363
n.1 (Minn. App. 2006) (noting that the district court properly determined it lacked statutory
authority for expungement before reviewing whether the district court properly granted
expungement under its inherent authority). Because both the plain language and prior
interpretations of the statute indicate that the expungement statute only refers to statutory
expungement and not to inherent-authority expungement, we agree with appellant that the
legislature did not intend to limit the judiciary’s inherent authority in subdivision 4 of the
expungement statute.
In sum, the judiciary’s inherent authority to grant expungements cannot be infringed
upon by the expungement statute, and section 609A.02, subdivision 4 was not intended to
limit the judiciary’s inherent authority. We remand to the district court to review D.V.L.’s
petition for expungement under the court’s inherent authority.
Reversed and remanded.