In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0643

In re the Marriage of:

Kelly John Brown, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Shawn Marie Brown,
Respondent.

Filed April 4, 2022
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-19-2311

John M. Jerabek, Tuft Lach, Jerabek & O’Connell, PLLC, Maplewood, Minnesota; and

Eric R. Parker, Johnson/Turner Legal, Forest Lake, Minnesota (for appellant)

Anne M. Honsa, Kari N. Kanne, Honsa & Mara, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After more than 20 years of marriage, appellant-husband petitioned for dissolution
of his marriage to respondent- wife. And after almost two y ears of litigation, their case
arrives here. Husband argues that the district court (1) should have awarded husband his
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nonmarital interests in certain properties; (2) erred by ordering the sale of the parties’ real
property, thereby changing the properties’ valuation dates; (3) made erroneous findings of
fact that together do not su pport the award of spousal main tenance to wife; (4) erred by
ordering him to secure his spousal-maintenan ce obligation with a life-insurance policy;
(5) erred by deeming wife’s post-valuation-da te familial loan marital property; and
(6) abused its discretion by awarding wife co nduct-based and need-bas ed attorney fees.
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-husband Kelly John Brown a nd respondent-wife Shawn Marie Brown
married in 1992. Husband pe titioned for dissolution in April 2019. The parties attended
the initial case-management conference on June 10, 2019, which is the presumed valuation
date for property-division purposes. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2020). After
significant discovery conflicts and two attempted mediation sessions, the parties proceeded
to trial in September 2020 on property and debt division, spousal maintenance, and attorney
fees. The district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, and
judgment and decree in February 2021. The following summarizes the facts relevant to
the issues on appeal.
Real Property Division and Husband’s Nonmarital Claims
At the time of trial, the parties owned eight real properties. They did not stipulate
to the value of any of those properties. Hu sband claimed a nonmarital interest in several
properties, and he further claimed that the proceeds of refinanc ing and selling some
properties in which he had a nonmarital interest were used to purchase or improve other
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properties, so that his nonmarital interest carr ied over into those properties. The district
court found that husband failed to establish a nonmarital interest in any of the properties
by a preponderance of the evidence and therefore held that all the parties’ real property was
marital. It ordered the sale of seven of the parties’ properties and that the proceeds be split
evenly between them.
Spousal Maintenance
Turning to spousal maintena nce, husband is a manager at Wex, Inc. with a gross
monthly income of $13,333. He has earned an average of $26,577.39 yearly in bonuses
over the past four years. The district court found that, if the parties sell their real property
and invest the proceeds and other liquid assets from the marital-property division, husband
would likely earn approximately $1,152.58 per month as investment income. Thus, the
court set husband’s income at $16,701 per month.
Wife has an accounting associate degree an d a tax specialist degree. She currently
works as an office manager earning $18 per hour. Her annual income in recent years was
between $34,372.62 and $37,156. The court estimated that wife could earn approximately
$928 per month in investment income after the marital property division. It noted that wife
would be awarded the parties’ cattle but found that the cattle operation was not profitable
and therefore declined to attribute any cattl e-operation income to wife. Based on these
factors, it estimated wife’s income to be $4,048 per month.
The district court found that husband’s projected reasonable expenses after the
property division—and after selling the pr operties for which husband had been paying
mortgage, property tax, and other expenses—would be $4,193 per month, whereas wife’s
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reasonable expenses would be $5,040.14 per month. Because wife’s reasonable expenses
exceeded her estimated income, the district court found that wife adequately demonstrated
her need for spousal maintenance. And after analyzing the statutory spousal-maintenance
factors, it awarded wife $99 2 per month in permanent spousal maintenance and an
additional $928 per month in temporary maintenance until the properties are sold.
Life Insurance as Security for Spousal Maintenance
The district court also found that, b ecause wife has limited retirement or other
financial resources, if husband dies and therefore stops paying spousal maintenance, wife
will not have sufficient income to meet he r expenses. It noted that husband already
maintains two life-insurance policies totaling $560,000 in cove rage. It therefore ordered
husband to maintain $500,000 in life-insurance coverage w ith wife as sole beneficiary to
secure his spousal-maintenance obligation.1
Familial Loans
The parties also dispute the district court’ s classification of familial loans that each
party obtained after the presumptive va luation date. Beca use husband had begun
withholding financial support from wife, wife took out a $15,500 loan from her mother to
pay monthly expenses. The district court determined that this loan was marital debt.

1 This requirement was not in addition to maintaining husband’s then-existing $560,000 in
coverage. Rather, it was a requirement that husband maintain at least $500,000 in coverage
going forward.
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Husband took out a $40,000 loan from hi s mother and a $50,000 loan from his
brother. Both loans were for payment of expe nses. The district court found that these
loans were nonmarital debt.
Attorney Fees
Finally, the district court awarded wife co nduct-based and need-based attorney fees.
To support the conduct-based fee award, it found that husband violated the court’s
July 2020 order that he provide outstanding discovery responses by the deadline imposed
by the court. And to support the need-based fee award, the district court found that husband
could contribute to wife’s attorney fees and that wife could not pay them on her own.
Husband appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by conclu ding that husband failed to prove that
he had a nonmarital interest in any of the real properties.

Husband argues that the district court should have awarded him nonmarital interests
in five of the properties owne d by the parties: the Sherid an property, cab in property,
Connors Lake property, Devil’s Lake property, and vacation rental property.2
We review the district court’s distribution of property for an abuse of discretion.
Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002). But whether property is marital or
nonmarital is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. And we review the district
court’s underlying findings of fact for clear error. Id.

2 At the time of trial, the parties owned three additional properties but neither party claimed
a nonmarital interest in any of those properties. We therefore do not discuss them here.
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With certain exceptions, marital property includes all property acquired by the
parties or either of them du ring their marriage and before the valuation date. Minn.
Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2020). Property acquired by either spouse during a marriage is
presumptively marital. Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 100-01. A party claiming a nonmarital
property interest has the burden of demonstr ating that interest by a preponderance of the
evidence to overcome th is presumption. Id.; see also Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b.
Nonmarital property includes property acquired by one spouse before the marriage. Minn.
Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(b).
In order to meet the burden of proving a nonmarital interest, a party must keep
nonmarital property separate from marital property or, if commingled, the nonmarital
property must be readily traceable. Wopata v. Wopata, 498 N.W.2d 478, 484 (Minn. App.
1993); see also Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). If the party claiming
nonmarital property cannot show that it was invested in a readily traceable asset, the
property should be classified as marital property. Id. But strict, detailed tracing is not
required, and credible testimon y alone may be sufficient to trace a nonmarital interest.
Doering v. Doering, 385 N.W.2d 387, 390-91 (Minn. A pp. 1986). Whether a nonmarital
interest was adequately traced is a question of fact that we revi ew for clear error. Olsen,
562 N.W.2d at 800.
We begin by observing that husband’s arguments as to the cabin, Connors Lake,
Devil’s Lake, and vacation-rental properties hinge on whether he adequately proved the
existence or extent of his nonmarital interests in the Sheridan property and two additional,
now-sold properties: the Thomas and Elliot properties. We therefore first address whether
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the district court properly determined that husband failed to prove that he has a nonmarital
interest in the Sheridan, Thomas, and Elliot properties.
The district court’s framework for considering husband’s nonmarital claims began
with a credibility assessment. It found that husband’s nonmar ital claims appeared to be
“manufactured post hoc” when dissolution became clear. An d it therefore declined to
credit husband’s testimony regarding his nonm arital claims unless that testimony was
corroborated by credible documentation. We defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations, Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Min n. 1988), and thus review
husband’s arguments regarding each prope rty to determine whether the court’s
corroboration assessments are supported by the record.
Sheridan Property
We turn first to the Sheridan property. Husband purchased the Sheridan property
in July 1991 before the par ties married. The district court found credible husband’s
expert’s calculation of husband’s original nonmarital interest in the Sheridan property as
26.5% of its value. Husband obtained an appraisal stating that Sheridan’s value at the
valuation date was $512,000, 26.5% of which is $135,680. Husband argues that the district
court erred by not awarding him this amount as his nonmarital interest in the Sheridan
property.
To support its determination that hu sband failed to carry his burden of
demonstrating a current nonmarital interest in Sheridan, the district court made the
following findings: husband purchased the Sheridan property in contemplation of marrying
wife; husband did not establish the origin of the funds used for a down payment on
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Sheridan; the parties’ treatme nt of their properties before and during their marriage
suggested that they intended th e properties to be part of a marital estate; and the parties
made improvements of an unknown value to Sheridan during the marriage.
The record shows that husband purchased Sheridan before marrying wife. Yet the
parties did not identify—nor are we aware of—any authority for the district court’s
assumption that purchasing property in contemplation of marriage is a factor in the marital
property assessment. But as the district court acknowledged that husband at one point had
a nonmarital interest in Sheridan, considerat ion of this “in contemplation” fact does not
upend the court’s ultimate determination.
This is particularly so when husband, who carries the burden to establish his
nonmarital interest, failed to show that no improvements were made to Sheridan during the
marriage. Wife’s testimony and the parties’ tax returns, to the contrary, show that
improvements were made. And improvements made during the marriage are presumed to
be marital property. Dorweiler v. Dorweiler , 413 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Minn. App. 1987).
To calculate a party’s remaining nonmarital inte rest in an improved property, the district
court must (1) divide the initial nonmarital inte rest by the purchase price; (2) subtract the
cost of repairs and improvements from th e current value of the property, thereby
determining the increase in value attributable solely to appreciation; and (3) multiply the
appreciated value of the property by the ratio of nonmarital property to purchase price. Id.
Thus, improvements may reduce a party’s nonmarital interest. But here, husband provided
no calculations to show whether or the extent to which that occurred.
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In sum, the district court implicitly found that husband failed to adequately trace his
nonmarital interest, which finding is not clearly erroneous. Pechovnik v. Pechovnik ,
765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (indicating that fact findings may be implicit).
Accordingly, the district court did not err by concluding that husband failed to prove his
nonmarital interest in Sheridan by a preponderance of the evidence.
Because we conclude that husband failed to prove his nonmarital interest in
Sheridan, his tracing of that inte rest to other properties also fails. He asserts that the
proceeds of refinancing Sheridan in 2016 funded the down payment on the vacation-rental
property. But proceeds of refinancing are marital unless the cash taken out exceeds the
marital equity in the property. See Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 103-04. And husband provided
no documentation that the 2016 refinancing drew from nonmarital funds. Indeed,
husband’s expert’s report that the 2016 refinancing drew from nonmarital funds rested on
husband’s recollection alone, and, as noted above, the district court found husband’s
testimony not credible unless co rroborated by documentation. See Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d
at 210 (noting that we defer to district court credibility determinations). Further, the record
reflects that all the proceeds from the 2016 refinancing were put in the parties’ joint bank
account approximately four months before th e parties made the down payment on the
vacation-rental property. Thus, any nonmarital funds were commingled with marital funds
and are not traceable from a nonmarital s ource or to a nonmarital interest. Wopata,
498 N.W.2d at 484; Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 705 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that
nonmarital asset commingled with marital asset may lose nonmarital status if not traceable
to nonmarital source).
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The district court’s finding that husband failed to adequately trace his nonmarital
interest in Sheridan to the vacation-rental property is not clearly erroneous.
Thomas Property
We turn next to the Thomas property. Husband asserts that he had $31,250 (25%)
in nonmarital equity in the Th omas property in 1991 which grew to $43,287 (32.9%) in
nonmarital equity by the time of the 1992 marriage. He ba ses these calculations on the
following: he insured the Th omas property for $125,000 in 1991 and refinanced the
property that year, taking out a $93,750 loan. Thus, he asserts that he had $31,250, or 25%,
in nonmarital equity in the property ($125,000 - $93,750 = $31,250 and $31,250 / $125,000
= 25%). Husband’s expert calculated the prope rty’s value at the time of the marriage in
1992 as $131,729 based on an assumed 3% an nual increase drawn from the Minneapolis
Home Price Index. The expert also determ ined that the mortgage at the time of the
marriage was $88,442 based on the amortization schedule for the property. Thus, husband
asserts $43,287 (32.9%) in n onmarital equity at the time of the marriage ($131,729 -
$88,442 = $43,287 and $43,287 / $131,729 = 32.9%). He contends the district court should
have accepted his nonmarital claim and that it would have carri ed over into other
properties, the acquisition of which was funded by the proceeds of refinancing and selling
the Thomas property.
Although the district cour t acknowledged that it is li kely that husband had a
nonmarital interest in the Thom as property, it concluded that husband failed to establish
the original extent of that nonmarital interest by a preponderance of the evidence. It found
the documentation relied on by husband an d his expert suspect. The record—and our
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deference to the district court’s credibilit y determinations—supports that finding.
See Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. The purchase agreement fo r the property is absent from
the record; thus, the extent of husband’s down payment an d the original value of the
property is unknown. The only evidence of the property’ s value in 1991 is that husband
insured it for $125,000. Ther e is no evidence of the propert y’s value at the time of the
marriage—the expert assumed a 3% annual in crease starting from th e insured value in
1991. Further, even if husband had a nonmarital interest in the Thomas property, his
calculations about the present value of that interest failed to account for improvements that
the record shows were made. See Dorweiler , 413 N.W.2d at 576 (noting that
improvements made during marriage are presumed to be marital).
The district court did not clearly err by fi nding husband’s tracing insufficient, and
it therefore did not err by concluding that hus band failed to establis h the extent of his
nonmarital interest in the Thomas property.
Elliot Property
We next address the Elliot property, wh ich wife owned with her first husband.
Husband claims a nonmarital interest in the E lliot property, asserting that he bought out
wife’s first husband’s interest in that property by payment of $7,250 and that he spent
nonmarital funds from his retirement account and 3M stock sales on improvements to the
Elliot property.
But, as the district court found, husband provided no evidence, aside from the fact
that his income exceeded wife’s income at the time of her pr ior divorce, showing that he
paid wife’s first husband’s settlement. And husband failed to esta blish that no other
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financial resources were available to wife to provide the settlement payment. The district
court did not err by concluding that husband failed to establish a nonmarital interest based
on the settlement payment.
As for husband’s claimed nonmarital im provements, we again note that
improvements made during a marriage ar e presumed to be marital property. Dorweiler,
413 N.W.2d at 576. Husband testified that the improvements took place between 1991 and
1993. But he provided no receipts or other documenta tion of the improvements or his
alleged time frame. And although husband w ithdrew funds from his retirement account
and sold stock before and early in the parties’ marriage, he provided no documentation to
show that those funds went to im provements for the Elliot property. Cf. Nash v. Nash ,
388 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Minn. App. 1986) (cre diting wife’s tracing when she received an
inheritance and produced receipts for home improvements made two weeks after receiving
inheritance), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1986). Furthe r, husband worked at 3M during
the first few years of the marriage and participated in a stock-purchase program. Because
some retirement withdrawals and stock sales occurred during the ma rriage, it is possible
that some of the withdrawn funds or sold stocks that allegedly funded improvements were
acquired during the marriage and were theref ore marital property. Finally, the parties
refinanced the Elliot property several times, including in 1994, 1997, 2000, and 2002, the
proceeds of which could have been used for improvements.3

3 Husband testified that these refinances were used for other purposes, such as for the
parties’ cabin property. But he provided no documentation for this assertion.
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In light of this evidence, and recalling agai n that we defer to the district court’s
finding that husband’s testimony is not cred ible unless corroborated by documentation,
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210, we conclude the district court did not err by determining that
husband failed to establish a nonmarital interest in the Elliot property.
Cabin, Connors Lake, Devil’s La ke, and Vacation Rental Properties
Finally, because we conclude that husband failed to de monstrate the existence or
extent of his nonmarital in terests in the Sher idan, Thomas, and E lliot properties, we
accordingly conclude that the district court did not err by rejecting husba nd’s claim of
nonmarital interests in the remaining properties to the extent that those claims are based on
tracing from husband’s purported nonmarital interests in the Sheridan, Thomas, and Elliot
properties.
But husband presents an additional ar gument based on non-real-property-related
nonmarital funds. He asserts that he contributed money from a nonmarital Schwab account
towards the cabin property. He acknowledge s that he furnished no documentation of
withdrawing money from a Schwab account for this purpose. Further, he failed to provide
any tracing as to the origin of the Schwab account funds. Given the district court’s finding
that husband’s testimony was not credible unless corroborated by documentary evidence,
this argument also fails.
II. The district court properly ordered the sale of the real properties.

Husband next argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering the sale
of the parties’ real property, effectively changing the valuation date of those properties.
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“Upon a dissolution of a marri age . . . the [district] c ourt shall make a just and
equitable division of the marital property of the parties.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58 (2020). The
court may do so by ordering (1) di vision of the assets in-kind, (2) sale of the assets and
division of the proceeds of the sale, or (3) “distribution of the entire asset to one of the
parties, and order[ing] the recipient to pay to the other spouse a just and equitable share of
the value of the asset.” Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 188 (Minn. 1987). In valuing
the parties’ assets, the district court usually must use “the day of the initially scheduled
prehearing settlement conference [as the valuati on date], unless a differe nt date is agreed
upon by the parties, or unless the court ma kes specific findings that another date of
valuation is fair and equitable.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1.
In determining this issue, we note that the district court has broad discretion in
dividing marital property and we will not overturn the dist rict court’s decision absent an
abuse of discretion. Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 100. Likewise, we review the district court’s
choice of a valuation date for an abuse of discretion. Grigsby v. Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d 716,
720 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2002). There is no abuse of discretion
when the district court’s factual findings re garding its choice of a valuation date are
supported by the record and its decision has “an acceptable basis in fact and principle.” Id.
at 719-20 (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court found that the parties disagreed on the value of the properties
as well as their dispositions. Accordingly, the district court was well within its discretion
15
to order the sale of the properties. See Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 188 (stating that ordering
sale of asset is permissible when parties disagree on asset value).4
We also note that, when the district c ourt determines that selling property is the
proper resolution in a dissolution property dispute, it need not value the properties unless
for purposes such as estimating the total value of the marital estate at the time of the district
court’s decision. Instead, the value of the properties will be determined by the fair market
value at the time of sale, which is unknown to all parties and the district court until the sale
actually occurs.
Turning to whether ordering the sale of the properties impermissibly altered the
valuation date, we observe that the district court properly found that the valuation date was
June 10, 2019, the date of the initial case-manag ement conference. For purposes of
considering the marital estate as a whole, it estimated that the aggregate value of the
properties was $844,000, reflecting the aver age of the parties’ respective aggregate
valuations of $830,500 and $857,500. By selecting a valuation resting between the parties’
valuations, which were based on the June 10, 2019 valuation date, the district court valued
the properties as of the presumptive valuati on date and did not impermissibly alter that
date. See Hertz v. Hertz , 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1975 ) (stating that factfinder’s

4 Although we agree w ith husband that the district c ourt’s finding that the COVID-19
pandemic affected the properties’ values is clearly erroneous because it is not based on any
evidence in the record, we nevertheless affirm on this issue because evidence in the record
supports the district court’s other findings that support its decision. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61
(requiring courts to ignore harmless error).
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valuation should stand if it is “within the lim its of credible estimates made by competent
witnesses”).5
III. The record supports the district co urt’s award of permanent spousal
maintenance to wife.

Husband next asserts that the district court’s factual findings as to spousal
maintenance are clearly erroneous and do no t support its award of permanent spousal
maintenance.
We review a district court’s spousal- maintenance decision for an abuse of
discretion. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997). A district court abuses
its discretion if it makes findings that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplies the law,
or reaches a conclusion “that is against logic and the facts on record.” Id. We review the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Kampf v. Kampf , 732 N.W.2d 630, 633
(Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007). Findi ngs are clearly erroneous if
they are “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by
the evidence as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted).

5 Husband also objects to the district court’s determination of the aggregate value of the
properties, rather than their individual values. But he fails to point to any harm to him as
a result of the court’s approach. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (re quiring courts to ignore
harmless error); Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (stating that error without
prejudice is not grounds to reverse). Nor does he cite to any authority requiring the district
court to value each individual piece of pr operty instead of aggregating the values.
Scheffler v. City of Anoka , 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017) (stating that an
argument based on mere assertion withou t citation to authority is forfeited), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 26, 2017). Thus, not only has husband forfeited this argument under Scheffler,
but also any error is not reversible under rule 61 and Loth.
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Husband does not challenge the threshol d issue of whether wife adequately
demonstrated her need for spousal maintenance. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2020)
(stating circumstances under which sp ousal maintenance may be awarded);
Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 251-52 (Minn. 2016). Instead, husband challenges only
the district court’s consideration of the ei ght statutory factors used to determine the
duration and amount of spousal maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2020) (listing
factors). In weighing the eight factors, the district court must balance the payor’s ability
to pay against the recipient’s need. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d at 702. We address the eight factors
in turn.
A. Wife’s Financial Resources

With regard to this facto r, husband asserts that the di strict court clearly erred by
finding that wife has not earned income fro m the cattle operation and that the cattle
operation was not profitable. But wife testified that she received no income from the cattle
operation in 2019 or 2020. The district court implicitly found wife’s testimony about the
profitability of the cattle credible. See Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 99 (indicating that such
findings may be implicit). And the parties’ tax returns show that the cattle operation
resulted in a net loss each year from 2015 to 2018. The record supports the district court’s
finding that the cattle operation provided no income to wife.6

6 Husband notes that income, revenue, and prof it are different. We agree. And although
the terminology used by the parties and the district court in this case may have caused some
confusion, we observe that wife’s testimony and the evidence in the record show that, each
year, the parties paid more money for the ca ttle and their care than the money the cattle
brought in. Thus, the record s upports the district court’s determination that no income is
attributable to wife based on the cattle operation.
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B. Time Necessary to Acquire Additional Employment Training and Probability
of Wife’s becoming Self-Supporting

Husband next argues that the district court’s analysis on this factor is not supported
by the record. But the district court’s order acknowledges wife’s educational performance,
secondary degrees, and employment capacity and extensively discusses those factors. And
the district court agreed with husband’s expert that wife was appropriately employed given
her qualifications. We discern no error in the district court’s analysis.
Husband also asserts that the court failed to address whether wife’s skills were
outdated. But the district cour t addressed this factor by finding that wife does not need a
period of re-education because she is approp riately employed based on her education,
experience, and earnings history.
C. Standard of Living Established During Marriage
Husband appears to argue that the district court erred by finding that the parties had
a middle-to-high standard of living. But the district court’s findings are based on testimony
in the record about the parties’ lifestyle , which included purchas ing real property,
purchasing vehicles and cattle to assist retirement goals, ta king road trips, and obtaining
medical care and other necessities without worr ying about cost. The district court also
noted the parties’ aggregate monthly income.
Still, husband points to the district court’s finding that the parties lacked sufficient
income to meet their monthl y expenses. But husband provided no evidence that any
shortfall impacted the parties’ standard of living. Thus, the district court’s finding as to
the marital standard of living is not clearly erroneous.
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D. Duration of Marriage and any Absence of Wife from the Workforce due to
Homemaking Efforts

With regard to this factor, husband appears to allege that the district court found that
wife’s employment opportunities were permanently diminished due to the marriage. But
the district court did not fi nd that wife’s employment o pportunities were permanently
diminished. Rather, the court noted that wife stayed at home to care for the parties’ children
for a time but also worked nights and weekends in various part-time jobs over the years. It
also credited wife’s testimony that her career took a backseat to husband’s career. And the
court acknowledged that wife obtained an asso ciate degree and worked full time later in
the marriage. These findings are not clearly erroneous.
E. Employment Opportunities Forgone by Wife
Husband next contends that the district court’s finding that wife sacrificed her
earnings, seniority, and other em ployment opportunities to enable husban d to work full
time is clearly erroneous. But the record shows that, while husband worked full-time, wife
stayed at home with the children and worked part-time jobs until obtaining an associate’s
degree and returning to full-tim e work after about 20 years of marriage. And wife
accumulated only $40,179 in retirement assets by age 56. Based on these facts, the district
court’s finding that wife lost some earning s, seniority, retirement benefits, and other
employment opportunities is not clearly erroneous.
F. Age and Physical and Emotional Condition of Wife
Husband appears to argue that the district court should have considered his age (65)
and health under this factor. But this factor requires that th e district court consider only
20
the age and condition of the person seeking maintenance. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 2(f). The district court found that wife is 56 years old and does not have physical or
emotional conditions that imp act her ability to work, and husband does not contest these
findings.
G. Husband’s Ability to Meet His Own Needs while Meeting Wife’s Needs

Husband disputes whether he can meet hi s own needs while contributing to wife’s
needs. He asserts that his j ob is in jeopardy, he plans to retire next year, and his health
inhibits his ability to work. But husband provided no documentation of his health issues
or of his job insecurity. Instead, the re cord shows that husba nd remains gainfully
employed. And the district court’s order in cludes a detailed exploration of the parties’
respective incomes and expenses based on the parties’ testim ony and evidentiary
submissions.
7 Because the district court’s finding that husband can meet his own needs
while supporting wife is supported in the record, it is not clearly erroneous.
H. Parties’ Respective Contributions to Marital Estate
Turning to the final factor, husband notes that he contributed to building the marital
estate. The district court found that both pa rties contributed. This finding is not clearly
erroneous in light of record evidence rega rding husband’s full-time work, wife caring for
the parties’ children and worki ng part-time, and the parties’ joint efforts to manage their
real property.

7 Further, the district court noted that husband will be able to move to modify spousal
maintenance if his income substantially decreases for some reason.
21
In sum, the district court’s findings as to the spousal-maintenance factors are
supported by the record. Those findings esta blish that, based on her projected income,
even including her portion of the divided marita l property, wife cannot meet her needs at
the marital standard of living. And the amo unt of maintenance that the district court
awarded corresponds with the amount wife needs to make up her projected budget shortfall.
The district court therefore did not abuse its di scretion by ordering husband to pay $992
per month in permanent spousal maintenance.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering husband to maintain
a life-insurance policy in order to secure his spousal-maintenance obligation.

Husband argues that a $500,000 life-insu rance-policy requirement exceeds the
amount of spousal maintenance wife would receive and that the district court failed to make
the required findings before ordering him to secure his spousal-maintenance obligation.
We first note that husban d did not challenge the pr opriety of the security
requirement. Instead, he challenges only the amount of security the district court required.
The district court has discretion to determin e how much security is justified. Minn.
Stat. § 518A.71 (2020); Kampf, 732 N.W.2d at 635. In determining how much security to
require, the district court should consider th e maintenance-recipient’s age, education,
vocational experience, and employment prospects, Kampf, 732 N.W.2d at 635, as well as
the insurability and the cost of life insurance to the person paying maintenance, Lee v. Lee,
775 N.W.2d 631, 642 (Minn. 20 09). There is no requirement that “security be strictly
equivalent to the [spousal-maintenance] obligati on . . . . The [district] court must simply
22
make a reasonable award.” Head v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 449 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Minn.
App. 1989).8
Here, the district court recounted wife’s financial, educational, and employment
situation and found that she would “be in financial hardship” without spousal maintenance
from husband. Although it did not explicitly find that husband is insurable and can pay for
insurance, it implicitly made those findings when it noted that husband already had two
life-insurance policies totali ng $560,000 in coverage. See Prahl , 627 N.W.2d at 703
(recognizing that requisite findings may be im plicitly addressed). And although wife’s
monthly investment income from a $500,000 policy payout could exceed the awarded
monthly maintenance, we note that such excess is not unreasonable or out of step with the
parties’ marital standard of living, which the district court found to be a middle to high
standard. In sum, the district court’s findi ngs are supported by the record, and it did not
abuse its discretion by ordering that husband maintain life in surance in the amount of
$500,000 to secure his spousal-maintenance obligation.
V. The district court did not err by conclu ding that wife’s familial debt was
marital.

Husband asserts that the district court erred by treating wife’s familial loan as
marital when it treated his familial loans as nonmarital.

8 We observe that the purpose of spousal maintenance is to put both parties as close to the
marital standard of living as is e quitable under the circumstances. Peterka v. Peterka ,
675 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. App. 2004) (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(a), (b), 2(c)
(2002)). To the extent that security is part of a spou sal-maintenance award, some
symmetry between the amount of security requi red and the marital standard of living is
warranted.
23
We review the district court’s classifica tion of property as marital or nonmarital
de novo but defer to the district c ourt’s underlying findings of fact. Antone, 645 N.W.2d
at 100; Keithahn v. Keithahn, 392 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Minn. Ap p. 1987). Expenses incurred
after the presumptive valuation date are us ually nonmarital. Minn. Stat. § 518.003,
subd. 3b. However, the district court has authority to remedy a party’s unfair dealings with
marital property. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (stating that if a party unfairly
transfers or conceals marital assets, the court may compensate the other party accordingly).
The district court may consider whether one party controls and withholds the parties’
assets, forcing the other to borrow to meet expenses, in determining whether
post-separation debts should be classi fied as marital or nonmarital. See Keithahn , 392
N.W.2d at 10.
Here, both parties took out loans from family members after the presumptive
valuation date. But wife incurred her debt to meet monthly expens es in part because
husband stopped financial support to her (with the exception of paying the mortgage and
utilities on certain properties) and closed the pa rties’ joint bank accounts. Husband does
not dispute that he closed the joint accounts. Nor does he dispute that he stopped providing
other financial support to wife. In contrast , although husband’s debts were also incurred
to meet expenses, there is no evidence th at he incurred them because wife unfairly
concealed or transferred marital assets. 9 These facts justify the district court’s disparate
treatment of the parties’ respec tive familial loans. Thus, the district court did not err by

9 Husband also testified that he used portions of the loans to pay attorney fees associated
with the dissolution proceeding.
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concluding that wife’s fam ilial debt was marital while husband’s familial debt was
nonmarital.
VI. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding wife conduct-based
and need-based attorney fees.

Turning finally to the issue of attorney fees, husband first argues that the district
court’s award of conduct-based attorney fees is unjustified, asserting that the court failed
to list the deficient discovery, he provided the requested discovery as soon as he could,
wife withheld documents, and wife caused de lay in obtaining proper ty appraisals by
refusing to agree to neutral appraisers.
Minnesota statutes section 518.14 (2020) (the attorney-fee statute) governs awards
of attorney fees in fa mily law cases. “Nothing in [the attorney-fee statute] . . . precludes
the court from awarding, in its discretion, additional fees, costs, and disbursements against
a party who unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. The party moving for conduct-based attorney fees has the burden
to show that the other party’s conduct unreasonably contributed to the length or expense of
the proceeding. Baertsch v. Baertsch , 886 N.W.2d 235, 238 (M inn. App. 2016). We
review conduct-based fee awards for an abuse of discretion. Szarzynski v. Szarzynski ,
732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007).
Here, the district court referred to its prior order requiring husband to produce
discovery as well as wife’s subsequent submissions outlinin g the outstanding discovery.
Thus, contrary to husband’s assertion, the district court stated the information that husband
failed to provide. And the district court implicitly fou nd husband’s test imony about the
25
reasons for delays in providing discovery and obtaining appraisals not credible. See
Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 99. Fu rther, wife provided reasonable responses—which the
district court apparently credited—to husband’ s allegations that she caused the appraisal
delay and destroyed documents. 10 We defer to these credibility determinations. Id.;
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. The district cour t therefore did not abuse its discretion by
awarding conduct-based attorney fees to wife.
Husband also argues that the district c ourt erred by awarding wife $40,000 in
need-based attorney fees.
The district court “shall” award need-based attorney fees if it finds
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith assertion
of the party’s rights in the proceeding and will not
contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of
the proceeding;

(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and disbursements
are sought has the means to pay them; and

(3) that the party to whom fees , costs, and disbursements
are awarded does not have the means to pay them.

Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. We review a district court’s award of need-based fees for
an abuse of discretion. Gully v. Gully , 599 N.W.2d 814, 825 (Minn. 1999). Although
conclusory findings on the statutory factors do not support a need-based fee award, a lack
of specific findings is not fatal if the distri ct court’s order “reasonably implies” that it

10 Wife stated that she could not afford an appraisal, and she denied destroying documents.
She stated that she provided documents to husband via the parties’ respective attorneys and
told husband that he could come to the parties’ cab in to collect documents so long as he
notified her beforehand so that she could be absent.
26
considered the relevant factors and if “the di strict court was familiar with the history of
the case and had access to the parties’ financial records.” Geske v. Marcolina ,
624 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotations omitted).
Here, the district court found that wife incurred the fees for a good-faith assertion
of her rights, a finding that husband does not challenge and is supported by the record. It
found that husband can contribu te to wife’s fees based on the property division and his
income.11 Even if that finding is conclusory, th e district court’s order shows that it was
familiar with the record and the parties’ resp ective financial positions as evidenced by its
extensive findings regarding the pa rties’ incomes and expenses. See Geske, 624 N.W.2d
at 817. Finally, the district court found that wife cannot pay her fees because she lacked
access to marital funds and earn s $37,000 per year. These findings are supported by the
record. Thus, the district court did not abus e its discretion by awarding wife need-based
fees.
Still, husband points to various evidence showing that he is in debt to family, must
service the parties’ debt, and must make paym ents on the parties’ real property to argue
that he lacks the ability to pay need-based fees for wife. The district court knew of this
evidence but determined that husband nevertheless has the ability to pay. Further, because
the district court ordered the parties to sell the real property, husband’s property-related
expenses will eventually terminate. Our revi ew is for an abuse of discretion, and we

11 Husband erroneously states that the district court fou nd he could pay based on the
property division. He fails to acknowledge that the district court also considered his
income in finding that he has the ability to pay.
27
discern no reason to conclude th at the district court abused its discretion in determining
that husband has the ability to contribute need-based attorney fees to wife.
Affirmed.