Aries Williams, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0660

Aries Williams,
Relator,

vs.

ME Savage Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed December 13, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 41264896-3

Aries Williams, Eagan, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

ME Savage Inc., Savage, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Relator challenges an unemployment-law ju dge’s (ULJ) determination that she is
ineligible for unemployment benefits because she was terminated for employment
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misconduct. Relator argues that she did not engage in employment misconduct because
her absences were authorized and that the ULJ improperly declined to issue her requested
subpoenas. Because the record supports the ULJ’s determination that relator was
discharged for unauthorized absences constit uting employment misconduct, and the ULJ
did not abuse his discretion by refusing to issue subpoenas, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent ME Savage Inc. (Massage Envy) owns and operates several massage
clinics in Minnesota. It hired relator Aries Williams in mid-November 2019 to work at a
clinic scheduled to open in December 2019 in Eagan. Massage Envy’s new employee
training has both online and in-person components. Because the Eagan clinic was not yet
open, the Savage clinic co nducted Williams’s hiring and in-person training. With
Williams’s input and based on her availab ility, the Savage clinic manager created
Williams’s in-person training schedule. The Sa vage clinic manager also reviewed with
Williams a copy of Massage Envy’s company policies which included a requirement that
employees provide a doctor’s note to retu rn to work after missing two consecutive
workdays.
Williams completed the online training and three in-person training shifts at the
Savage location on N ovember 26, 27, and 29. But Massage Envy discharged Williams
after she missed in-person training shifts on December 2, 3, and 4 without providing a
doctor’s note.
Williams applied for unemplo yment benefits, and the De partment of Employment
and Economic Development dete rmined she was ineligible. Williams appealed this
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determination. Following an evidentiary hearing, the ULJ concluded Williams had been
discharged for employment misconduct and affirmed this conclusion upon Williams’s
request for reconsideration. This certiorari appeal follows.
DECISION
We reverse or modify a ULJ’s decision determining eligibility for unemployment
benefits only “if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because
the findings, inferences, conclusion, or deci sion are . . . (5) unsupported by substantial
evidence in view of the hearing record as submitted; or (6) arbitrary or capricious.” Minn.
Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2 020). If the credibility of a w itness “has a significant effect
on the outcome of a decision, the [ULJ] must set out the reason for crediting or discrediting
that testimony.” Id., subd. 1a(a) (2020). Th is credibility determination is “the exclusive
province of the ULJ and will no t be disturbed on appeal.” Bangtson v. Allina Med. Grp.,
766 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. App. 2009).
I. The ULJ did not err in determining Williams was ineligible for unemployment
benefits.

Williams claims the ULJ erred because, sh e argues, “[n]o misconduct occurred.”
Because the record supports the factual findings of the ULJ leading to his conclusion that
Williams committed serious employment misconduct, we affirm.
“Whether an employee enga ged in conduct that dis qualifies the employee from
unemployment benefits is a mixed question of fact and law.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc.,
796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). We review whether a particular
act constitutes disqualifying misconduct de novo. Id. We review whether the applicant
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engaged in the conduct “in the light most favorable to the decision and should not disturb
those findings as long as there is evidence in the record that reasonably tends to sustain
them.” Id. (quotation omitted).
An unemployment benefits claimant is ine ligible for benefits if “the applicant was
discharged because of employment misconduct.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2020).
“Employment misconduct means any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the
job or off the job, that is a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer has
the right to reasonably expect of the employee.” Id., subd. 6(a) (2020). An employer
generally “has a right to expect an employee to work when scheduled.” Del Dee Foods,
Inc. v. Miller, 390 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Minn. App. 1986) (quotation omitted). “As a general
rule, refusing to abide by an employer’s reasonable policie s and requests amounts to
disqualifying misconduct.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp. , 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn.
2002).
The ULJ heard testimony from the Savage clinic manager and Williams. He found
the clinic manager’s testimony “credible beca use it was clear, detailed, plausible, and
supported in part by contem poraneous documentation.” He found Williams’s testimony
not credible because it “was scattered, inconsistent, and regularly included implausible
information.” On reconsideration, the ULJ concluded Williams “provide[d] no new
information or argument requiring that this credibility finding be a ltered.” We do not
disturb the ULJ’s credibility determination. Bangtson, 766 N.W2d at 332.
The clinic manager testified that she cr eated an in-person training schedule with
Williams’s input and understanding and provided Williams a printed copy of the schedule,
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and that Williams did not indicate she had other employment obligations or conflicts with
the schedule. The clinic manager also testifie d that, other than stati ng that they were not
health-related, Williams provided no explanation for her absences.
Williams testified that she told the assi stant manager who hire d her that she had
another job and she was “given the opportunity not to even come in at all, but to wait until
[she] start[ed] at Eagan, until that location was actually physically open to do anything.”
Williams testified that she understood she was hired for the Eagan clinic and “didn’t think
[she] would have to drive in the winter all the way to Savage.”
Based on the clinic manager’s credible testimony, the ULJ found that Williams and
the clinic manager together created a schedule of training shifts at the Savage clinic and
that Massage Envy discharged Williams “because she missed three days of work in the
first few weeks of employment without a good re ason.” The ULJ fu rther found that
Williams missed these shifts “because she did not want to work at the Savage location,” as
evidenced by her complaints du ring testimony about having to work in Savage and not
because the shifts conflicted w ith another job or were optiona l. Based on these findings,
the ULJ concluded that Williams’s absences were “a serious violation of the standards of
behavior the employer ha[d] a right to reason ably expect,” and thus, she was discharged
for employment misconduct.
In short, the record supports the ULJ’s determination that Williams was discharged
for unexcused absenteeism, which constitutes serious employment misconduct.

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II. The ULJ was within his discretion to refuse to issue subpoenas.
A ULJ has the power to subp oena witnesses, documents, and other exhibits if the
requesting party shows the evidence is necessary, Minn. R. 3310.2914, subp. 1 (2019), and
a “duty to assist” parties with the development of the record. White v. Univ. of Minn.
Physicians Corp., 875 N.W.2d 351, 357 (M inn. App. 2016). “A request for a subpoena
may be denied if the testimony or documents sought would be irrelevant, immaterial, or
unduly cumulative or repetitious.” Icenhower v. Total Auto., Inc. , 845 N.W.2d 849, 853
(Minn. App. 2014) (quoting Minn. R. 3310.2914, subp. 1 (2013)), rev. denied (Minn. July
15, 2014). We review a ULJ’s subpoena decision for abuse of discretion. Id.
Before the hearing, Williams asked the UL J to subpoena five witnesses and 17 other
items. Four of the requested witnesses we re other Massage Envy employees whom she
expected to testify about their own workplace absences, customer complaints, and training
procedures. The ot her requested witness was Willia ms’s other employer, whom she
expected to testify regarding obligations to that employer.
The ULJ denied all subpoena requests. The ULJ concluded this prospective
testimony was “not connected with the core issues here today and wouldn’t shine any light
on any additional information.” The ULJ concluded the other subpoena requests were “not
relevant” and, of the “numerous requested pieces of information, many of them ha[d] been
given in the testimony today.” On reconsider ation, the ULJ affirmed that “[m]any of the
requests were covered in [Massage Envy’s] testimony” and “[t]he requests for information
that were not asked . . . in the examination were all not relevant.” Our review of the record
supports this conclusion.
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Williams argues the ULJ failed to assist her in developing the record by not issuing
subpoenas. We disagree. The duty to assist parties in developing the record does not
extend to irrelevant information. White, 875 N.W.2d at 357 (reve rsing and remanding
because the ULJ failed to assist the relator in developing th e record regarding a relevant
fact). The record shows that the ULJ assisted in developing the record by asking relevant
questions of both Williams and the clinic ma nager, pursuing and clarifying the issues
Williams raised, and assisting Williams with cross-examination. The record also supports
the ULJ’s determination that the subpoenas would only pr oduce information that was
irrelevant or cumulative. Therefore, the UL J did not abuse his discretion in declining to
issue subpoenas.
Affirmed.