State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0671

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Brian John Leonida,
Appellant.

Filed February 7, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-20-313

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Acting Dakota County A ttorney, Anna Light, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Max Brady Kittel, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Pres iding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to deny his presentence motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Because appellant did not establish fair and just reasons for
withdrawal and because district courts may consider the interests of the victim when
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determining whether withdrawal prejudices the st ate, we conclude that the district court
did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea. We affirm.
FACTS
On February 4, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Brian John
Leonida with a felony violatio n of an order for protection (OFP) for sending electronic
communications to the protected party disc ussing topics outside the permitted scope of
communication. After two weeks in cust ody, Leonida moved for a bail reduction,
explaining he needed to get out of jail to care for his children. The district court denied
this motion.
On February 26, 2020, Leonida pleaded guilty to the sole count of violating an OFP.
At the plea hearing, Leonida’s attorney asked him whether he was “[m]aking the claim that
the fact [he’s] been held in jail since [his] arrest and coul d not post bail caused [him] to
decide to plead guilty in order to get this thing over with rather than waiting for [his] turn
at trial?” Leonida indicated that he was not pleading guilty just to get out of jail. Leonida
also signed a written plea petition. In that doc ument, Leonida marked the box next to the
following statement: “I do not make the claim that the fact that I have been held in jail
since my arrest and could not post bail caused me to decide to plead guilty in order to get
the thing over with rather than waiting for my turn at trial.” Leonida affirmed that he was
freely and voluntarily pl eading guilty without making a cl aim that he was innocent.
Leonida’s counsel noted for the record that Leonida had been advised to proceed to trial,
but Leonida testified that he chose to plead guilty instead because he was in fact guilty of
the offense. During the state’s inquiry, the state explained that “in order to plead guilty to
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this specific charge, it has to be shown that you knew you were viola ting the order at the
time you did it.” Leonida stated that he had in fact violated the OFP by sending
communications to the protected party. In addition, Leonida affirmed that he knew a jury
trial was scheduled, but he agreed to waive his right to trial. Leonida also agreed that he
understood each of the other rights that he was waiving by pleadi ng guilty. Leonida’s
counsel also explained to him that if he changed his mind, the di strict court and the
appellate court would not allow him to withdraw his plea. The district court accepted
Leonida’s guilty plea, adjudicated him guilty, ordered a presentence investigation (PSI),
and continued the matter for se ntencing. A victim impact statement was submitted prior
to sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing, Leonida orally moved to withdraw his guilty plea,
arguing that he only pleaded guilty to get out of jail. Leonida explained the basis for his
motion: “I told everybody I was guilty so I could get out of ja il. I’m appealing this. The
State of Minnesota has already been aware of it . . . . But they said I couldn’t appeal this
before I got sentenced on this.” The district court clarified that Leonida was seeking to
withdraw his guilty plea because he did not enter it intelligently and voluntarily. Leonida
explained: “I entered it voluntarily, but I wanted to get out of jail. . . . I couldn’t financially
afford to bail out, and I had a ch ild at home that I had to ta ke care of and a 73-year-old
father watching this child. So I needed to get out of jail. ” Leonida’s counsel explained
that the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was “based upon the fact that [Leonida] said he
did not make that—he did not want to admit to the facts as they were alleged in the
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complaint, and he pleaded guilty solely to get out of jail.” The district court continued the
matter for a hearing regarding the motion to withdraw.
Leonida and the state filed memoranda prior to the hearing. Le onida asserted that
“he had not had adequate time to consult with his attorney, that he [pleaded] guilty only to
get out of jail and that he was not guilty of anything other than being a loving father.”
Leonida argued that a withdrawal would be appropriate under the fair-and-just standard
and to avoid a manifest injustice. In its mo tion, the state argued only that there was no
manifest injustice because Leonida’s plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.
At the hearing, the state argued it would be prejudiced if the district court were to
grant the motion because one year had passed since the offense and, referencing the victim
impact statement, the state argued that reope ning the case would negatively affect the
victim. Leonida testified at the hearing and stated that he pleaded guilty to get out of jail,
the motion filed by his attorney was incomplete because he also believed in his innocence,
and he had children he needed to take care of. On cross-examination, Leonida further
explained that he had a lot goi ng on in his life and was u nder a lot of mental stress,
reiterating that he pleaded guilty to get out of jail.
The district court denied Leonida’s motion, finding that Leonida testified during the
plea hearing that he did not deci de to plead guilty in order to get out of jail. The district
court also quoted Leonida’s testimony at the plea hearing in which Leonida agreed his
counsel advised him to go to trial, but he di sregarded this advice because he was, in fact,
guilty of the offense and that he freely and voluntarily chose to plead guilty. The district
court quoted from the written pl ea petition as well, noting th at Leonida denied pleading
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guilty in order to get ou t of jail. The district court then contrasted these statements with
the stated reason Leonida provided for withdrawing his guilty plea:
“[Leonida] claimed that he pled guilty on February 26, 2020,
only to get out of jail. He is now claiming this despite stating
under oath at the time of the plea that he was not pleading
guilty just to get out of jail . . . . [Leonida] said he was innocent
despite telling the court at the plea hearing that he was pleading
guilty because he was in fact guilty.”

The district court concluded that that “[f]or the past year the victim had the peace of mind
that this matter was resolved. To now take that away from her, especially when considering
the reasons given by [Leonida] for withdrawing his plea, would be prejudicial to the state
and the victim.” The district court further concluded that “it would not be fair and just to
allow [Leonida] to withdraw his plea” and that “[Leonida] has not met his burden of proof
that it would be a manifest injustice if he were not allowed to withdraw his plea.” The
district court denied the motion to withdraw and, on March 30, 2021, sentenced Leonida
to a term of imprisonment of 15 months. Th e district court stayed the execution of the
prison term for a period of three years subject to conditions of probation. Leonida appeals.
DECISION
Leonida asserts that the district court erred in two primary respects. First, Leonida
contests the district court’s determination that he failed to state fair and just reasons for
withdrawing his guilty plea. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
credited Leonida’s statements during the plea colloquy over his contradictory statement in
support of the motion to withdraw, we affirm th is portion of the distri ct court’s decision.
Second, Leonida argues that the district court erred as a matter of law when it considered
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the victim’s interests in determining whethe r withdrawal would prejudice the state.
Because binding precedent permits consideration of the vi ctim’s interest as a component
of prejudice to the state, we affirm this portion of the district court’s decision as well.
Although a person has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, State v. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010), district courts may permit a person to withdraw a guilty
plea in two circumstances. First, if “wit hdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice,” the district court must grant a wi thdrawal request at any time, including when
the request “is made after sentencing.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Second, a district
court may grant a withdrawal request before sentencing “if it is fair and just to do so.” Id.,
subd. 2. Only the second standard is properly before this court.1 Under this standard, the
district court must consider the person’s stated reasons for withdrawal and whether
withdrawal would cause prejudice to the state. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. The defendant
bears the burden of proving, by a prepondera nce of the evidence, th at the facts warrant
withdrawal of the guilty plea. James v. State, 674 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Minn. App. 2004),
rev’d on other grounds , 699 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 2005). The state bears the burden of
showing prejudice caused by the withdrawal. State v. Crump, 826 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Minn.
App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. May 21, 2013).

1 To the extent that portions of Leonida’s brief characterize the district court order as only
considering whether withdrawal was necessary to correct a manifest in justice, we do not
agree. While the state argued this standard to the district court, the district court considered
and applied both standards. Be cause Leonida makes no specific argument to this court
regarding manifest injustice, we need only review the portion of the district court’s order
applying the “fair and just” standard.
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This court reviews a district court’s de cision to deny a presentence motion to
withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of disc retion, reversing only in the rare case. Kim v.
State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989); State v. Jones , 921 N.W.2d 774, 782 (Minn.
App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019); Crump, 826 N.W.2d at 841. We defer to
the district court’s credibility determinations. State v. Miller, 659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn.
App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. July 15, 2003).
In support of his motion to withdraw, Leonida stated th at he only pleaded guilty
because he wanted to get out of jail in order to take care of his children. This statement
contradicts the statements that Leonida made at the time of his plea. Contrary to the stated
reason in support of withdrawal, Leonida stated that he was not pleading guilty “in order
to get this thing over with rather than waiting for [his] turn at trial” In addition, in the
written plea petition that Leonida signed, he made the following statement: “I do not make
the claim that the fact that I have been held in jail since my arrest and could not post bail
caused me to decide to plead guilty in order to get the thing over with rather than waiting
for my turn at trial.” Leon ida also affirmed that he wa s freely and voluntarily pleading
guilty, he was not claiming innocence, he was in fact guilty of the offense, and he
understood that if he changed his mind, the district court and the appellate court would not
likely withdraw his plea.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s weighing of Leonida’s
conflicting statements or in th e district court’s decision to credit the statements Leonida
made during the plea colloquy. See Jones, 921 N.W.2d at 782 (affirming district court’s
denial of a defendant’s presentence motio n to withdraw his guilty plea where the
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defendant’s stated reasons in support of th e motion contradicted statements made by the
defendant at the plea hearing); see also State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983)
(affirming district court’s denial of a defe ndant’s postsentence mo tion to withdraw his
guilty plea where the defendant’s stated reasons in support of the motion contradicted
statements made by the defe ndant at the plea hearing); State v. Lopez , 379 N.W.2d 633,
637 (Minn. App. 1986) (same), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1986).
Leonida also argues that the district court erred as a matter of law when it considered
the victim’s interests as part of its analysis of prejudice.2 Again we are not persuaded. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that di strict courts are justified in considering
the interests of the victim wh en analyzing the prejudice that the state would face if the
district court granted a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Kim, 434 N.W.2d at
267; see also State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 650-51 (Minn. 2007) (noting that the holding
in Kim permits “consideration of the alleged victim’s interests as prejudice to the State”).
Leonida’s argument is contrary to this established caselaw.
Affirmed.

2 We note that Leonida does not dispute the de termination that withdrawal of the guilty
plea would be contrary to the interests of the victim in this case. Instead, Leonida raises a
legal challenge, arguing that an alleged victim’s interests are necessarily distinct from any
impact to the state.