State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0672

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ryan Lee Debner,
Appellant.

Filed May 2, 2022
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-18-1224

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brandi Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant Ryan Lee Debner challenges his felony theft conviction, arguing that the
district court erroneously concluded that a witness’s out -of-court statements fell within an
exception to the hearsay rule. We affirm.
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FACTS
On the evening of October 20, 2018, Litchfield police responded to a theft report
from a trustee of the Eagle’s Club (club). The trustee informed the first responding officer
that someone had tried to steal the c lub’s beverage cooler from the banquet room. A
television that had been on top of the cooler was found behind the club, and the large, glass
beverage cooler lay broken in the middle of the parking lot with much of its contents either
broken or damaged. Based on several eye -witness statements and a search of Debner’s
vehicle, which contained items identified as belonging to the club, Debner was charged
with felony theft in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2018).
The following summarizes the witness testimony at Debner’s three -day jury trial.
A club employee saw Debner and his significant other, Jaclynn Condon, having drinks at
the club bar. The employee noticed Condon, a former club bartender, going in and out of
the club’s kitchen. The employee informed the trustee, who searched the kitchen but did
not find Condon there. While the trustee was in the kitchen, he saw someone in the banquet
room, which is attached to the kitchen.
A patron soon informed the trustee that the club’s beverage cooler was broken in
the middle of the park ing lot. The cooler was ordinarily stored in the banquet room. The
patron testified that she heard a strange noise and observed a sport utility vehicle (SUV)
speed out of the parking lot with its hatchback open.
The first police officer arrived roughly 15 minutes later, around 8:00 p.m. A second
officer came to help but left after determining that the first officer did not need assistance.
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When the second officer left around 8:20 p.m., he saw Debner drive into the parking lot of
the club in a red SUV.
After the bartender informed the first officer that Debner had returned to the club,
the officer moved to park his squad car in front of Debner’s SUV to prevent him from
leaving the club parking lot. The second officer returned , and together they searched
Debner’s vehicle. The officers found loose beverage containers and other items that the
trustee identified as belonging to the c lub.
During this time, Condon was at a local tavern for the second time that day. The
tavern owner testified at trial about s tatements Condon made to her. Debner objected to
the admission of these statements as hearsay, and the district court found the statements
admissible under the excited -utterance exception.
The tavern owner testified that Condon and Debner were at the tavern in the
afternoon and that several hours later, Condon returned to the tavern towards the end of the
dinner rush, which is usually from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. In her testimony, the tavern
owner described Condon as nervous, frantic, and giddy when Condon returned. The tavern
owner stated that Condon confided in her that she and Debner had stolen a cooler from the
club but that it broke when it fell out of their car in the c lub parking lot. Condon was
concerned that someone had seen them leave. She was also worried because they had
forgotten to pay their tab at the club. Condon explained that Debner had returned to the
club to pay their tab while she waited for him at the tavern. Debner never returned . The
tavern owner eventually call ed the sheriff’s department and learned that Debner had been
arrested.
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After a three-day trial, the jury found Debner guilty of theft , and the district court
entered a judgment of conviction. The district court stayed imposition of sentence, placed
Debner on probation for five years, and ordered restitution.
Debner appeals.
DECISION
Debner contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the tavern
owner to testify about hearsay statements Condon made to her.
“Evidentiary rulings rest wit hin the sound discretion of the district court, and
[appellate courts] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). A district court abuses its discretion when
its “ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted) .
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies.
Minn. R. Evid. 802; State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006).
Here, the district court found that Condon’s statements to the tavern owner were
admissible under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The excited-utterance
exception allows admission of a “statement relating to a startling event or condit ion made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”
Minn. R. Evid. 803(2). Three requirements must be met for hearsay to qualify as an excited
utterance: (1) there was a startling event or condition; (2) the hearsay statement relates to
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the startling event or condition; and (3) the declarant was “under a sufficient aura of
excitement caused by the event or condition to insure the trustworthiness of the statement.”
Minn. R. Evid. 803(2) 1989 advisory comm. cmt. The district court, “ in its discretion,
determines whether the declarant was under the ‘aura of excitement,’ and we review that
determination for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 224 (Minn.
2000) (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 803(2) 1989 advisory comm. cmt.) (citation omitted) .
Debner mounts three challenges to the district court’s evidentiary ruling. We address his
challenges in turn.
The district court found that Condon’s statements about the “very recent theft from
the Eagles [Club]” constituted a startling event. This finding supports the first two
requirements for an excited utterance: there was a startling event , and the statement relates
to it. Debner, however, argues that the statements Condon made wer e not related to her
witnessing a startling event but were instead the result of her worrying about “get[ting] in
trouble for the theft.” We disagree. Condon’s statements either described how the theft
unfolded or expressed her worry about getting caught for the theft . Both of those
statements relate generally to the theft, and we need not parse them as Debner suggests .
The district court therefore did not clearly err in its finding.
The third requirement asks whether Condon was sufficiently under the s tress of
excitement when she made the statements. Debner contends that Condon’s statement fails
this requirement because Condon’s excitement is attributable to her drinking and because
the state failed to establish how much time passed between the theft and Condon’s
statements. Neither contention is persuasive.
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First, t he tavern owner specifically testified that although she was aware that
Condon had been drinking, Condon appeared frantic, nervous, and giddy “because of that
incident.” Based on the tavern owner’s description of her, the district court did not clearly
err in its finding that Condon was still under the stress of excitement caused by the theft.
Second, our caselaw is clear that t here are “no strict temporal guidelines for
admitting an excited utterance ” so long as the declarant is still under the stress of
excitement caused by the event. Martin, 614 N.W.2d at 223-24 (quotation omitted) . As
we previously noted, the record here supports the district court’s determination that Condon
was still under the stress of excitement caused by the theft. We also observe that the record
supports the district court’s finding that Condon’s statements were made within an hour of
the theft , which is within a time range that other cases have found acceptable for the
excited-utterance exception. See State v. Berrisford , 361 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. 1985)
(affirming the admission of a statement made “just 90 minutes after the murder”); State v.
Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 783-84 (Minn. 1986) (affirming the admission of statements
made “within an hour” of a fire).
On this record, the re is no basis to conc lude that the district court abuse d its
discretion in weighing the tavern owner’s description of Condon’s demeanor and finding
that Condon’s statement fell within the excited -utterance exception to the hearsay rule .
Affirmed.