In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: D. Y., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0674

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: D. Y., Parent.

Filed November 22, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-20-3356

Anne M. Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant-
mother D. Y.)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and
Public Health Department)

Brea Alisabeth Buettner-Stanchfield, Buettner Law Group, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for father S. X.)

David Allen Yates, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court or der adjudicating her children in need of
protection or services (CHIPS). Appellant argues her due-process rights were violated
because the CHIPS trial occurred beyond th e timeline established by the juvenile-
protection rules. Appellant also claims th e district court abused its discretion by
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concluding that the children are in need of protection or services and erred by finding the
disposition was in the children’s best interest s. Because appellant was not prejudiced by
the timing of the trial date, he r due-process rights were not violated. Also, because the
record supports the district court’s determina tion that the children face a present risk of
harm and that the disposition is in the children’s best interests, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother D.Y. has three minor childr en who were, at the time of trial, ages
four, three, and one. Mother and the children’s father lived together from 2014 to 2020.
On June 21, 2020, the family was living in a hotel after they were forced from their
house due to a mortgage foreclosure. After father assaulted her during a three-hour period
in the hotel room with the children present, mother ca lled the police from her vehicle.
Respondent Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department (the county)
met with mother who agreed and signed a volu ntary case plan. The voluntary case plan
directed mother to 1) complete a mental-hea lth evaluation, 2) participate in parenting
education, 3) obtain safe and stable housing for the children, 4) cooperate with the county
and notify it before changing addresses, 5) prevent contact between father and the children
unless authorized by the so cial worker, and 6) partic ipate in domestic-violence
programming. Mother and her children, with the county’s consent, moved in with the
children’s maternal grandmother and resided there from July 2020 to September 2020.
Without notifying the coun ty, mother and her children moved from the maternal
grandmother’s home in September. Mother did not respond to multiple phone calls, text
messages, and emails from the county after September 1. The county filed a CHIPS
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petition on September 21, 2020, along with an ex parte motion for emergency protective
care (EPC), which the court granted. The EPC order directed that the children were to be
immediately taken into custody and placed by the county.
The county had no contact with mother or the children until early November when
it located mother and children at a family shelter. The county took emergency custody of
the children and, following an EPC hearing on November 9, the district court ordered
interim legal custody of the children be granted to the county. The children were initially
placed in foster care with mother’s brother and, later, with the maternal grandmother.
During a December 9 pretrial hearing, at which mother was present and with her
appointed counsel, the county requested the scheduling of a trial date and all parties except
mother were willing to participat e in a remotely conducted trial. 1 The district court
scheduled another pretrial hearing for January 8 and a trial for March 19. During the
January 8 pretrial hearing, mother requested that her appointed co unsel be dismissed,
which the district court granted. Mother retained private counsel on February 1. On March
12, mother moved to dismiss th e CHIPS proceeding for failure to hold a trial within the
60-day period set out by the juvenile-protection rules. The district court denied this motion.
The district court adjudicated the child ren in need of protection or services,
concluding that the children are: (1) without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education or
other required care, (2) without proper parental care, and (3) in an environment which is

1 All court proceedings, with unr elated exceptions, were to be held remotely, due to an
order of the Chief Justice respon ding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Order Governing the
Continuing Operations of the Minn. Jud. Branch , No. ADM20-8001 at 2-3 (Minn. Nov.
20, 2020).
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injurious or dangerous to th e children or others. The di strict court also found the
disposition was in the children’s best interests. The disposition included a transfer of legal
custody to the county for placement in foster care. Mother appeals.
DECISION
We review a CHIPS determination under “a very deferential standard of review.”
In re Welfare of Child of S.S.W. , 767 N.W.2d 723, 734 (Minn. App. 2009). We review
“factual findings for clear error and [] finding of a statutory basis for the order for abuse of
discretion.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015),
rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). Noting that “[t]he clear-erro r standard of review is
familiar because it applies acro ss many contexts,” the supreme court recently stated: “In
applying the clear-error standard, [appellate courts] view the evidence in a light favorable
to the findings. [Appellate courts] will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless,
on the entire evidence, [they] are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” In re Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)
(quotations and citations omitted). Additionally,
[the] clear-error review does no t permit an appellate court to
weigh the evidence as if trying the matter de novo. Neither
does it permit an appellate court to engage in fact-finding
anew, even if the court would find the facts to be different if it
determined them in the first instance. Nor should an appellate
court reconcile conflicting evidence. Consequently, an
appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of the
evidence to prove or demonstr ate the correctness of the
findings of the trial court.

Id. at 221-22 (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).
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The decision of a trial court to adjudicate a child in need of protection or services
will not be reversed “[i]n the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d
at 734 (quotation omitted). “Amo ng other ways, a district court abuses its discretion if it
acts against logic and the facts on record, or if it enters fact findings that are unsupported
by the record, or if it misapplies the law.” In re Adoption of T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d 573, 578
(Minn. App. 2010) (quotation and citations omitted).
I. Mother was not denied due process by th e trial occurring 130 days after the
EPC hearing.

Mother argues that the March 19 tria l, which occurred 130 days after the EPC
hearing date, was “per se prejudicial” because “no remedies were available to Mother that
would enable her to have the children return ed to her care” between their removal and
issuance of the district court’s CHIPS order.
“[A] trial regarding a child in need of protection or services matter shall commence
within 60 days from the date of the emergency protective ca re hearing or the admit/deny
hearing, whichever is earlier.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 49.01. Mother’s trial began on March
19, 130 days after the November 9 EPC hearing, in violation of the rule.
2 However, this
does not end our analysis. The question we are asked to consider is whether this violation
of the procedural rule deprived mother of due process. On this record, we conclude it does
not.

2 Respondent argues that the trial date did not violate the rule because Minn. R. Juv. Prot.
P. 49.01 provides for a trial continuance. This rule does not apply here because the trial
was set, in the first instance, 70 days be yond the timeline – trial was never continued
pursuant to this rule.
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“Due process requires reasonable notice, a timely opportunity for a hearing, the right
to counsel, the opportun ity to present evidence, the right to an impartial decision-maker,
and the right to a reasonable decision based solely on the record.” In re Welfare of Children
of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008). “[P]rejudice as a result of the alleged
violation is an essential component of the due process analysis.” In re Welfare of Child of
B.J.-M., 744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2008) (c itations omitted). The prejudice inquiry
facilitates the fundamentally flexible nature of the “procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.” Bendorf v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 727 N.W.2d 410, 415 (Minn. 2007)
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)); In re Welfare of HGB , 306
N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981) (“It is settled that the nature of due process is flexibility.”).
Mother was aware, at the tim e of the December 9, 2020 pretrial hearing, that all
trials were scheduled remotely due to th e Chief Justice’s pandemic order. However,
mother informed the c ourt she wished for an “in person” hearing. The district court
explained its reasoning for the scheduled date at the beginning of the March 19 trial as it
denied mother’s March 12 due-process-pretri al motion to dismiss. The court explained
that it attempted to accommodat e mother’s request: “the farther out [it] set the date . . .
[the] more likely she would be able to have an in-person trial.” 3 The record reveals that,
until mother’s March 12 pretrial motion, she did not object to the trial date though it had

3 The trial was ultimately held remotely, pursuant to a cont inued prohibition of in-person
civil trials absent an exceptio n by the chief judge of the di strict made after consultation
with the Chief Justice. Order Governing the Continuing Op erations of the Minn. Jud.
Branch, No. ADM20-8001 at 2-3 (Minn. Feb. 18, 2021).
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been established on December 9, 2020. 4 Therefore, the first opportunity for the district
court to consider mother’s due-process objection was at the start of the March 19 trial.
Mother has provided no law, and we have found none, which suggests that the
violation of a court deadline in a child protection matter resu lts in “per se prejudice.”
Mother fully contested the CHIPS petition. Mo ther testified during the trial and her trial
attorney conducted thorough cross-examination of the county’s witnesses.
Further, the record belies mother’s claim that “no remedies were available to Mother
that would enable her to have the children re turned to her care.” Mother repeatedly
informed the social worker that she would not comply with the case plan “until after trial
to see if [the county] has any solid proofs to prove that [her] kids are in need of CHIPS and
to see if [she] need[s] any of [the] recomm ended services.” The county continued its
attempts to connect mother w ith services after taking custo dy of the children and, during
trial, continued to express a desire to assist mother with the recommended services. Mother
declined these efforts.
In sum, mother was not denied due process by the delayed trial date.
II. The district court was within its discre tion in concluding the children are in
need of protection or services.

“[S]ection 260C.007, subdivision 6, require s proof that one of the enumerated child-
protection grounds exists and that the subject child needs protection or services as a result.”
S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 728. We review the district court’s “factual findings for clear error

4 Mother did not provide this court with a transcript of the pretrial hearings. Therefore, we
are not aware of any discussion between the parties and the district court which may have
preceded the establishment of the trial date.
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and its finding of a statutory basis fo r the order for abuse of discretion.” D.L.D., 865
N.W.2d at 321. This involves a close inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence, but due
deference “to the district court, which is in a superior position to a ssess the credibility of
witnesses.” In re Welfare of Child of H.G.D. , 962 N.W.2d 861, 873 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted).
The district court found that mother’s children were in need of protection or services
because their “environment [was] such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child[ren] or
others. An injurious or dangerous enviro nment may include, but is not limited to, the
exposure of [children] to criminal activity in the child [ren]’s home.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.007, subd. 6(9) (2020). Following the June 2020 assault, father was convicted of
domestic assault by strangulation. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2247 (2020).
Mother argues the district court abused its discretion in concluding this ground
existed because it “addressed an incident that occurred nine months prior to trial, . . . failed
to make any clear and specific findings that conform with the statutory criteria, and . . .
failed [to] identify a causal link between th e children’s environment and their resulting
need for protection or services.” We disagree.
The district court found, and the record co nfirms, that mother has “a long history or
involvement with domestic violence, including violence committed on her in the presence
of her children.”
5 The record shows that since 2014 mother has repeatedly returned to

5 Mother testified that the children were not present for the physical abuse in June, but the
district court did not find her testimony cred ible, and we defer to the district court’s
credibility determination. H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d at 873.
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father following assaults, including serious assault leading mother to seek medical attention
including hospitalization and a protective or der against father, which she later had
dismissed. The record also indicates that the children have been present for multiple
incidents when father assaulted mother.
In sum, the record supports the district court’s factual finding that the children
remain at risk of being exposed to criminal activity in the home if mother is present.
Therefore, the district court was within its discretion to conclude the children face an
injurious or dangerous environment and are, therefore, in need of protection or services.6
III. The district court was within its discretion to conclude that the disposition is in
the children’s best interests.

An order for disposition as a child in need of protection or services must address
“why the best interests and safety of the ch ild are served by the di sposition and case plan
ordered.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.201, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020). The district court found that “[i]t
is in the best interests and sa fety of the children to remain in foster care placement until
[mother] can provide a safe environment fo r her children, demonstrated through her
substantial compliance with the case plan ordered below and her correction of the
conditions which lead to the placement.” The record supports the district court’s findings.
Two social workers and the guardian ad litem, all of whom the district court found
credible, testified that continued out-of-home placement and custody with the county was

6 Because the statute requires the existence of only one statutory ground to demonstrate the
children are in need of protec tion or services, and because we affirm the district court’s
determination on this ground, we do not co nsider the other two grounds found by the
district court to exist.
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in the children’s best intere st. Mother, despite recent incidents of domestic violence,
returned to the children’s father. The children witnessed mother being abused on multiple
occasions. Mother did not have stable housing after her children were removed, and, at the
time of trial, was living with her brother, whom the court found would not prevent contact
by father with the children. Mother did not provide verifica tion that she participated in
domestic-violence programming as directed by her case plan nor did she accept any other
services offered by the county to assist her to comply with the case plan.
Because the record supports the district court’s finding that it is in the best interests
of the children to remain in an out-of-home placement, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the disposition was in the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.