State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0683

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Vincent Eric Kraven,
Appellant.

Filed December 27, 2021
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-11-690

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Kristen E. Swanson, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Cleary, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that
the district court failed to make adequate findings and, consequently, abused its discretion
by revoking his probation. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2011, appellant Vincent Eric Kraven pleaded guilty to second- degree criminal
sexual conduct. The district court granted appellant a dispositional departure from the
255-month presumptive sentence for second- degree criminal sexual conduct and stayed
execution of that sentence for ten years.
At the time of his guilty plea, appellant also had two probationary sentences. The
district court found that appellant violated both probationary sentences by failing to remain
law abiding, but it stayed these sentences . The district court then placed appellant on
probation and ordered him to serve one year in jail.
In 2014, appellant admitted to violating his probation by using alcohol, failing to
complete a sex-offender-treatment program, and failing to be truthful to his probation
officer. The district court executed his two previously stayed probationary sentences while
again staying the execution of the sentence for the second-degree criminal-sexual-conduct
offense.
In May 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with
felon-in-possession of a firearm and reckless discharge of a firearm. Pursuant to an
agreement between appellant and the state, appellant pleaded guilty to the
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felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm offense with the understanding that the
reckless-discharge offense would be dismissed and that he could move for a downward
dispositional departure at the sentencing hearing. The district court accepted appellant’s
guilty plea and found that appellant violated his probation by failing to remain law abiding
by possessing a firearm. The district court also allowed the state to pursue other alleged
probation violations at a contested hearing should it choose to do so.
In February 2021, a contested probation- violation hearing was held on the
remaining probation violations. The district court found that appellant violated seven
conditions of his probation and dismissed the remaining violation.1 Appellant moved for a
downward dispositional departure, and the district court scheduled a joint hearing on
sentencing and disposition of appellant’s probation violations.
At the joint hearing, appellant’s attorney and the county attorney presented
arguments. The probation officer testified and recommended executing appellant’s
felon-in-possession and criminal-sexual-conduct sentences. Appellant also testified.
On the issue of probation revocation, appellant’s counsel highlighted appellant’s
history of mental health issues and a traumatic brain injury (TBI) that he sustained in 2014.
She presented evidence that he completed sex-offender treatment and rehabilitative mental

1 The district court accepted appellant’s admissions that he: (1) failed to remain law
abiding; (2) possessed a deadly or dangerous weapon; (3) failed to report to his probation
officer; and (4) possessed mood-altering substances. It also found that the state proved the
following violations: (1) failure to cooperate with and be truthful to his probation officer;
(2) failure to comply with additional requirements imposed by his probation officer; and
(3) possessing mood-altering substances (on another occasion). It dismissed the alleged
violation that appellant failed to submit to an unannounced visit.
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health services. She emphasized that he showed rehabilitation regarding the
criminal-sexual-conduct offense and argued that appellant’s success surrounding his
sex-offender treatment suggested that his treatment needs could be effectively addressed
as probation conditions.
As to the departure motion, appellant’s attorney again highlighted his TBI. She
stressed that the firearm offense occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic and that
appellant “lacked substantial capacity” when he committed the offense. She noted that
appellant was accepted into an inpatient treatment program and argued that appellant had
shown a particular amenability to probation, justifying a dispositional departure.
The county attorney argued that appellant was not amenable to probation because
he committed several serious crimes while on probation and there is no exceptional
circumstance warranting departure.
The district court denied appellant’s motion for a dispositional departure and
revoked his probation. Addressing the dispositional departure first, the district court found
that appellant was given a departure and placed on probation but, even so, his record on
probation was “horrible.” The district court determined that appellant’s TBI did not
correlate to the current offense because his TBI and significant mental health issues
predated the felon-in-possession offense by over a year. The district court also found that,
even if there were another treatment program that had an opening for appellant, he had
already been through a treatment program and continued to violate his probation. The court
found that appellant was not amenable to probation and it denied the departure. It sentenced
him to 60 months’ imprisonment for the felon-in-possession charge.
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Addressing the probation revocation next, the district court found that appellant’s
violations were intentional and inexcusable, and it revoked appellant’s probation and
executed his 255-month sentence. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I.
Appellant challenges the district court’s order revoking his probation, arguing that
the district court failed to make adequate findings supporting its decision because it failed
to address the factors required under State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn.
2005).
We review the district court’s probation revocation decision for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d 319, 331 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d on other
grounds, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016). But we review de novo whether the district court
supported its decision with adequate findings. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 605.
Before revoking probation, the district court must (1) “designate the specific
condition or conditions that were violated”; (2) “find that the violation was intentional or
inexcusable”; and (3) “find that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). The district court must
make adequate fact-specific findings to enable review, and it may not rely on a general
recitation of the Austin factors. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608.
In addressing the third Austin factor, the district court should consider “the original
offense and the intervening conduct” that supports revocation. Id. at 607. The district court
should also consider whether (1) “confinement is necessary to protect the public from
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further criminal activity”; (2) “the offender is in need of correctional treatment [that] can
most effectively be provided if he is confined”; or (3) “it would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.” Id. (quotation omitted)
(discussing what have become known as the Modtland factors). Therefore, the question
that we must answer is whether the district court examined proper considerations,
compared those considerations to a “thorough, fact-specific record[],” and thereby properly
concluded that revocation was appropriate. Id. at 608. We conclude that it did.
Appellant argues that the district court’s findings in support of the third Austin factor
are inadequate, and so its decision to execute his stayed sentence was an abuse of
discretion. Appellant contends that, although the district court made extensive findings
when addressing his motion for a downward dispositional departure, its findings on his
probation revocation were inadequate because they were limited to a single paragraph.
Although appellant concedes that the downward dispositional findings “relate generally”
to the need for his confinement, he nevertheless asserts that the district court needed “to go
a step further and weigh that need against the policies in favor of probation” by making
findings on at least one of the Modtland factors.
Although the better practice would be for the district court to make substantive
findings using language from the Modtland factors, we conclude that the district court’s
reasoning here is sufficient. The district court conveyed its substantive reasons for
revocation, those reasons show that it was necessary to confine appellant to protect the
public, and we did not need to “scour the record” to understand the district court’s
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reasoning. See id. at 608 (“[I]t is not the role of appellate courts to scour the record to
determine if sufficient evidence exists to support the district court’s revocation.”).
As appellant concedes, the district court’s extensive findings relating to his
downward departure motion “relate generally to the need to confine [appellant],” and we
also infer from those findings that the district court determined it was necessary to confine
appellant in order to protect the public. The district court highlighted appellant’s “horrible”
probation record, repeated probation violations despite his participation in an intensive
outpatient treatment program, and his multiple felon-in-possession- of-firearm offenses.
Because these findings have record support and show that appellant’s confinement is
necessary to protect the public, the district court satisfied its duty to address the third Austin
factor.
II.
Appellant also argues that revocation of his probation should be reversed because
the need for confinement does not outweigh the policies favoring probation. He contends
that the district court abused its discretion because he is amenable to treatment and because
intermediate sanctions were available.
A district court may revoke probation if the probationer violates any of the probation
conditions. Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1(a) (2020). But its decision must not be “a
reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical violations.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251
(quotation omitted). A technical violation is “any violation of a cour t order of probation,
except an allegation of a subsequent criminal act that is alleged in a formal complaint,
citation, or petition.” Minn. Stat. § 244.196, subd. 6 (2020).
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Appellant’s probation violations were not technical violations. Instead, he violated
the terms of his probation by failing to remain law abiding. The state presented evidence
that appellant possessed a sawed-off shotgun, and this prompted a formal felony charge for
felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm. Because appellant’s probation violations were serious
violations, the district court’s decision was not a “reflexive reaction,” rather, it was based
on evidence that appellant’s behavior shows he “cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial
activity.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted).
The district court found that, although appellant may be amenable to an inpatient
treatment program, he has already been through multiple treatment programs and has
violated his probation multiple times. This finding is supported by the record, which shows
that, although appellant completed four chemical dependency treatment programs by 2012,
in 2014 he violated his probation by drinking alcohol and failing to remain law abiding.
The record also reflects that appellant completed sex-offender treatment in May 2018 and
another chemical dependency treatment program in September 2019, but he violated his
probation in May 2020 by possessing and discharging a firearm and by violating seven
additional conditions of his probation. Appellant’s extensive criminal history and frequent
probation violations support the district court’s finding that he is not amenable to probation.
The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in making this finding.
Appellant finally argues that the district court abused its discretion because
intermediate sanctions were available. He contends that, because the district court
previously imposed an intermediate sanction in 2014 when it executed the 60-month
sentence for the felon-in-possession of a firearm while continuing to stay his
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criminal-sexual-conduct sentence, the district court should have imposed a similar
intermediate sanction here. But appellant does not point to any authority that a district court
must impose intermediate sanctions when available. The authority appellant cites, State v.
Cottew, does not hold that intermediate sanctions are required, it only discusses that
intermediate sanctions may be imposed in certain situations. 746 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Minn.
2008); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 3 (2020) ( The district “ court may . . . order
intermediate sanctions.” (emphasis added)). But here, the district court found that
rehabilitation is not still possible because, despite considerable resources used to
rehabilitate appellant, he has violated his probation many times. And the district court
already imposed the intermediate sanction that appellant now requests. On this record, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant’s probation.
Affirmed.