Christopher Lee Haugen, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0703

Christopher Lee Haugen, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 4, 2022
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-18-1222

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Ab igail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle M. Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Benjamin G. A. Olson, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant filed a petition for postconvicti on relief seeking to withdraw his guilty
pleas to fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance and possession of ammunition by
an ineligible person. Appe llant now challenges the distri ct court’s order denying his
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request, arguing that both pleas lacked an adequate factual basis. Because the factual bases
provided by appellant at the plea hearing are sufficient to support both pleas, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Christopher Haugen with
five criminal offenses: (1) third-degree criminal sexual conduc t; (2) possession of
ammunition by an ineligible person; (3) fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance;
(4) fifth-degree assault; and (5) domestic assault. The complaint contained the following
allegations.
On April 5, 2018, an adult woman repor ted to police that Haugen had sexually
assaulted her multiple times over the course of several hours in a motel room in Pelican
Rapids. She reported that during one of the assaults, someone knocked on the door of the
motel room and handed Haugen a clear bag that she believed contained drugs. That same
day, police went to the motel, learned from the owner that Haugen was staying at the motel,
and obtained his room numbe r. Police then knocked on th e window to Haugen’s room,
and Haugen eventually opened the door. Po lice ordered Haugen out of the room and
secured the room while they sought a search warrant. After obtaining a search warrant
later that day, police entered the motel room. As they open ed the door, th ey found that
another man, who had been living in another room at the motel, was inside Haugen’s room.
There was a ladder and a large amount of insu lation on the bed. The man told police that
he had used the attic access to enter the room after it had been secured. While searching
the room, police found a clear plastic bag cont aining a crystal-like substance on top of a
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mini fridge. The substance tested positive for methamphetamine. Police also found three
unspent 30-06 ammunition rounds sitting on the bed stand.
In November 2018, Haugen agreed to plead guilty to two counts: unlawful
possession of ammunition and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. In
exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in the complaint. The terms of
the plea agreement also required Haugen to register as a pred atory offender. The district
court then held a plea hearing, at which Haugen entered his guilty pleas and provided a
factual basis for each of his pleas. At a later sentencing hearing, the district court accepted
both pleas and imposed sentences consistent with the plea agreement—60 months stayed
for 15 years on the ammunition offense (a downward dispositional departure) and
17 months stayed for five years on the fifth-degree drug-possession offense.
In December 2020, Haugen f iled a postconviction petition. He requested additional
time to file an amended petition, and the district court granted his request. In his amended
petition, Haugen contended that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas because both
pleas were inaccurate. Alterna tively, he requested that th e district court vacate the
predatory-offender registration requirement because it was unlawful. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the district court issu ed an order denying Haugen’s request to
withdraw his guilty pleas but granting his request to va cate the predatory-offender
registration requirement.
Haugen appeals the district court’s denial of his request to withdraw his guilty pleas.
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DECISION
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017 ). But a defendant may withdraw a
guilty plea at any time, even after sentencing, if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice occurs if a plea
is not valid. State v. Boecker, 893 N.W.2d 348, 350 (Minn. 2017). “To be constitutionally
valid, a guilty plea must be accura te, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Determining the validity of a guilty plea presents a question of law that this court reviews
de novo. Barrow v. State, 862 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. 2015).
Haugen challenges only the accuracy of his pleas. For a guilty plea to be accurate,
a proper factual basis must be established for each element of the offense. State v. Jones,
921 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019). “A district
court should not accept a guilty plea unless the record supp orts the conclusion that the
defendant actually committed an offense at leas t as serious as the crime to which he is
pleading guilty.” Boecker, 893 N.W.2d at 350 (quotation omitted).
Haugen pleaded guilty to two offenses. The first offense, possession of ammunition
by an ineligible person, makes it a crime for a person convicted of a crime of violence to
“possess ammunition.” Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016). The second offense,
fifth-degree possession of a controlled subs tance, makes it a crime for a person to
“possess[] one or more mixtures containing a controlled substance classified in Schedule I,
II, III, or IV, except a small amount of mariju ana.” Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1)
(2016). Possession is a required element of both offenses. See id.; Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
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subd. 1. Haugen contends that his guilty pleas are inaccura te because the factual bases
provided at the plea hearing for both offenses do not adequately establish the element of
possession. We disagree.
Possession can be proved by evidence of actual possession or constructive
possession. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). Constructive possession
exists “where the inference is strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed
the [relevant item] and did not abandon his possessory interest in the [item] but rather
continued to exercise dominion and control over it up to the time of the arrest.”
State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975 ). Constructive possession requires a
showing either that the poli ce found the item in a place un der the defendant’s exclusive
control to which others did not usually have access or that, if others did have access, there
is a strong probability, inferabl e from other evidence, that th e defendant was at the time
consciously exercising dominion and control over the item. Id. at 611; see also
State v. Hunter, 857 N.W.2d 537, 542 (Minn. App. 20 14) (explaining that constructive
possession requires a suspect’s exercise of dom inion and control over the item, not over
the place where it is found). Al though not dispositiv e, the defendant’s proximity to an
item is an important factor in es tablishing constructive possession. State v. Sam ,
859 N.W.2d 825, 834 (Minn. App. 2015).
Regarding the ammunition found in Haugen’s motel room, the following exchange
occurred at the plea hearing:
THE COURT: Now let’s talk ab out April 4th of this year.
What did you do that day that makes you guilty of possession
of a firearm or ammunition?
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HAUGEN: I possessed the bullets inside the hotel room .
There were 30-06 shells in th e room that I was currently
renting were at my—in my possession or at my, I guess I can’t
think of the word I’m looking for, but, yeah, yep.

Q: In the motel room, was that here in Otter Tail County?
A: It was, yes. It was in Pelican Rapids.

Q: Okay. So you had this motel room in Pelican Rapids and—
and you were living there, correct?
A: Yes.

Q: And there were some 30-06 rifle bullets in that motel room,
correct?
A: Yes, there was.

Q: Were they yours?
A: They were not mine, but I was in possession of them.

Q: All right. You knew they were there?
A: Yes.

Q: All right. And you were exercising control over them?
A: I guess, yeah, you’d have to say it.

Q: All right. And where were they in the motel room?
A: Sitting on a nightstand.

Q: Okay. Out in the open?
A: Yep.

Q: And—and so, and they—were they in a box?
A: No, I do not believe so.

Q: Loose rounds?
A: Yeah.

Q: And did—and so they were in plain view?
A: Yes.

Q: And this was a motel room that you were occupying?
A: It wasn’t—I had been, yeah. Yeah. I wasn’t at the time of
the search warrant, but, yeah, it was.
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Q: Oh, okay. And during the time that you were occupying,
you could have—you could ha ve done something with
those,—
A: Yeah.
Q: —that ammunition,—
A: Yes, I—
Q: —is that correct?
A: Yeah.

Q: All right. And so you’re satisfied that you possessed them?
A: Yes.

Q: Alright. And—and during this time that you occupied the
motel room, did you touch the bullets?
A: No.

Q: All right. But you—they were there and they were
available—
A: Yep.
Q: —for you to use, is that correct?
A: Yep.

(Emphasis added.)

The district court then questioned Haugen about the methamphetamine found in the
motel room:
THE COURT: Let’s turn to the fifth-degree possession charge
in count three. What did you do that makes you guilty of drug
possession?
HAUGEN: There was a bag of methamphetamine in—also in
the same room—
Q: Okay.
A: —that was available to me, at my disposal.

Q: All right. Was it your methamphetamine?
A: I do believe it had been left there, but it was in my control
or possession, would have been, yeah.

Q: Did you know it was there?
A: Yes.
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Q: And where was it in the room?
A: On—sitting on top of a refrig, dorm refrigerator.

Q: All right. And did you touch it?
A: No, I didn’t.

Q: Okay. But it was out in plain view,—
A: Yeah.
Q: —and you—you could have moved it?
A: Yeah, yep.

Q: And you were in control of this motel room, is that correct?
A: Yes.

(Emphasis added.)
This testimony implies that Haugen was exercising dominion and control over the
ammunition and methamphetamine found in the motel room. Regarding the ammunition,
Haugen stated that he “possessed” and “was in possession” of the bu llets. He answered
“Yes” when the district court asked if he was “satisfied that [he] possessed” the
ammunition. He also testifie d that he was living in the motel room, the ammunition was
sitting on a nightstand in the motel room while he was occupying the room, he knew the
ammunition was there and coul d have used it, and he was exercising control over
the ammunition. Regarding the methamphetami ne, Haugen testified th at it “was in [his]
control or possession” and “was available to [him], at [his] disposal.” He further
acknowledged that the methamphetamine was on top of a refrigerator in the motel room,
he knew it was there, he was in control of the motel room, and he could have moved the
bag of methamphetamine.
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Haugen contends that his “bare admissi on of ‘possession’” of the ammunition and
methamphetamine does not establish the le gal element of possession because the word
“possession” carries “a different meaning in a courtroom than in conversation.” And he
argues that his testimony does not establish constructive possession because he never stated
that he intended to exercise control over the items, he testified that he did not touch the
ammunition and that someone else had left the methamphetamine in the motel room, and
his testimony did not demonstrat e that he had a continuing possessory interest in the
contraband up to the time of his arrest. But, as the supreme court has explained, the
accuracy standard requires a district court judge considering a guilty plea to “make certain
that facts exist from which the defe ndant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably
inferred.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016) (emphasis added) (quotation
omitted). Haugen’s testimony at the plea h earing, considered as a whole, meets this
standard. Haugen testified that the ammu nition and methamphetam ine were found in a
motel room in which he was living and over wh ich he had control. He testified that he
knew the ammunition and the methamphetamine were in the room and that he could have
used or moved them. And he testified that he had “control” over both the ammunition and
the methamphetamine. Considering that testimony, along with Haugen’s repeated
testimony that he “possess[ed]” the am munition and methamphetamine, it can be
reasonably inferred that Haugen committed bo th offenses to which he pleaded guilty
because there is a “strong prob ability” that he was “consciously exercising dominion and
control” over the ammunition and the methamphetamine. See Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611.
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Haugan also argues that the factual bases for his pleas are insufficient because his
testimony at the plea hearing did not establish that he had ex clusive control of the motel
room. He notes that the complaint showed that the motel manager had access to the room,
as did the man who was present in the room wh en police entered to conduct their search.
However, Haugen did not expr essly testify to the truthfulness and accuracy of the
complaint, and therefore the complaint cannot be considered in assessing the accuracy of
Haugen’s pleas. See Rosendahl v. State , 955 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. App. 2021)
(concluding that allegations in a complaint are not part of the record when reviewing the
accuracy of a guilty plea unless the defendant expressly testified to the truthfulness and
accuracy of those allegations during the plea colloquy). Moreover, constructive possession
does not require exclusive control of the place in which contraband was found if the
evidence otherwise demonstrates a “strong probability” that the defendant was exercising
dominion and control over the contraband. Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611. For the reasons
stated above, that standard is met in this case.
Because the factual bases supporting Haugen ’s pleas were adequate to establish the
element of possession for both offenses, Hauge n’s pleas were accurate. We therefore
affirm the district court’s decision to deny Haugen’s postconviction request to withdraw
his guilty pleas.
Affirmed.