Lavonia M. Bell, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0724

Lavonia M. Bell,
Appellant,

Jhonathan J. Robinson,
Appellant,

vs.

681 Properties LLP, et al.,
Respondents,
Minnesota Department of Human Rights,
Respondent.

Filed May 9, 2022
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-20-2865

Lavonia M. Bell, Jhonathan J. Robinson, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (pro se appellants)

Christopher T. Kalla, Douglass E. Turner, Hanbery & Turner, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents 681 Properties LLP, et al.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Corinne Wright, Assistant Attorney General, S t. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Department of Human Rights)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal, self -represented appellants Lavonia Bell and Jhonathan Robinson
challenge a district court order (1) denying their motion for default judgment against
respondents 681 Properties, LLP (681 Properties), Steven Scott Management, LLC (SSM),
Hanbery & Turner, LLC (Hanbery), and the Minnesota Department of Human Rights
(MDHR) and (2) granting all respondents’ motions to dismiss with prejudice. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellants leased an apartment owned by 681 Properties and managed by SSM.
Following many contentious disputes, 681 Properties and SSM evicted appellants. Bell
then filed a complaint with MDHR against SSM, alleging that SSM violated their lease
agreement when it racially discriminated against appellants sometime before February 19,
2018. MDHR investigated the claim and determined that no probable cause existed to
support appellants’ racial-discrimination claim. MDHR issued its final no-probable-cause
decision on December 30, 2019 , and notified Bell in a right -to-sue letter that, under
Minnesota Statutes section 363A.33, subdivision 1(2) (2018), she could bring a private
civil action against SSM within 45 days.
On February 14, 2020, a ppellants filed a complaint and summons in district court
alleging multiple claims , including violations of the Minnesota Human Rights Act
(MHRA), retaliation, defamation, harassment, failure to investigate discrimination claims,
and emotional distress. Appellants named 681 Properties, SSM, Hanbery, and MDHR as
the defendants. They did not serve the complaint on any respondent at that time.
3
On March 3 and March 11, 2020, appellants attempted to serve 681 Properties,
SSM, and Hanbery by mail ing a copy of the summons and complaint to attorney
Christopher Kalla. Kalla had represented 681 Properties and SSM in the eviction action .
Neither 681 Properties nor SSM had authorized Kalla to accept service of process on their
behalf, nor had Hanbery waived personal service . On March 18, the district court issued
an order requiring that mediation “must occur before the [district court] will sched ule a
hearing on a dispositive motion.”
On May 11, appellants mailed MDHR and again mailed Kalla their summons and
complaint. On May 18, MDHR filed a letter requesting that the district court waive its
mediation requirement and giving notice of its intent to file a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim . MDHR’s letter also claimed that
appellants’ service was ineffective under Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(d) but waived personal
service. On May 19, 681 Properties, SSM, and Hanbery filed a letter with the district court
requesting waiver of its mediation requirement and stating their intent to file a motion to
dismiss under rule 12.02(d) and 12.02(e).
Appellants then moved for entry of default judgment , arguing that all respondents
failed to answer their complaint with in 21 days of service. Following a telephone
conference, 681 Properties, SSM, Hanbery, and MDHR moved to dismiss under rule 12.
On October 16, 2020, appellants filed and attempted to serve an amended complaint
on 681 Properties, SSM, and MDHR, and properly served the amended complaint on
Hanbery. All respondents answered by moving to dismiss based on the same grounds as
their previous motions. MDHR again waived the issue of in effective service, but 681
4
Properties and SSM did not. Hanbery later conceded that service of the amended complaint
was effective. On November 13, 2020, appellants again moved for entry of defa ult
judgment against all respondents for failure to respond within 21 days.
The district court held a combined hearing on appellants’ motion s for default
judgment and all of respondents’ motions to dismiss. The district court denied appellants’
motions for entry of default judgment against all respondents and granted all respondents’
motions to dismiss with prejudice under rule 12. This appeal follows.
DECISION
As an initial matter, we note that appellants’ brief lacks legal citation and argument
to support their appeal. Courts have a duty to reasonably accommodate self-represented
litigants so long as the adverse party is not prejudiced. Kasson State Bank v. Haugen, 410
N.W.2d 392, 395 (Minn. App. 19 87). But we have repeatedly stated that “ [self-
represented] litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply
with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001).
Although appellants’ brief is inadequate, we will nevertheless address their claims.
I. The district court did not err by denying appellants’ motions for default
judgment.

Appellants generally argue that they are entitled to default judgment against all
respondents because all respondents failed to serve an answer with in 21 days after
appellants purportedly served the amended complaint. We are not persuaded.
5
A party avoids an entry of default judgment against it if it “plead[s] or otherwise
defend[s]” the case within 21 days after the petitioner seeking affirmative rel ief serves its
summons and complaint on that party. Minn. R. Civ. P. 55.01; Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.01.
“The decision to grant or deny a motion for a default judgment lies within the
discretion of the district court, and this court will not reverse absent an abuse of that
discretion.” Black v. Rimmer , 700 N.W.2d 521, 525 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. dismissed
(Minn. Sept. 28, 2005).
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’
motions for default judgment against 681 Properties and SSM.

Appellants appear to argue that they properly served 681 Properties and SSM
because they served a copy of the summons and complaint to Kalla on three occasions :
(1) on March 3 and 11, 2020, by mail ; (2) on May 11, 2020, again by mail ; and (3) on
October 16, 2020, by delivering the documents to Kalla. We disagree.
Proper service of process is a fundamental requirement of commencing a lawsuit.
Doerr v. Warner, 76 N.W.2d 505, 511 (Minn. 1956). Unless a plaintiff adequately serves
a defendant under rule 4, a district court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Wick v. Wick , 670 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Minn. App. 2003); see McCullough &
Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights , 883 N.W.2d 580, 590 (Minn. 2016) (“[S]ervice of
process is the means by which a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant. . . .”).
And without personal jurisdiction, a district court cannot enter default judgment. Laymon
v. Minn. Premier Props., LLC, 903 N.W.2d 6, 19 (Minn. App. 2 017), aff’d, 913 N.W.2d
449 (Minn. 2018).
6
Undisputedly, 681 Properties is a partnership, and SSM is a corporation. Under
rules 4.03(b) and (c), a plaintiff may personally serve a summons and complaint upon a
partnership or corporation by delivering a copy to a member or officer, the managing agent,
or any other person authorized by the partnership or corporation or by statute to receive
service of summons. Alternatively, a plaintiff may send the summons and complaint to a
defendant by mail and request that the defendant waive personal service. Minn. R. Civ. P.
4.05. This procedure, if successful, results in waiver of the service requirement, not
“service by mail.” Id.; Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05 2018 advisory comm. cmt. District courts
strictly enforce the waiver requirement of rule 4.05. See Hughes v. Lund, 603 N.W.2d 674,
677 (Minn. App. 1999).
We review a district court’s findings of facts relevant to service of process for clear
error and review its application of the rules of civil procedure de novo. See Melillo v.
Heitland, 880 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. 2016).
On March 3, March 11, and May 11, appellants mailed a copy of the summons and
complaint to Kalla. But service on a party’s attorney is ineffective unless the party has
appointed the party’s attorney as the party’s agent for service of process. Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Allen, 590 N.W.2d 820, 822-23 (Minn. App. 1999). Neither 681 Properties nor SSM
authorized Kalla to accept service on their behalf. Nor did they waive service. Finally,
although appellants properly delivered the necessary documents to Kalla on October 16,
service was still ineffective. 681 Properties and SSM had still not authorized Kalla as their
agent for service of process. Id. The district court therefore lacked personal jurisdiction
over 681 Properties and SSM and did not err by denying entry of default judgment.
7
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’
motion for default judgment against Hanbery.

Appellants assert that “No motions were filed in this case. [All respondents] failed
to plead and defend this case.” We disagree.
A party “otherwise defend[s]” a case when they challenge service, move to dismiss,
and have, at a minimum, made a rule 12 or other defense motion. Black, 700 NW.2d at
526. The district court first noted that appellants’ service on Hanbery had not been
effective until October 16, 2020 , when appellants properly delivered the summons and
complaint to Hanbery . But it found that Hanbery had otherwise defended the case well
before that date by: (1) filing its May 19, 2020 letter seeking permission to file a motion to
dismiss; (2) participating in the parties’ July 1 telephone conference; and (3) filing a rule
12 motion to dismiss on July 10.
The record supports those findings. First, for the reasons explained in section I.A.
above, appellants’ first attempts to serve Hanbery by mail were likewise ineffective.
Hanbery conceded that appellants effectively served it on October 16, 2020. But by that
point, Hanbery had defended the case many times . Because Hanbery timely defended
appellants’ complaint, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’
motion for default judgment against Hanbery.
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’
motion for default judgment against MDHR.

Appellants assert that they properly served MDHR. Because MDHR waived
service, we do not analyze whether appellants effectively served MDHR . Instead, t he
8
relevant question is whether MDHR had “otherwise defended” the case within the time
allowed by the rules. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 55.01.
The district court found that MDHR filed a letter on May 18, 2020, requesting
waiver of its mediation requirement and stating its intent to move to dismiss appellants’
claims against it . It also found that MDHR participated in the telephone conference on
July 1, 2020, and filed a rule 12 motion the next day, all of which occurred before October
16, 2020. Although MDHR had waived service of the original May 11, 2020 complaint,
appellants’ amended complaint superseded their original complaint by the time the motion
for default judgment was brought. Because the record supports the district court’s findings,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’
motion for entry of default judgment against MDHR.
II. The district court did not err by dismissing appellants’ claims with prejudice.

Appellants chall enge the district court’s order granting respondents’ motions to
dismiss. We review a district court’s decision on a motion to dismiss de novo and limit
our review to whether the complaint sets forth legally sufficient claims for relief. Hebert
v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008).
A. The district court did not err by granting 681 Properties and SSM’s
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim.

Appellants argue that they properly served 681 Properties and SSM and therefore
the district court had personal jurisdiction over them. They do not address 681 Properties
and SSM’s argument that appellants’ claims were statutorily time-barred under the MHRA.
9
First, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district court did not err
by granting 681 Properties and SSM’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
because appellants did not properly serve them.
Second, under the MHRA, appellants were required to bring a claim against 681
Properties within one year of when the alleged act occurred, which would have been by
February 19, 2019. Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3(a) (2018). Appellants failed to meet
that deadline. And because Bell first filed a claim against SSM with MDHR, she had to
bring a civil suit against SSM within 45 days of receiving notice of MDHR’s decision to
dismiss the charge. Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 1. Bell also failed to meet that deadline.1
Appellants’ claims under the M HRA against 681 Properties and SSM were therefore
statutorily time -barred. The district court did not err by dismissing appellants’ claims
against 681 Properties and SSM with prejudice.
B. The district court did not err by granting Hanbery’s motion to dism iss
for failure to state a claim due to absolute privilege.

Appellants allege that Hanbery committed defamation by making false assault and
theft allegations during the 2018 eviction action , but Hanbery counters that those
statements were protected by absolute privilege.2 We agree with Hanbery.
A complaint must “contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. The district court may dismiss a
complaint that “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Minn. R. Civ. P.

1 Because Robinson was not a party to Bell’s MDHR complaint against SSM, he had one
year to bring a claim against SSM, which he also failed to do.
2 Appellants do not now, nor did they below, address absolute privilege.
10
12.02(e). Dismissal under rule 12.02(e) is only proper “if it appears to a certainty that no
facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support
granting the relief demanded.” Finn v. All. Bank , 860 N.W.2d 638, 653 (Minn. 2015)
(quotation omitted).
Defamatory statements may be protected by absolute privilege in a defamation
lawsuit if an attorney made the statements at a judicial proceeding and thos e statements
were relevant to the subject matter of the litigation. Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729
N.W2d 302, 306 (Minn. 2007). Hanbery represented 681 Properties and SSM in the 2018
eviction action against appellants. In so doing, Hanbery made the allegedly defamatory
statements at issue. Because the eviction action was based, in part, on 681 Properties and
SSM’s claims that appellants assaulted staff and stole from management, Hanbery’s
statements about appellants’ alleged assault and theft were relevant to the eviction action.
Because Hanbery’s statements were protected by absolute privilege, we conclude that the
district court did not err by dismissing appellants’ defamation claim with prejudice.
C. The district court did not err by granting MDHR’s motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Appellants only generally assert that the district court should not have dismissed
their claims, but MDHR asserts that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
MDHR’s argument has merit.
“The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction and a determination of the meaning of
statutes addressing subject-matter jurisdiction present legal questions, which we review de
novo.” Christianson v. Henke , 812 N.W.2d 190, 192 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d, 831
11
N.W.2d 532 (Minn. 2013). “Subject-matter jurisdiction is the court’s authority to hear the
type of dispute at issue and to grant the type of relief sought.” Seehus v. Bor-Son Constr.,
Inc., 783 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2010). Although a party may waive the issue of personal
jurisdiction, as MDHR did here, a party cannot waive or confer subject-matter jurisdiction.
In re Rosckes v. County of Carver, 783 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Minn. App. 2010).
Under Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 1 , appellants could have directly sued 681
Properties, SSM, and Hanbery for alleged MHRA violations without first filing a charge
with MDHR. But after they filed their charge with MDHR and MDHR ma de its final
administrative decision on that charge, only this court could review that decision. County
of Hennepin v. Civil Rts. Comm’n, 355 N.W.2d 458 (Minn. App. 1984).
Because the district court did not have the authority to review MDHR’s final
decision, the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, the district court
did not err by dismissing appellants’ claims. We therefore need not address the merits of
MDHR’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Affirmed.