John Schulz, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0733

John Schulz, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Town of Duluth,
Respondent,

Carol Danielson-Bille,
Appellant.

Filed February 14, 2022
Reversed
Johnson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-17-2438

William D. Paul, William D. Pa ul Law Office, Duluth, Minn esota (for respondents John
Schulz, Rebecca Norine, and Jack Nelson)

Robert A. Alsop, Kennedy & Graven, Chartered, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
Town of Duluth)

David M. Johnson, Trial Group North, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presid ing Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Carol Danielson-Bille owns property on th e north shore of Lake Superior. She and
her late husband twice sought zoning variances so that th ey could build a house on the
property. Some of their neighbors opposed their applications for the variances. The town
board denied the Billes’ first variance application but later approved their second, revised
application. After the objecting neighbors sought judicial review, the district court
reversed the town board’s grant of the sec ond application on two gr ounds: that the town
board was collaterally estopped from granting the second application after denying the first
application and that the town board’s decision is unreasonable, capricious, and arbitrary.
We conclude that the common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude the town
board from considering the second variance application and that the town board’s decision
is not unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary. Therefore, we reverse the district court and
reinstate the decision of the town board.
FACTS
In 1992, Carol Danielson-Bille and Charles Bille (hereinafter the Billes) purchased
two lots on the north shore of Lake Superior. The property is on the lake side of Lake
Shore Drive, approximately 18 miles north of the city of Duluth and approximately 10
miles south of the city of Two Harbors. As the Billes were nearing retirement, they decided
that they would like to build a house on the property.
In March 2017, the Billes submitted an application to the Town of Duluth planning
commission for six variances from the town’s zoning ordi nance. The Billes sought
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variances concerning the minimum lot area and width as well as the setback distances from
the road, a side boundary line, an unclassified watercourse, and the vegetation line of Lake
Superior. At a public h earing in late May 2017, the planning commission approved the
application by a four-to-two vote.
Four of the Billes’ neighbors—John Schu lz, Rebecca Norine, Dan Watkins, and
Jack Nelson—appealed the planning commission’s decision to the town board. In late June
2017, at a public hearing, the town board denied the Billes’ variance application by a three-
to-two vote.
Charles Bille attended a town board meetin g in July 2017 to express the Billes’
interest in continuing to pursue their building plans. The chair of the town board told the
Billes that they could seek judicial review of the June 2017 denial in district court or could
submit another, revised variance application. The meeting minutes state, “Mr. Bille has
the right to court and/or reapply for another variance.”
The Billes later submitted a second vari ance application to the planning
commission. The second application was differe nt from the first in th at the plans for the
house were modified in respon se to the concerns raised by the planning commission and
the town board. Specifically, the Billes reduced the height of the roof, eliminated a walk-
out to the lake on the lower level, added a rock retaining wall with terracing, added a deck
facing the lake, added a “turn-around area” to the driveway, and eliminated the need for a
well on the property. In August 2017, the planning commission approved the Billes’
second variance application by a four-to-three vote.
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In September 2017, the neighbors appealed the planning commission’s decision on
the second application to the town board . At a public hearing, the town board approved
the Billes’ second variance application by a three-to-two vote. The town board’s decision
is reflected in a three-page document, which states the reasons for its decision.
In October 2017, three of the four objecting neighbors sought judicial review of the
town board’s decision in the St. Louis County District Court. The district court dismissed
the Billes from the action on the ground that the neighbors did no t timely commence the
action against them, and the district court dismissed the action with respect to the town on
the ground that the Billes are necessary and indispensable parties. This court affirmed. See
Schulz v. Town of Duluth , 923 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. App. 2019) (subsequent history
omitted). But the supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that the Billes must be
added to the action pursuant to the second sent ence of rule 19.01 of the rules of civil
procedure. Schulz v. Town of Duluth, 936 N.W.2d 334, 340-42 (Minn. 2019). In February
2020, the chief justice assigned a judge of the Tenth Judicial District to the case. See Minn.
Stat. § 2.724, subd. 1 (2020).
In December 2020, the neighbors and the to wn served and filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. The Billes joined in the town’s motion. Charles Bille passed away in
January 2021. In April 2021, the district court filed a 42-page order in which it granted the
neighbors’ motion in substantial part, deni ed the town’s and th e Billes’ motion in
substantial part, and ordered entry of judgment in favor of the neighbors. The district court
reasoned that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the town board from considering
the Billes’ second variance application and, in the alternative, that the town board’s
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decision to grant the Billes’ variance application is unreasonable, capricious, and arbitrary.
Danielson-Bille appeals.
DECISION
A municipality may, by ordinance, regulat e, among other things, “the location,
height, width, bulk, type of foundation, number of stories, size of buildings and other
structures, the percentage of lot which may be occupied, the size of yards and other open
spaces, [and] the density and di stribution of population.” Mi nn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 1
(2020). A municipality also may grant variances to its zoning ordinance. Id., subd. 6(2).
A town is authorized to adopt and enforce a zoning ordinance in the same manner as a city
because each is within the definition of “municipality.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 394.32, 394.33,
subd. 2, 462.352, subd. 2, 462.357 (2020); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 366.10-.181 (2020).
The Town of Duluth has en acted both a comprehensive plan and an ordinance to
regulate land use within the town. Town of Duluth, Minn., Comprehensive Land Use Plan
(DCLUP) ch. 1 (2002); Town of Duluth, Minn., Zoning Ordinance No. 5 (DZO) art. XVII
(2015). The town’s ordinance al lows the town to grant variances from the restrictions of
its zoning ordinance. DZO art. X, § 3. The ordinance provides that variance applications
initially are considered by the planning commission after a public hearing, id., and that any
aggrieved person may, within 15 days, appeal a final decision of the planning commission
to the town board, DZO art. XIV, § 3.A.1. The town’s ordinance does not expressly state
whether a person may apply for a variance more than once.
Judicial review of a town’s denial of a variance application is based on the following
statute:
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Any person aggrieved by an ordinance, rule, regulation,
decision or order of a governing body or board of adjustments
and appeals acting pursuant to sections 462.351 to 462.364
may have such ordinance, rule , regulation, decision or order,
reviewed by an appropriate remedy in the district court, subject
to the provisions of this section.

Minn. Stat. § 462.361, subd. 1 (2020); see also Schulz, 936 N.W.2d at 338-40. A district
court decision may be appealed to this court in the same manner as other civil actions.
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03; Krummenacher v. City of Minnetonka , 783 N.W.2d 721,
725 (Minn. 2010). Consistent with section 462.361, subdivis ion 1, the town’s ordinance
provides that a final decision of the town board may, within 30 days, be appealed to the St.
Louis County District Court. DZO art. XIV, § 3.E.4.
I. Collateral Estoppel
Danielson-Bille first argues that the district court erred by applying the doctrine of
collateral estoppel and by concluding that the town board was precluded from considering
the Billes’ second variance application. Her fi rst argument has four parts; she argues, in
the alternative, that the doctr ine of collateral estoppel does not apply as a matter of law,
that the application of the doctrine would be contrary to public policy, that the application
of the doctrine would work an injustice on her in the circumstances of this case, and that
the first requirement of the doctrine is not satisfied because the first and second variance
applications presented different issues.
Collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, “bars the relitigation of issues that
are both identical to those issues already lit igated by the parties in a prior action and
necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
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Lennartson, 872 N.W.2d 524, 534 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). The doctrine may
apply only if all of the following requirem ents are satisfied: (1) the issue on which
relitigation is sought to be barred is identical to an issue in a prior adjudication; (2) there
was a final judgment on the me rits in the prior adjudication; (3) the party sought to be
estopped either was a party in the prior adjudi cation or was in privity with a party; and
(4) the party sought to be estopped was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the
adjudicated issue in the prior adjudication. Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829,
837 (Minn. 2004).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, howeve r, is not “rigidly applied” and may be
“qualified or rejected” if its application “w ould contravene an overriding public policy.”
AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrowhead Reg’l Corr. Bd., 356 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1984).
In addition, collateral estoppel is “a flexible doctrine,” and “the focus is on whether its
application would work an injustice on the party against whom estoppel is urged.” Johnson
v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. , 420 N.W.2d 608, 613-14 (M inn. 1988). This court
generally applies a de novo standard of review to the question whether the collateral-
estoppel doctrine precludes relitigation of an issue. Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 837.
A. General Applicability
We begin by consid ering the first part of Danielson-Bille’s argument, that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply as a matter of law.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel typically is invoked to prevent relitigation in a
judicial forum after a prior decision in a judicial forum. See, e.g., Lennartson, 872 N.W.2d
at 534-537; Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 837-840; see also Pope County Bd. of
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Commissioners v. Pryzmus, 682 N.W.2d 666, (Minn. App. 2004) (holding that landowner
in zoning-enforcement action in district c ourt was precluded from litigating issue of
applicability of zoning ordinance due to prior decision of district court affirming denial of
variance application), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). The doctrine sometimes is
applied in a judicial forum after a prior de cision by an administra tive agency or local
governmental body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. See, e.g., Villarreal v. Independent
Sch. Dist. No. 659, 520 N.W.2d 735, 738-39 (Minn. 1994) (holding that plaintiff in race-
discrimination action was precluded from litigating issue of qualifications in district court
due to prior decision of school bo ard in teacher-termination hearing); Graham v. Special
Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 472 N.W.2d 114, 115-120 (Minn. 1 991) (holding that plaintiff in
defamation action was precluded from litigating i ssue of misconduct in district court due
to prior decision of school board in teacher-termination hearing). Conversely, the doctrine
also has been applied to a proceeding before a local governmental body acting in a quasi-
judicial capacity after a prior decision in a judicial forum. See, e.g., Ellis v. Minneapolis
Comm’n on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn. 1982) (holding that complainant in
race-discrimination matter was precluded from litigating issue of discrimination before
municipal commission due to pr ior jury verdict in district court in unlawful-detainer
action). In addition, this court has applie d the doctrine to a proceeding before a state
administrative agency after a prior decision by another st ate administrative agency. Ress
v. Abbott Northwestern Hosp., Inc., 438 N.W.2d 727, 729-731 (Minn. App. 1989) (holding
that applicant for unemployment benefits was not precluded from litigating issue of
9
misconduct due to prior deci sion of board of nursing in professional-discipline
proceeding), rev’d on other grounds, 448 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. 1989).
The parties agree that there is no precedential caselaw approving the application of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the particular circumstances of this case: a proceeding
before a town board on a zo ning variance application afte r a prior decision by the same
town board on a prior zoning vari ance application. We agree as well. Danielson-Bille
contends that, in light of the absence of precedent, there is no legal authority for the district
court’s collateral-estoppel ruling and that this court should refrain from extending existing
caselaw. In response, the neighbors contend that this court should apply the doctrine
because Danielson-Bille has not demonstrated that it should not apply.
We question the premise apparently shared by all parties that it is appropriate to
resolve their arguments in a categorical manne r. In the cases cited above, the supreme
court and this court typically have refrained from such reasoning and have discussed the
applicability of the collateral-estoppel doctrine in case-specific ways. We are unable to
discern any legal principle by which the supreme court has broadly held, as a matter of law,
that the doctrine does not apply because of the subject matter of the case or the nature of
the tribunals involved. Instead, the s upreme court sometimes has relied on certain
qualifying principles, wh ich are the bases of Daniels on-Bille’s other arguments. See
Johnson, 420 N.W.2d at 613-14 (stating that collateral estoppel is “flexible doctrine” that
should not be applied if it “would work an injustice”); AFSCME Council 96, 356 N.W.2d
at 299 (stating that collateral estoppel is no t “rigidly applied” an d may be “qualified or
rejected” if it “would contravene an overriding public policy”). In Johnson, the supreme
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court concluded that it “need not reach” the question whether, “a s a matter of law,”
collateral estoppel may be based on a prior arbitration award because “the facts do not
support estoppel in any event.” 420 N.W.2d at 613. For similar reasons, we decline to
resolve Danielson-Bille’s argum ent by declaring broadly that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel never may be applied to a town boa rd’s consideration of a zoning-variance
application after its denial of a prior application.
B. Injustice Exception to Applicability
We proceed to consider Dani elson-Bille’s third contention, that the application of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel would work an injustice on her in the circumstances of
this case. She bases this contention primarily on the fact that, in July 2017, the town board
expressly stated to Charles Bille that the Bill es could either seek judicial review of the
denial of their first variance application or submit a second, revised application. Danielson-
Bille asserts that, in li ght of that express statement by the town board, it would be unjust
for the district court and this court to change the rules after the fact by concluding that the
town board should not have considered their second variance application.
Danielson-Bille’s contention is supported by the applicable caselaw and the record.
In Johnson, the supreme court stated that collateral estoppel is “a flexible doctrine” and
that “the focus is on whether its application would work an injustice on the party against
whom estoppel is urged.” 420 N.W.2d at 613-14. In Builder’s Commonwealth, Inc. v.
Department of Emp’t & Econ. Devel., 814 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. App. 2012), this court applied
Johnson by holding that the application of collateral estoppel would be unjust in that case
because the legislature and this court previously had disapproved of the application of the
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doctrine in similar circumstances. Id. at 55. The facts of this case present an even more
compelling case for not applying the doctrine because the town board specifically informed
the Billes that the town board would consider a second, revised variance application.
Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not apply in th is case to preclude
the town board from considering the Billes’ second variance application.
C. Requirement of Identical Issue
We next consider Danielson-Bille’s fourth contention, that the neighbors have not
satisfied the first requirement of the doctrine: that the issue on which relitigation is sought
is identical to an issue in the prior adjudication. See Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 837. The
district court reasoned that there were only “slight” differences between the first and second
variance applications but that those differences did not “sufficiently alter the underlying
facts” and were therefore “insufficient to ov ercome collateral estoppel.” Danielson-Bille
contends that the second variance applicati on presented a different issue than the first
variance application because the Billes had made material changes to their building plans.
Danielson-Bille’s contention is supported by the applicable caselaw and the record.
In Mach v. Wells Concrete Products Co., 866 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 2015), the supreme court
held that a person seeking workers’-compensa tion benefits would not be precluded by a
prior decision of a workers’-compensation judge if his second claim was based on different
facts. Id. at 927-28. The supreme court stated, “collateral estoppel does not apply to bar a
claim for reimbursement of medical expenses for treatment received when an employee’s
medical condition has changed.” Id. at 928.
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In their second variance application, the Billes made changes by, among other
things, reducing the height of the house’s roof from 25 feet to 22 feet and otherwise
reducing the scope of the building project. The Billes made those modifications in response
to concerns expressed by bo th the planning commission an d the town board. As a
consequence of the Billes’ modifications, the objecting neighbors had a better view of Lake
Superior than they would have had if the Billes’ first variance application had been granted.
The town board responded to the Billes’ modifications by granting the second application,
which indicates that the to wn board believed that the differences between the two
applications were meaningful. In light of the modifications, the first variance application
and the second variance application did not present identical issues because the
circumstances had changed. See id. Accordingly, the neighbors have not satisfied the first
requirement of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Because we agree with Danielson-Bille’s third and fourth contentions for reversal,
we need not consider her second contention. We conclude that the district court erred by
reasoning that the doctrine of collatera l estoppel precluded the town board from
considering the Billes’ second variance application.
II. Grant of Variance Application
Danielson-Bille also argues that the district court erred by determining that the town
board’s decision to grant the second variance application is unreasonable, capricious, and
arbitrary.
Since 2011, a municipality’s consideratio n of a variance application has been
governed by a statute that provides as follows:
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Variances shall only be permitte d when they are in harmony
with the general purposes and intent of the ordinance and when
the variances are consistent w ith the comprehensive plan.
Variances may be granted when the applicant for the variance
establishes that there are pract ical difficulties in complying
with the zoning ordinance. “Pra ctical difficulties,” as used in
connection with the granting of a variance, means that the
property owner proposes to use the property in a reasonable
manner not permitted by the zoning ordinance; the plight of the
landowner is due to circumstances unique to the property not
created by the landowner; and the variance, if granted, will not
alter the essential character of the locality. Economic
considerations alone do not constitute practical difficulties. . . .

Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. 6(2) (2020); see also 2011 Minn. Laws ch. 19, § 2, at 107.
The town’s zoning ordinance incorporates the requirements of section 462.357,
subdivision 6(2). DZO art. X, § 3.E.1.-3.E.3.
On an appeal from a district court’s review of a municipality’s zoning decision, this
court reviews the municipality’s decision “independent of the findings and conclusions of
the district court.” Northwestern Coll. v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Minn.
1979); see also C.R. Investments, Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn.
1981). In conducting our review, we reco gnize that “[m]unicipalities have ‘broad
discretionary power’ in considering whether to grant or deny a variance.” Krummenacher,
783 N.W.2d at 727 (quoting VanLandschoot v. City of Mendota Heights, 336 N.W.2d 503,
508 (Minn. 1983)). Accordingl y, an appellate court should “review such decisions to
determine whether the municipality was within its jurisdiction, was not mistaken as to the
applicable law, and did not act arbitrarily, oppressively, or unreasonably, and to determine
whether the evidence could reasonably support or justify the determination.’” Id. (quoting
14
In re Stadsvold , 754 N.W.2d 323, 332 (Minn. 2008 )) (quotation omitted). The supreme
court recently summarized judicial review of a municipality’s land-use decision as follows:
We will reverse a governing body’s decision regarding
a conditional use permit application if the governing body
acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously. Schwardt v.
Cnty. of Watonwan, 656 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn. 2003). There
are two steps in determining whether a city’s denial was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or ca pricious. First, we must
determine if the reasons give n by the city were legally
sufficient. C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of Shoreview , 304 N.W.2d
320, 325 (Minn. 1981). Second, if the reasons given are legally
sufficient, we must determine if the reasons had a factual basis
in the record. Id.

RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d 71, 75-76 (Minn. 2015).
Furthermore, a court should set aside a municipality’s zoning decision only in “those
rare instances in which the . . . decision has no rational basis.” White Bear Docking &
Storage, Inc. v. City of White Bear Lake, 324 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Minn. 1982). “Even if [a
municipality’s zoning] decision is debatable, so long as there is a rational basis for what it
does, the courts do not interfere.” Mendota Golf, LLP v. C ity of Mendota Heights , 708
N.W.2d 162, 180 (Minn. 2006 ) (quotation omitted). Because we are obligated to look
through the district court’s decision and revi ew the city’s zoning decision independently,
we do not apply a clear-error st andard of review to the district court’s decision. Honn v.
City of Coon Rapids , 313 N.W.2d 409, 415 n.4 (Minn. 1981); Northwestern Coll., 281
N.W.2d at 868 n.4.
In this case, the town board made written findings on each of the relevant issues and
determined that all statutory re quirements were satisfied. The district court determined
that the town board’s decision is erroneous with respect to four of the five statutory issues.
15
Danielson-Bille argues that the town board properly determined each of those four issues.
In response, the neighbors argue that the district court correctly decided three of the four
issues that were decided adversely to Danielson-Bille. We construe the neighbors’ brief to
challenge the factual bases of the town board’s decision, not its legal bases. See RDNT,
861 N.W.2d at 75-76.
A. General Purpose and Intent of Ordinance
Danielson-Bille first contends that the town board properly made the following
finding concerning the first issue in section 462.357, subdivision 6(2):
The variances are in harmony with the general purposes
and intent of the ordinance because they allow a home similar
in size and shape to those surrounding it. This encourages an
appropriate use of the property and maintains the rural
residential nature area in a way that reasonably protects the
natural resources of the area.

The purpose and intent of the town’s zoning ordinance are expressly stated in article
I of the ordinance. The purpose of the ordinance is
to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the
community by dividing the Township into zones and
regulating the uses of land and the placement of all structures,
. . . to encourage the most appropriate uses of land in the
Township, to encourage and main tain the community as rural
and in balance with its many na tural amenities, to protect its
rich and diverse natural resour ces for future generations, and
to provide a basis for a sustainable community.

DZO art. 1, § 3.B. The intent of the ordi nance is “to establish comprehensive land use
regulations for the Town of Duluth in accordance with the provisions of Minnesota Statutes
Chapters 366 and 462.” DZO art.1, § 3.A. No thing in these statements of purpose and
intent is necessarily inconsistent with the Billes’ second variance application.
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The neighbors contend that the town boar d’s decision on this issue is erroneous
because of the extent of the variances requested by the Billes. For example, the neighbors
note that the Billes’ property is only 0.3 acres in size, which is much less than the minimum
buildable lot size of two acres. The neighbors make a sim ilar argument concerning the
extent of the Billes’ requested setback variances.
The neighbors’ argument is not focused on the general purposes of the town’s
zoning ordinance but, rather, on the specific restrictions in the zoning ordinance. In other
words, the neighbors do not attempt to show th at the Billes’ second variance application
would be inconsistent with “t he health, safety, and general welfare of the community,”
would not “maintain the comm unity as rural and in bala nce with its many natural
amenities,” or would not “protect its rich and diverse natural resources for future
generations.” See DZO art. 1, § 3.B.
Even if we consider the neighbors’ ar guments on their own terms, however, we
would conclude that the argument fails beca use the Billes sought a variance to build a
house on their 75-foot-wide property that w ould be similar to other homes in the
surrounding area. The Billes presented evidence to the planning commission that there is
a nearby lot that is only 40 f eet wide with a structure on it. The Billes also presented
evidence to the planning commission that there are five other nearby houses on lots of one
acre or less with substandard setbacks. The planning commission approved a motion
stating that the shoreline district “has b een developed for many ye ars in a quite dense
fashion” and that the Billes’ property is “in sync with lot sizes from previous
developments.” At the hearing before the town board, the Billes presented a map to show
17
that their proposed house would not be one of the largest houses on one of the smallest lots
but, rather, would be typical of other houses in the surroundi ng area. In addition, the
planning commission approved a motion stating that the Billes’ plan “respects the existing
view corridor” because of the height of their roofline and the fact that the house would be
“tucked . . . into the trees on the west side of the property.” At the hearing before the town
board, the Billes presented a drawing to show that, because of existing trees on the property,
the proposed house would block only a small amount of the existing view of Lake Superior
from the highway. Charles Bille stated to th e board that he was not aware of any other
property in the area that offered as much of a view of the lake.
Thus, the town board had a su fficient factual basis to find that the Billes’ variance
application is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the ordinance. See RDNT,
861 N.W.2d at 77, 79.
B. Comprehensive Plan
Danielson-Bille next contends that the town board properly made the following
finding concerning the second issue in section 462.357, subdivision 6(2):
The variances are consistent with the Comprehensive
Land Use Plan because it pe rmits housing consistent and
similar to the neighboring re sidences, maintains the rural
residential nature of the loca lity and is consistent with
sustainable development in th e north shore corridor of the
Town.

The town’s comprehensive plan states, in part, that “[ f]uture land use, economic
growth and community pride are all strongly tied to housing” and that housing “is a
dominant presence on the community la ndscape and is a be drock supporting a
18
community’s health, wealth, and future vitality.” DCLUP § 3.E. The comprehensive plan
also states, “All new housing promotes the community’s rural character and sustainable
development practices.” Id. § 4.A.
As noted above, the record shows that the town boar d received and considered
evidence concerning other homes on similar properties in the surrounding area. In addition,
the town board was presented w ith evidence that the Billes’ pl ans for the exterior of the
house were in conformance with the attributes of a rural residence, including tree coverage
and a professionally maintained landscape design. The town board also received evidence
that the Billes planned to live on the property year-round and to preserve and maintain its
natural attributes. The Billes submitted to the town board a stormwater management plan
that would prevent run-off into Lake Superior. This and other evidence is consistent with
the comprehensive plan’s goals of economic growth, community pride, maintaining a rural
character, and encouraging sustainable development.
Thus, the town board had a sufficient fact ual basis to determine that the Billes’
variance application is consistent with the comprehensive plan. See RDNT, 861 N.W.2d
at 77, 79.
C. Practical Difficulties
Danielson-Bille contends that the town board properly found the existence of each
of the three components of the definition of practical difficulties and, thus, properly found
that Danielson-Bille would have practical difficulties in comply ing with the zoning
ordinance without the requested variances.

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1. Reasonable Manner No t Permitted by Ordinance
Danielson-Bille contends that the town bo ard properly made the following finding
concerning the first part of the definition of practical difficulties:
The applicant sought to use the property in a reasonable
use not permitted by the Ordinance. A residential home on that
parcel is reasonable use of the property, much like many of the
neighboring properties. The home proposed can only be built
with the requested variances.

The neighbors do not present any argument that the town board erred in its finding on this
issue. Thus, the town board had a sufficient factual basis to determine that the Billes
proposed to use the property in a reasonable manner. See RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 77, 79.
2. Plight of the Landowner
Danielson-Bille contends that the town bo ard properly made the following finding
concerning the second part of the definition of practical difficulties:
The plight of the property owner is due to unique
dimensions of the property, a non-conformity existing at the
time the property was purchased by the applicant. For that
reason, the plight of the la ndowner was not created by the
landowner.

The town board’s finding on this issue is supported by the re cord. The Billes’
property was part of a 1930s subdivision that platted 100-foot -wide lots in the area. In
1958, a prior owner further subdivided the property into the 25-foot-wide and 50-foot-wide
lots that were purchased by the Billes in 1992. Accordingly, the Billes did not create the
unique dimensions of their property. The planning commission approved a motion stating
that the Billes did not create their plight “because one of the requested setbacks is from the
unclassified waterway, which is a drainage swale created by MNDOT [and] is a manmade
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unclassified stream” and “because, at the time of the platting in the 1930s, the highway was
in place and the lots were created there in Greenwood Cliffs sandwiched between the water
and Highway 61.”
The neighbors contend that the town board’ s finding on this issue is erroneous on
the ground that the Billes knew or should have known before purchasing the 75-foot-wide
property that it did not comply with the zoning ordinance, which, since 1951, has required
a minimum buildable lot width of 200 feet. See DZO art. V, § 3 (Table 5.1). The
neighbors’ contention is inconsistent with our caselaw. This court has held that a property
owner does not create his or her own “plight ” by purchasing property with knowledge of
its non-conforming status. Myron v. City of Plymouth, 562 N.W.2d 21, 22-23 (Minn. App.
1997), aff’d, 581 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Wensmann
Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2007). Rather, we expressly held in
Myron that “actual or constructive knowledge of a zoning ordinance before a purchase of
land is not a bar to granting a variance.” Id. at 23.
Thus, the town board had a sufficient fact ual basis to determine that the Billes’
plight is due to circumstances unique to the property and not created by them. See RDNT,
861 N.W.2d at 77, 79.
3. Essential Character of the Locality
Danielson-Bille also contends that the town board properly made the following
finding concerning the third part of the definition of practical difficulties:
The variances will not alter the essential character of the
locality as there are similarly sized residences on small lots
along the north shore corridor in the Town . The home
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proposed by the applicants will not substantially alter the view
of the lake from the highway or the neighboring properties.

The district court determined that the town board’s finding on this issue is reasonable. The
neighbors do not present any argument that the town board erred in its finding on this issue.
Thus, the town board had a suffi cient factual basis to determine that the Billes’ requested
variance, if granted, would not alter the essential character of the locality. See RDNT, 861
N.W.2d at 77, 79.
D. Summary
Because the town board had a sufficient factual basis for each of the findings
challenged by the neighbors, the town board did not act unreasonably, capriciously, or
arbitrarily when it granted the Billes’ second variance application. See id.
Before concluding, we reiterate that we are reviewing the decision of the town
board, not the decision of the district court. See Northwestern Coll., 281 N.W.2d at 868;
C.R. Investments, Inc., 304 N.W.2d at 325. Nonetheless, we note that our reversal of the
district court’s decision is ge nerally attributable to the deference that we give to a
municipality’s zoning decision. As the supreme court has stat ed, the “scope of review is
narrow.” Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 180. A court sh ould “uphold a city’s land use
decision unless the party challenging that de cision establishes that the decision is
unsupported by any rational basis related to promoting the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Even if the [municipality’s] decision is
debatable, so long as there is a rational basis for what it does, the courts do not interfere.”
Id. (quotations and alteration omitted). “A municipal decisionmaking body has a broad
discretionary power to [grant or] deny an application for variances." VanLandschoot, 336
N.W.2d at 508-09. "The fact that a court reviewing the action of a municipal body may
have arrived at a different conclusion, had it been a member of the body, does not invalidate
the judgment of the city officials if they acted in good faith and within the broad discretion
accorded them by statutes and the relevant ordinances." Id. at 509. In this case, the district
court did not give sufficient deference to the broad discretion of the town board in zoning
matters.
In sum, we conclude that the town board's decision to grant the Billes' second
variance application is not unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary.
Reversed.
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