State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0737

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tracy Dean Bullock,
Appellant.

Filed March 7, 2022
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-2364

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Max B. Kittel, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a downward dispositional departure. We affirm.
2
FACTS
On a March evening, a father and his so n (son 1) were in father’s other son’s
(son 2’s) driveway fixing a car radio. Appell ant Tracy Dean Bullock came outside of his
house and stared at them from across the street. Bullock returned inside his house briefly
and, upon returning outside, re sumed staring at father and son 1 from across the street.
Bullock eventually shouted at the two men. Father respon ded by shining his flashlight at
Bullock. Bullock drew a handgun and pointed it at father and son 1. Bullock then reentered
his home and came back outside carrying an assault rifle with a scope and light.
Son 2 and his partner arrived home and saw father crouching behind their trash can.
They went inside the house. Son 2’s partner later told police that Bullock had “pointed [a]
red laser light” into the home and that it wa s on her forehead and on each of her children
during the incident. She stated that she was afraid Bullock would shoot her and the
children. Son 2 and his partner have now moved to a new house away from the area. Some
of son 2’s children, as well as son 1 and fath er, have undergone therapy as a result of the
incident.
Bullock told police that he never had a weap on outside. He stated that one of the
victims shined a light on him and asked, “what the f--k are you looking at.” He told police
that he responded by raising his hand toward the victims, mimicking shooting a gun. After
that, he said he went inside, grabbed his flas hlight and a bat, and we nt back outside. He
acknowledged that he owns a handgun and also has an assault rifle, registered in his wife’s
name, with a scope and laser light.
3
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Bu llock with one count of second-degree
assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2018), and
three counts of threats of violence in viola tion of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2018).
The state later indicated that it would add another second-degree-assault charge and request
consecutive sentencing.
Bullock entered an Alford plea to the second-degree assault charge and one count
of threats of violence, whic h the district court accepted. 1 Bullock then filed a motion
requesting a dispositional departure or, in the alternative, a downward durational departure.
In support of his motion, he submitted several documents, including a letter from his
dispositional advisor advocating for probati on, data from the Mi nnesota Sentencing
Guidelines showing that many defendants who, like Bullock, have no criminal history and
are convicted of second-degree assault receiv e departures, and letters from friends and
relatives in support of Bullo ck. Bullock also submitted evidence showing that he
voluntarily began treatment for alcoholism.
At a sentencing hearing, the district c ourt found Bullock guilty and convicted him
in accordance with his Alford plea. It then denied Bullock’s motion for a dispositional
departure and imposed the presumptive sentence of 36 months in prison on the assault
count and imposed a stayed 15-month sentence on the threats-of-violence count. This
appeal followed.

1 A defendant may plead guilty even though he maintains innocence under North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970).
4
DECISION
Bullock argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for
a dispositional departure, asserting that the di strict court improperly relied on his lack of
remorse alone. We are not persuaded.
We review a district court’s decision whether to depart from a presumptive sentence
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Schmit , 601 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn. 1999). The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines limit the district court’s sentencing discretion by
prescribing presumptive sentences. State v. Soto , 855 N.W.2d 303, 3 08 (Minn. 2014);
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2019). A distri ct court must adhere to those presumptive
sentences unless “identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances” support its
decision to depart. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1; Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308. Only in a
“rare” case will an appellate court reverse a district court’s imposition of a presumptive
sentence. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
In determining whether to grant a dispositional departure, the district court focuses
on the defendant’s individual characteristics a nd what sentence would be best for the
defendant and society. State v. Heywood , 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983). The
sentencing guidelines provide a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors that may support a
dispositional departure, including when the defendant is “particularly amenable to
probation.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308; see also Minn. Sent. Guidelines at 2.D.3.a.7 (2019).
The factors the district court may consider in determining whether the defendant is
particularly amenable to probation include, but are not limited to, “the defendant’s age, his
prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, hi s attitude while in court, and the support of
5
friends and/or family” (Trog factors). Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 310 (quoting State v. Trog, 323
N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982)). However, the presence of mitigating factors does not
obligate the district court to grant a departure. Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn.
App. 2013). Additionally, the district court need not make finding s on a decision not to
depart from a presumptive sentence. State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App.
1985).
Here, the record shows that several of the Trog factors, including Bullock’s age (53),
absence of a criminal history, respectful a ttitude while in court, and support from friends
and family, favor a dispositional departure. Bu t, contrary to Bullock’s argument that the
only factor weighing against a departure was hi s lack of remorse, the district court noted
that Bullock not only fa iled to show remorse, but he also failed to take responsibility for
his actions or acknowledge harm to the victims. Th e record shows that the district court
carefully considered the relevant factors and information in making its decision. See id. at
80-81 (stating that a reviewing court may not interfere with di strict court’s exercise of
discretion when record shows district court carefully evaluated the relevant information
before making its decision). And even if mitigating factors favoring a dispositional
departure are present, the district court is not obligated to grant a departure. See Wells, 839
N.W.2d at 781. The circumstances here do not rise to the level of the “rare” case in which
we will intervene in the district court’s sentencing discretion. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
Bullock contends that the district court “treated remorse ‘as a necessary condition
of staying a presumptively executed sentence.’” But it is not error for the district court to
emphasize Bullock’s lack of re morse. Further, the district court also expressed concern
6
about Bullock’s failure to recognize harm to the victims.2 The district court did not make
Bullock’s remorse a necessary element for granting a departure. Instead, it weighed
Bullock’s lack of remorse and failure to re cognize victim harm against the mitigating
factors and, in its discretion, declined to grant a departure. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 311 (stating
that remorse is just one factor among severa l that the district court may consider in
determining whether an offender is particularly amenable to probation); State v. Fett, 414
N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that an offender’s “inability to recognize the
effect of his actions negates amenability to treatment” (emphasis added)). This was not an
abuse of discretion.
Bullock also contends that his voluntary participation in treatment for alcoholism is
a mitigating factor that shows that he is amen able to treatment outside of prison. But his
treatment is not connected to these offenses : the record reveals no evidence that Bullock
committed the alleged offenses as a result of intoxication. In fact, Bullock denied being

2 We disagree with Bullock’s characterization at oral argument th at any expression of
“remorse” for victim harm would have been inconsistent with Bu llock maintaining his
innocence under Alford. Bullock could maintain his innocence of the charges levied but
also recognize that his participat ion, such as it was, in the events caused harm to others
involved.

We also emphasize that an Alford plea is, despite the defend ant maintaining innocence, a
guilty plea. See Miller v. State, 816 N.W.2d 547, 547 n.1 (M inn. 2012) (explaining that
“[a]n Alford plea is guilty plea in which a defe ndant maintains his innocence” but
acknowledges the strength of prosecution’s case); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 15. The
district court need not accept th e defendant’s contention that he is innocent. Instead, it
finds the factual basis for an Alford guilty plea thro ugh means other th an a defendant’s
admissions. State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 648-49 (Minn. 2007). And in accepting a
defendant’s Alford guilty plea, the district court finds the defendant guilty.
7
intoxicated during the incident and indeed denied wrongdoing of any kind. Here, Bullock’s
participation in treatment is not a mitigating factor with regard to these particular offenses.
In sum, the district cour t did not abuse its discreti on by denying Bullock’s motion
for a dispositional departure.
Affirmed.