State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0746

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lawrence Michael Johnson,
Appellant.

Filed January 17, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-19-11006

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Bratvold , Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant is one of three men who attacked and stabbed another man at a bar; the
victim later died. Appellant challenges a final judgment of conviction for aiding and
abetting second-degree murder. Appellant argues that his conviction should be reversed for
three reasons: (1) the 228-day delay before his jury trial began violated his constitutional
right to a speedy trial; (2) the district court abused its discretion when it denied sanctions
for the state’s discovery violations; and (3) the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his postconviction petition for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We
determine that appellant’s constitutional speedy-trial rights were not violated, and the
district court acted within its discretion by denying sanctions for discovery violations and
rejecting postconviction relief. Thus , we affirm in part. Because we also determine the
district court erred by entering convictions for three lesser-included offenses that arose
from a single behavioral incident, we reverse in part and remand to amend the warrant of
commitment.
FACTS
The following summarizes the evidence received at the jury trial. At about 1:00 a.m.
on December 29, 2019, appellant Lawrence Michael Johnson and two codefendants —
Johnson’s brother and Johnson’s friend—were at a bar in St. Cloud. They climbed the
stairway to the bar’s third level, which had a dance floor. The first-level street entrance was
at the bottom of the stairway, which bypassed the second level.
3
While on the dance floor, Johnson and the two codefendants (the three men) fought
with a fourth man, who allegedly stepped on the shoes of Johnson’s brother’s girlfriend.
As the fight went on, the three men assaulted U.M., who fought back. A bouncer intervened
and directed the three men to leave the bar. The three men left the bar, went to their car,
briefly entered another business, and then returned to the bar about 15 minutes later. The
three men returned to the third level and attacked U.M. near the D.J. booth. Cameras
installed on the dance floor and around the bar captured both fights, and the district court
received the surveillance video into evidence during the trial.
U.M. was stabbed during the second fight. The surveillance video does not show
who stabbed U.M. The video shows that i mmediately following the attack by the three
men, U.M. was bloody, and he staggered down the steps to the first floor, exited the door,
and collapsed outside the bar. The three men left through the same door moments later—
two of them kicked U.M. in the head while he lay bleeding on the ground. Forensic
evidence received at trial showed a pool of blood near the D.J. booth on the third level,
blood on the wall nearby, and a trail of blood down the stairs. No weapon was recovered.
U.M. was taken to the hospital via ambulance, where he died from his injuries less
than two hours later. The medical examiner testified that U.M. had a penetrating wound to
the front of his chest and “three stab wounds to his back.” His cause of death was “excessive
bleeding” because of “sharp-force injuries.” Police arrested Johnson four days later in
Minneapolis.
4
Johnson’s trial began on October 12, 2020. The state called 18 witnesses, including
responding officers, the trauma surgeon, the medical examiner, and witnesses from the bar.
Johnson did not testify and did not present evidence.
The jury found Johnson guilty of four charges: aiding and abetting second-degree
murder with intent under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.19, subd. 1(1), 609.05, subd. 1 (2018) (count
one); aiding and abetting second-degree murder while committing a felony under Minn.
Stat. §§ 609.19, subd. 2(1), 609.05, subd. 1 (2018) (count three); and fifth-degree assault
under Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2) (2018) (counts two and four). The jury’s special
verdict also found that Johnson committed this crime as part of a group of three or more
offenders who actively participated in the crime. The district court sentenced Johnson to
415 months in prison on count one and entered additional convictions on counts two, three,
and four.
Johnson appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not violate Johnson’s constitutional right to a speedy
trial.

Johnson demanded a speedy trial at his omnibus hearing on February 27, 2020.
Johnson repeated his speedy-trial demand at several pretrial hearings and in one motion to
dismiss. Johnson’s trial was first scheduled to take place in April 2020, but the COVID-19
pandemic disrupted judicial proceedings. Around the time of Johnson’s scheduled trial, the
Minnesota Supreme Court issued several orders that prohibited jury trials from taking place
until the district courts could determine how to proceed while protecting the safety of
5
participants.1 The district court reset Johnson’s trial for August 2020, “the next available
jury trial date.”
On August 4, 2020, the district court again continued Johnson’s trial, this time until
October. The district court’s order cited concerns about developing appropriate procedures
to protect the health of jurors, parties, and court staff for a three-week trial and found good
cause for the delay. The district court reasoned that “potential issues . . . with this new
felony courtroom may not be evident until the first trial begins,” so “it is necessary for the
first trial held in that courtroom to be of shorter length than this one is anticipated to last in
order to figure out and correct any potential issues.”
Johnson remained in custody throughout the pretrial period. The district court
denied multiple requests to reduce bail or release Johnson on conditions, reasoning as
stated in a May 2020 order that “the charges in this matter are very serious,” and Johnson
“was apprehended . . . in Minneapolis after a two-day manhunt, making [him] a flight
risk.” The district court also noted that Johnson had “some recent failures to appear[] in
just the fall of 2019,” and the district court was “concerned about public safety.”
Johnson’s trial began on October 12, 2020. Johnson argues on appeal that the
228-day delay between his first speedy-trial demand and the first day of trial violated his
constitutional right to a speedy trial. The federal and state constitutions provide a criminal

1 See Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-33 , Extending Stay at Home Order and Temporary
Closure of Bars, Restaurants, and Other Places of Public Accommodation (Apr. 8, 2020);
Continuing Operations of the Courts of the State of Minnesota Under Emergency Executive
Order 20-33 , No. ADM20-8001 (Minn. Apr . 9, 2020) (“No jury trials shall commence
before May 4, 2020 or until further order of this court, whichever occurs first.”).
6
defendant the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. The
speedy-trial right is a “safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to
trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the
possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.” State
v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 244 (Minn. 2021) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S.
116, 120 (1966)).
No fixed rule defines how long is too long to wait for a trial, and whether the delay
“amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon the circumstances.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “Whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial is a constitutional
question subject to de novo review.” State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017).
To determine “whether the State brought the accused to trial quickly enough to
avoid endangering the values that the right to a speedy trial protects,” we consider the four
factors explained in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 245.
The four factors are nonexclusive and include (A) the length of the delay, (B) the reason
for the delay, (C) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (D) the
prejudice to the defendant. State v. Paige, 977 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2022). We consider
each Barker factor in turn.
A. Length of Delay
The first factor is the “triggering mechanism” that determines whether we must
consider the other factors. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 245 (quotation omitted). A defendant
must be tried within 60 days of entering a plea “unless the court finds good cause for a later
trial date.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). A violation of this rule is presumptively prejudicial
7
but not necessarily a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Paige,
977 N.W.2d at 838.
Johnson first requested a speedy trial on February 27, 2020, and his trial began on
October 12, 2020. Johnson and the state agree that the 228-day delay violates the general
rule and gives rise to a presumption of prejudice. As a result, we analyze the remaining
three factors.
B. Reasons for the Delays
In analyzing the second factor, we “must determine which party is responsible for
the delay and the relative weight that should be assigned to this factor based on the reason
for the delay.” Id. Johnson divides the 228-day delay into two periods and argues that both
weigh against the state . He identifies (1) the delay from April 27 to August 10 under the
Minnesota Supreme Court order prohibiting criminal jury trials and (2) the delay from
August 10 to October 12 after the district court’s decision to continue the trial until October
2020.
Johnson’s brief to this court argues that “despite the pandemic’s status as a
public-health crisis, the state is not free to disregard the constitution.” Shortly after
Johnson’s brief was filed, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in Paige that “trial delays
due to the statewide orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic do not
weigh against the State.” Id. The supreme court reasoned that “the statewide orders issued
in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic reflected a policy decision prompted by an
external public health crisis” and therefore should not weigh against the state. Id. at 840.
8
We rely on Paige to conclude that the trial delay from April 27 to August 10 does not
weigh against the state.
Johnson argues the second delay involved scheduling considerations that weigh
against the state because it “amounted to another 63 days beyond when the county was
authorized to hold felony trials.” Johnson contends that his trial should have been held as
soon as the county had “a pandemic-approved courtroom constructed and operational,” and
the district court’s decision to begin shorter trials first is a delay that must be attributed to
the state. Johnson argues that the second delay is analogous to the delay in State v. Jones,
which held that a seven-month trial delay resulting from an “overburdened judicial system”
cannot “rest with the defendant,” and “[t]he reason for this delay must weigh against the
state.” 392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn. 1986). The state argues we should distinguish Jones
because the second delay was also caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
We agree with the state in part. The district court’s reason for granting a continuance
in August 2020 was based on the COVID -19 pandemic and sought to ensure trial
participants’ health and safety. The record also shows that the district court judge assigned
to Johnson’s case diligently sought a firm trial date. Still, we agree with Johnson that the
anticipated length of Johnson’s trial was a factor, as was the backlog of felony cases
awaiting trial; these reasons are somewhat like the “overburdened judicial system” in
Jones. There, the supreme court attributed the seven -month delay to the state but
determined that the delay “weighs less heavily against the government than, for example,
a deliberate attempt on the part of a prosecuting attorney to delay a trial.” Id.
9
Because the second delay of Johnson’s trial was not a “deliberate attempt[] to
hamper the defense,” Paige, 977 N.W.2d at 838, we are persuaded to weigh the delay “less
heavily” against the state, Jones, 392 N.W.2d at 235. In short, the first delay does not weigh
against the state, and the second delay weighs “less heavily” or only somewhat against the
state.
C. Assertion of Johnson’s Speedy-Trial Right
Under the third factor, we consider the forcefulness of Johnson’s speedy-trial
demand. Paige, 977 N.W.2d at 840. “[T]he frequency and force of a demand must be
considered when weighing this factor and the strength of the demand is likely to reflect the
seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted.” State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d
509, 515 (Minn. 1989). Johnson argues, and the state agrees , that Johnson adequately
asserted his speedy-trial demand. We also agree. Johnson promptly requested a speedy trial
in February 2020. He later reasserted his right at hearings and in a motion to dismiss. Thus,
Johnson’s demand was both frequent and forceful and weighs against the state.
D. Prejudice to Johnson
An appellate court considers three interests when determining whether and how the
delay prejudiced the criminal defendant: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration;
(2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility
that the defense will be impaired.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 20 (Minn. 2015). The
third interest—preventing the impairment of the defense —is the most important. Id.
Johnson argues that the delays harmed him in all three ways.
10
First, Johnson argues that his pretrial incarceration “put [him] at increased risk for
contracting, and possibly dying from COVID -19.” The supreme court rejected a similar
argument in Paige, where it held that jail hardships suffered because of the pandemic—
such as “potential risk of infection”—fall outside the scope of the fourth factor because
these hardships were not “suffered due to the trial delay.” 977 N.W.2d at 842. Here, we
also conclude that Johnson’s health risks because of pretrial incarceration were not because
of the delay in Johnson’s trial. Johnson had outstanding warrants in Blue Earth and Benton
Counties. Had he been released before trial, Johnson likely would have been transferred to
those counties for processing and may not have been released into the community. See
State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 318 (Minn. 1999) (concluding that the first two factors
do not apply when a defendant is in custody for another offense).
Second, Johnson contends he suffered significant anxiety and concern “because [the
delay] jeopardized one of his purposes for demanding a speedy trial,” which was that
Johnson “wanted to go to trial before either of his co-defendants decided to falsely accuse
him of stabbing [U.M.] in order to get a reduced sentence.” The state argues that Johnson’s
pretrial anxiety is unrelated to the trial delay because it applies to “anyone awaiting trial
where they were charged as an accomplice.” We agree that the anxiety Johnson alleges is
because of the circumstances of a group offense and cannot be attributed to the trial delay.
Third, Johnson argues that the trial delay prejudiced his defense because it “allowed
the state to leisurely assemble its case for trial while slowly disseminating evidence to the
defense that should have been disclosed months earlier.” We do not find this argument
persuasive because Johnson fails to make an affirmative showing that the delay weakened
11
his ability to raise specific defenses, elicit specific testimony, or produce specific items of
evidence. The supreme court has emphasized that defense-impairing prejudice is shown by
“memory loss by witnesses or witness unavailability.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20. Johnson
cannot point to one witness or piece of evidence that was lost because of the delay. We
have stated that “the state’s additional opportunity to prepare for trial as a result of pretrial
delay does not constitute prejudice to the defendant sufficient to support a finding of a
speedy-trial violation under the fourth Barker factor.” State v. Strobel, 921 N.W.2d 563,
572 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’d, 932 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2019). If anything, the delay in
Johnson’s trial also allowed Johnson the opportunity to investigate, strategize, and prepare
a defense.
In short, any alleged prejudice “not directly related to the delay at issue” is not
“attributable to the delay” in the speedy-trial analysis. Paige, 977 N.W.2d at 843. Thus, we
determine that the fourth factor weighs against a speedy-trial violation.
E. Balancing
After considering the Barker factors individually, we then balance them to
determine whether the state brought a criminal defendant to trial “quickly enough so as not
to endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial protects.” Id. While we conclude that
Johnson’s trial delay was presumptively prejudicial, and his demand for a speedy trial was
frequent and forceful, Johnson’s constitutional claim ultimately fails. The first delay was
because of the COVID-19 pandemic, which does not weigh against the state under Paige.
The second delay was due mostly to the pandemic and only somewhat weighs against the
state, which was overburdened. Finally, Johnson fails to show his defense was prejudiced
12
because of either delay. Thus, we determine that Johnson’s constitutional right to a speedy
trial was not violated.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied sanctions for the
state’s untimely disclosure of evidence.

On May 12, 2020, Johnson moved to compel discovery. The state responded to the
motion to compel, claiming that its failure to produce the evidence that Johnson requested
“can be attributed to the simple explanation: It does not exist.” Still, the state disclosed
evidence before and during the trial. Johnson moved for discovery sanctions several times.
At trial, Johnson asked the district court to dismiss the charges against him, suppress all
the untimely disclosed evidence, or grant a continuance because of the state’s discovery
violations. Johnson argued that he was entitled to a continuance to get a blood- spatter
expert to evaluate untimely disclosed Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) photos
because “they would be able to determine where the stabbing actually took place on the
dance floor,” and “if the stabbing took place while [Johnson] was being detained by a
bouncer, it makes it impossible that he took part in it.”
On October 13, the district court denied Johnson’s request for a trial continuance
based on the state’s September and October discovery disclosures. The district court
reasoned that Johnson had sufficient information to adequately prepare a defense. The
district court also determined that Johnson was not prejudiced by discovery that was
produced in June or July because he had ample time to investigate before the October trial.
The district court did “not find that [Johnson] was prejudiced in a manner that requires the
remedies he now requests.”
13
On appeal, Johnson argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to impose sanctions for the state’s discovery violations.
“Whether a discovery violation occurred is an issue of law which [an appellate] court
reviews de novo.” State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489 (Minn. 2005). An appellate
court reviews for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision whether to impose
sanctions for a discovery violation. Id. “The imposition of sanctions for violations of
discovery rules and orders is a matter particularly suited to the judgment and discretion of
the trial court.” State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1979). The district court is
“in the best position to determine whether any harm has resulted from the particular
violation and the extent to which this harm can be eliminated or otherwise alleviated.” Id.
A district court considers four factors when determining whether sanctions are
appropriate for discovery violations : (1) the reason the disclosure was not made; (2) the
extent of prejudice to the opposing party; (3) the feasibility of rectifying any prejudice by
a continuance; and (4) any other relevant factors. Id. Here, the district court determined
that Johnson’s motion for discovery sanctions failed under the second Lindsey factor—
prejudice— because the district court was “ultimately not persuaded that [Johnson] was
prejudiced by [the state’s] late disclosure.”
We start by considering the second factor, the extent of prejudice. Johnson argues
in his brief to this court that the “ongoing late disclosures affected the defense’s ability to
formulate a solid trial strategy because the landscape of the evidence kept changing.”
Johnson asserts that two pieces of evidence disclosed thirteen and ten days before trial—
crime-scene photos and a video from the BCA and the statement of a witness, J.R.,
14
identifying another bar patron with a knife—“precluded the defense from consulting with
a blood- pattern expert” and “precluded the defense from investigating an alternative
perpetrator.” The state responds for both alleged late disclosures that the evidence of
Johnson’s guilt as an accomplice is “so overwhelming” that “there is no chance that earlier
disclosure of any of the challenged evidence would have changed the result.”
We conclude that Johnson fails to show that he was prejudiced by the denial of his
request for a continuance. First, with regard to the blood-spatter evidence, the district court
correctly noted that Johnson had “not provided any information that he sought a
blood-spatter expert” when “other photographs of the blood were previously disclosed.”
This is convincing because Johnson did not request a blood-spatter analysis from the state
and did not contend that he had been seeking this type of expert evidence even though other
crime-scene photos were disclosed promptly.
We also are not persuaded by Johnson’s theory that the blood-spatter analysis would
have helped his defense because it would show Johnson’s exact location when U.M. was
fatally stabbed. Under a theory of aiding and abetting, the state needed to prove that
Johnson “intentionally aids, advises . . . or conspires with . . . other[s] to commit the
crime,” in this case, second-degree murder. Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1. The jury could
reasonably find that Johnson was guilty under this statute regardless of his exact physical
position when U.M. was stabbed.
Second, with regard to the state’s disclosure of J.R.’s statement, Johnson fails to
show prejudice. As the district court determined, the late disclosure of J.R.’s statement did
15
not prejudice Johnson because he was “provided with a description of [J.R.’s] statement in
a narrative police report” and could have investigated more at that time.
We also reject Johnson’s argument that the ongoing discovery violations warranted
sanctions because of “the cumulative impact” they had on his “ability to adequately prepare
for trial.”2 First, the video recordings showed that Johnson participated in the fatal assault
of U.M. and are strong evidence of Johnson’s guilt. Second, Johnson’s sole defense at trial
was reasonable doubt that he knew, or reasonably should have known, that a codefendant
planned to stab U.M . Because Johnson does not deny that he participated in the attack,
J.R.’s statement and any blood-spatter analysis would have had little evidentiary weight.
Third, none of the late- disclosed evidence was exculpatory evidence. The state presented
overwhelming evidence of Johnson’s participation in the fatal attack on U.M. While we do
not condone the late discovery disclosures by the state, the evidence that Johnson identifies
was not exculpatory and was summarized in other evidence provided well before trial.
Because Johnson failed to show that the state’s discovery violations prejudiced him,
we need not analyze the other Lindsey factors. Thus, we determine that the district did not
abuse its discretion when it denied Johnson’s motion for discovery sanctions.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Johnson’s petition
for a postconviction evidentiary hearing.

In February 2022, Johnson petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that he was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing because newly discovered evidence likely would have

2 For similar reasons, we reject Johnson’s argument that even if he “cannot make the
required prejudice showing,” he is entitled to a new trial “in the interests of justice.”
16
led to an acquittal or a more favorable result at trial. Along with his petition, Johnson
submitted a recorded statement from a jailhouse informant, K.J., who stated that one of the
two codefendants confessed to stabbing U.M. and throwing the knife in a sewer on the
night of the stabbing. An investigator submitted an affidavit summarizing an interview with
K.J. where K.J. stated that he “did not want to be involved and wanted to recant his
statement.”
On appeal, Johnson argues that the district court erred in denying his postconviction
petition without an evidentiary hearing. A postconviction petitioner is entitled to a n
evidentiary hearing on the petition “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the
proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.04, subd. 1 (202 0); accord Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018).
“In determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required, a postconviction court
considers the facts alleged in the petition as true and construes them in the light most
favorable to the petitioner.” Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Minn. 2017). An
evidentiary hearing is only required when a petitioner alleges facts that, if proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, would entitle them to the relief requested. Id. Appellate
courts “review the ultimate decision by the postconviction court to grant or deny an
evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.” Caldwell v. State, 853 N.W.2d 766, 770
(Minn. 2014). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on
an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Andersen,
913 N.W.2d at 422 (quoting Brown, 895 N.W.2d at 617).
17
Johnson is entitled to an evidentiary hearing for newly discovered evidence—K.J.’s
jailhouse statement—only if he satisfies the four-factor test set out in Rainer v. State,
566 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1997). Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Minn. 2012). Under
Rainer, Johnson must show that the evidence (1) was not known to the defendant at the
time of the trial, (2) could not have been discovered through due diligence before trial,
(3) was not cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful, and (4) would probably produce an
acquittal or a more favorable result. Id. (citing Rainer, 566 N.W.2d at 695).
On the first factor, the district court determined that the information in K.J.’s
statement was “known at the time of [Johnson’s] trial” and was “mostly not new” because
it was “mainly corroborative of the surveillance videos and other evidence.” The district
court also determined that K.J. made his statement two months after Johnson’s trial, and
so the second factor is satisfied. The state does not dispute the district court’s analysis of
the second factor. The district court reasoned that factors three and four determine whether
Johnson is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We assume without deciding that Johnson
satisfies factors one and two and focus on factors three and four.
A. Materiality of Evidence
Johnson argues that K.J.’s statement is “not cumulative, impeaching , or doubtful”
because “it definitively identified the principal” and “explained what happened to the
murder weapon.” In contrast, the district court found that K.J.’s statement was cumulative
because it “largely corroborates . . . the video surveillance evidence and other evidence
presented at trial.” The district court reasoned that the state “produced video surveillance
evidence to advance the factual theory that the three codefendants acted together
18
and . . . never stated who had the knife (or knives) or stabbed [U.M.]”; therefore, “who[]
specifically possessed the knife (or knives) is not necessarily determinative.”
We agree with the district court’s analysis. The state’s theory of the case was that
the three men left the bar after the first assault, formulated a plan to return and attack U.M.,
and returned to execute the coordinated attack that led to the fatal stabbing. Although the
state did not offer evidence on which of the three men stabbed U.M., it claimed that
Johnson aided and abetted the stabber. Thus, K.J.’s statement identifying the principal was
cumulative evidence and supported the state’s theory that Johnson aided and abetted the
commission of second-degree intentional murder.
B. Probability of a More Favorable Result
Johnson argues that K.J.’s statement probably would have led to an acquittal or more
favorable result because K.J.’s statement “omits any mention of a plan” and therefore
“eliminates the idea that [Johnson] knew the principal [codefendant] was going to commit
a murder or that [Johnson] intended to help [codefendant] commit that murder.” The
district court disagreed and determined that K.J.’s statement would “probably not change
the result” because “the State . . . advance[d] the factual theory that the three codefendants
acted together and . . . never stated who had the knife (or knives) or who stabbed the
victim.” The district court also concluded that the “remaining evidence is overwhelming
that [Johnson] was guilty of aiding and abetting murder, regardless of who possessed the
knife.”
We agree with the district court’s view of the fourth factor. The state presented video
recordings that showed Johnson and the codefendants engaged in two fights with U.M. The
19
three men left the bar together after the first fight and returned to the bar a short while later,
after which they quickly began the second fight, and one of the three men stabbed U.M.
The jury could reasonably infer from the video recordings that the behavior of the three
men on the dance floor just before the attack— having a discussion, circling U.M., and then
attacking U.M. in quick succession —showed a plan. A witness standing outside the bar
testified that he overheard three men on the sidewalk state that “they wanted to kill the
guy.”
Johnson’s brief to this court concedes that K.J.’s statement implicates Johnson as a
“possible aider and abettor.” We agree and determine that K.J.’s statement is merely
cumulative evidence supporting the state’s theory that Johnson aided and abetted the
intentional murder of U.M. Because strong evidence supports the jury’s findings that
Johnson aided and abetted intentional murder and that he was part of a group of three who
actively participated in the crime, we conclude that K.J.’s statement probably would not
have led to a more favorable result at Johnson’s trial. Thus, the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied Johnson’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary
hearing.
IV. The district court erred by entering convictions for three lesser -included
offenses that arose from a single behavioral incident.

Although Johnson did not raise this issue on appeal, we conclude that the district
court erred when it entered judgments of conviction for three lesser-included offenses. “[I]t
is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide the cases in accordance with law. ” State
v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990). The Minnesota Statutes
20
specifically provide that a cr iminal defendant “may be convicted of either the crime
charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 ( 2018)
(emphasis added). Minnesota law defines an included offense as “a lesser degree of the
same crime” or “a crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were proved.” Id., subd.
1(1), (4). Whether an offense is a lesser-included offense of the charged offense is a legal
question that an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 552 (Minn.
2012).
The jury found Johnson guilty of aiding and abetting second-degree murder with
intent (count one), aiding and abetting second -degree murder while committing a felony
offense (count three ), and two counts of fifth-degree assault (counts two and four). The
unintentional felony-murder offense is a lesser-included offense of the intentional-murder
offense because under the state’s theory of the case, assault was the underlying felony, and
intent is the only other element that distinguishes the second-degree intentional-murder
offense and the second -degree felony-murder offense. See State v. Hannon, 703 N.W.2d
498, 512 (Minn. 2005) (recognizing unintentional felony murder with assault as the
underlying felony as a lesser-included offense of intentional murder).
The jury’s guilty verdict found that Johnson “intentionally inflict[ed] or attempt[ed]
to inflict bodily harm upon” U.M., the definition of fifth-degree assault. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.224, subd. 1(2). As a result, the verdict agrees with the state’s theory that Johnson’s
participation in the assault constituted aiding and abetting intentional murder. Under these
facts, fifth-degree assault was necessarily proved when the jury found Johnson guilty of
aiding and abetting second-degree intentional murder for his participation in the attack. We
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therefore conclude that counts two, three, and four are lesser-included offenses of count
one.
When a criminal defendant is “convicted on more than one charge for the same act,”
the proper procedure is for the district court to “adjudicate formally and impose sentence
on one count only.” State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984). The remedy
for this error is to remand to the district court to vacate the convictions entered on the
lesser-included offenses while leaving the guilty verdicts intact. State v. Balandin,
944 N.W.2d 204, 222 (Minn. 2020). “If the adjudicated conviction is later vacated for a
reason not relevant to the remaining unadjudicated conviction(s), one of the remaining
unadjudicated convictions can then be formally adjudicated and sentence imposed . . . .”
LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d at 284.
Thus, we reverse in part and remand to the district court to amend the warrant of
commitment and vacate the convictions for the lesser-included offenses of aiding and
abetting second-degree felony murder and the two counts of fifth-degree assault, for which
Johnson received no sentence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.