State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0753

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Loren Michael Longie,
Appellant.

Filed May 9, 2022
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-20-2274

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of fifth- degree assault, arguing that the state
failed to meet its burden to disprove his claim of self-defense. Because the state presented
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sufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonabl e doubt that appellant was not
acting in self-defense, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Loren Longie with second-degree
assault with a dangerous weapon and gross-misdemeanor fifth-degree assault. The charges
stemmed from allegations that Longie struck a woman in the f ace with a shovel. Prior to
trial, the defense informed the state that Longie intended to rely on a claim of self-defense.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. Three witnesse s testified: the woman who was
injured, a police officer who responded to the incident, and Longie himself.
The injured woman, M.S., testified as follows. On the day of the assault, she went
to McDonald’s to get dinner. While at the restaurant, she re ceived a call from a friend.
The friend, N.F., asked M.S. to go to the house where N.F. had been staying and pick up
N.F.’s phone and car keys. After getting her food to go, M.S. drove to the house and parked
her car on the street. She then walked towards the house. She was eating her McDonald’s
sandwich and had her fries in hand at the time.
Outside the house, M.S. saw two men—one of whom was holding a shovel. At trial,
M.S. identified the man holding the shovel as Longie. Longie was standing in the driveway
near a car and close to the house. The other man was standing on the steps of the house.
As M.S. walked up the driveway, Longie “pretty much stopped” her. M.S. tried to
explain to Longie that she was there to get her friend’s phone and keys, but Longie began
accusing her of “snooping around the car or trying to break into the car.” Longie was
“coming off really aggressive” and telling her to leave. Longie then suddenly hit M.S. in
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the face with the shovel. M.S. testified that she was standi ng still at the time and “didn’t
see it coming . . . . It happened so fast.” Her food “flew out of [her] hand” and she could
feel her face bleeding. M.S. told Longie th at she was going to call the police and started
dialing 911. At that point, the two men went into the house. M.S. walked back toward her
car and waited for the police.
The second witness who testified at tria l was one of the two police officers who
responded to M.S.’s 911 call. The officer found M.S. on the street, near the house where
she had been injured, and obse rved that her face was bleeding. The officer testified that
M.S. reported that she had gone to the house to pick up some items for a friend and that a
man standing outside the house had hit her in the face with a shovel. M.S. gave the officer
a description of the person who had hit her—a description that matched Longie. The officer
also took photos of (1) M.S.’s injuries and (2) the scene outside the house, which included
fries scattered on the driveway. After interviewing M.S., the officer knocked on the door
of the residence and spoke w ith A.G., who answer ed the door. The o fficer did not find
Longie at the house at that time.
Later during the same shift, the officer returned to the house to follow up on another
incident and found Longie at the house. The officer ques tioned Longie about the assault
of M.S. The officer testified that Longie’s story was “rather inconsistent,” but he admitted
that he had hit a woman with a shovel. Longie stated that he did so because he thought the
woman was not supposed to be at the house. Longie also told the officer that a woman had
stabbed him, and he showed the officer his stab wound. He did not say when the stabbing
occurred.
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Longie testified in his own defense and desc ribed a different series of events. He
testified that, on the day of the assault, he we nt to visit a friend, A.G., who was living at
the house where the incident occurred. A.G. asked Longie to come over because she was
“having trouble” with a group of people w ho were using drugs at the house. Longie
eventually got the people to leave the hous e, but not before getting into a physical
altercation with them. Longie then called a friend, who picked him up from the house.
Later that day, A.G. called Longie’s friend to report that the group had returned and
that they were trying to break into the house and into a car parked in the driveway. After
receiving the call, Longie went back to the house. According to Longie, he saw a man
standing in the driveway by the car. Longie to ld the man to leave. Longie testified that
the man then brandished a flashlight like a ba seball bat and gestured like he was going to
hit Longie with it. Longie could also see another person in the car and told them to get out.
Longie testified that he then picked up a shovel, “hoping to posture. . . and . . . de-escalate”
the situation. Longie then tried to get into the house, but A.G. did not answer the door. He
again told the people to leave. At that point, Longie “rushed” the man because he believed
the man was coming at him, and they wrestled to the ground. Longie then realized there
was another person involved in the scuffle, so he disengaged, and the people “took off
running up the street.” After they left, Lo ngie’s friend told him that one of the people
involved in the scuffle, a woman, had stabbed Longie. Longie then saw that he had been
stabbed in the stomach but did not call 911 or seek medical attention.
At trial, Longie acknowledged that, when law enforcement arrested him, he told the
arresting officer that he had hit a woman w ith a shovel during an a ltercation. But he
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explained that he hit the woman because she stabbed him. On cross-examination, M.S.
denied stabbing Longie.
Following the close of evidence at trial, the district court instructed the jury on the
charged offenses—second-degree assault with a deadly weapon and fifth-degree assault.
The district court also instructed the jury on self-defense for both counts. The jury
acquitted Longie of second-degree assault but found him guilty of fifth-degree assault.
Longie appeals.
DECISION
Longie argues that the state did not pres ent sufficient evidence to support his
conviction. He does not contend that he did not assault M.S.; rather, he contends that the
state’s evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting
in self-defense when he injured M.S.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the ev idence for a conviction, we undertake “a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the convic tion, was sufficient” to convict. State v. Ortega ,
813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). “We must assume the jury believed
the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell ,
803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “Assessing witness credibility
and the weight given to witness testimony is exclusively the province of the jury.”
State v. Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d 900, 909 (Minn. 2009 ). “And we will not disturb the
verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the
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requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
A person is guilty of gross-misdemeanor fifth-degree assault if he “intentionally
inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm upon another” a nd that violation occurs “within
three years of a previous qualified domestic violence-related offense conviction.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.224, subds. 1(2), 2(b) (2018).1 But an individual may use reasonable force to
resist an offense against th em. Minn. Stat. § 609.06, su bd. 1(3) (2018). In such a
circumstance, a defendant may claim self-defense. The supreme court has instructed that
a self-defense claim involves four elements:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation by the defendant,
(2) the defendant’s actual and hon est belief that he or another
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, (3) the
existence of reasonable ground s for the belief, and (4) the
absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid danger.

State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017). At trial, the defendant bears the
burden of introducing evidence to support a self-defense claim. State v. Basting ,
572 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. 1997). Once the defendant has introduced such evidence, the
burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that the defendant did not ac t in self-defense by
negating one or more of these four elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Longie argues that the eviden ce presented by the state at trial was insufficient to
establish that he was not acting in self-defense. He contends that the state failed to disprove

1 Longie stipulated at trial to a prior conviction within three years that qualified as a
domestic violence-related offense.
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any of the four elements and, therefore, “a jury could not have reasonably found that [he]
did not act in self-defense.” We are not persuaded.
Starting with the first required element of self-defense, “the absence of aggression
or provocation by the defendant,” the record reflects that the state’s evidence was sufficient
to disprove Longie’s claim that he was not the initial aggressor. See State v. Johnson ,
719 N.W.2d 619, 630 (Minn. 20 06) (discussing first element of self-defense in terms of
whether defendant was the original aggressor). At trial, M.S. testified that Longie hit her
with the shovel without provocation. She e xplained that she went to the house alone,
started to walk towards the door, and was “p retty much stopped” by Longie. She further
testified that, while she was trying to explai n her reason for being there, Longie suddenly
hit her with the shovel. She also testified that, at the time of the assault, she was standing
still and holding food in her ha nds. The food flew out of her hands and her face started
bleeding from the impact of the shovel. Th e responding officer’s testimony and photo
evidence corroborated M.S.’s version of events . Based on this evidence, the jury could
have reasonably found that the state proved that Longie was the initial aggressor.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Longie’s argument that the state failed to rebut
his testimony that a third party was the aggre ssor and that he was ac ting in self-defense
when he hit M.S. with the shovel. His testimony about the alleged third-party aggressor is
inconsistent with the version of events testified to by M. S. In reviewing evidence on
appeal, we assume that “the jury believe d the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any
evidence to the contrary.” Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 384 (quotation omitted). Therefore,
we must assume that the jury rejected Longie’s testimony and believed the testimony of
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M.S. Accordingly, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence to disprove the
first element of Longie’s self-defense claim. On this basis alone, the jury could have
reasonably concluded that Longie was not acting in self-defense when he hit M.S. with the
shovel. Because the state pres ented sufficient evidence to di sprove the first element of
Longie’s self-defense claim, we need not address the a dditional elements. See Basting,
572 N.W.2d at 286 (noting that the state defeats a self-defense claim by disproving just one
of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt).
In sum, because the evidence in the record is sufficien t for a jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Longie was the aggresso r and did not act in self-defense when he
committed fifth-degree assault, we conclude that sufficient ev idence exists to sustain his
conviction.
Affirmed.