A21-0754 Precedential Reinstated Processed

Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam Concurring, Thissen, J. In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Ignatius Chukwuemeka Udeani, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0300615

Minnesota Supreme Court · Filed January 25, 2023

The holding in the court’s own words

When the weig ht of these violations is combined and considered in light of Udeani ’s prior professional disciplin e for similar misconduct, the other aggravating factors found by the referee, and the lack of mitigating factors, we hold that the appropriate discipline in this case is disbarment.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A21-0754

Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam
Concurring, Thissen, J.
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action
against Ignatius Chukwuemeka Udeani,
a Minnesota Attorney,
Registration No. 0300615
Filed: January 25, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Je nnifer D. Peterson, Senior A ssistant Director, Office of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Ignatius Chukwuemeka Udeani, Minneapolis, Minnesota, pro se.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
Disbarment is the appropriate discipline for an attorney with a significant disciplinary
history who engaged in seri ous and prolonged mi sconduct across multiple matters that
harmed vulnerable clients and who failed to cooperate with the Director’s investigations.
Disbarred.

2
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.
The Director of the Office of Lawyer s Professional Responsibility filed a petition
for disciplinary action agains t respondent Ignatius Chukwu emeka Udeani. The petition
alleged that Udeani breached hi s ethical duties to five clients, three of whom were
vulnerable immigrants, incl uding by misappropriating clie nt funds and providing
incompetent representation, and then did not cooperate with th e Director’s investigations
into those activities. After a hearing, the referee concluded that Udeani committed the
alleged misconduct and that multiple aggravating factors were present, including Udeani’s
extensive experience as a la wyer, long discipline history, lack of remorse, and the
vulnerable nature of his clients who were harmed. The referee found no mitigating factors.
The referee recommended that Ud eani be disbarred. We agree. Based on Udeani’s
misconduct, we disbar Udeani from the practice of law.
FACTS
Udeani was admitted to practice law in Mi nnesota in 2000. He has an extensive
disciplinary history: he was put on private probation in 2007; admonished in 2012 and
2013; suspended for 30 days in 2017 and, when reinstated, placed on supervised probation
for a period of 2 years; indefinitely susp ended for a minimum of 3 years in 2020; and
admonished four more times in 2020. This prior discipline was for multiple instances of
misconduct concerning Udeani’s fee arrangements with clients, trust accounts, and failure
to competently and diligently represent clients.
3
The Director filed this petition for disc iplinary action agains t Udeani on June 15,
2021, alleging misconduct consisti ng of nine separate rule vi olations and involving five
clients. The Director alleged, and the referee concluded, th at Udeani committed
misconduct in numerous ways. He failed to return unearned fees to two clients, and for
one of those clients, the refe ree concluded that the failure was misappropriation. Udeani
committed additional financial misconduct by failing to get receipts for cash payments
countersigned by a third client. He created costly and time-consuming delays by not acting
with diligence and promptness for one client . He failed to represent three clients
competently in immigration-related matters. And for one of those three clients, he did not
promptly reply to the client’s reasonable reque sts for information. Finally, he failed to
cooperate with the Director’s investigation into seven complaints.
Following a hearing on the petition— for which Udeani failed to appear 1—the
referee concluded that Udeani’s actions and failures to act violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct

1 Udeani’s only appearance before the referee was for a telephonic scheduling
conference held 6 months before trial. Fo llowing the referee’s findings, Udeani did not
file a brief with the court, nor did he appear for oral argument.
4
1.1,2 1.3,3 1.4(a)(3)4 and (a)(4),5 1.15(c)(4),6 1.15(h),7 1.16(d),8 8.1(b),9 and 8.4(c).10 The
referee hearing in this matter was held while Udeani was suspended for other misconduct.

2 Rule 1.1 states: “ A lawyer shall provide competen t representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the le gal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”

3 Rule 1.3 states: “ A lawyer shall act with reasonabl e diligence and promptness in
representing a client.”

4 Rule 1.4(a)(3) states: “A lawyer shall . . . keep the client reasonably informed about
the status of the matter.”

5 Rule 1.4(a)(4) states: “A lawyer shall . . . promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information.”

6 Rule 1.15(c)(4) states: “A lawyer shall . . . promptly pay or deliver to the client or
third person as requested the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the
lawyer which the client or third person is entitled to receive.”

7 Rule 1.15(h) states in relevant part: “ Every lawyer engaged in private practice of
law shall maintain or cause to be maintained on a current basis, books and records sufficient
to demonstrate income derived from, and expenses related to, the lawyer’s private practice
of law, and to establish compliance with paragraphs (a) through (f).”

8 Rule 1.16(d) states: “ Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps
to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable
notice to the client, allowing time for employ ment of other counsel, surrendering papers
and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fees or
expenses that has not been earned or incurred.”

9 Rule 8.1(b) states in relevant part: “ An applicant for admissi on to the bar, or a
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary
matter, shall not . . . knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an
admissions or disciplinary authority, except th at this rule does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”

10 Rule 8.4(c) states: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”

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In re Udeani ( Udeani I ), 945 N.W.2d 389, 399 (Minn. 2020) (imposing indefinite
suspension with no right to petition for reinstatement for th ree years). In Udeani I, the
referee and the Director recommended that we suspend Udeani for the misconduct at issue
there. Id. at 396. In this matter, the referee re commended that we disbar Udeani, and the
Director agrees with that recommendation.
ANALYSIS
The only issue before us is the appropri ate discipline for Udeani. In considering
this issue, the referee’s findi ngs of fact and conclusions of law are deemed conclusive
because neither party ordered a transcript of the proceedings. Rule 14(e), Rules on Lawyers
Professional Responsibility (RLPR); In re Fru, 829 N.W.2d 379, 387 (Minn. 2013). The
purpose of attorney discipline is “not to punish the attorney but rather to protect the public,
to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as
well as by other attorneys.” In re Rebeau , 787 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Minn. 2010). In
determining the appropriate discipline for an atto rney, we consider four factors: “(1) the
nature of the misconduct; (2) the cumulative we ight of the disciplinary violations; (3) the
harm to the public; and (4) the harm to the legal profession .” In re Nelson , 733 N.W.2d
458
, 463 (Minn. 2007). We also consider aggravating or mitigating circumstances in
determining the discipline to impose. Fru, 829 N.W.2d at 388. We address each of these
in turn.
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First, the nature of Udeani’s misconduc t is serious; it includes failure to return
unearned fees—which the referee concluded was misappropriation in one instance11—lack
of diligence, lack of competence, failure to communicate, and failure to cooperate with the
Director’s investigations. “Misappropriation of client funds alone is particularly serious
misconduct and usually warrants disbarment absent clear and convincing evidence of
substantial mitigating factors.” In re Sayaovong, 909 N.W.2d 575, 581–82 (Minn. 2018)
(citation omitted) (internal quot ation marks omitted). Failure to return unearned fees is
another form of financial mi sconduct and also constitutes “serious misconduct” because,
“from the clients’ perspectives, they [are] de prived of the use of their funds without any
explanation.” In re Taplin, 837 N.W.2d 306, 312 (Minn. 2013). Udeani’s misconduct also
placed two clients at risk of deportation—one for several months and the other for a period
of years. We have issued serious discipline—including disbarment—for actions that place
immigration clients at risk of deportation. See In re Kaszynski , 620 N.W.2d 708, 711,
713-14 (Minn. 2001). In addition, Udeani failed to cooperate w ith the Director’s
investigation into seven disciplinary complaints filed against him. We have explained that
“failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation, in and of itself, constitutes an act of
misconduct that warrants indefinite suspension.” In re Brooks, 696 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn.
2005). And finally, we view “other disciplinary rule violations” more severely when paired

11 Our case law supports the referee’s determ ination that the failure to return unearned
fees to the clients was misappropriation, see, e.g., In re Lundeen , 811 N.W.2d 602, 608
(Minn. 2012)—a determination that was not challenged here. But the failure to return
client funds is not always misappropriation. For example, in Udeani I, the referee did not
conclude that the failure to return the c lient funds at issue was misappropriation. See
Udeani I, 945 N.W.2d at 397.
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with “serious client ne glect and incompetence,” Fru, 829 N.W.2d at 389, and “have
disbarred attorneys in cases invol ving serious client neglect,” In re Fahrenholtz ,
896 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. 2017). Udeani acted incompetently a nd neglectfully with
respect to three clients, and th is—paired with his failure to cooperate, failure to return
unearned fees, failure to get cash receipts countersigned, and failure to communicate—is
serious misconduct. In short, the nature of Udeani’s misconduct weighs toward serious
discipline.
Next, we consider “the cumulative weight of all of the professional misconduct in
determining the appropriate sanction.” In re Rhodes, 740 N.W.2d 574, 580 (Minn. 2007).
Even if “a single act standi ng alone would not have warra nted such discipline,” we
recognize that “the cumulative weight and severity of multiple disciplinary rule violations
may compel severe discipline.” In re Oberhauser , 679 N.W.2d 153, 160 (Minn. 2004).
Udeani’s misconduct here, like the misconduct th at previously gave ri se to his indefinite
suspension, was not a “brief lapse in judgment or a singl e, isolated incident.” Udeani I,
945 N.W.2d at 397. Rather, there are “multip le instances of misconduct occurring over a
substantial amount of time.” Id. Indeed, his ethical violations in this case were committed
over 9 years and against multiple clients. This factor also weighs toward serious discipline.
We also measure harm to the public based on the quantity (“ ‘the number of clients
harmed’ ”) and quality (“ ‘the extent of the clients’ injuries’ ”) of the harm. In re Coleman,
793 N.W.2d 296, 308 (Minn. 2011) (quoting In re Randall, 562 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn.
1997)). Udeani caused widespread harm here. His misconduct injured five clients and
their families. Similarly, the extent of the clients’ injuries is extensive. Two clients were
8
placed at risk of deportation—a “most perilous fate.” In re Muenchrath, 588 N.W.2d 497,
501 (Minn. 1999). The amount of money that Udeani failed to return was a substantial
amount to one of his clients. Indeed, four clients faced financial hardship because of
Udeani’s misconduct—one of those clients was fo rced to move back in with parents, and
others struggled to support their families. This factor weighs toward serious discipline.
Finally, we consider the harm to the legal profession. In addition to the harm Udeani
caused his clients directly, much of his misconduct also undermined the reputation of and
public confidence in the lega l profession. In the immigration context, neglect and
misconduct that threatens a client’s immigrati on status undermines the “public’s trust in
the competence, diligence, a nd integrity of lawyers.” Fru, 829 N.W.2d at 390. That is
precisely what occurred here. Udeani’s misconduct threatened the legal status of two
clients. The referee found that Udeani’s condu ct left one of those clients “skeptical of
lawyers” and the other “skeptical and afraid to trust attorneys.” A third client from whom
Udeani misappropriated funds felt “scammed” and “los[t] trust in lawyers.” This factor
also points toward serious discipline.
In addition to the four factors discusse d above, we also consider aggravating or
mitigating circumstances in determining the discipline to impose. Id. at 388. The referee
found that no mitigating factors and five aggravating factors apply to Udeani’s misconduct.
The aggravating factors are Udeani’s: (1) failure to cooperate after the Director served the
petition for discipline;
12 (2) failure to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his misconduct or

12 Failing to cooperate can be either an independent ground fo r discipline or an
aggravating factor, depending on when in the proceeding it occurred, but the same conduct
9
show remorse; (3) harm to vulnerable immigran t clients; (4) substantial experience in the
practice of law having been licensed since 2000; and (5) history of prior, similar
misconduct. Our case law recognizes all of these factors as aggravating factors.13
Although each of these aggravating factors is significant, we take particular note of
Udeani’s disciplinary history, which is exte nsive and involves misco nduct similar to his
current misconduct. See In re MacDonald , 962 N.W.2d 451, 467 (Minn. 2021) (giving
“serious weight” to disciplinary history that “involved the same type of misconduct”).
Udeani was placed on privat e probation in 2007, based in part on his failure “to
competently and dilig ently represent a client in an immigration matter.” His
admonishments in 2012 and 2013 were ba sed on misconduct that included missing a
hearing and not depositing funds into a client’s trust acco unt. We suspended him for
30 days in 2017 based, in part, on failing to ha ndle client matters diligently. Finally, the
2020 suspension was for wide ranging misconduct, a ddressed in 16 counts, including
refusing to refund unearned fees, failing to act competently and with diligence, and failure

cannot be both. Taplin, 837 N.W.2d at 313. Here, th e referee properly accounted for
Udeani’s noncooperation. His noncooperation before the petition was filed was an act of
misconduct, as alleged in count five of the petition. The aggravating factor does not include
that noncooperation but is instead limited to Udeani’s noncooperation after the petition was
filed. Specifically, after attending a telepho nic scheduling conference with the referee,
Udeani has taken no further part in the proceedings.

13 See Taplin, 837 N.W.2d at 313 (recognizing failure to cooperate as an aggravating
factor); In re Severson, 860 N.W.2d 658, 670 (Minn. 2015) (recognizing lack of remorse
as an aggravating factor); Kaszynski , 620 N.W.2d at 712– 13 (recognizing both
vulnerability of clients—particularly includ ing immigration clients who we re dependent
on their attorney in legal proceedings—and substantial experience in the practice of law as
aggravating factors); Rhodes, 740 N.W.2d at 580 (recognizing prior history of misconduct
as an aggravating factor).
10
to cooperate with the Di rector’s investigations. 14 See Udeani I , 945 N.W.2d at 401.
Overall, Udeani’s previous discipline was for similar miscon duct and harm to vulnerable
victims. These factors aggravate Udeani’s misconduct in this case.
In sum, Udeani failed to re turn unearned client funds, failed to get countersigned
cash receipts, failed to act comp etently and diligently on behalf of his clients, failed to
properly communicate with them, and failed to cooper ate with the Director’s
investigations. His actions caused extensive harm to several clients and their families and
damaged the legal profession. When the weig ht of these violations is combined and
considered in light of Udeani ’s prior professional disciplin e for similar misconduct, the
other aggravating factors found by the referee, and the lack of mitigating factors, we hold
that the appropriate discipline in this case is disbarment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent Igna tius Chukwuemeka Udeani is disbarred
from the practice of law in the State of Minneso ta, effective on the date of this opinion.
Respondent shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice to clients, opposing
counsel, and tribunals), and shall pay $900 in costs under Rule 24(a), RLPR.

14 Much of Udeani’s misconduct in this case happened at the same time as the
misconduct for which we suspended and admonished him in 2020. It was largely because
of Udeani’s noncooperation that the Director had to proceed se parately with the
misconduct committed here from that at issue in Udeani I.
C-1
C O N C U R R E N C E
THISSEN, Justice (concurring).

I agree that Ignatius Chukwue meka Udeani should be disbarred. I write separately
to note my continued concern with the practice of relyi ng on noncooperation with the
disciplinary proceedings (which is an independent rule violation) as an aggravating factor.
See In re Nelson, 933 N.W.2d 73, 75–77 (Minn. 2019) (Thissen, J., concurring). I suggest
that the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board review the question of whether the
recent practice of bringing in noncooperati on with disciplinary pr oceedings through the
back door of aggravating circumstances is appropriate and whether the rules should be
clarified on that issue.