Landmark Community Bank, N.A., now doing business as Flagship Bank Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0763

Landmark Community Bank, N.A.,
now doing business as Flagship Bank Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James L. Lang,
Appellant.

Filed March 7, 2022
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Pope County District Court
File No. 61-CV-20-370

Donald R. McNeil, Jeffrey A. Scott, Brian W. Varland, Heley, Duncan & Melander, PLLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Michael C. Mahoney, Mahoney Lefky LLC, Wayzata, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presidi ng Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
In this appeal from summary judgment, ap pellant argues that the district court
(1) erred in determining as a matter of law th at the default judgment against him must be
satisfied by a money payment by the judgment debtor; (2) erred by concluding that there
are no genuine issues of material fact for trial; and (3) abused its discretion by denying his
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motion for a continuance to conduct discovery. Because the district court did not err by
granting summary judgment in favor of re spondent and did not abuse its discretion by
denying appellant’s motion for a continuance, we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2008, appellant James L. La ng executed a mortga ge and promissory
note in favor of respondent Landmark Community Bank N.A. (Landmark) for $1,300,000.1
Lang secured the note with a mortgage on three properties located in Crow Wing and Aitkin
Counties. In March, Landmark increased Lang’s available credit by $65,000 in exchange
for the first mortgage on a property Lang owned in Pope County.
Lang defaulted on the note and Land mark commenced judicial foreclosure
proceedings for the properties located in Crow Wing and Aitkin C ounties. In October
2010, these properties so ld at a foreclosure sale for $916,000. Landmark began judicial
foreclosure proceedings for Lang’s Pope County property to satisfy the remaining debt.
In January 2011, the distri ct court entered default judgment in favor of Landmark
for the remaining note balance of $143,473.40 and authorized the sale of the Pope County
property with the proceeds to be placed toward the remaining debt. Lang’s Pope County
property was then sold at au ction for $75,950.38. The distri ct court entered a deficiency
judgment in favor of Landmark for the remaining $75,114.91.
In June 2019, Lang moved the district court to vacate the default judgment. In
September, the district court denied Lang’ s motion because the motion was not filed

1 Landmark now conducts business as Flagship Bank Minnesota.
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“within a reasonable time after entry of judgment.” Lang appealed, this court affirmed the
default judgment, and the Minnesota Suprem e Court denied Lang’s petition for further
review. Landmark Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Lang , No. A19-1718, 2020 WL 3635576 (Minn.
App. July 6, 2020), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2020).
In July 2020, Landmark f iled a complaint in district court seeking to renew the
default judgment against Lang. Landmark moved the district court for summary judgment.
Lang then moved the district court for a continuance to complete discovery for the purpose
of defending against Landmark’s pending summary-judgment motion.
Lang also submitted his opposition to Landmark’s summa ry-judgment motion
arguing that the district court “should either continue the motion to permit [Lang] to
conduct necessary discovery to defend the summary judgment motion . . . or deny the
motion because of material fact disputes.”
In April 2021, the district court grante d summary judgment in favor of Landmark
and renewed the default judgment against Lang in the amount of $151,003.92. In May, the
district court docketed the j udgment noting that “costs and interest will accrue on any
money judgment amounts from the date of entry until the judgme nt is satisfied in full.”
This appeal followed.
DECISION
Summary judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P.
56.01. On appeal from summary judgment, this court reviews de n ovo whether there are
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any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law.
Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, LLC , 829 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. 2013). We must “view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
granted.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P. , 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn.
2002).
A genuine issue of material fact exists wh en there is sufficient evidence that could
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d
60, 69 (Minn. 1997). To surv ive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “extract
specific, admissible facts from the record that demonstrate that a genuine issue of material
facts exists.” Beecroft v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. , 798 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Minn. App.
2011) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2011).
Money payment
Lang argues that the district court erre d by concluding that a default judgment must
be satisfied with a money payment by the judgme nt debtor. As stated above, a district
court’s application of the law is reviewed de novo. Ruiz, 829 N.W.2d at 56.
The district court’s summary-judgment order provided that “[a] personal monetary
judgment shall be entered . . . in favor of [Landmark], in [the] amount of $75,114.91, plus
statutory interest pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 549.09, subd. 1 (c)(2) . . . in the amount
of $75,012.01 . . . plus costs and disburseme nts of $877.00, for a total judgment of
$151,003.92.” Under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(a) (2020), “[w]hen a judgment or award
is for the recovery of money . . . interest from the time of the verdict, award, or report until
judgment is finally entered shall be computed by the court administrator.”
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Lang argues that because Minn. Stat. § 548.15, subd. 1(4) (2020), provides an
alternative remedy to a monetary payment of a judgment the district court erred in
determining satisfaction of the judgment required such a payment. However, this remedy
requires that “an order of the court, made on motion, requiring the execution of a certificate
of satisfaction, or directing satisfaction to be entered without it” be recorded with the court
administrator. Minn. Stat. § 548.15, subd. 1(4). The record reveals that the district court
was not moved for an order to execute a certificate of satisfaction, nor is there evidence of
such an order being filed with the court administrator.
Under Minn. Stat. § 548.15, subd. 1(4), di strict courts are permitted to order the
execution of a certificate of satisfaction or to direct that satisfaction be entered without a
certificate, but they are not required to do so. We conclude that the district court did not
err as a matter of law by determining that a monetary payment was required to satisfy the
default judgment.
Satisfaction of default judgment
Lang argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
Landmark because genuine issues of material fact exist whether the default judgment has
been satisfied either in full, or in part. “We review a district court’s application of the law
de novo.” Harlow v. State Dep’t of Human Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016).
As an initial matter, we emphasize that Landmark’s renewal action was authorized
by law. “Under Minnesota law, a civil judgme nt survives for a period of ten years after
entry of judgment.” Dahlin v. Kroening, 796 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. 2011) (citing Minn.
Stat. § 548.09, subd. 1 (2010)). But a party may renew a judgment by commencing a civil
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action on that judgment within ten years of its entry. Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 541.04
(2010)); see also Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith , 737 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn. App. 2007)
(Shamrock I) (explaining requirements for renewal-of-judgment action), rev’d on other
grounds, 754 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Minn. 2008) (Shamrock II).
In September 2020, Landmark moved the district court to renew the default
judgment in the amount of $75,114.91 plus st atutory interest. The parties agree that the
district court entered a default judgment against Lang in January 2011 and that Landmark
commenced its renewal action within ten y ears of the recorded default judgment. See
Minn. Stat. § 548.09, subd. 1 (2020). The renewal action was therefore timely and
authorized.
Turning to appellant’s argumen t that there exists a genuin e issue of material fact
regarding whether he satisfied the judgment in part or in fu ll, we note in the record an
affidavit from Landmark’s vice president st ating that “[t]he judgment entered against
[Lang] in the amount of $75, 114.91 . . . has not been paid and remains unsatisfied.” For
a judgment to be satisfied, one of the following must be filed with the court administrator:
(1) an execution satisfied, to the extent stated in the sheriff’s
return on it; (2) a certificate of satisfaction signed and
acknowledged by the judgment creditor; (3) a like certificate
signed and acknowledged by the a ttorney of the creditor . . . ;
(4) an order of the court, ma de on motion, requiring the
execution of a certificate of satisfaction, or directing
satisfaction to be entered wit hout it; (5) where a judgment is
docketed on transcript, a copy of either of the foregoing
documents, certified by the court administrator in which the
judgment was originally entere d and in which the originals
were filed.

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Minn. Stat. § 548.15, subd. 1 (2020). The reco rd contains no evidence that any of these
documents were filed. Lang provided no evidence that the debt had been satisfied, see id,
and thereby failed to carry his summary-jud gment burden of “extract[ing] specific,
admissible facts from the record” that demons trate a genuine issue of material fact.
Beecroft, 798 N.W.2d at 82. The district court th erefore did not err as a matter of law by
concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed and ordering summary judgment
on Landmark’s renewal action.
Discovery
Lang argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a continuance to
conduct additional discovery. The district court has wide discretion in granting or denying
discovery requests, Rice v. Perl , 320 N.W.2d 407, 412 (Mi nn. 1982), and we will not
disturb the district court’s order absent an abuse of discretion. Molde v. CitiMortgage, Inc.,
781 N.W.2d 36, 45 (Minn. App. 2010). Neve rtheless, discovery continuances should be
liberally granted in the summary-judgment context. Rice, 320 N.W.2d at 412. In reviewing
the district court’s order denying a discovery request, we are limited to “determining
whether the district court made findings un supported by the evidence or [improperly
applied] the law.” In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Minn. 2007).
At the summary-judgment stage, when th e nonmoving party shows by affidavit that
it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition to a su mmary-judgment motion,
the district court may, among other things, “a llow time to obtain affidavits or to take
discovery.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The di strict court should consider two factors when
considering a nonmoving party’s rule 56 .04 continuance request: (1) whether the
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nonmoving party has “been diligent in obtain ing or seeking discovery,” and (2) whether
the nonmoving party is “seeking further discove ry in the good faith belief that material
facts will be uncovered, or . . . merely engaging in a fishing expedition.” Rice, 320 N.W.2d
at 412. But “if the discovery would not assist the district court or change the result of the
summary judgment motion, the district court does not abuse its discretion by granting the
summary judgment motion withou t granting the continuance.” QBE Ins. Corp. v. Twin
Homes of French Ridge Homeowners Ass’n, 778 N.W.2d 393, 400 (Minn. App. 2010).
Lang moved the district court for a con tinuance to conduct discovery to defend
against Landmark’s summary-judgment motion. Lang provided affidavits in support of his
discovery requests which, in part, focused on his need for any of Landmark’s records,
documents, depositions, answers to interroga tories, and the names and locations of
individuals with factual knowledge of Landmark’s transactions related to the sale of Lang’s
real and personal property. See Molde, 781 N.W.2d at 45 (stating that an affidavit in favor
of continuance “must be speci fic about the eviden ce expected, the source of discovery
necessary to obtain the evidence, and the reasons for the failure to co mplete discovery to
date”) (quotation omitted).2
The district court’s determination that La ng appeared to be d iligent in his efforts
seeking discovery, “but there is no good faith reason to believe that the discovery [Lang]

2 At the time Molde was decided, the rule governing discovery continuances was numbered
56.06. In 2018, the supreme court promulgated amendments to the rules of civil procedure,
which included rephrasing and renumbering the former rule 56.06 into the current rule
56.04. Order Promulgating Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure , No.
ADM04-8001 (Minn. Mar. 13, 2018).
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seeks will uncover material facts to oppose [Landmark’s] summary judgment motion” is
supported by the record. The district court noted that (1) Lang’s discovery requests that
were closely related to the values and sales of his real and personal property were likely
intended to be used by Lang for “a collateral attack on the underlying judgment,” (2) Lang’s
remaining discovery requests focused on a lleged misconduct by Landmark that was
unrelated to the renewal of default judgment. See QBE Ins. Corp. , 778 N.W.2d at 400.
Because the district court’s decision to grant Landmark’s su mmary-judgment motion
without additional discovery is supported by sufficient evid ence and its interpretation of
the law proper, we affirm.
Affirmed.