Jeffery John Huebner, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0767

Jeffery John Huebner, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 13, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Kanabec County District Court
File No. 33-CR-18-85

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Barbara McFadden, Kanabec County Attorn ey, Daniel S. Shub, Assistant County
Attorney, Mora, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presid ing Judge; Florey, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing that
the district court erred by denying his motion to strike the jury pane l for its exposure to
prejudicial statements made during voir dire. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2018, appellant Jeffery John Huebner went to trial on charges of
assault with a dangerous weapon and reckless handling of a dangerous weapon. See Minn.
Stat. §§ 609.222, subd. 1, .66, subd. 1(a)(1) (2 016). During voir dire, prospective jurors
were asked if they knew Huebner. One prospective juror stated that he knew Huebner from
Sunday school. He stated that “15 years ago” he purch ased scrap iron from Huebner’s
father. The prospective juror st ated that he last saw Huebner “[i]n the grocery store four
months ago, maybe.” When asked if he considered Huebner a friend, the prospective juror
answered “probably, yeah.” The prospective juror expressed his concern about serving as
a juror. When asked to elaborat e on his concerns, the prospec tive juror stated, “I think if
[Huebner] wanted to do someone harm, he prob ably would have.” The prospective juror
was excused from the panel.
After the jury was selected, the panel left the courtroom. Huebner moved to strike
the jury panel because the pros pective juror’s statements e xposed the panel to unfairly
prejudicial material. Huebner argued that the statement “[i]f [Huebner] wanted to do some
harm, he certainly would have,” was both “very inflammatory” and “very prejudicial.” The
state argued that because the prospective ju ror never expressly stated that “I know
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[Huebner] did this” or “he’s capable of somethi ng like that,” his statements could not be
construed as prejudicial. The district court stated that it would review the voir dire
transcript. The district court then stated “[t]he statement’s a little bit different than I
thought it was, but it’s still kind of the same—it has, I guess, various meanings you could
read into.” After determining that the statem ents were not prejudicial, the district court
denied Huebner’s motion.
The jury found Huebne r guilty as charged. In Janua ry 2019, the district court
sentenced Huebner to 36 months in prison. In January 2021, Huebner petitioned for
postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitle d to a new trial because the prospective
juror’s statements were unfairly prejudicial, and the district court should have granted his
motion to strike the jury. The district c ourt denied Huebner’s pe tition. This appeal
followed.
DECISION
As the postconviction petiti oner, Huebner carried the bur den to prove “the facts
alleged in the petition . . . by a fair preponderance of the evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04,
subd. 3 (2020). In denying the petition, the district court analyzed the prospective juror’s
statements through the application of the four-factor test established in State v. Cox, 322
N.W.2d 555, 559 (Minn. 1982), and conclude d that the statements were not unfairly
prejudicial.
“We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion. A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion
in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or
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made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn.
2017) (quotation and citation om itted). We review legal issu es “de novo, but our review
of factual issues is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain
the postconviction court’s findings. Put diffe rently, we do not reverse the postconviction
court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotations and alterations omitted).
A district court’s denial of a new trial be cause of a juror’s exposure to improper
material is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cox, 322 N.W.2d at 558. A “district court
is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during
the trial.” State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 819 (Minn. 2013). “The exposure of a jury
to potentially prejudicial material creates a problem of constitutional magnitude, because
it deprives a defendant of the right to an impartial jury and the right to confront and cross-
examine the source of the material.” Cox, 322 N.W.2d at 558. When a jury is inadvertently
exposed to potentially prejudicial material, we, as the district court did, apply the Cox
factors to determine whether a new trial is warranted. See id. at 559. These factors include,
“the nature and source of th e prejudicial matter, the number of jurors exposed to the
influence, the weight of evidence properly before the jury, and the likelihood that curative
measures were effective in reducing the prejudice.” Id. We consider each of the Cox
factors independently. See id.
Nature and source of the prejudicial matter
Huebner argues that because the prospective juror was a friend, his statements about
Huebner would be deemed credible by the panel. Huebner’s facts are distinguishable from
Cox because in Cox it was a court official who made the prejudicial comments. Id. at 558
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(stating that, given their position, statements made by court officials in the presence of
jurors raise a rebuttable presumption of prejudice). The district court considered the nature
of the relationship between Huebner and the pr ospective juror and de termined that they
were acquaintances rather than friends. The district court noted that the prospective juror
“had minimal interaction with [Huebner] over the past 15 ye ars.” The district court
concluded that given the prospective juror’s level of contact with Huebner and the fact that
the prospective juror did not pa rticipate in “trying or inves tigating” Huebner’s case, his
comments were less likely to cause prejudice. We agree with the district court’s analysis
and conclusion.
Number of jurors exposed to the influence
Huebner argues that the entire 21-person ju ry panel was exposed to the prospective
juror’s statements. The record is unclear as to the actual number of jurors exposed to the
statements. The district court determined that because the statements were made early in
the voir dire process, “many, if not all” of the prospective jurors were exposed to the
statements. However, the number of jurors exposed is not determinative when the other
factors show little likelihood that the statements tainted the verdict. See id. at 559. That is
the case here.
Weight of evidence properly before the jury
Huebner argues that the evid ence against him could not support the verdict and that
an alternative explanation jus tified his conduct. The district court found that substantial
evidence supported the verdicts.
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The jury found Huebner guilty of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon
(a shotgun) and reckless handling of a dangerous weapon. To be found guilty of second-
degree assault with a dangerous weapon, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Huebner “assault[ed] another with a dangerous weapon.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.222,
subd. 1. Assault is “an act do ne with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily
harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(1) (2016). The requisite intent is present
when a defendant “either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or
believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result.” Id., subd. 9(4) (2016). To be
guilty of reckless handling of a dangerous we apon, the state had to prove that Huebner
“recklessly handle[d] or use[d] a gun . . . so as to endanger the safety of another.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1 (a)(1).
At trial, the state called two witnesses to testify that Huebner fired his shotgun over
the pickup truck they were in. During trial, Huebner never denied firing his shotgun that
day. Instead, Huebner claimed that he was firing his shotgun at a backstop on his property
to train his dog. A spent cartridge matchi ng Huebner’s shotgun was recovered by law
enforcement from Huebner’s driv eway. Witnesses testified th at when Huebner fired his
shotgun toward them, he was standing in that same general area. In addition to the weight
of the evidence presented, the district court addressed the length of deliberation by the jury,
stating that “[t]he jury deliberated for approximately five hours” which was “enough time
to fully review and discuss th e testimony and evidence and come to a reasoned verdict.”
Because substantial evidence supports the verdicts, this factor weighs in favor of a finding
of no prejudice.
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Likelihood that curative measures were effective in reducing the prejudice
Huebner argues that the district cour t took no curative measures following the
prospective juror’s statements. The district court determined that curative measures were
taken. We agree.
Prior to voir dire, the district court told the prospective jurors that if called upon to
serve as a juror, they would be required to remain fair and impartial. Additionally, the
preliminary jury instructions reminded the jurors that Huebner was presumed innocent, and
that presumption remained un til the state proved him guilt y beyond a reasonable doubt.
During trial, the statements were never referenced again in the presence of the jury. Prior
to deliberations, the district court gave the final jury instructions. These instructions were
agreed to by both parties prio r to being read to the jury. Huebner’s presumed innocence
was again addressed in the final jury instructions. During the final instructions the district
court told the jury that “you must consider all the evidence you have heard and seen in this
trial, and you must disregard anything you may have heard or seen elsewhere about the
case.” The district court therefore took affirmative steps to mitigate any prejudicial effect
of the juror’s statements.
The district court’s application of the Cox factors was neither arbitrary nor
capricious, and thus it did not abuse its disc retion when it denied Huebner’s petition for
postconviction relief.
Affirmed.