In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0774

In re the Marriage of:

Jacinda Eve Mills, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Joshua James Mills,
Appellant.

Filed March 21, 2022
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-FA-19-869

Jacinda Eve Mills n/k/a Jady Eve Mills, Blaine, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Joshua James Mills, Blaine, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Following a marriage dissolution, appella nt Joshua Mills (father) and respondent
Jady Mills (mother) sought a court order to de termine child custody, child support, and

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
spousal maintenance. The district court ordered child support from father, concluded that
it was in the children’s best interests to maintain their current parenting time schedule, and
denied father’s spousal maintenance request. Father appeals. Because the record supports
the district court’s income calculations, the district court properly analyzed the
best-interests factors for child custody, and the district court was not biased against father,
we affirm in part. But because the district court did not consider th e marital standard of
living when reviewing father’s request for temporary spousal maintenance, we reverse and
remand in part.
FACTS
Father and mother married in 1997. Father and mother have three children together
aged 12, 8, and 7 (children). The marriage was dissolved in a partial judgment and decree
entered October 22, 2020. Based on that decree, the parties stipulated to joint legal custody
and no label of physical custod y, although mother’s home is the primary residence of the
children for purposes of school registration. A court trial was held in the fall 2020 to
resolve the remaining issues, wh ich included parenting time, the parties’ incomes, child
support, and spousal maintenance. And after the trial, the record was re-opened briefly to
receive the parties’ 2020 W-2s and final 2020 paystubs.1
With regard to the parties’ incomes, evidence at trial established that father worked
in court security with Hennepin County. His 2020 W-2 states that he is paid an hourly

1 In an email to the parties, the district court law clerk explained that the trial record would
be reopened to receive copies of the parties’ 2020 W-2s and final 2020 paystubs. It also
stated that “submission of this documentati on will ensure that the parties’ incomes are
properly calculated; particularly [mother’s] income.”
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wage of $35.09. In addition to overtime of $4,193, the district court determined his yearly
pay was $77,180 with a gross monthly income of $6,342. Father submitted current monthly
living expenses of $2,917.02.
Mother submitted evidence showing th at she worked full-time as a nurse
practitioner, and that her income is based on the number of patients she sees with quarterly
bonuses if her patient contacts are above a required minimum limit. Mother’s gross
income, based on her 2020 W-2, was $130,321.30. The district court calculated mother’s
monthly gross income as $10,860.
In addition to information on the pa rties’ incomes and expenses, the evidence
included a neutral custody evaluation completed by D.C. (evaluator). The evaluator opined
that it was in the best interests of the children to maintain the parenting time schedule used
during the dissolution of the marriage. This parenting schedule pr ovided father with
parenting time every Thursday overnight and alternate w eekends from Thursday after
school or daycare until Monday morning. At trial, mother argued that the parenting
schedule should be maintained. Father proposed that paren ting time be divided equally
and that one parent receive all holidays in alternate years.
In an order following trial, the district court concluded that it was in the children’s
best interests to maintain the at-the-time cu rrent parenting schedule. In making this
decision, the district court relied—in part—o n the facts that father denied the oldest
daughter therapy after the parties’ separation and that he introduced his new significant
other to the children soon after the separation.
4
After revising father’s monthly living ex penses down to $1,978.79 to reflect
splitting the utilities with his cohabitating significa nt other, the district court ordered that
father must pay $1,036 per month in child support, including $325 for childcare. The
district court denied father’s requested spousal maintenance of $559 per month, explaining
that he did not establish a budgetary shortfall.
Father appeals.
DECISION
In a pro se brief, father challenges several of the district court’s findings, as well as
its analysis of the best-interests factors determining parenting time. He further argues that
the district court was biased against him. 2 The majority of father’s arguments are
challenges to factual findings. When an issue turns on the district court’s findings of fact,
we review the findings for clear error, “giving deference to the district court’s opportunity
to evaluate witness credibility” and reversing only if we are left “with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284
(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
District courts have broad discreti on regarding child support and spousal
maintenance, and an award will only be re versed on appeal if the court abused its
discretion. Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2021) (spousal maintenance);
Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984) (child support). An abuse of discretion

2 While we accord “some leew ay” for pro se appellants, Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc. ,
400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987), they are “g enerally held to the same standards as
attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115,
119 (Minn. App. 2001).
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occurs when a district court makes finding s unsupported by the record or when it
improperly applies the law. Honke, 960 N.W.2d at 265. As to father’s claims of partiality,
questions of judicial bias are questions of law which we review de novo. State v. Dorsey,
701 N.W.2d 238, 246 (Minn. 2005).
I. The record supports the district court’s income calculations.
First, father challenges the factual findings underlying his income calculation.
Father asserts that the district court miscalculated his income, causing him to pay too much
in child support. To address this argument, we turn to the child-support-calculation statute.
In order to calculate the appropriate amount of child support, a district court must calculate
each parent’s “gross income” pursuant to Mi nnesota Statutes section 518A.29 (2020).
Gross income “includes any form of periodic payment to an individual, including, but not
limited to, salaries, wages, commissions,” and various other types of payments listed in the
statute. Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a). It doe s not include, however, “compensation received
by a party for employment in excess of a 40-hour work week,” subject to several
provisions. Id. A district court’s calculation of in come “must be based in fact and will
stand unless clearly erroneous.” Newstrand v. Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Minn. App.
2015) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015).
Here, the district court used father’s year end 2020 W-2 to determine his hourly rate
of pay and overtime. Father’s W-2 clearly notes his hourly wage as well as the number of
hours he worked in 2020, including overtime. And notably, father did not demonstrate that
his overtime should not be included, whic h is his burden to prove. Minn. Stat.
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§ 518A.29(b)(2)(i)-(iv). Given this record, we conclude that the district court’s calculation
of father’s gross income is not clearly erroneous.
But father argues that the district court, in calculating his gross pay, committed three
errors. First, father infers from the district court’s statement that “submission of [the 2020
W-2s] will ensure that the parties’ incomes are properly calculated; particularly [mother’s]
income” that his income was not properly cal culated because he was not explicitly
mentioned like mother was. (Emphasis added.) But part of the need for a reopened record
was that—unlike father’s consistent hourly pay—mother’s salary is based on a commission
that makes her salary figure more complicat ed to calculate. The phrasing of this
explanation does not point to any unfairness or lack of consideration toward father by the
district court.
Second, father argues that the court misc alculated his income by roughly $10,000
because the district court calculated his annua l gross income using hi s hourly rate of pay
and overtime instead of his 2020 W-2 and pay stub. 3 But as explained above, both the
hourly rate of pay and overtime came from hi s 2020 W-2. Father does not demonstrate

3 Father also argues that he should have be en allowed to include his uniform expenses as
an asset because wife is allowed to include her education costs. While “expenses” may be
relevant to a district court’s finding of a party’s ability to provi de self-support or pay
maintenance under Minnesota Statutes secti on 518.552, subdivision 2 (2020), expenses
are, for the most part, not relevant to ca lculation of “gross income” under Minnesota
Statutes section 518A.29. Additionally, in reviewing the allocation and division of marital
property, student loan debts are treated the same as assets. Dahlberg v. Dahlberg ,
358 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. App. 1984).
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how this is clearly erroneous, as looking to his year-end pay stub is a proper way to
determine his hourly rate.
Third, father alleges that ordering his significant other split utilities and rent 50/50
defies logic and is an abuse of discretion because—by court order—she is not allowed to
be in the apartment when he has custody of the children. But cont ext matters. Here, the
district court found that father and hi s significant other had been blatantly violating the
original order as his significant other was, for the most part, not leaving the apartment
during father’s periods of child custody. Because his signifi cant other was found to be
effectively living with father full time—and father did not contend otherwise—ordering
the utilities be split is not erroneous.
Because the district court properly calculat ed father’s income and other expenses to
determine his monthly child support payment fi gure, the district court did not abuse its
discretion.
II. The district court properly anal yzed the best-interests factors.
Next, father argues that the district court improperly considered the best-interests
factors when it concluded that the current pa renting schedule was appropriate. Father
asserts that a proper analysis of the best-interests factors should have prompted the district
court to award equal custody time to the parents.
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Minnesota Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 1(a) (2020), sets forth twelve factors
that the district court must consider when evaluating the best interests of the children. The
statute articulates twelve factors to consider in evaluating the best interests of a child:
(1) a child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and other
needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
child’s needs and development;

(2) any special medical, mental health, or educational needs
that the child may have that may require special parenting
arrangements or access to recommended services;

(3) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems
the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express
an independent, reliable preference;

(4) whether domestic abuse . . . has occurred in the parents’ or
either parent’s household or relationship; the nature and
context of the domestic abuse; and the implications of the
domestic abuse for parenting and for the child’s safety,
well-being, and developmental needs;

(5) any physical, mental, or chemical health issue of a parent
that affects the child’s safety or developmental needs;

(6) the history and nature of ea ch parent’s participation in
providing care for the child;

(7) the willingness and ability of each parent to provide
ongoing care for the child; to meet the child’s ongoing
developmental, emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs; and to
maintain consistency and follow through with parenting time;

(8) the effect on the child’s well-being and development of
changes to home, school, and community;

(9) the effect of the proposed arrangements on the ongoing
relationships between the child and each parent, siblings, and
other significant persons in the child’s life;

9
(10) the benefit to the child in maximizing parenting time with
both parents and the detriment to the child in limiting parenting
time with either parent;

(11) except in cases in which domestic abuse . . . has occurred,
the disposition of each parent to support the child’s relationship
with the other parent and to encourage and permit frequent and
continuing contact between the child and the other parent; and

(12) the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate in the
rearing of their child; to maxi mize sharing information and
minimize exposure of the child to parental conflict; and to
utilize methods for resolving di sputes regarding any major
decision concerning the life of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1)-(12). The district court must make detailed findings on
each factor based on the evidence presented, and must “explain how each factor led to its
conclusions and to the determinati on of custody and parenting time.” Id., subd. 1(b)(1)
(2020).
Where a party contests the district court’ s weighing of factors or its ultimate
decision regarding custody, we review the disputed conclusion for an abuse of discretion.
E.g., Thornton v. Basquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 794 (Minn. 2019); Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at
282. We do not reweigh the best-interests factors. Vangsness v. Vangsness ,
607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000) (holding that there is “scant if any room for an
appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations”).
Here, father challenges every factor, but focuses primarily on the first and third
factors, which we address separately before turning to the remaining factors.
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Children’s Physical and Emotional Needs
For the first factor, the children’s physical and emotional needs, father argues that
the evaluator was morally and ethically required to tell the children’s psychologist that she
was performing a child custody evaluation when she intervie wed the psychologist. In
making this argument, father effectively ch allenges the credibility of the evaluator, who
favored mother’s requested pa renting time schedule. But we defer to the credibility
determination of the district court. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
And more to the point, the eval uator only makes a recommenda tion to the district court,
they do not issue the ultimate decision. Father’s reque st that this court reweigh all the
factors due to the evaluator’s alleged error is misplaced.
Father also contends that it was not in th e best interests of th e children for mother
to inform them that the reason for the parties’ separation was that father had an affair. But
the district court agreed with the father on this point. The court stated it was not advisable
for mother to have done so. Accordingly, this is not a question of a clearly erroneous
factual finding. Father simply wants us to rewe igh this and conclude that it is in the best
interests of the children to have equal parenti ng time. This defies the abuse of discretion
standard and our caselaw about restraint in reweighing the best-i nterests factors.
Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 477. The district c ourt did not abuse its discretion when
weighing this first factor.
Reasonable Preference of the Children
For the third factor, the reasonable preferen ce of the children, father alleges two
factual errors. The first is that the evaluator did not effectively explain the possibilities for
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parenting time to the younger daughter. In essence, he argues that the evaluator was
required to ask each child if they wanted equal parenting time, compared to asking if they
liked the current parenting plan. But father does not demonstrate that this question phrasing
violates a statutory requirement, or otherwise constitutes error.
Father also argues that the district court erred when it described father’s introduction
of his significant other to his children as “shortly after” the separation, because he actually
waited three months. But the record reflects that the district court knew the time was three
months and discerned this period of time was “shortly after” the parents’ separation. This
factual determination falls within the district court’s wide discretion.
Because father failed to demonstrate how these findings were clearly erroneous, the
district court did not abuse its discretion when weighing this factor.
Remaining Factors
For factors four, five, six, and twelve, fa ther argues that we should reweigh the
factors to support an award in favor of equal parenting time.
4 But we do not normally
reweigh the best-interests fa ctors and father does not demo nstrate why we should do so
here. Id.
Father contends that the seventh, eighth, and ninth factors are in error because the
district court is using the same facts—partic ularly the presence of his significant other
around the children, and his refusal to allow his oldest daughter to go to therapy—in

4 Father’s challenges against factors two, te n, and eleven have no discernable legal or
factual argument. See Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn. , 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App.
1994) (stating that the court of appeals declines to address allegations unsupported by legal
analysis or citation). Therefore, we do not address these challenges.
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assessing multiple factors. Bu t father does not point to casel aw saying that the district
court is not allowed to highlight the same fa cts it finds concerning or persuasive when
analyzing more than one factor.
In sum, the district court’s analysis of th e best-interests factors is supported by the
record, and father has failed to meet his burden of establishing error on appeal. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in its careful determination of the parenting-time schedule.
III. The district court was not biased against father.
Next, father argues that the district cour t was biased against him based on how it
ruled on who can style the da ughters’ hair before dance competitions and a statement by
the judge concerning the judge’s personal finances.
Appellate courts presume that district court judges have discharged their duties
properly. Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008). Adverse rulings by a judge
do not, by themselves, constitute judicial bias. State v. Sailee, 792 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn.
App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). The bias must be proved in light of the
record as a whole. Hannon, 752 N.W.2d at 522.
Daughters’ Hair
Father contends that the district court e rred and was biased against him when ruling
that mother is allowed to style the daughter s’ hair during dance competitions, including
weekends where father has custody.
Father appears to argue that the district court decided he could not style hair because
of his gender. But the district court noted that father is not allowed in the women’s locker
room during competitions, which is where the girls prepare their hair before a competition.
13
As this is the dance company’s policy, the determination by the district court that mother
style the daughters’ hair before competitions is neither erroneous nor demonstrates bias
against father.5
Judge’s Statement on Financial Interests
Next, father argues that the district c ourt was biased because of a comment that
suggested it had a financial interest in th e dance company that his daughters regularly
attend. The district court’s statement in que stion was that “both of my daughters danced
competitively for literally years at Northern Force Dance Company. I think that the second
floor that they put on there, I personally paid for.” Read in context, this appears to be a
comment about how much mone y the judge spent on her da ughters’ dance activities.
Father’s suggestion that the ju dge actually has an investment in the second floor of the
dance company strains reality. And father also does not explain or po int to why, even if
the judge was a part-owner of the dance comp any, she would side with mother over who
does the daughters’ hair before competitions.
Given the record as a whole, because father was unable to establish that the district
court acted improperly, as well as failing to otherwise establish any prejudice or error, the
district court was not biased against father.

5 Father also challenges the district court’ s failure to stop mother from interrupting him
during questions about their daughters’ hair as biased against hi m. Father did not
demonstrate that this was an error, particularly in light of the number of interruptions he
also committed during the proceeding.
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IV. The district court did not evaluate the marital standard of living when
considering spousal maintenance.

Next, father challenges the denial of temporary spousal maintenance.6 The district
court may grant spousal maintenance if a party “is unable to provide adequate self-support,
after considering the standard of living esta blished during the marriage and all relevant
circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(b) (2020).
Here, the district court concluded that father is not in need of spousal maintenance
because he can meet his own necessary monthly living expenses. But the district court did
not consider father’s expenses with the ma rital standard of living in mind. Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(c) (2020);7 see also Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Minn.
App. 2009) (“In determining spousa l maintenance, the district court must consider the
standard of living established during the marriage.” (emphasis added)). And in his request
for temporary spousal maintenance, father testified that as a married couple he and mother
were able to purchase luxury vehicles, go on vacation, and enjoy fine dining and
entertainment—a lifestyle he now is unable to afford.
Because the district court did not consider the marital standard of living as required
by statute, we reverse in part and remand for further findings to review father’s request for

6 While the district court said that father failed to specify a requ est for permanent or
temporary spousal maintenance, the record reflects that he requested 60 months of
temporary maintenance.
7 While the district court noted this statute in the order, the subse quent findings do not
reflect consideration of the marital standard of living.
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temporary spousal maintenance with the marital standard of living in mind.8 The district
court may reopen the record in its discretion.
In sum, we affirm on the issues of the calculation of fa ther’s income, the
best-interests factors, and judicial bias, but remand on the narrow issue of temporary
spousal maintenance.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

8 Father further contends that because the ch ildren’s daycare, Adventures Plus, no longer
requires full-time enrollment to st ay enrolled due to the pandem ic, he should not have to
pay as much as the children do not use Adventures Plus fulltime. Both father and mother
agree that circumstances surrounding dayc are has changed due to Adventures Plus
reducing some restrictions following vacc inations and the g overnor’s peacetime
emergency being lifted. But these changes occurred after the district court made its factual
findings and the changes father argues to this court are not reflected in the record presented
to this court. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (defining the record on appeal). We may
not base our decision on matters that were not received into evidence by the district court
and that are outside the record on appeal. In re Welfare of J.P.-S. , 880 N.W.2d 868, 874
(Minn. App. 2016). This matter may instead be considered in a motion to modify child
support at the district court level or at the di strict court’s discretion while this case is on
remand. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (2020) (stating that a child-support order may
be modified upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances that makes the order
“unreasonable and unfair”).