Derrick Devon Turner, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0777

Derrick Devon Turner, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 24, 2022
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-16-7565

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Renee N. Courtney, St. Cloud City Attorney, Lindsey D. Lancette, Assistant City Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After responding to a complaint that a ma n was threatening to kill someone, a
St. Cloud police officer—after determining no threat existed—asked for the identification
of a group of men, including appellant Derric k Turner. During th is encounter, Turner
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started yelling that no one ne eded to comply and refused to identify himself. He was
charged with obstructing legal process, and with misdemeanor ordi nance violations of
disruptive intoxication, and yelling and screaming. Turner moved to suppress the evidence
discovered after the seizure. The district court denied the motion, and ultimately Turner
was found guilty of obstructing legal proce ss. Three years later, Turner filed a
postconviction petition, arguing that the district court erred by not suppressing the evidence
leading to his arrest. Becau se the postconviction court di d not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion to suppress, we affirm.
FACTS
On an early evening in A ugust, a St. Cloud police officer and his partner were
dispatched to an apartment building to investigate a complaint that one man threatened to
kill another man. When making the complaint, the caller de scribed the people allegedly
involved as two Black men, one wearing white and the other wearing black. The officer
and his partner arrived at the apartment complex in uniforms and a marked squad car. The
officer observed four men—including Turn er, who was wearing pink—sitting outside on
a grassy area near the apartment. The officer, roughly 60 feet from the individuals, heard
loud music playing, which was turned off as he approached. Two of the men matched the
descriptions of the men who, according to the complaint, were arguing. The officer
informed the men that he received a call abou t an argument and death threat, but all the
men denied being involved. The officer then noted that the music he heard when he exited
his squad car was too loud and in violation of St. Cloud ordinance. D.V. explained that the
music came from his hoverboard.
3
The officer testified at a motion heari ng that after D.V.’s statement about the
hoverboard, he asked who lived in the apartment and for their identification. He made the
request, the officer explained, because St. Cl oud ordinances provide for keeping track of
noise violations in or near apartment complexes. D.V. stated that he lived at the apartment.
While the officer was jotting down the information, Turner lo udly exclaimed that no one
had to identify themselves and that the office r had no reason to be there. The officer
testified that he reexplained that the St. Cloud noise ordinance requires him to identify who
violated the noise ordinance, particularly if they live at the apartment. Turner continued to
yell and swear at the officer. The officer th en noted that Turner had bloodshot, watery
eyes, his speech was “a little slurred,” and he smelled of alcohol. While he was still in the
process of identifying D.V., the officer again asked Turner not to yell. At that point the
officer then believed that Turner was di sruptive and was violating the intoxication
ordinance.
After making this determination, the offi cer (and other officers who were now on
the scene) attempted to separate the men. The officer asked Turner to identify himself.
Turner refused, despite being asked over a dozen times for his identification. The officers
eventually tased Turner. Tu rner was cited with obstructing legal process, disruptive
intoxication, and yelling and screaming—all misdemeanors.1
Turner moved to suppress the evidence discovered after the seizure, and the district
court denied the motion. A ju ry found Turner gu ilty of obstructing legal process but not

1 Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2016), St. Cloud, Minn. Code of Ordinances §§ 1002.30,
1050.05, subd. 4 (2007).
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guilty of disruptive intoxicatio n or yelling and scre aming. The district court sentenced
Turner to a stayed 90 -day sentence and gave him credit for the two days he had been
detained.2
Three years later, Turner filed a postconv iction petition challengi ng the denial of
his motion to suppress. 3 He argued that the district court erred by not suppressing the
evidence discovered after the officer “dispelled any suspicion” that Turner had engaged in
criminal activity. The postconviction court denied the petition for two reasons. First, the
court concluded that the offi cer had reasonable suspicion of a noise violation permitting
him to demand Turner’s identification because he was in a group that had produced the
loud music. Second, the postconviction c ourt determined that an officer who has
reasonable suspicion to investigate a crime may demand the identification of any witness.
Turner appeals.
DECISION
As a threshold matter, we review an order denying postconviction relief for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Nicks , 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). A court abuses its
discretion if its ruling “is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the
facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). At issue he re is the postconviction court’s
conclusion that the district court did not err in concluding that the officer was justified in
asking Turner for his identification after knowi ng both that he was not the owner of the

2 Turner completed probation, and the court discharged him.
3 Turner did not bring a direct appeal. Beca use the state failed to assert that Turner’s
petition for postconviction relief was untimely under the two–y ear statute of limitations,
the time bar is waived. Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 606 (Minn. 2012).
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hoverboard (which caused the music) and th at Turner did not resi de at the apartment
complex. We review whether an officer ha d reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
supporting a continued seizure de novo. State v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn.
2011).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constituti on guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, ho uses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. As a
general rule, a law-enforcement officer may not make a warrantless arrest of a person
without probable cause that the person “had committed or was committing an offense.”
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). But an officer may temporarily detain a person for
investigatory purposes if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person
has engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19-22, (1968); Diede,
795 N.W.2d at 842-43. It is an unconstitutional intrusion to ask for identification after the
validity for the stop has expired. State v. Hickman , 491 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Minn.
App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1992).
Here, because Turner does no t dispute that the officer had reasonable suspicion to
seize Turner to investigate the threat and music incidents, our review is narrow: was there
reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize Tu rner after the initial justifications were
dispelled? And Turner does not dispute that there was reas onable, articulable suspicion
that he was violating the yelling-and-scream ing and disruptive-intoxication ordinances—
he argues only that he was asked for his identification before that reasonable, articulable
suspicion was obtained.
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This comes down purely to a matter of timing: when did the officer know that Turner
was not the culprit behind the music, and when did the officer ask for Turner’s
identification in relation to Turner yelling at the officer? The record shows that the officer
explained that he needed the identification of any person who lived at the apartment to
comport with St. Cloud’s noise ordinance. Then, D.V. volunteered that he was the owner
of the hoverboard and also resided at the ap artment. While the o fficer was talking with
D.V., Turner began yelling and swearing, whic h created the reasonable suspicion that he
was violating the relevant St. Cloud ordinances. Although the officer initially asked to
review the identification of whomever lived at the apartment, it was only after Turner
yelled, which was during the consensual identif ication process of D.V., that the officer
focused on Turner. In short—regardless of the fact that reasonable suspicion was dispelled
for the violent threat and for the noise violation—Turner created the reasonable, articulable
suspicion for new criminal conduct by yelling and showing signs of intoxication before he
specifically was asked for his identifica tion. Therefore, the officer did not
unconstitutionally seize Turner by asking him for his identification.
To convince us otherwise, Turner ar gues that the record, specifically the
postconviction court’s recitation of the facts, proves that the officer asked for identification
before Turner started to yell. Turner is correct that the officer asked for the identification
of everyone to find out who lived in the apartment. But neith er the facts nor the analysis
should stop at that point. As explained above, the timing of events still gave the officer
reasonable suspicion that an additional crim e was being committed, meaning the seizure
was proper. Nor does the slight variation in the recitation of the facts between the district
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court’s and the postconviction court’s order alter this conclusion. The postconviction
court’s facts merely sum up the findings of fact from the district court at a broader level.
And regardless, the summation of the facts by the postconviction court does not change the
underlying record, which showed that the offi cer did not ask Turner individually for his
identification for excessive noise until after Turner began yelling.4
Therefore, because there was reasonable, ar ticulable suspicion that Turner violated
the St. Cloud ordinances, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by affirming
the district court’s denial of Turner’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.

4 Turner also alleges that the postconviction court’s justifications for affirming the district
court were legally incorrect. But we have de novo review over the reasonable, articulable
suspicion issue, which as explained above, was met. Because we will not reverse a correct
decision “simply because it was based on incorrect reasons,” this argument does not need
to be addressed. Katz v. Katz , 408 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1978); see also
State v. Robinson, 699 N.W.2d 790, 799 (Minn. App. 2005) (applying this holding of Katz
in a criminal case), rev. granted (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005).