In re: Guardianship of Ednord Alcenat.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0779

In re: Guardianship of Ednord Alcenat.

Filed May 16, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-GC-PR-20-230

Peter H. Dahlquist, Dahlquist Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant Ednord
Alcenat)

James A. Reichert, James A. Reichert, LL C, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
Pitagore Alcenat)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s establishment of a guardianship. We affirm
the district court’s decision because the record supports the district court’s finding that
appellant was an incapacitated person and beca use the district court’s conclusion that no
less restrictive means were available is not against logic or the facts in the record.
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FACTS
On May 26, 2020, petitioner Pitagore Alcenat filed a petition seeking appointment
as a guardian for his brother, appellant Ednord Alcenat. The petition alleged that Alcenat
could not make decisions for himself and referred to Alcenat’s history of civil commitment.
Alcenat was first civilly committed as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental
illness in September 2020 and his commitmen t was extended until March 9, 2022, by an
order from the district court in March 2021.
On January 27, 2021, the district court held a hearing on the guardianship petition.
At the start of the hearing, Alcenat stated he did not want his brot her as his guardian and
requested a professional guardian. The distri ct court accepted two exhibits, including a
physician statement from Dr. Ma rk Rynda. Dr. R ynda examined Alcenat in September
2020 and concluded that Alcenat “has lo ngstanding paranoid schizophrenia,” and
“becomes very disorganized a nd engages in dangerous beha viors when decompensated,
which happens frequently due to [noncomplia nce with medication prescriptions].” Dr.
Rynda stated that Alcenat “ frequently leaves any attempte d placements and is extremely
vulnerable on the streets,” therefore he opined that “[h]aving a guardian for purposes of
placement in an appropriate long-term setti ng would be very bene ficial for his overall
safety and wellbeing.” Pursuant to an agreement between the parties, the district court also
took judicial notice of the two court files from Alcenat’s civil co mmitment proceedings,
including the order for civil commitment and the order author izing Alcenat’s psychiatric
provider to administer neuroleptic medications. The court files included a court examiner’s
report, filed in September 2020.
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Both petitioner and Alcenat testified at the hearing. Petitioner testified about
Alcenat often leaving placements or running aw ay. Petitioner further stated that Alcenat
does not consistently take his medication and has not cashed the checks from his
employment. Alcenat testified that he pays for his own groc eries, buys his own clothes
and other necessities, and at the time of th e hearing was applying for social security
benefits. Alcenat testified that he did not want petitioner to supervise him and alleged that
petitioner abused him when they were children.
The district court concluded that clear and convincing eviden ce established that
Alcenat is an incapacitated pe rson because Alcenat is “impai red to the extent of lacking
sufficient understanding or capacity to make personal decisions, and [ ] is unable to meet
personal needs for medical care, nutrition, clothing, shelter, or safety, even with appropriate
technological and supported decision making assistance.” The district court relied on Dr.
Rynda’s statement as well as the court examiner’s September 2020 report from Alcenat’s
civil commitment court file. The district court summarized this report, stating that Alcenat
“failed to obtain necessary fo od, clothing, shelter, or medi cal treatment” and explaining
that in the report, the examiner opined that Alcenat “poses a substantial likelihood of
physical harm to himself and others.”
The district court found th at Alcenat’s testimony was not credible, but that
petitioner’s testimony was credible. Specific ally, the district court credited petitioner’s
testimony that Alcenat is unable to make many decisions for himself, runs away, and does
not take his medication. The district court also listed eight powers and rights that Alcenat
was incapable of exercising and concluded that clear and convincing evidence established
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that Alcenat’s needs cannot be met by less rest rictive means. The di strict court rejected
alternatives to guardianship because Alcenat could not effectively participate in residential
and community services and because of the limited duration of civil commitments:
Due to the extent of Respondent ’s mental illness, there is no
less restrictive alternative that would adequately protect the
Respondent even with the use of technology. The Respondent
is extremely vulnerable. Due to the Respondent's
noncompliance with psychiatric treatment, severe
disorganization and inability to make complex decisions, the
Respondent would not be able to effectively participate in any
supported decision-making arrangement or residential and
community services. Respo ndent is currently civilly
committed, but civil commitments expire and it is uncertain if
he will continue to be under commitment in the extended
future.

The district court reserved the issue of who would be the guardian to allow time for
Alcenat’s attorney to find information about professional guardianship services. On March
23, 2021, the district court held a hearing to address this issu e. Alcenat reiterated that he
did not want petitioner to serve as his guardian and instead proposed Open Roads LLC, a
professional guardian. Alcenat also requested that the appointment of a guardian be limited
in duration, specifically requesting a one-year appointment. An employee of Open Roads
LLC appeared and testified that it would be willing to take Alcenat’s appointment. At the
hearing, the district court stated some of its reasons for denying a guardianship of limited
duration, noting that given Alcenat’s needs, and the work required to be a guardian, it was
“logical” to order a guardianship lasting “multiple years.”
On April 22, 2021, the district cour t filed its written order on Alcenat’s
guardianship. The district court determined that although petitioner had a higher priority
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to be appointed as Alcenat’ s guardian under the applicable statute, appointing petitioner
would not be in the best interest of Alcenat. The district court appointed Open Roads LLC
as limited guardian in the best interests of Alcenat. Alcenat appeals.
DECISION
I. Findings of Fact Re garding Incapacitation
Alcenat first challenges the findings of fact made by the district court underlying its
determination that Alcenat is an incapacitate d person. Because we are not left with the
firm conviction that a mistake was made in dete rmining these facts, we affirm the district
court’s findings.
A court may appoint a guardian if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
subject of the guardianship is an incapacitated person whose needs cannot be met by less-
restrictive means. Minn. Stat. § 524.5-310(a) (2020). An incapacitated person is defined
as a person who “is impaired to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity
to make or communicate responsible personal decisions” and “has demonstrated deficits in
behavior which evidence an in ability to meet personal needs for medical care, nutrition,
clothing, shelter, or safety, even with appr opriate technological assistance.” Minn. Stat.
§ 524.5-102, subd. 6 (2020).1
We review the district court’s decision to appoint a guardian for abuse of discretion,
In re Guardianship of Kowalski , 478 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn. App.1991), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 10, 1992), but we review factua l findings underlying that decision for clear

1 On August 1, 2020, the statutory definition was amended, but these changes do not impact
our analysis.
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error and view the record in the light most favorable to those findings, In re Civil
Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Minn. App. 2014); In re Guardianship of
Wells, 733 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007). We
defer to the credibility determinations of the district court, In re Conservatorship of
Lundgaard, 453 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. App. 1990), and will not conclude that the district
court clearly erred “unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistak e has been committed,” In re Civil Commitment of Kenney , 963
N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021 ) (quotations and citations om itted). Nor do we reconcile
conflicting evidence or “weigh the eviden ce as if trying the matter de novo.” Id. at 221
(quotation omitted). “When the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal,
it is immaterial that the reco rd might also provide a reasona ble basis for inferences and
findings to the contrary.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted).
Importantly, in this case, Alcenat does not argue that the district court’s findings are
insufficient to support a determination of inca pacity. Rather, Alcenat directly challenges
the underlying findings themselves, arguing that the record contained other, conflicting
evidence that compelled altern ative factual findings. For example, Alcenat argues that
contrary to the district court’s findings, Alcenat’s own testimony established that he could
perform certain daily living activities and that there were periods of time when he had no
contact with the petitioner, reducing the weight of petitioner’s tes timony. We are not
persuaded for two reasons. Firs t, given our standard of revi ew, we defer to the district
court’s determination of witness credibility, Lundgaard, 453 N.W.2d at 61, and do not
reweigh conflicting evidence, Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 217, 221.
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Second, we conclude that the findings ma de by the district court are supported by
the evidence in the record. Dr. Rynda’s report includes information about Alcenat’s history
of failing to take medications on his own and Alcenat’s denial of diagnosed mental illness,
which contributed to his inability to care for himself. Dr. Rynda concluded that Alcenat
“has longstanding paranoid schizophrenia,” and because of Alcenat’s inability to remain
medication compliant, Alcenat “becomes very disorganized and engages in dangerous
behaviors when decompensated, which happens frequently.” Dr. Rynd a also stated that
Alcenat “frequently leaves a ny attempted placements and is extremely vulnerable on the
streets.” In addition, the district court noted that the court examiner concluded that Alcenat
“failed to obtain necessary food, clothing, sh elter, or medical treatment.” The examiner
further opined that Alcenat’s psychiatric di sorder “poses a substantial likelihood of
physical harm to himself and others.”2 Based on the record, we conclude that the district
court did not clearly err in making the findings underlying its determination of incapacity.
II. Determination Regarding Le ss Restrictive Alternatives
Next, Alcenat argues that the district c ourt erred when it determined that less
restrictive alternatives could not meet Alcenat’s needs. We discern no abuse of discretion.3

2 Alcenat does not challenge the district court’s reliance on the commitment files, and we
have previously permitted relia nce on such materials. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.J.N. ,
568 N.W.2d 170, 174-75 (Minn. App. 1997) (stating that court records and files from prior
adjudicative proceedings are an appropriate subject of judicial notice by the district court).
3 It is not clear whether Alcenat intended to assert error in the district court’s underlying
factual findings. Alcenat explicitly disagrees with the reasoning of the district court,
without directly challenging the facts underl ying that analysis, thereby asserting a
challenge only to the district court’s exercise of discretion. However, the facts relied on to
reject the identified alternatives are nearly indistinguishable from those underlying the
determination of incapacity that Alcenat expr essly challenges in the first portion of his
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A district court may appoint a guardian only if the incapacitated person’s needs
cannot be met by less restrictiv e means. Minn. Stat. § 524.5- 310(a)(2). Less restrictive
means are those that do not infringe on the ward’s autonomy while providing necessary
protection. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 866. Because Alcenat argues that the district court’s
stated reasons do not support its ultimate decision rejecting the two offered alternatives,
we review the district court’s weighing of a lternatives to guardianship for an abuse of
discretion. See Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 792; Wells, 733 N.W.2d at 509, 510. A district
court abuses its discretion when its decision is against logic and the facts in the record. See
Thompson ex rel. Minor Child v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 501 (Minn. 2018).
In rejecting the two identified alternatives, the district court listed several facts to
“indicate why less restrictive alternatives do not work,” includi ng Alcenat’s extreme
vulnerability, noncompliance with psychiatric treatment in the past, severe disorganization,
and inability to make complex decisions. In the district court’s estimation, these
impairments rendered Alcena t unable to participate in supported decision-making
arrangements, residential programming, and community services. In addition, in its written
order, the district court also emphasized that these needs would persist after the expiration
of a civil commitment, and in its statements at the March 23 , 2001 hearing, the district
court stated that a guardianship lasting multiple years was more appropriate.

brief. To the extent that Alcenat impliedly challenges those facts as they relate to the
determination that no less rest rictive alternatives could meet his needs, we reiterate our
previous conclusion that these facts are supported by the record. To the extent that Alcenat
instead, or in addition, argues that these fa cts cannot support the ultimate determination
regarding less restrictive alternatives, we disagree for the reasons noted above.
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The district court’s decision was not against logic or the facts. Given the underlying
facts regarding the nature and severity of Alcenat’s needs, it was not an abuse of discretion
to conclude that Alcenat would be unable to conduct himself in the manner required by a
civil commitment. In addition, given the fa cts regarding the history of Alcenat’s needs
over a long period of time, it was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that neither a civil
commitment nor a six- or twelve-month guardianship would meet Alcenat’s needs.
Affirmed.