State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0787

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Darwin Eldridge Anderson,
Appellant.

Filed April 18, 2022
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-20-44

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, An drew J. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Appellant Darwin Eldridge Anderson ch allenges his conviction for second-degree
intentional murder and atte mpted second-degree intentional murder, arguing that the
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district court improperly denied his presente nce motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We
affirm.
DECISION
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). Ho wever, a district court may allow a
“defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and just to do so.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. Under this standard, a district court considers: (1) the
reasons the defendant advances to support w ithdrawal of the guilty plea; and (2) whether
granting the motion prejudices the state. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. The defendant bears
the burden of advancing sufficient reasons to support plea withdrawal. Id. We review the
district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, State v. Kaiser, 469 N.W.2d 316, 320
(Minn. 1991), and only the “rare case” merits reversal, Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266
(Minn. 1989).
Appellant argues that it is fair and just to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea
because: (1) he was not able to adequately prepare for trial; (2) he received ineffective
assistance of counsel; and (3) he lacked intent to commit attempted second-degree murder.
With respect to his first argument, appellant claims that he did not have adequate
time to review the evidence against him or ad equately prepare for trial. The record does
not support this claim. Appellant reached a plea agreement with the state and agreed to
plead guilty to second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder. In exchange,
the state agreed to dismiss two first-degree murder charges and an illegal-possession-of-a-
firearm charge. At the plea hearing, appella nt acknowledged that he had enough time to
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talk to his attorney, that hi s attorney had done a good job re presenting him, and that he
wanted to plead guilty pursuant to the terms of the negotiated plea agreement. Appellant
agreed that he had an opportunity to sit down with his attorney, fill out the petition to enter
a plea of guilty, and go through the document with counsel. Appellant testified that he was
entering the guilty plea of his own free will.
Appellant’s second argument, that he receiv ed ineffective assistance of counsel, is
also unsupported by the record. Ineffective assistance of counsel may render a guilty plea
invalid. Sames v. State, 805 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Minn. App. 2011). A defendant receives
ineffective assistance of coun sel when: (1) “counsel’s re presentation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the re sult of the proceeding would have been
different.” Gates v. State , 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)). In the context of a guilty plea, such as this,
a defendant must demonstrate that “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 486
(Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Appellant has not demonstrated that hi s counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Appellant claims he did not have confidence in his
attorney because his a ttorney did not adequately investig ate his case. “The extent of
counsel’s investigation is considered a part of trial strategy,” which this court generally
does not review. Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004). It is true that “a
failure to investigate a potential defense may c onstitute ineffective assistance if it results
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not from counsel’s considered choice but rather from inattention or neglect.” Swaney v.
State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 218 (Minn. 2016). Here, however, appellant has not presented any
evidence showing that his attorney was inattentive or neglectful. During the plea hearing,
appellant acknowledged that he had time to speak with his attorney, th at his attorney had
done a good job of representing him, and that he understood the terms of the plea deal and
wanted to plead guilty. The district court acknowledged that appellant did not like his
attorney, but correctly determin ed that this was not a valid reason to withdraw his guilty
plea. After carefully examining appellant’s in effective-assistance claim, we are satisfied
that counsel’s representation di d not fall below an objective st andard of reasonableness.
And, because appellant cannot sa tisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, we need not
address the prejudice prong. Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020) (noting
that when one prong of Strickland test is determinative, an appellate court need not address
remaining prong).
Lastly, appellant claims the factual basis portion of his plea is inadequate because
he lacked intent to commit attempted second -degree murder. The charges arise from a
shooting that occurred in Novemb er 2019. Appellant got into an argument with another
man at a bar. Appellant followed the man home from the bar and fired several shots at the
driver’s-side window of the man’s vehicle. The man died from a gunshot wound to his
head, and a woman in the passenger seat was wounded. The state charged appellant with
second-degree murder for the man’s death a nd attempted second-degree murder for the
woman’s injuries. In support of the factual basis for the plea, appellant admitted that he
fired several shots into the vehicle with the intent of killing the male victim.
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On appeal, appellant concedes that his te stimony at the plea hearing sufficiently
establishes the elements for the second-degr ee murder of the male victim. However,
appellant claims that he did not realize the woman was in the passenger seat of the vehicle
and did not intend to harm her. As such, appellant claims he lacked the requisite intent for
the second-degree attempted murder charge against the woman. The Minnesota Supreme
Court recognizes that “Minnesota’s homicide statutes . . . incorporate the doctrine of
transferred intent.” State v. Cruz-Ramirez, 771 N.W.2d 497, 507 (Minn. 2009). Under this
doctrine, “transferred intent allows evidence of an intent to harm someone to transfer to the
person actually harmed when there is a possibility the victim was not the intended recipient
of the specific act.” Id. Here, appellant admitted that he fired several shots into the man’s
vehicle with the intent of k illing him. The female victim was the unintended recipient of
this act. The transferred intent doctrine app lies to the attempted-murder charge as to the
female victim. See id. at 501, 506-07 (affirming conv iction for attempted first-degree
murder under transferred intent doctrine); State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 559, 562-64
(Minn. 2008) (applying doctrine to a ttempted first-degree murder conviction); State v.
Bakdash, 830 N.W.2d 906, 914-15 (Minn. App. 2013) (applyi ng doctrine to attempted
second-degree murder conviction), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2013). The district court
did not err by applying the transferred intent doctrine.
We note, finally, that appellant also asserts that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty
plea under the manifest-injustice standard. A ma nifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is
invalid. State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 20 07); Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05,
subd. 1. The manifest-injustice standard is more demanding than the fair-and-just standard.
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Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 646. Base d on our determination that appellant is not entitled to
withdraw his plea under the less burdensome fa ir-and-just standard, it is unnecessary to
address whether withdrawal should also have been permitted under the manifest-injustice
standard when appellant’s arguments are the same for both.
In sum, we determine that the record supports the district court’s decision to deny
appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea under the fa ir-and-just standard and we
discern no abuse of discretion. See State v. Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. App.
2003) (affirming district court’s decision to deny withdrawal of plea under the fair-and-
just standard where “[n]othing objectively in the record suggests that [defendant] failed to
comprehend the nature, purpose, and consequences of his plea”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug.
19, 2003). Because appellant failed to demonstrate fair-and- just reasons for withdrawal,
we need not reach whether the state showed that a plea withdrawal would result in
prejudice. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97-98; see also See State v. Cubas , 838 N.W.2d 220,
224 (Minn. App. 2013) (“Even when there is no prejudice to the state, a district court may
deny plea withdrawal . . . if the defendant fails to advance valid reasons why withdrawal is
fair and just.”), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 31, 2013). Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.