State of Minnesota, Minnesota Judicial Branch, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0794

State of Minnesota, Minnesota Judicial Branch,
Respondent,

vs.

Teamsters Local 320,
Appellant.

Filed January 24, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-20-5773

Keith Ellison, Attorney Genera l, Joseph Weiner, Assistant A ttorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Kevin M. Beck, Joseph A. Kelly, Patrick J. Kelly, Kelly & Lemm ons, P.A., St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pr esiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

SYLLABUS
1. The 2019-2021 collective bargaining agre ement for official court reporters
provides that a judge’s decision to terminate an appointed court reporter’s employment is
not subject to arbitration.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
2. A court reporter serving the Minnesota Judicial Branch by appointment of a
judge is an at-will employee.
OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether two court reporters, both terminated
by their appointing judges fo r “disruptive and disrespectful conduct,” are entitled to
arbitrate their terminations. An arbitrator de termined that they ar e entitled to arbitration
under both the collective barg aining agreement (CBA) in e ffect at the time of the
terminations and Minnesota law. But the dist rict court vacated the arbitrator’s decision,
concluding that state law forecloses arbitration when an appointing judge terminates a court
reporter’s employment. Appellant Teamsters Local 320 (the union), which represents court
reporters employed by respondent Minnesota J udicial Branch (the MJB), challenges the
district court’s decision. We affirm.
FACTS
Since 2000, the union has represented all official court reporters employed by the
MJB. “The Court Employees Court Reporter Unit consists of court reporters not otherwise
excluded who are employed by a judicial district . . . .” 1 Minn. Stat. § 179A.101, subd.

1 Beginning in 1989, “[d]istrict court referees, judicial officers, court reporters, law clerks,
. . . district administration staff” and other district court employees became state employees
of the MJB. See Minn. Stat. § 480.181, subd. 1 (Supp. 1989); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 43A.02, subd. 25 (Supp. 1 989). Previously, these individuals were employed by
Minnesota counties or judicial districts. See Minn. Stat. § 480.181, subds. 2, 4 (Supp.
1989).

3
1(e) (2020). In 2019, the un ion and the MJB entered into a CBA that would be effective
from July 2019 to June 2021 (the 2019-2021 CBA).
Two district court judges terminated th eir court reporters for “disruptive and
disrespectful conduct” in September 2019. 2 Following the termin ations, the union filed
administrative complaints under the 2019-2021 CBA and requested arbitration. The MJB
moved to dismiss the complaints, asserting that the terminations were not arbitrable. Both
parties briefed the issue before an arbitrat or, whose inquiry was “specifically limited to
whether the employees [could] proceed to an arbitration” under the terms of the CBA.
The arbitrator determined th at the terminations were ar bitrable. He distinguished
between the MJB, which is identified as the “employer” under the CBA, and the appointing
judges. According to the arb itrator, the CBA and state law allow an appointing judge to
“remove a reporter from their courtroom.” But the arbitrator reasoned that an appointing
judge has no authority to terminate a court reporter’s “employment with the [MJB],” which
is the party to the CBA. The arbitrator concluded that the administrative complaint process
under the CBA—including the requirement for bi nding arbitration—applies to the MJB.
According to the arbitrator, “while a Judge may well have the right to remove a court
reporter from his or her courtroom, the questi on of whether they remain employed by the
employer is an arbitrable question.”

2 The chief judge of the district sent the notice-of-termination emails, but on appeal, the
parties do not take issue with her authority to do so on behalf of the appointing judges. See
Minn. Stat. § 484.69, subd. 3 (2020) (descr ibing a chief judge’s general administrative
authority over the courts within the chief judge’s judicial district).
4
The MJB moved the arbitrator to reconsid er this decision a nd submitted evidence
to support its position that the appointing judge has complete authority to terminate a court
reporter’s employment. The evidence include d a declaration by a former MJB human
resources assistant regarding the bargaining process between the MJB and the union in
2001 and the MJB’s past pr actices when judges terminated their court reporters’
employment. Additionally, the MJB offered audio recordings of state legislative sessions
addressing relevant state statutes. The arbitrator rejected this evidence because it was “not
raised in the original mo tion [to dismiss]” and denied the MJB’s request for
reconsideration.
Subsequently, the MJB filed a motion to vacate the arbitrato r’s decision in the
district court3 pursuant to Minnesota Statutes secti on 572B.23 (2020). The district court
vacated the arbitrator’s decisi on, determining that the termin ations were not arbitrable
under state law.
The union appeals.
ISSUE
Are court reporters who have been terminated by their appointing judges entitled to
arbitrate the terminations under the 2019-2021 CBA and Minnesota law?
ANALYSIS
The union argues that court reporters employed by the MJB have a right to arbitrate
their terminations under the 2019-2021 CBA and Minnesota la w. Acknowledging that a

3 To avoid a conflict of interest, the motion was assigned to a senior judge who did not
appoint or supervise a court reporter.
5
judge has authority to remove a court repor ter from the judge’s employment, the union
maintains that a court reporter removed by a judge remains an MJB employee and is
entitled to arbitrate any termination by the MJB. 4 On the other hand, the MJB contends
that a judge’s decision to terminate a court reporter ends the court reporter’s employment
with the MJB and that neither the CBA nor Minnesota law provides for arbitration.
Before turning to these arguments, we identify our standard of review.
“Determining whether a party has agreed to ar bitrate a particular di spute is a matter of
contract interpretation that [appell ate courts] review de novo.” Glacier Park Iron Ore
Props., LLC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 961 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Minn. 2021); see also Johnson v.
Piper Jaffray, Inc. , 530 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Minn. 1995). “In reviewing an arbitrator’s

4 In the district court, the union also argued that the MJB’s motion to vacate the arbitrator’s
decision was untimely under the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA), Minn. Stat.
§§ 572B.01-.31 (2020). Altho ugh the union withdr ew the argument du ring the hearing
before the district court, th e union now raises a similar tim eliness argument on appeal.
Moreover, without authority, the union alleges that the district court had no “jurisdiction”
to consider the motion to vacate because the MJB did not comply with statutory deadlines
under the MUAA. Generally, we do not consider claims that were not presented to the
district court. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate
courts should generally only review questions that the district court heard and considered).
But a party may raise a district court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time. See
Cochrane v. Tudor Oaks Condo. Project , 529 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. App. 1995)
(“Because subject matter jurisdiction goes to the authority of the court to hear a particular
class of actions, lack of subject matter jurisdic tion may be raised at any time . . . .”). The
union’s new timeliness argument—which pr ovides the entire foundation for its
unsupported jurisdiction claim—fails. The proceedings below all occurred during a period
when statutory deadlines were suspended by a session law, the “COVID-19 Policy.” See
2020 Minn. Laws ch. 74, art. 1, § 16, at 66 (suspending “statutes of limitations” and “other
time periods prescribed by statute” during, and for 60 days after, the peacetime emergency
declaration prompted by the COVID-19 pand emic). We therefore reject the union’s
argument that the district court improperly considered th e motion to vacate because the
MJB failed to comply with statutory timelines.

6
decision, the arbitrator is the final judge of both law and fact, but this court’s review of the
determination of arbitrability is de novo.” Phillips v. Dolphin , 776 N.W.2d 755, 758
(Minn. App. 2009) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 16, 2010). Because we
are reviewing the arbitrator’s decision on arb itrability, which requires us to interpret the
terms of the 2019-2021 CBA, we apply a de novo standard of review.
For background, we briefly summarize the relevant Minnesota statutes. Several
Minnesota statutes address the employment of court reporters appointed by judges. Section
486.01, which is included in a chapter concerning court reporters, provides that “[e]ach
judge . . . may appoint a competent stenographer as reporter of the court, to hold office
during the judge’s pleasure, and to act as the judge’s secretary in all matters pertaining to
official duties.” Minn. Stat. § 486.01 (2020).
The Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn. Stat.
§§ 179A.01-.25 (2020 & Supp. 2021), also applies to court reporters who work for district
court judges. PELRA, which was enacted in 1984, established collective bargaining rules
and rights for Minnesota public employees. 1984 Minn. Laws ch. 462. MJB employees
were not initially covered under PELRA. Court employees, excluding court reporters, were
first given collective bargaining rights in 1999. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 216, art. 7, §§ 4, at
1352-53; 7, at 1354; 9, at 1355-56. Court reporters were included one year later. 2000
Minn. Laws. ch. 345, § 2, at 332.
Under PELRA, “[a]ll contracts must include a grievance procedure providing for
compulsory binding arbitration of grievances including all written disciplinary actions.”
Minn. Stat. § 179A.20, subd. 4. But PELRA also directly addresses removal of a court
7
reporter by a judge. Section 179A.101 stat es, “Notwithstanding a ny provision of this
chapter or any other law to the contrary, judges may appoint and remove court reporters at
their pleasure.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.101, subd. 1(f).
With the applicable law in mind, we next consider the rights of court reporters under
the 2019-2021 CBA. Specifica lly, we turn to the question of whether the CBA requires
arbitration of a judge’s termination decision.
I. The 2019-2021 CBA does no t require arbitration of a judge’s decision to
terminate an appointed court reporter’s employment.

A party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute that the party did not contractually
agree to arbitrate. Glacier Park, 961 N.W.2d at 771. To determine whether a party agreed
to arbitrate a dispute, courts examine the contract language. Id.
The 2019-2021 CBA id entifies an arbitrable clai m—called an “administrative
complaint”—as a “dispute or disagreement as to the interpretation or application of the
specific terms and conditions of this agr eement.” It also specifies what is not subject to
arbitration: “powers granted to the Appointing Authority under statute or this contract are
not subject to the Administrative Complaint Process.” And it further states that “[n]othing
contained in this Administrative Review Procedure abrogates or diminishes the Appointing
Authority’s right to appoint Employees or to remove an Employe e from serving at the
pleasure of the Appointing Authority.”
The MJB argues that the plain language of the CBA excludes a judge’s termination
decision from arbitration. It contends that the CBA explicitly preserves a judge’s right to
remove a court reporter at will. The uni on acknowledges that the CBA recognizes the
8
continuing authority of a judge to remove a court reporter. According to the union,
however, a judge’s decision to remove a c ourt reporter is different from the MJB’s
termination of the court reporter.
To resolve this disagreement over the te rms of the CBA, we must interpret the
meaning of the word “remove” as used in the CBA. Does it mean termination of
employment, as the MJB contends? Or does it mean something short of termination, such
as no longer using a court reporter’s services?
“We interpret and enforce a CBA as we do other contracts.” Minn. Teamsters Pub.
& Law Enf’t Emps. Union, Local 320 v. County of St. Louis, 726 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Minn.
App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2007). “The primary goal of contract
interpretation is to determine and en force the intent of the parties.” Travertine Corp. v.
Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 2004 ). A court first considers the
language of the contract. Id. When the language of the contract is unambiguous, it should
be given its plain meaning. Savela v. City of Duluth , 806 N.W.2d 793, 796-97 (Minn.
2011). Contract language is ambiguous if it is “reasonably susceptible of more than one
meaning.” Hoyt v. Browkaw , 359 N.W.2d 310, 311 (Minn. App. 1984). To determine
whether a contract is ambiguous, courts should not read words and phrases in isolation, but
should consider their meaning in the context of the contract as a whole. Art Goebel, Inc.
v. N. Suburban Agencies, Inc. , 567 N.W.2d 511, 5 15 (Minn. 1997). “A contract must be
interpreted in a way that gives all of its provisions meaning.” Current Tech. Concepts v.
Irie Enters., Inc., 530 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 1995).
9
Considered in isolation, the word “remove” has many meanings. But in the context
of the 2019-2021 CBA, it can only have one me aning: termination of employment. We
conclude that the meaning of “remove” un ambiguously means termination for several
reasons.
First, the word “remove” is included in a provision that specifically addresses a
court reporter’s employment—“the Appointing Authority’s right to appoint Employees or
to remove an Employee from serving at the pleas ure of the Appointing Authority.”
(Emphasis added.) When interpreting a contract, a court cannot ascertain the parties’ intent
“by a process of dissection in which words or phrases are isolated from their context.”
Motorsports Racing Plus, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Minn. 2003)
(quotation omitted). By using the word “remove” in a provision discussing employment,
the parties clearly intended it to mean removal from service.
Second, the 2019-2021 CBA uses th e words “remove” and “terminate”
interchangeably. As noted, the CBA states that the administrative-review procedure does
not “abrogate[] or diminish[]” a judge’s right to “remove an Employee from serving at the
pleasure of the [judge].” (Emphasis added.) In an article entitled “Separations,” the CBA
states that “[n]othing in this article shall be construed to limit in any way the right of the
Appointing Authority to terminate their Court Reporter at th eir pleasure.” (Emphasis
added.) Another provision articulates the pro cedures to be followed when an appointing
authority leaves office. It states, “Upon the death, resignation, removal or retirement of an
Appointing Authority, so long as the Employee is availa ble for work, the Employee shall
remain on the payroll and work in a temporar y pool subject to assignment by the Chief
10
Judge or designee” until the court reporter is selected by the newly appointed judge or not
selected. (Emphasis added.) And a section entitled “Other Removals” provides:
Employees who are terminated by a Judge for reasons other
than non-selection by a newly appointed or elected Judge shall
be given paid notice of termination of employment of not less
than thirty (30) calendar days but not more than sixty (60)
calendar days, at the discretion of the Appointing Authority.

(Emphasis added.)
Third, considering the contract as a whole, the word “remove” is used in
circumstances where it could only refer to termination of employment. The article entitled
“Separations” effectively illustrates this point. It lists the various situations where a court
reporter’s employment ends, including “resignation” and “abandonment of position,” and
correspondingly provides information about the implications of each separation type. One
of these situations is “involuntary removals.” The CBA identifies two types of involuntary
removals. First, an involunt ary removal occurs when a c ourt reporter’s appointing judge
dies, resigns, or otherwise leaves the positi on, and the judge’s successor in the position
does not select the affected court reporter. Un der those circumstances, the court reporter
is entitled to “paid notice of termination of employment” of a duration that depends on
years of service. The second type of involuntary removal occurs when a judge
“terminate[s]” a court reporter “for reasons other than non-selection by a newly appointed
or elected Judge.” For this second type of involuntary removal, a court reporter is entitled
to no more than 60 days’ paid notice of termination. In th e context of separations and
involuntary removals, the word “remove” only makes sense if it is interpreted to mean
termination of employment. Conversely, the union’s interpretation—that removal simply
11
means removal from the judge’ s courtroom—makes no sense in the context of these
provisions. If removal refers only to re moval from a courtroom, it is unclear why a
removed court reporter would receive “paid notice of termination.” Considering the
contract as a whole, the word “remove” means termination of employment.
Fourth, the union asks us to adopt an interpretation of the 2019-2021 CBA that has
no support in the text of the contract. There is no indicati on in the CBA that the parties
intended to require arbitration after a judge’s decision to remove and before the MJB could
officially terminate a court reporter. Indeed, the union’s interpretation is contrary to the
plain language of the contract, which repeatedly affirms a judge’s authority to terminate a
court reporter and excludes such decisions from the complaint-review procedure.
Based on these considerations, we conclude that the 2019-2021 CBA
unambiguously recognizes that a judge’s decision to terminate a court reporter’s
employment is not subject to th e administrative-review procedur e, including arbitration.
But even if there is some ambi guity in the contract language, the parties’ past practices
confirm that the word “remove,” as used in the CBA, means termination of employment.
When a written agreement is ambiguous or in complete, a court may consider
extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. Staffing Specifix, Inc. v. TempWorks Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., 913 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Minn. 2018). The MJB submitted extrinsic evidence with its
reconsideration request to the arbitrator and its subsequent motion to vacate the arbitrator’s
decision in the district court.5 Those submissions included the declaration of a former MJB

5 The union argues that this evid ence should not be included in the district court record
because the MJB submitted it to the arbitrat or in connection with the request for
12
employee that summarized contract negotiations between the union and the MJB, and the
parties’ past practices. According to the declaration, the union and the MJB negotiated the
first CBA in 2000 and 2001. During that process, the parties initially were unable to reach
an agreement about whether court reporters would be entitled to an administrative
complaint process, including arbitration, up on termination by an appointing judge. But
after a foray into mediation regarding several issues, “including the at-will status of the
court reporters,” the parties ultimately agreed to a contract “with no erosion of the at will
rights of judges.” And the final draft of the first CBA explicitly recognized that it did not
restrict the right of judges to terminate their court reporters.
As to past practices, the declaration stat es that between 2001 and 2019, 25 court
reporters were terminated by their appointing judges. None of these terminations resulted
in arbitrations. The terminated court reporters left the serv ice of their appointing judges
and were no longer MJB employees.
The extrinsic evidence strongly supports the plain language of the 2019-2021 CBA.
A judge’s decision to terminate a court reporter is not subject to arbitration. The arbitrator
erred in concluding otherwise.

reconsideration after the arbitrator’s decision. However, in conducting de novo review of
an arbitrator’s determination of arbitrability, the district c ourt may receive “evidence in
addition to that presente d to the arbitrator.” State v. Berthiaume , 259 N.W.2d 904, 909
(Minn. 1977). And although the union conte nds that the evidence raises new arguments
that the arbitrator did not address, on de novo review, the district court is not bound by the
arbitrator’s rationale. See id.
13
II. Under Minnesota law, a court reporter appointed by a judge and employed by
the MJB is an at-will employee.

The union also argues that arbitration is required under Minnesota law. It points to
PELRA, which requires all public employee c ontracts to provide a grievance procedure,
including compulsory binding arbitration, for written disciplinary actions. See Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.20, subd. 4. According to the union, to the extent that the 2019-2021 CBA and any
other laws suggest that court reporters are not entitled to arbitrate terminations, they
conflict with PELRA.
Before we turn to the union’s argument, we briefly review the law that we must
consider. As noted, Minnesota Statutes section 486.01 provides that a judge may appoint
a court reporter “to hold office during the judg e’s pleasure.” PELRA does require public
employee contracts to include a grievanc e procedure, as the union observes. See Minn.
Stat. § 179A.20, subd. 4. And it does be stow collective bargaining rights on court
reporters. See Minn. Stat. § 179A.101, subd. 1(e). But PELRA also contains a provision
specifically addressing the employment terms of court reporters who work for judges:
“Notwithstanding any provision of this chap ter or any other law to the contrary, judges
may appoint and remove court reporters at their pleasure.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.101, subd.
1(f). To address the union’s argument, we must determine what these statutes mean. “The
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.”
Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016).
14
To interpret these statutes, we must construe the terms “during the judge’s pleasure”
and “at their pleasure.” Both section 486.01 and PELRA use this language to describe the
employment relationship between a judge and the judge’s appointed court reporter.
The first task in statutory interpretati on is to determine whether the statute’s
language is ambiguous. State v. Townsend , 941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 2020).
Ambiguity exists where a statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.
State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017). If the language of a statute is
plain and unambiguous, we will not engage in further construction. Townsend, 941
N.W.2d at 110.
The legislature has provided some ground rules for determining the plain meaning
of a statute—the canons of interpretation. See Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2020) (“In construing
the statutes of this state, the . . . canons of interpretation are to govern, unless their
observance would involve a construction incons istent with the manifest intent of the
legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute.”); see also State v. Pakhnyuk , 926
N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019). One of those rules requires a court to construe “technical
words and phrases and such othe rs as have acquired a special meaning . . . according to
such special meaning or their definition.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1). “A word has a special
meaning if courts have ascribed a well-established and long-accepted meaning to it.” Cox
v. Mid-Minnesota Mut. Ins. Co., 909 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
To decide whether words or phrases have a technical meaning, we consider the context in
which they appear. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of Duluth v. Lee, 852 N.W.2d 683, 691 (Minn.
15
2014); see also Roberts v. State, 933 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Minn. App. 2019), (explaining that
we consider statutes as a whole), aff’d, 945 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 2020).
The term “pleasure” as used in section 486.01 and section 179A.101, subd. 1(f), has
a technical meaning. “Where a statute provides that a public officer or employee may be
removed at pleasure of the appointing authority, he is removable at will, with or without
cause.” State ex rel. Stubben v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Hennepin Cnty., 141 N.W.2d 499,
504 (Minn. 1966); see also In re Admin. Appeal of Termination of Emp., 374 N.W.2d 754,
756 (Minn. App. 1985) (“Serving at the ‘pleas ure’ of the county at torney is synonymous
with removal at the pleasure of the county attorney.”), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 13, 1985).
Because the term “pleasure” has a technica l meaning when used to describe the
employment status of a public employee, we use that meaning in interpreting section
486.01, which concerns the employment re lationship between a ju dge and the judge’s
appointed court reporter. We conclude that, under section 486.01, a court reporter is an at-
will employee6 who can be removed without cause.
Although the union argues that section 486.01 conflicts with PELRA’s requirement
that all contracts between public employees and their employers provide a grievance
process, PELRA contains an exception for judges that mirrors section 486.01. It excludes
judges from “any provision of this chapter or any other law to the contrary” because
“judges may appoint and remove court repor ters at their pleasure.” Minn. Stat.

6 When an employee is at will, “the employer can summarily dismiss the employee for any
reason or no reason.” Pine River State Bank v. Mettille , 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn.
1983).
16
§ 179A.101, subd. 1(f). By including this exception and using the term “at their pleasure,”
PELRA recognizes that court reporters ar e at-will employees a nd can be terminated 7
notwithstanding any provisions under PELRA. We therefore see no inconsistency between
section 486.01 and PELRA.
Citing General Drivers, Local No. 34 6 v. Aitkin County Board , the union argues
that PELRA’s general requirement for grieva nce procedures trumps any other contrary
statutory provisions, such as section 486 .01. 320 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. 1982). In General
Drivers, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the relationship between the statutory
predecessor to PELRA and a state statute that gave a county sheriff authority to “appoint”
and “remove” deputies “at pleasure,” but gave the county board the authority to set the
number of deputies to be employed and their compensation. Id. at 699. There, the county
had negotiated a CBA with the deputies, which prohibited terminations except for cause.
Id. at 698. Notwithstanding the CBA, the sher iff discharged a deputy without cause. Id.
Before the supreme court, the labor union argued that the PELRA predecessor and the CBA
controlled, while the county board argued that the sheriff had authority to discharge under
the statute delineating the sheriff’s responsibilities. Id. The supreme court determined that
the county board was the sole employer for the purpose of the CBA, and that the PELRA
predecessor and the CBA prevailed over the contrary statute. Id. at 700.

7 We also note that in at least one provision, PELRA uses the word “remove” to mean
termination. See Minn. Stat. § 179A.19, subd. 6 (using the terms “remove” and “terminate”
interchangeably).
17
General Drivers is not helpful to the union, though. Here, the 2019-2021 CBA
expressly excludes a judge’s decision to rem ove a court reporter from the administrative
complaint process. Moreover, as noted, the current incarnation of PELRA excludes from
PELRA requirements the decision of a judg e to remove a court reporter. Thus, General
Drivers does not support the union’s position that PELRA mandates arbitration under the
circumstances here.
Contrary to the union’s argument, Minnesota law does not require arbitration of a
judge’s decision to terminat e an appointed court reporter. Section 486.01 and PELRA
unambiguously state that court reporters are at-will employees. Thus, a judge’s decision
to terminate an appointed court reporter ends the court reporter’s employment with the
judge and the MJB.
DECISION
Neither the 2019-2021 CBA nor Minnesota law requires arbitration of a judge’s
decision to terminate the judge’s appointed court reporter. The arbitrator erred in
concluding otherwise, and the district court properly vacated the arbitrator’s decision.
Affirmed.