Progressive Preferred Insurance Company, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0797

Progressive Preferred Insurance Company,
Appellant,

vs.

Christenson Electric, Inc.,
Respondent.

Filed February 7, 2022
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-20-5069

Michelle D. Hurley, Yost & Baill, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Rachel Beauchamp, Cousineau, Van Bergen, McNee & Malone, P.A., Minnetonka,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In this no -fault insurance appeal, appellant -insurer challenges the district court’s
denial of appellant’s motion to vacate several related arbitration awards. Appellant had
sought indemnity from respondent, the owner of a Ford F250 truck involved in a collision,
but the arbitration panel ruled that appellant was not entitled to seek indemnity because the
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truck was a “passenger vehicle, ” not a “commercial vehicle,” under the Minneso ta No-
Fault Insurance Act (the act), Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2020). Appellant argues that the
arbitration panel misapplied the vehicle definitions in the act and that the district court thus
erred by denying the motion to vacate the arbitration awards. Because we discern no error
in the application of the law, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2018, three vehicles were involved in a collision in Shakopee. A Ford F250
Super Duty four-door truck (the truck), driv en by M.V. and owned by respondent
Christenson Electric, Inc. (Christenson), rear -ended a car driven by M.M. Appellant
Progressive Preferred Insurance Company was the insurer of M.M.’s car .1 After the
accident, Progressive paid no-fault benefits to M.M. and his two passengers. Progressive
then brought claims , before a no -fault arbitration panel, against Christenson seeking
indemnification for the no-fault benefits paid by Progressive.2
Christenson defended against the claims arguing, among other things, that the truck
qualifies as a passenger vehicle and only commercial vehicles are subject to indemnity
under the act. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1. In support of its argument, Christenson
submitted to the arbitration panel the vehicle specifications for the truck showing that the

1 A third vehicle, a large truck, also hit M.M.’s car. The third vehicle is not involved in
this appeal.

2 Three claims were filed against Christenson, which is self-insured, one for each of the
occupants of the vehicle insured by Progressive . The issues applicable to this appeal and
determinations were identical for all three claims.
3
gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) for the truck was “Class 2H: 9,001 – 10,000
[pounds].”
The arbitration panel determined that, while Christenson was “liable for this loss,”
Progressive was not entitled to indemnity because the GVWR of the truck did not exceed
10,000 pounds and that the truck thus did not qualify as a commercial vehicle for the
purposes of obtaining indemnity under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1.
Progressive filed a motion in district court to vacate the arbitration awards, arguing
that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority b ecause it applied an erroneous
interpretation of the act. The district court agreed with the arbitration panel’s interpretation
and denied the motion to vacate the awards. Progressive appeals.
DECISION
This appeal requires us to review the decision of a no -fault arbitration panel.
Arbitrators in a no-fault proceeding under the act “are limited to deciding questions of fact,
leaving the interpretation of law to the courts.” Weaver v. State Farm Ins. Co s., 609
N.W.2d 878, 882 (Minn. 2000). This “departs from the generally accepted principle [in
other kinds of arbitration] that ‘arbitrators are the final judges of both law and fact.’” Id.
(quoting Johnson v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. , 426 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Mi nn. 1988)). The
supreme court has, however, recognized “that to grant relief, arbitrators must apply the law
to the facts they have found.” Fernow v. Gould, 835 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 2013) (quotation
omitted). Findings of fact by an arbitrator are final, but we review an arbitrator’s legal
determinations de novo. Id.
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Progressive claims that it is entitled to indemnity from Christenson under the
provisions of the act for the no-fault benefits it paid to M.M. and his passengers. The act
entitles an insurer to indemnity for no -fault benefits paid by the insurer when the vehicle
responsible for the accident is a “commercial vehicle of more than 5,500 pounds curb
weight.”3 Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1. The parties agree that the truck’s curb weight
exceeds 5,500 pounds. That, however, is only the beginning of the analysis.
Unfortunately, before we can answer the question of whether the truck constitutes a
“commercial vehicle” subject to indemnity under the act, we must track through a series of
definitions that tell us what is not a “commercial vehicle.”
We begin this task with the definition of commercial vehicle in Minn. Stat.
§ 65B.43, subd. 12(b), of the act : “‘Commercial vehicle’ means: . . . any motor vehicle,
other than a passenger vehicle d efined in section 168.002, subdivision 24 . . . .” In turn,
Minn. Stat. § 168.002, subd. 24(c)(1) (2020), provides, in relevant part, the following
definition of passenger automobile:4
“Passenger automobile” includes, but is not limited to:

(1) a vehicle that is a pickup truck . . . as defined in
subdivision[] 26 . . . .

3 According to the recor d, “curb weight” refers to the weight of a vehicle, including fuel
and other fluids but excluding cargo or passengers.

4 The act refers to “passenger vehicle ,” but the definition referenced in Minn. Stat.
§ 65B.43, subd. 12(b) , of the act is for a “passenger automobile.” Compare Minn. Stat.
§ 65B.43, subd. 12(b) (“passenger vehicle”) with Minn. Stat. § 168.002, subd. 24
(“passenger automobile”). The parties raised no concerns about this difference in wording
and we will assume they are interchangeable for the purposes of our analysis.
5
This brings us to the third and final definition relevant to the analysis —the definition of
“pickup truck” set out in Minn. Stat. § 168.002, subd. 26 (2020):
“Pickup truck” means any truck with a manufacturer ’s nominal
rated carrying capacity of three-fourths ton or less and commonly
known as a pickup truck. If the manufacturer ’s nominal rated
carrying capacity is not provided or cannot be determined, then
the value specifi ed by the manufacturer as the gross vehicle
weight as indicated on the manufacturer’s certification label must
be less than 10,000 pounds.

The arbitration panel ruled here that “Progressive failed to prove that [the truck] is
considered a commercial vehicle.” The arbitration panel’s decision is sparse and provides
little to no explanation of its reasoning in reaching this conclusion. The arbitration panel,
however, did state that the vehicle specifications submitted by Christenson “supports the
vehicle is a class 2 GVWR” and, as such, the truck “does not qualify as a commercial
vehicle” under the act.
The district court relied on this statement in its analysis of the arbitration decision.
The district court noted that “Minn. Stat. § 168.002, subd. 2[6], states that when a
manufacturer’s nominal rated carrying capacity is not provided, the question of whether a
truck qualifies as a commercial vehicle turns on whether its gross vehicle weight is less
than 10,000 pounds.” From that, the district court drew the logical conclusion, “that the
arbitrators based their decision on the truck’s weight rating [of 9,001 – 10,000 pounds]” in
the vehicle specifications supplied by Christenson . The district court reasoned that “it is
abundantly clear from the limited record in this case that the arbitrators based their decision
on the truck’s weight rating after determining that the part ies had not submitted evidence
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of its nominal rated carrying capacity .”5 The district court thus concluded that the
arbitration panel was correct in finding that (1) the truck was a “pickup truck” under Minn.
Stat. § 168.002, subd. 26 ; (2) it thus constituted a “passenger automobile” under Minn.
Stat. § 168.002, subd. 24; and (3) it was thereby excluded from the definition of
“commercial vehicle” in Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 12(b), of the act.
Progressive challenges the district court’s conclusion, arguing that the arbitration
panel and the district court misapplied the act because they ignored a phrase in the statutory
definition of “pickup truck.” Specifically, Progressive argues that, under the definition of
“pickup truck” in Minn. S tat. § 168.002, subd. 26, it is only proper to rely on the GVWR
when the “manufacturer’s nominal rated carrying capacity is not provided or cannot be
determined.” (Emphasis added.) Progressive agreed at oral argument that no document
showing the “manufacturer’s nominal rated carrying capacity” was produced and, indeed,
the parties appear to agree that manufacturers do not provide a “nominal rated carrying
capacity” for pickup trucks. Progressive argues, however, that the “ manufacturer’s
nominal rated carrying capacity” is a number that “can be determined” within the meaning
of Minn. Stat. § 168.002, subd. 26, and, since it “can be determined,” the arbitration panel
erred by deciding that the truck was not a commercial vehicle based on the truck’s GVWR.

5 We note that the vehicle specifications provided to the arbitration panel by Christenson
simply stated “9,001 – 10,000” pounds. Presumably, this includes a GVWR of 10,000
pounds. The definition of “pickup truck” in Minn. Stat. § 168.002, subd. 26, specifies a
GVWR of less than 10,000 pounds. Thus, theoretically, it could be argued that the truck
may not qualify as a pickup truck because of the possibility that its GVWR is 10,000
pounds, and is not less than 10,000 p ounds. Progressive, however, did not make that
argument either to the district court or in this appeal. We point it out here only to note this
de minimis discrepancy.
7
In support of its argument, Progressive points to an article from the website
“auto.howstuffworks.com” explaining that “payload capacity” can be calculated by
subtracting the gross vehicle weight rating from the curb weight. Progressive claims that
this calculation constitutes a method for determining the “manufacturer’s nominal rated
carrying capacity.” Progressive, however, missed a step in its proof —Progressive failed
to pro vide any evidence that “payload capacity” and a “manufacturer’s nominal rated
carrying capacity” are the same. And we cannot just assume that these phrases can be used
interchangeably as Progressive asks us to do. We must adhere to the rules of statutory
interpretation.
Here, the statutory definition of “pickup truck” uses the phrase “nominal rated” as
a modifier for “carrying capacity ,” but does not further define what is intended by that
phrase. Without a definition in the statute, t he rules of statutory interpretation require us
to look to “common and approved usage” of words and phrases. Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1)
(2020); see also Rodriguez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 931 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn.
2019). “[W]here the Legislature has not provided definitions of the relevant terms, we may
consider dictionary definitions to determine a word’s common usage.” Laymon v. Minn.
Premier Props., LLC , 913 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Minn. 2018). As Christenson notes in its
argument, t he word “nominal” is defined as “[e]xisting in name only; not real.” The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1197 (5th ed. 2018). The
definition suggests that the phrase “manufacturer’s nominal rated carrying capacity” is a
designated value that may or may not correspond to actual carrying or “payload” capacity.
As such, we must reject Progressive’s argument that the “manufacturer’s nominal rated
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carrying capacity” is a number that “can be determined” by calculating the “payload
capacity.”
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying the motion to
vacate the arbitration decision.6
Affirmed.

6 We note that a related issue under the act was analyzed in the recently released
precedential opinion of this court in Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co.,
___ N.W.2d ___ (Minn. App. Jan. 31, 2022) . The American Family opinion addresses
whether a pickup truck can qualify as a “passenger vehicle” under the act even if the parties
agree that the truck’s manufacturer’s nominal rated carrying capacity exceeds the limit set
out in Minn. Stat. § 168.002, subd. 26. Because the only issue asserted in this appeal is
whether the nominal rated carrying capacity of the t ruck “can be determined” by
subtracting the GVWR of the truck from its payload capacity, we have not analyzed the
impact of the American Family decision on this appeal.