State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0818

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Edward David Stahlmann,
Appellant.

Filed March 28, 2022
Affirmed; motion denied
Reilly, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-20-1151

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney , Heather Pipenhagen , Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Connolly , Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
On appeal from his conviction and sentence for check forgery, appellant argues that
the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional
2
departure. We affirm the district court’s decision. Based on this ruling, we deny as moot
respondent’s motion to strike portions of appellant’s pro se supplemental addendum.
FACTS
In December 2019, appellant Edward Da vid Stahlmann agreed to purchase a
restaurant business for about $400,000. A ppellant presented the business owner with a
cashier’s check and assumed co ntrol of the business and its accounts. In January 2020,
appellant transferred the company’s assets to his personal account and withdrew cash from
his account. Several days later, the bank reported that the cashier’s check was fraudulent.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged a ppellant with three counts of check
forgery. The state gave notice that it woul d seek an aggravated durational departure
because of appellant’s status as a repeat fe lony offender. The stat e based its request on
appellant’s criminal record, which included five or more felony convictions, and the
current charges committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct.
The parties reached a plea agreement. Appellant agreed to plead guilty to one count
of check forgery. In exchange, the state agr eed to dismiss the remaining charges. At the
plea hearing, appellant admitted that he presented a fraudulent check to the business owner.
Appellant admitted that he “kne w that it wasn’t a valid check and, in fact, that it was a
forged check.” Appellant acknow ledged that he used the ch eck to gain control of the
business. Appellant also ad mitted the aggravating factors of engaging in a pattern of
3
criminal conduct and of being a repeat offender. 1 The district court accepted appellant’s
guilty plea.
The plea agreement noted that the state could request a sentence of up to 180 months
in prison because of the aggravating factors,2 and that appellant could request probation or
a guidelines sentence. Before sentencing, appellant moved for a downward dispositional
departure, claiming that he wa s particularly amenable to pr obation. The district court
sentenced appellant to 120 mont hs in prison. The district court noted that this was an
aggravated durational departure under Minnesota Statutes section 609.1095, subdivision 4
(2020), based on appellant’s admission that he en gaged in a pattern of criminal conduct.
The district court also denied appellant’s motion for a downward dispositional departure.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. We affirm the district court’s sentencing decision.
Appellant challenges the district court’ s denial of his motion for a downward
dispositional departure. Appellant does not challenge the district court’s decision to
impose an aggravated durational departure. We review a district court’s refusal to grant a
dispositional departure for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668
(Minn. 2006). We will affirm the district court’s decision “when the record shows that the
[district] court carefully evaluated all th e testimony and information presented before

1 Because appellant admitted these aggravating factors, the district court could use these
factors to impose an upward durational departure from the sentencing guidelines.
2 Appellant has 23 total crimin al-history points with a se ntencing guideline range of 44
months to 60 months and a presumptive prison commitment of 51 months.
4
making a determination.” State v. Johnson , 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
Whether a downward dispositional departure is appropriate typically depends on a
defendant’s individual characteristics. State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn.
2016). A downward dispositiona l departure may be appropriate if a defendant shows a
“particular amenability to individualized treatment in a probationary setting.” State v. Soto,
855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Trog , 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn.
1982)). For a downward dispositional departur e to be warranted on this basis, the
defendant must be particul arly amenable to probation—meaning “the defendant’s
amenability to probation distin guishes the defendant from most others and tr uly presents
the substantial and compelling circumstances th at are necessary to ju stify a departure.”
Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309 (quotation omitted). The district court considers several factors,
including “the defendant’s age, his prior reco rd, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude
while in court, and the support of [the defendant’s] friends and/or family.” Trog, 323
N.W.2d at 31. Offense-related factors ma y also be used to support a downward
dispositional departure. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 313 (conside ring circumstances of offense
when reviewing departure request).
Appellant claims he is entitled to a downwa rd dispositional depart ure. A district
court need not set forth its reasons for de nying a motion for a downward dispositional
departure, provided it considered the reasons for departure. State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d
77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985). The district court need only demonstrate that it exercised its
discretion by considering the reas ons for and against departure. Id. at 80-81. Here,
5
appellant claims he accepted responsibility for his actions, has family support, and is
committed to addressing his mental-health issues. Assuming, without deciding, that these
Trog factors show appellant’s particular am enability to probation, “the presence of
mitigating factors does not obligate the [district] court to place a defendant on probation or
impose a shorter [prison] term.” Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn. App. 2013)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2014).
Appellant also argues in his pro se supplemental brief that his crimes stem from his
mental illness, which he prefers to addre ss in counseling in a probationary setting.
Appellant claims he “lacks capacity” because of his depression and a nxiety, and that the
district court should have considered a stay ed sentence under Minnesota Statutes section
609.1055 (2020). A district court may, “whe n consistent with public safety,” place an
offender “with a serious and persistent mental illness” on probation with the requirement
that the offender successfully co mplete treatment, rather th an impose a prison sentence.
Minn. Stat. § 609.1055. The de cision to place the offender on probation is discretionary.
Id. Appellant failed to raise this argument in district court and we decline to consider it for
the first time on appeal. See State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn. 1989) (noting
that reviewing courts “will not decide issues which are not first addressed by the trial court
and are raised for the first time on appeal”). Further, even assuming appellant suffered
from anxiety and mental illness, the district court did not have to place appellant on
probation because the decision to depart is discretionary. See State v. Abdi , 855 N.W.2d
546, 548-49 (Minn. App. 2014) (noting that even if section 609.1055 applies, the decision
whether to apply it rests with the district court).
6
The record shows that the district court thoroughly and thoughtfully considered the
arguments in support of the departure motion, but did not find that there were identifiable,
substantial, or compelling reasons to grant appellant’s motion to depart. The district court
referenced the presentence investigation report (the PSI) and noted that appellant had
approximately 28 or 30 convictions listed [in the record
presented to the court], all of similar types of convictions:
issued dishonored check, filing of false taxes, check forgery,
theft by swindle, [and] posse ssion of sales of counterfeit
checks. All very concerning be havior. What I might add is
that these aren’t small amounts, which is very concerning to
the Court . . . . We’re looking at almost 17 years of behavior
of which [appellant] has served multiple prison terms. But we
are still on the same behavior.

The district court observed that appellant displayed “an ongoing pattern of conduct
that is dangerous to all of the people and a financial danger to everybody.” The district
court noted that there are “types of patterns of things that have been going on for so many
years [that] are concerning to the Court and financially injures [everyone].” The district
court also found that appellant “admitted to aggr avating factor[s]” as part of a pattern of
criminal conduct. The district court ultimately concluded that appellant was not entitled to
a downward dispositional departure. Upon review, we determine that the PSI supports the
district court’s statements about appellant’s escalating criminal behavior. Thus, because
the record supports the district court’s determination, we discern no abuse of discretion.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognizes that only a “rare case” merits reversal of
a district court’s refusal to issue a downward dispositional departure. State v. Kindem, 313
N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). This is not the “rare case” compelling reversal. The district
court considered the circumstances for and against departure and concluded that appellant
7
was not entitled to a downward di spositional departure. The record supports the district
court’s decision. We thus determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying appellant’s motion.
II. The state’s motion to strike is moot.
The state moved to strike portions of appellant’s pro se supplemental addendum that
are not part of the record on appeal. Because we are not considering appellant’s argument
that he lacked capacity for judgment based on his failure to make this argument at
sentencing, the motion to strike the confidenti al material from the addendum is denied as
unnecessary.
Affirmed; motion denied.