State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0820

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shannon Lee Christianson, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed November 8, 2021
Affirmed in part and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-12-2349

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jordan W. Rude, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presid ing Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Shannon Lee Christianson, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order
denying his motion to correct his sentence, arguing that the ten-ye ar conditional-release
term following his prison sentence for third- degree criminal sexual co nduct is unlawful.
He contends that, in resentencing him on remand from this court, the district court did not
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reimpose the conditional-release term, and once his sentence expired, the district court had
no authority to add it. Because the district court imposed the conditional-release term at
Christianson’s original sentencing hearing an d only modified the dur ation of the prison
sentence on remand, we conclude that the district court di d not abuse its discretion in
denying Christianson’s motion, and we affirm in part. But because the resentencing order
contains a clerical error, we remand to the district court to amend the order.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ch ristianson by amended complaint with
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. St at. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2010), third-
degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat . § 609.344, subd. 1( c) (2010), pattern-of-
stalking conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(a) (2010), and false imprisonment, Minn.
Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2 (2010). Following a jury trial, Christianson was convicted of third-
degree criminal sexual conduct and pattern-of-stalking conduct. For the criminal-sexual-
conduct conviction, the district court sentenced Christianson to 99 months in prison—a
sentence at the upper end of the presumptive sentencing range—to be followed by a ten-
year conditional-release term. The district court imposed a concurrent 39-month sentence
for the pattern-of-stalking-conduct conviction.
Christianson appealed his 99-month sent ence for the criminal-sexual-conduct
conviction, arguing that the district court re lied on improper considerations to impose a
sentence at the upper end of the presumptive range. Specifically, Christianson asserted
that the district court abused its discretion by partially basing his sentence on the actions
of his family members in the courtroom, a co ndition beyond his control. We agreed and
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reversed and remanded for resentencing, stati ng that, “the district court may . . . issue a
new sentence anywhere within the presumptive range.” 1
On remand, the district court sentenced Christianson to 93 months in prison for the
criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. During the court’s sentencing pronouncement, the
following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: I’m going to resentence you, sir, to 93 months.
I find that that’s an appropri ate sentence given all the—the
facts and circumstances of this case.

You will, obviously, have credit for all the time that you’ve
served. I don’t know what th e number is right now but all
we’re doing is changing the sentence.

[CHRISTIANSON’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor,
[Christianson] asked me briefly before we started about
whether this changed his [criminal history] points or anything,
and I told him that I don’t think there’s anything that will
change other than the number of the sentence.

THE COURT: Yes.

[CHRISTIANSON’S COUNSEL]: Do you agree with that?

THE COURT: Yes.

(Emphasis added). The district court and the parties did not discuss the ten-year
conditional-release term orig inally imposed to follow th e criminal-sexual-conduct
sentence. Moreover, the district court did not address or modify Christianson’s other
sentence for pattern-of-stalking conduct.

1 State v. Christianson, No. A13-0433, 2014 WL 1344203, at *7 (Minn. App. Apr. 7, 2014).
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The district court record contains a written amended sentencing order from May 16,
2014, which reflects the district court’s mo dified 93-month sent ence for the criminal-
sexual-conduct conviction. This amended sentencing order does not show the conditional-
release term as following Christianson’s cr iminal-sexual-conduct conviction, however.
Instead, it shows that the conditional-release term is attached to the 39-month sentence for
pattern-of-stalking conduct.
Christianson served his prison sentence a nd was released on intensive supervised
release. On December 26, 2019—while Chri stianson was on supervised release—the
Minnesota Department of Corr ections held a supervised-rel ease-violation hearing. The
notes from that hearing, which are part of th e record before us, include recommendations
from the parole agent and Christianson’s atto rney. The agent’s recommendation states,
“The agent requests the offender’s supervised release be revoked to 02/29/20, after which
he will beg[i]n his conditional release period.” Further, the hearing notes state, “Counsel
states the offender [cannot] be revoked past 02/29/20 as he starts his conditional release on
03/01/20” and “Counsel and the offender concur with the agent’s recommendations.”
In March 2021, Christianson filed a motion to correct his sentence. He asked the
district court to vacate the ten-year conditional-release term reflected in the court’s May 16,
2014 written sentencing order, arguing that the conditional release was unlawfully imposed
as part of his sentence for pattern-of-stalkin g conduct. Christians on did not request a
hearing. The district court issued an orde r denying Christianson’s motion. It explained
that the May 16, 2014 sentencing order—whic h attached the conditional-release term to
the pattern-of-stalking-conduct sentence ra ther than the crim inal-sexual-conduct
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sentence—contained a clerical error that did not reflect the district court’s intent or the
actual sentence in the Minnesot a Court Information System (M NCIS). The district court
concluded that the statutorily mandated conditional-release term was correctly imposed as
part of the sentence for criminal sexual co nduct at the original December 11, 2012
sentencing hearing. It further concluded that the original conditional-release term was not
affected by our decision remanding for resentencing or by the subsequent modification of
Christianson’s prison sentence from 99 months to 93 months. The district court did not
issue a new sentencing order because it determ ined that “any clerical error in the 2014
MNCIS sentencing order has already been corre cted, as evidenced by the sentence as it
currently appears in MNCIS.”
Christianson appeals.
DECISION
Christianson challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to correct his
sentence. Under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, a district
court “may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by la w.” A sentence is
unauthorized if it is “contrary to law or applicable statutes.” State v. Overweg, 922 N.W.2d
179, 182 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). A sentence that omits a statutorily mandated
conditional-release term is unauthorized. State v. Humes , 581 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn.
1998).
An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion to correct a sentence for an abuse
of discretion. Overweg, 922 N.W.2d at 182. “Specifically, [an appellate court] review[s]
the district court’s legal conclusions de no vo and its factual findi ngs under the clearly
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erroneous standard.” Townsend v. State , 834 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. 2013) (citation
omitted).
Here, the parties agree that the amended sentencing order erroneously attached the
conditional-release period to Christianson’s se ntence for the pattern-of-stalking-conduct
offense.2 The record reflects that, at some point after the resentencing hearing,
Christianson completed his 93-month sentence for the criminal-sexual-conduct conviction
and the conditional-release term commenced.
In denying Christianson’s motion to corre ct his sentence, the district court
concluded that the May 16, 2014 order—the written order i ssued immediately after the
sentencing hearing—contained a clerical error. Christians on does not challenge this
finding. Instead, he argues that in reversing his sentence on appeal, we necessarily reversed
the mandatory conditional-release term. And because the dist rict court did not explicitly
pronounce a conditional-release term at sent encing, and the amended sentencing order
showed the conditional-release term as a component of the stalking sentence, there was no
conditional-release term after the resentencing hearing.
We first address Christianson’s argument that the original conditional-release
period did not survive this court’s reversal of his sentence. For the reasons discussed
below, we disagree with Christianson that th e original conditional-release term ceased to

2 Minnesota Statutes section 609.3455, subdivision 6 (2010), provides that a ten-year
conditional-release term is mandatory for an offender who has been convicted of first-
through fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct or criminal sexual predatory conduct,
“[n]otwithstanding the statutory maximum se ntence otherwise appli cable to the offense
and unless a longer conditional release term is required.”
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exist when we reversed and remanded his se ntence and the district court modified the
duration of his sentence.
First, our decision reversing Christianson’s sentence does not support his position.
We only reversed Christianson’s prison sent ence, and our decision was limited to the
duration of that sentence. Our remand to th e district court was likewise limited; we
remanded solely to give the dist rict court an opportunity to reconsider the length of the
prison sentence imposed. Our decision did not address the conditional-release term.
Second, the record on remand does not support Christianson’s argument. As noted,
on remand, everyone agreed that the only issue before the district court was the duration of
Christianson’s sentence for third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Third, the law does not support Christianson’s argument. “When a statute mandates
a period of conditional release, any sentence that omits the conditional-release period is
unauthorized.” Kubrom v. State , 863 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Minn. App. 2015). To the extent
that the sentencing order did not include the conditional-release term as part of the third-
degree sentence, the resulting sentence was improper.
Christianson argues that, ev en if the conditional-release term endured after the
resentencing hearing, the district court “los t” its authority to co rrect the error in the
amended sentencing order. He contends that once his supe rvised release expired on
February 29, 2020, the district court had no jurisdiction to fix the mistake. He also alleges
that the district court’s addition of furthe r sanctions—the conditional-release term—after
the expiration of his sentence implicated his right to due process.
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As stated, courts may, at a ny time, correct a sentence that is unauthorized by law.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd . 9. But as Christianson poin ts out, “[o]nce a sentence has
expired, the court no longer has jurisdiction to modify even what may be an unauthorized
sentence.” Martinek v. State , 678 N.W.2d 714, 718 (Minn. App. 2004) (citing State v.
Purdy, 589 N.W.2d 496, 498-99 (Minn. App. 1999)); State v. Hannam, 792 N.W.2d 862,
865 (Minn. App. 2011). “The expiration of a sentence operate s as a discharge that bars
further sanctions for a criminal conviction.” Purdy, 589 N.W.2d at 498.
We reject Christianson’s ar gument that the district court has no jurisdiction to
correct the mistake in its record s. Preliminarily, we agree with the district court that the
mistake in the amended sentencing order is a clerical error. “Clerical mistakes” are errors
that are “apparent upon the face of the record and capable of being corrected by reference
to the record only. It is usually a mistake in the clerical work of transcribing the particular
record [and] cannot reasonably be attributed to the exercise of judicial consideration or
discretion.” State v. Walsh, 456 N.W.2d 442, 443 (M inn. App. 1990) (quoting Wilson v.
City of Fergus Falls , 232 N.W. 322, 323 (Minn. 1930)). A motion to correct a clerical
error can only be used to ensure the truthfulness of the judgment or record, not to alter
them. Id. “Clerical mistakes in a judgment, order, or in the record arising from oversight
or omission may be corrected by the court at any time, or after notice if ordered by the
court.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 10.
Here, the amended sentencing order clearl y contains a transcription error. The
conditional-release term was notated below the wrong conviction. This error was not
attributable to judicial discretion. Indeed, as Christianson observes, the district court had
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no discretion to order conditiona l release to follow his sent ence for pattern-of-stalking
conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(a); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6.
Because the error is a clerical error, the district court retained the authority to correct it.
We also are not persuaded by Christians on’s argument that the clerical error
implicated his due-process rights. “An una uthorized sentence may be corrected without
violating due process when a defendant has notice that a correction is required and has not
developed a crystallized ex pectation as to the finality of the sentence.” Kubrom, 863
N.W.2d at 92 (quotation omitted). Again, th e record shows that Ch ristianson was told
about the conditional-release term at his orig inal sentencing hearing and agreed that the
district court’s resentencing decision only a ffected the duration of his prison sentence for
criminal sexual conduct. Moreover, the record establishes that Ch ristianson knew he
would be on conditional release even before his criminal-sexual-conduct sentence expired.
The notes from his supervised-release-viol ation hearing—which he submitted to the
district court in connection with his motion to correct his sentence —reflect a specific
discussion about the conditional -release term while he was s till on supervised release.
According to those notes, Christianson’s parole agent stated that Christianson “will begin
his conditional release period” after his February 29, 2020 date of maximum confinement.
Christianson’s attorney obse rved that Christianson “start s his conditional release on
03/01/20.” And Christianson agreed with the agent’s recommendations, which referenced
the conditional-release period. Given the reco rd, Christianson clearly had notice that he
was subject to the conditional-release term and had not devel oped a “crystalized
expectation” as to the finality of the sentence. State v. Calmes , 632 N.W.2d 641, 648
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(Minn. 2001). Thus, the mistak e in the amended sentencing order raises no due process
concerns.
In denying Christianson’s motion to correct his sentence, the district court observed
that the clerical error has already been corrected in MNCIS, which shows the conditional-
release term as following the criminal-sexual-conduct sentence. But the district court’s
amended sentencing order issued on May 16, 2014, which contains a clerical error, remains
a part of the record. To avoid future confusion, the clerical error in the amended sentencing
order should be addressed. We therefore remand to the district court to issue a new order
reflecting Christianson’s correct sentence.
Affirmed in part and remanded.