In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0821

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:

S. K. S., Parent.

Filed December 13, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-JV-21-8

Michael K. Pepin, Michael K. Pepin Law Offices, Pine Springs, Minnesota (for appellant
S.K.S.)

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Aimee S. Cupelli, Assistant County Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for Chisago County Health and Human Services)

Charlene Larsen, Cedar, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pr esiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the termination of his parental rights, arguing that the
district court (1) clearly erred by finding th at respondent-county made reasonable efforts

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
to reunite the family and (2) abused its discretion by determining that termination is in the
child’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant S.K.S. (father) has two children. Both children have the same mother.
Respondent Chisago County Health and Human Services (the county) has been involved
with and providing services to the family since 2016. In August 2017, father’s parental
rights to his first child were voluntarily term inated because of concerns about father’s
domestic violence, criminal history, active criminal charges, and substance abuse. Father’s
second child, who was born in 2018, is the subject of this case.
In April 2020, the county opened a family assessment for domestic
violence/threatened injury after receiving a re port about an incident that occurred in the
presence of the child. The report related to a physical altercation involving father, mother,
and others. The report alleged that father was armed with knives, yelling, and throwing
objects. According to law enforcement who observed father just after the alleged incident,
father appeared to be under the influence of chemicals. Father was subsequently arrested
for domestic assault. In Ma y 2020, the county received a second report involving father.
This report alleged that father physically assaulted his half-sister while the child was
present. In response to these reports, a county investigator made numerous efforts to reach
the family for purposes of co nducting the family assessment but was unable to make any
contact with the family or locate the child.
On June 29, 2020, the county received a third intake report and opened a new
investigation. The report stated that father had been arrested for shooting an individual
3
who father believed had sold drugs to mother. Father allegedly shot the individual after
mother overdosed (but not fatally). Father was charged with felony second-degree assault
with a dangerous weapon.
The day after receiving this report, th e county petitioned to have the child
adjudicated as a child in need of protection or services. The district court granted the
petition on an emergency basis and the child was placed into temporary foster care.
After the placement of the child, the county made efforts to develop a case plan with
father to address the concerns that led to the out-of-home placement. The case plan, which
father signed in August 2020 , focused on addressing fathe r’s chemical health, mental
health, domestic violence, and criminal activ ity. To address these concerns, the plan
required father to do the following: complete a chemical-dependency evaluation and follow
its recommendations; comply with an initial hair-follicle test; comply with additional drug
testing as requested by the county; comple te a psychological evaluation including an
anger-testing component and follow its reco mmendations; complete an offender-based
domestic-violence program; attend all schedule d visits with the child ; work on parenting
skills; remain law-abiding; and participate in assessments and services for the child.
In October 2020, mother tragically passed away from another suspected overdose.
A few months later, in January 2021, the coun ty petitioned to terminat e father’s parental
rights to the child.
In the petition, the county identified the following statutory grounds for termination
of father’s parental rights: (1) refusing or neglecting to comply with the duties imposed by
the parent-child relationship, (2) palpable un fitness to be a party to the parent-child
4
relationship, (3) failure of reasonable efforts to correct the conditions leading to the child’s
out-of-home placement, and (4) the child’s status as neglected and in foster care. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2 ), (4)-(5), (8) (2020). In support of the statutory grounds,
the petition alleged that father had “struggled to demonstrate consistent progress, insight,
sobriety, responsibility, and compliance with his case plan.” Specifically, he continued to
test positive for methamphetamine and engage in criminal activity. In addition, father
completed a psychological assessment whic h diagnosed him with borderline personality
disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and two chemical-use disorders. The psychological
assessment concluded that father was “not appropriate to i ndependently parent” the child
because of his unmanaged ment al illness. In addition, the petition for termination
expressed concern about father’s ability to provide stable housing for the child. Based on
these factual allegations, the petition asserted that termination of father’s parental rights
was in the best interests of the child. The petition em phasized that the child was
particularly vulnerable because of her trauma history, had been in out-of-home placement
for a significant portion of her life (197 days), and needed permanency and stability.
The case proceeded to trial in April and May of 2021, during which the district court
received over 70 exhibits and heard testim ony from a number of witnesses, including
father, an expert toxicologist, the expert who conducted father’s psychological assessment,
the child’s guardian ad litem, and the social workers who managed the case. Relevant to
this appeal, the social workers testified that they engaged in various efforts to rehabilitate
father and reunify the family. After placing the child in appropriate foster care, they
facilitated supervised visits between father and the child, providing a visit supervisor and
5
a parenting-skills educator for each visit. They referred father to various providers for
his chemical-use and psychological asse ssments and for the resulting treatment
recommendations. They provided father with an application for state-funded treatment and
health insurance. They facilitated regular drug testing and provided father with gas cards
to help with the cost of transportation. They arranged weekly phone calls with father that
included his case manager and his case manager’s supervisor.
The social workers also testified that fa ther had not substantially completed his
case-plan requirements by the time of trial. He complied with an initial hair-follicle drug
test and completed chemical-use and psycho logical assessments but did not complete
chemical-dependency treatment. And he continued to test positive for methamphetamine.
In addition, he did not complete individual therapy, delayed in starting dialectical behavior
therapy (DBT) (prescribed to treat borderline personality disorder), and did not complete a
domestic-violence program as recommended.
At trial, father testified that he no longer uses methamphet amine and no longer
struggles with chemical dependency. However, an expert toxicologist testified that the
amount of methamphetamine appearing in father’s drug-screen test results was consistent
with chronic, repeated use over the previous year. Father also testified that he believed his
borderline-personality-disorder diagnosis was wrong and that he had his mental health
under control.
The district court granted the county’s petition to terminate father’s parental rights.
The district court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported termination on
three separate statutory grounds: (1) refusi ng or neglecting to comply with the duties
6
imposed by the parent-child re lationship, (2) being palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent-child relationship, and (3) the failure of reasonable efforts to correct the conditions
leading to the child’s out-of- home placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2),
(4)-(5). The district court made detailed findings as to each ground for termination.
Separately, the district court made spec ific findings as to whether the county
engaged in reasonable efforts to finalize th e permanency plan, rehabilitate father, and
reunify the family, as required by Minn. Stat. §§ 260.012(a), 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2020).
The district court determined that the coun ty “repeatedly provided reasonable efforts and
services” to father and the child throughout the proceedings that were relevant to the child’s
safety and protection, adequate to meet the family’s needs, culturally appropriate, available
and accessible, and consistent, timely, and realis tic given the circumstances. The district
court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interests.
Father appeals.
DECISION
“Parental rights should only be terminat ed for grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of Children of B.M., 845 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted).
Generally, we will affirm a district court’s termination of parental rights when (1) “at least
one statutory ground for termination is sup ported by clear and convincing evidence,”
(2) the county has made reasonable effort s to reunite the pa rent and child, and
(3) termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. ,
744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). When re viewing a decision to terminate parental
rights, we review a district court’s factua l findings for clear error, but we “review its
7
determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental
rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. ,
805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
Here, the district court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports three
statutory bases for termination. It also co ncluded that the county engaged in reasonable
efforts to rehabilitate father and reunify the family. Father does not challenge the specific
statutory grounds for terminati on found by the district court. Instead, father’s appeal
focuses on the district court’s determination that the county made reasonable efforts at
reunification. Father argues that the dist rict court clearly erred in making this
determination. And father further argues that the district court abused its discretion when
it found that terminating father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
I. The district court did not clearly err by finding that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite father and the child.

Unless relieved of its obligation by the district court, a county seeking to terminate
a person’s parental rights must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite
the parent with their child. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a); In re Children of T.R. ,
750 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. 2008). “Whether the county has met its duty of reasonable
efforts requires consideration of the length of the time the county was involved and the
quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990),
rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). Reasonable efforts must “g o beyond mere matters of
form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W. ,
727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
8
2007). The efforts must be: “(1) relevant to the safety and pr otection of the child;
(2) adequate to meet the ne eds of the child and family ; (3) culturally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the
circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020). And the district court must make
“individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the
social services agen cy to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1).
The district court concluded that the coun ty met the six requirements for services
constituting reasonable efforts under Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). The district court
specifically found that the county provided the following services in its effort to finalize a
permanency plan, rehabilitate father, and reunify father with the child:
 Placed the child in foster care that met her needs
 Ensured regular communication between father, foster-care providers, and other
professionals to make sure appropriate services were provided
 Conducted a relative search and deve loped an out-of-home permanency
placement plan which was re viewed with father and subsequently filed and
approved by the district court
 Provided reasonable supervised visits between father and the child, though the
county could have allowed more visita tion once father started consistently
participating in visits
 Assisted in locating, arranging, and prov iding referrals for fa ther to complete
chemical-use and parenting asse ssments and comply with their
recommendations
 Provided services for the child including a diagnostic assessment
 Provided gas cards to father and transported the child for visits
 Provided drug testing to assist father in remaining sober from illicit drugs
 Helped father and the child obtain health insurance

9
The district court found that despite these reasonable efforts, father’s chemical dependency,
mental illness, criminal activity, and dome stic-violence issues prevented him from
appropriately parenting and providing a stable environment for the child.
Whether the county made reasonable efforts at reunification is an underlying factual
finding that we review for clear error. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 387. “A finding is clearly
erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of S.R.K. , 911 N.W.2d 821, 830
(Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). “We defer to the district court’s determinations of
witness credibility and th e weight to be give n to the evidence.” In re Welfare of T.D. ,
731 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. App. 2007).
Father argues that the district court clearly erred when it found that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify father and the child for the following reasons: (1) the county
brought its petition to terminate too soon; (2 ) the case workers were “just going through
the motions” and did not help father obtain n ecessary services; and (3) obtaining services
was more difficult because of pandemic-related closures.
To support these arguments, father makes several specific assertions. He contends
that he attended chemical-dependency therapy consistently and would have completed the
program by the time of trial if not for his own request to voluntarily extend his participation
in the program. He emphasizes that he followed through with the psychological evaluation
just after the death of the child’s mother in October 2020 because he was committed to
reunification. And he asserts that he was de layed in starting his DBT therapy because he
was left to fend for himself. He claims he called every prov ider on the DBT referral list
10
that he received from the county, but none of them were accepting new patients due to the
pandemic. He states that he later found a DBT counseling service on his own, but he was
unable to get an appoin tment before March 2021. He also asserts that he was unable to
start classes addressing domestic violence until March 2021 due to the pandemic. And he
argues that the county’s failure to increase his visitation with the child and involve him in
the child’s diagnostic assessment demonstrates the county’s la ck of reasonable efforts to
reunify the family. We are not persuaded for several reasons.
First, we disagree that the county brought its petition to terminate father’s parental
rights too soon. The record demonstrates that the county brought its petition to terminate
father’s parental rights within the timeframe required by statute. Generally, a permanency
or termination of parental rights petition must be filed at or prior to the time the child has
been in foster care for 11 months. Minn. St at. § 260C.505(a) (2020). Further, a review
hearing must be held after only six months to evaluate the parent’s progress on the case plan
and the county’s reasonable efforts and provisi on of services. Minn. Stat. § 260C.204(a)
(2020). Here, the county filed its petition to terminate father’s parental rights
approximately six months after the child was placed in foster care. Therefore, as noted by
the district court, the county properly filed its petition in accordance with the timeline
established by statute. While we recognize that the statutor y timeline prescr ibed by the
legislature is expedited, the timeline reflects a recognition that an e fficient resolution is
essential for the best in terests of the child. See In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. ,
853 N.W.2d 127, 134 (Minn. 2014) (noting that child-protecti on proceedings “are
expedited because a quick resolution is essential for the best interests of children who are
11
in need of protection”). Furthermore, the record in this case reflects that the county brought
its petition only after making numerous efforts to reunify father and the child.
Second, the record fully supports the district court’s finding that the efforts made by
the county at reunification were reasonable. The social work ers managing father’s case
testified to their efforts to work with fath er toward reuniting him with the child. As
described in detail by the district court, these efforts included, but were not limited to, the
following: engaging in multiple attempts to meet with father to develop the case plan,
facilitating weekly visitation w ith the child, holding weekly phone calls with the case
manager and a supervisor to address fath er’s progress and concerns, coordinating
outpatient treatment, facilitating drug testing, and referring father to service providers and
programs to help him stay sober and stabilize his mental health.
To the extent that father is asking us to reweigh the evidence on appeal, we may not
do so. Our role is to review the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the factual
findings made by the district court. In re Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 223
(Minn. 2021). And we give “[c]onsiderable defe rence . . . to the district court’s decision
because a district court is in a superior pos ition to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In
re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996).
Here, the district court made thorough and detailed findings based on the testimony
at trial and other evidence. In particular, th e district court credite d the testimony of the
social workers, the toxicologist who testified to the validity of father’s drug tests, and the
expert who conducted father’s parenting asse ssment. The district court did not credit
father’s testimony that he no longer str uggled with chemical dependency despite
12
continuing to test positive for methamphetamine. Similarly, the district court did not credit
father’s testimony that his mental health was under control or his testimony minimizing his
history of domestic violence.
In sum, the evidence reasonably supports the district court’s finding—including its
express credibility determinations—that the social workers managing the case “repeatedly
provided reasonable efforts and services” to fath er and the child that were relevant to the
child’s safety and protection, adequate to meet the needs of the family, culturally
appropriate, available and accessible, and c onsistent, timely, and realistic under the
circumstances. We discern no clear error in th e findings that led the district court to
determine that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father and reunify father
with the child.
Any potential effect of pandemic-related closures on father’s ability to access
services does not alter this conclusion. The district court’s finding that father had not
substantially satisfied the requirements of his case plan was not based on pandemic-related
reasons but rather was based on father’s c ontinued use of methamphetamine throughout
the proceedings, his mental health issues, his cr iminal history, and his inability to parent.
Specifically, the district court found that father had not accepted or addressed his ongoing
chemical dependency, mental illness, criminal activity, and domestic-violence issues. The
district court also found that father lacked awareness of his own dangerous behaviors and
how they could affect the child’s safety and well-being. These concerns are supported by
13
the record. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err when it
found that the county engaged in reasonable efforts to reunify father and the child.1
II. The district court did no t abuse its discretion by determining that termination
is in the best interests of the child.

Father also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that
termination of his parental right s was in the child’s best intere sts. Father’s best-interests
argument is tied to his previous argument that the county failed to make reasonable efforts
to reunify father and the child.
The child’s best interests are the “paramount consideration” in all termination cases.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020). When analyzing the best interests of the child, a
district court must balance three factors: “( 1) the child’s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare of Child of J.H. ,
___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2021 WL 5045274, at *7 (Minn. App. Nov. 1, 2021) (quotation
omitted). Competing interests of the child may include the child’s need for a stable
environment, health considerations, and the child’s preferences. Id. We review a district
court’s best-interests determination for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of
K.L.W., 924 N.W.2d 649, 656 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 8, 2019).

1 Father does not challenge the district cour t’s determination that statutory grounds for
termination exist under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2), (4),
or (5). Therefore, because we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the
county engaged in reasonable efforts, there is no basis to reverse the district court’s
determination that each of these statutory grounds support termination of father’s parental
rights.
14
Here, the district court determined that the county established by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interests. Specifically, the district court found that the child’s diagnostic assessment
indicated that permanency wa s important to help the child recover from mental health
issues. The district court al so credited the testimony of th e child’s guardian ad litem and
father’s case manager—they both testified that they believed termination was in the child’s
best interests because the ch ild’s current placement is appropriate and she “deserves
permanency.” The district court explained ho w it considered the three balancing factors,
finding that father had “not demonstrated an ability to put [the child’s] needs above his
own by taking the actions necessary to stop using methamphetami ne and address his
chemical dependency,” failed to acknowledge his mental health diagnosis, failed to remain
law-abiding, and had “not cr edibly resolved his domestic assaultive behaviors.” The
district court concluded that “[w]hile those issues might not diminish [father’s] love for
[the child], they do have a critical impact on his ability to parent.” The district court then
determined that the child’s “overriding intere st in developing [a] stable and positive
relationship[] with a parent who can meet [the child’s] basic and unique needs” outweighs
the child’s and father’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship.
Father argues that the district court a bused its discretion when it made this
determination. Father contends that, because the county failed to make reasonable efforts
at reunification, it is not in the child’s best in terests to terminate father’s parental rights.
We are not persuaded. As discussed above, th e district court did not clearly err when it
found that the county made reasonable reunification effort s. Moreover, while the record
15
shows that father loves the ch ild and the two have a bond, th e record also fully supports
the district court’s determination that termination of father’s parental rights is in the child’s
best interests. We discern no abuse of di scretion by the district court in making that
determination.
Affirmed.