Chambers Self-Storage Oakdale, LLC,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A21-0825

Tax Court Gildea, C.J.

Chambers Self-Storage Oakdale, LLC,

Relator,

vs. Filed: March 9, 2022
Office of Appellate Courts
County of Washington,

Respondent.

________________________

Diana Longrie, Longrie Law Office, Maplewood, Minnesota, for relator.

Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, James Zuleger, Assistant County Attorney,
Stillwater, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. Because taxpayers may prove unequal assessment claims by using the
Department of Revenue’s sales ratio studies, the tax court did not abuse its discretion when
it determined that the detailed discovery the taxpayer sought on other properties was not
proportional to the needs of this case.
2
2. Because constitutional claims of unequal assessment and disparate treatment
under the Minnesota and United States Constitutions employ the same or a more exacting
test and provide the same remedies as a statutory unequal assessment claim, the tax court
did not abuse its discretion when it denied the taxpayer’s motion to amend its pleadings to
add constitutional claims.
3. The tax court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the taxpayer’s oral
motion to require disclosure of nonpublic data or to compel the appearance of the county
assessor at trial.
4. The tax court did not err in determining that the taxpayer failed to meet its
burden of proof to establish that its property was unequally assessed.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
O P I N I O N
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
This case comes to us on direct appeal from the tax court. The taxpayer, Chambers
Self-Storage Oakdale, LLC (“Chambers”), challenges the denial of two motions to compel,
a motion to amend the pleadings, and the tax court’s rejection of its unequal assessm ent
claim. The tax court denied Chambers’s motion to compel respondent Washington County
(“the County”) to produce information about other similar properties, denied Chambers’s
motion to amend its complaint to add unequal assessment and disparate treatmen t claims
under Article X of the Minnesota Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and denied a motion to compel the County Assessor to testify
3
when Chambers failed to subpoena that witness . On the merits, the tax court rejected
Chambers’s statutory claim that its property was unequally assessed , concluding that
Chambers did not meet its burden to prove this claim. Because we conclude that the tax
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on these motions, and that Chambers failed to
present evidence to support the unequal assessment claim, we affirm.
FACTS
Chambers operates a 321 -unit self -storage facility on two p arcels of land in
Washington County under the name “Stephen’s Self Storage. ” The County assessed the
property at $2,724,300 for 2016 and $2,680,000 for 2017. Chambers challenged both its
2016 property taxes, payable in 2017, and 2017 property taxes, payable in 2018, asserting
valuation and unequal assessment claims under chapter 278 for both years. See Minn. Stat.
§ 278.01, subd. 1(a) (2020) (allowing taxpayers to challenge assessments based on grounds
that a “parcel has been assessed at a valuation greater than its real or actual value” and that
“property has been partially, unfairly, or u nequally assessed in comparison with other
property in the . . . county”).1
Chambers served interrogatories and requests for production of documents on
December 12, 2019, just before the discovery deadline set by the tax court.2 The discovery
requests sought information on the methodology and data the County used to assess

1 Chambers filed these claims in Washington County District Court, which
transferred the cases to the tax court pursuant to a standing district court order.

2 The tax court’s scheduling order in the 2017 matter required the parties to serve
discovery so that answers and responses could be provided no later than January 13, 2020.
4
26 properties associated with 16 self-storage facilities in Washington County.
Specifically, the interrogatories asked the County to:
Describe, explain, and show your calculations, in detail, to demonstrate the
methodology including identification of the data used (and the source of the
data) and the adjusted cap rate applied, if any, together with whether you
used a sales comparison approach, an income a pproach or some other
appraisal approach in determining the 2016 [ and 2017] Taxable Market
Value of the Similar Property . . . .

Chambers requested documents that the County used in calculating the “Taxable Market
Value” of th ose properties, including “in come and expense figures” ; “average vacancy
factors”; “verified net rentable areas or net usable areas ”; documents identifying features
of the rentable areas (e.g., temperature/climate controls, parking, or other purposes for the
area); “any leasing information, brochures, advertisements, leasing agreements or similar
materials”; and “information on proposed, approved or rejected modifications or changes
made to an original assessment valuation.” Chambers also requested the County’s protocol
for determinin g vacancy rates, credit loss allowances, and rental rates for self-storage
facilities, as well as procedures for collecting and verifying data, inspection practices, and
manuals maintained by the County that addressed the assessment process. Finally,
Chambers requested a list of other property owners who had appealed the assessment for a
self-storage facility in Washington County.
Because the data Chambers requested was nonpublic, Chambers sent letters to the
owners of self-storage facilities in Washington County , informing them that Washington
County’s assessment data for the owner’s self-storage facility property was the subject of
5
a discovery request.3 Although some self-storage owners inquired about the request, none
objected to the discovery requests or intervened to restrict disclosure of the property
assessment data.
The County did not timely respond to Chambers’s discovery request s. After
repeated follow-up, the County responded on March 4, 2020, answering the interrogatories
by stating that appraisals were carried out via a “mass appraisal process” and stating that
actual data from the property owner, if provided to the County, would have been used. The
County’s response did not provide the individualized data and calculations that Chambers
requested. On April 15, 2020, Chambers filed a motion to compel responses to its
discovery requests.
A hearing was held to address the motion to compel on April 29, 2020—after the
trial-ready deadline. 4 Chambers argued that the discovery was “relevant to the issue of
unequal valuation and to proving ” its claim “that there are serious inconsistencies in the
County’s valuation process.” At the hearing, the County waived the statutory presumption
that its assessed value of the property was correct and stated it would rely on expert opinion
to establish the value of the property. See Minn. Stat. § 271.06, subd. 6(a) (2020)
(providing that county assessments are “prima facie valid”); Minn. Stat. § 272.06 (2020)

3 This notice is required by Minn. Stat. § 13.51, subd. 4 (2020) (requiring a party who
seeks “legal discovery of income property assessment data” to notify the record owner of
the property).

4 The 2016 and 2017 claims were consolidated at this hearing. The scheduling order
in the 2017 matter had a trial -ready deadline of April 13, 2020. The scheduling order in
the 2016 matter had a trial-ready deadline of April 27, 2020.
6
(providing that “[a]ll such assessments and levies shall be presumed to be legal until the
contrary is affirmatively shown”).
The tax court denied the motion to compel. The tax court first concluded that the
information was not relevant because the assessments for the 26 properties, as well as
Certificates of Real Estate Value (which show sales prices) , are pu blicly available and
would allow Chambers to present the assessment ratios needed to support an unequal
assessment claim. The court concluded that “proof of the manner in which the county set
those values will add nothing.” Alternatively, the tax court determined that “even if the
information sought had some marginal relevance, the requests would not be proportional
to the needs of th is case,” because using the Department of Revenue’s sales ratio studies
“would significantly reduce the time and effort needed to prosecute this claim.”
At this same hearing, the tax court also addressed a motion by Chambers to amend
its complaint to add “constitutional claims of unequal assessment under Article X of the
Minnesota Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution . . . that similarly situated properties have received different treatment.” The
tax court denied this motion because (1) the “late-stage motion to amend would not entitle
[Chambers] to any additional remedy,” and (2) the “constitutional equal protection and
uniformity claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” because
“Chambers does not allege facts to state claims for either.”
The day before trial, Chambers filed a letter with the tax court , stating that it had
attempted to serve a subpoena on the County Assessor (disclosed as a witness on its witness
list) but had been “prevented” from doing so bec ause the County Assessor was working
7
remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Chambers explained that the County Attorney
would not accept the subpoena on behalf of the County Assessor or provide Chambers with
the County Assessor’s home address. Chambers had not hired a process server to attempt
to locate the County Assessor.
The tax court addressed the subpoena issue at the outset of trial. Chambers asserted
that the County Assessor would testify about the County’s appraisal process for self-
storage facilities and argued that, despite the pandemic, “County personnel and officials
need to make themselves available during regular office hours.” When asked, “What action
do you want the Court to take?” Chambers’s counsel responded that “I would like to be
able to either have him appear or that I be allowed to serve this subpoena on him so he does
appear.” Later, Chambers suggested that the tax court has “ equitable powers” that would
allow the court to disclose the Assessor’s “address where he is working remotely during
the daytime during his office hours.” The tax court interpreted this request as a motion to
order service or a motion to order the County Assessor to appear. The tax court denied the
motion, concluding that it does not have the legal authority to order the County Attorney
to accept service on the County Assessor’s behalf and that the County Attorney’s refusal
to accept service on the County Assessor’s behalf did not prevent Chambers from securing
service of a subpoena. The tax court also noted that it was “not convinced that [the County
Assessor’s] testimony would provide relevant facts.”
The tax court then proceeded with trial on the valuation and unequal assessment
claims. Chambers did not present appraisal evidence to support a different valuation of the
property. Michael Chambers, Assistant Chief Manager of Chambers, testified that the
8
County’s assessments —$2,724,300 for 2016 and $2,680,000 for 2017 —were actually
“pretty close” and within range of the property’s market value. The County submitted an
expert appraisal prepared by Andrew Donahue , which provided valuation estimates for
both 2016 and 2017 using the income approach and the sales approach.5 Donahue’s income
approach valued the property at $2,770,000 in 2016 and $2,860,000 in 2017, and his sales
approach valued the property at $2,630,000 for both years. Donahue opined that the
property was worth $2,770,000 in 2016 and $2,860,000 in 2017, basing this final appraisal
only on the income approach.
For its unequal assessment claim, Chambers introduced a letter from its experts ,
Mitchell Simonson and Marlo Headrick , that showed that Chambers’s tax per square foot
of rentable area was higher than two other self-storage facilities in Washington County.
According to Simonson, his consulting letter “was not an appraisal.” Chambers also
introduced the County’s “pro formas” —estimates of property value based on the income
approach, but not the Count y’s final assessed value —which showed that the County did
not use the same values for vacancy and credit loss, operating expenses, and capitalization
rate when assessing self-storage facilities. Chambers also relied on the County’s inability
to answer questions about its mass appraisal process as applied to self-storage facilities and
asserted that a valuation process based on the number of units in the facility was improper,

5 See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. County of Hennepin, 450 N.W.2d 299, 303 (Minn.
1990) (explaining that the market approach, also known as the “sales approach,” considers
market data on recent sales of comparable properties and that the income approach
capitalizes the expected income and expenses for the property).
9
in particular because the County’s unit data demonstrated a 489 percent difference between
the lowest value per unit and the highest value per unit assigned to self-storage facilities.
In response to Chambers’s argument that its property was unequally assessed, t he
County relied on the Department of Revenue’s sales ratio studies. The County argued that
these studies demonstrated that the ratios for commercial/industrial property in the County
for both years were within the permissible range , and therefore there was no merit to the
unequal assessment claim.6
The tax court agreed and rejected the unequal assessment claim. The court rejected
the claim because (1) the evidence did not overcome the prima facie valid ity of the
Department of Revenue’s sales ratio studies, and (2) Chambers did not provide evidence
of the market value of other self -storage facilities as required to prove an unequal
assessment claim. As to the valuation of the property, the tax court increased the assessed
value of the property to $2,742,000 for 2016 and $2,814,000 for 2017. In reach ing these
values, the tax court assigned 80 percent weight to the County’s income approach and
20 percent weight to the County’s sales approach.7

6 The parties stipulated that the property is properly classified as
commercial/industrial. Department of Revenue sales ratio studies show that the median
ratio for commercial/industrial property in the County was 99.6 percent for 2016 and
96.1 percent for 2017. Sales ratio studies are prima facie evidence of unequal assessment
only if “the median ratio of the same classification of property in the same county . . . is
lower than 90 percent.” Minn. Stat. § 278.05, subd. 4(d) (2020).

7 Other than its assertion that its property was unequally assessed, Chambers does not
otherwise challenge the tax court’s valuation of the property on appeal.
10
Chambers moved for amended findings and a new trial. Chambers asked the tax
court to reconsider its decision to deny the motion to compel , the motion to amend the
complaint, and its decision concerning service of a subpoena on the County Assessor. The
tax court denied the motion for a new trial after a hearing. In doing so , the tax court
clarified its rationale for denying the motion to amend the complaint to add constitutional
claims, explaining that the motion to amend was denied because Chambers sought “to
belatedly add claims that identify no additional elements or remedy when the case is trial
ready.”
Chambers filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review by our court.
ANALYSIS
Chambers raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the tax court abused its
discretion when it denied Chambers’s motion to compel detailed discovery regarding other
self-storage facilities in Washington County, (2) whether the tax court abused its discretion
in denying Chambers leave to amend its pleadings to add constitutional claims, (3) whether
the tax court erred in declining to compel disclosure of the County Assessor’s home
address, and (4) whether Chambers met its burden of proof to establish its claim of unequal
assessment. We address each issue in turn.
I.
We begin with Chambers’s argument that the tax court abused its discretion when
it denied Chambers’s motion to compel discovery of nonpublic assessor data related to
26 properties associated with 16 self-storage facilities in Washingto n County . The tax
court denied this motion because it determined that the information was not relevant or, if
11
minimally relevant, that disclosure was not proportional to the needs of the argument. We
review discovery orders from the tax court under an abuse of discretion standard.
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. County of Hennepin, 450 N.W.2d 299, 305–06 (Minn. 1990).
The tax court “has considerable discretion ,” and we will reverse on ly if it “abused its
discretion, exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, or based its ruling
on an erroneous view of the law.” Id.
Chambers argues that the tax court abused its discretion by failing to apply a
statutory balancing test to the discovery request. Minnesota Statutes § 13.03, subd. 6
(2020), sets out a two-part test that courts must use when determining whether to order the
disclosure of nonpublic data in a property tax dispute. See Montgomery Ward & Co. ,
450 N.W.2d at 306, 308 (holding that “[i]n a property tax matter . . . the two-part analysis
is mandatory” and “that a failure to apply the test . . . should be an automatic abuse of
discretion”). First, the court must determine whether the data is “discoverable” under the
rules of evidence and civil proced ure. Minn. Stat. § 13.03, subd. 6; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 271.06, subd. 7 (2020) (“[T]he Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure for the district
court of Minnesota shall govern the procedures in the Tax Court, where practicable.”).
Information is discoverable if it “is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(b). If the court determines
that information is discoverable, it must next “decide whether the benefit to the party
seeking access to the data outweighs any harm to the confidentiality interests of the entity
maintaining the data, or of any person who has provided the data or who is the subject of
the data, or to the privacy interest of an individual identified in the data.” Minn. Stat.
12
§ 13.03, subd. 6; see EOP-Nicollet Mall, L.L.C. v. County of Hennepin , 723 N.W.2d 270,
276 (Minn. 2006) (allowing a court to use a protective order if needed).
Here, the tax court determined that the information sought was either not relevant
or, even if minimally relevant, was not proportional to the needs of the argument. This
determination is effectively a conclusion that the information was not discoverable under
Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(b). Thus, the tax court did not fail to apply the test required by
Minn. Stat. § 13.03, subd. 6; its analysis under that provision was simply at an end.
Chambers also asserts, however, that the tax court’s determination that the
information was not relevant or, alternatively, not proportional to the needs of the argument
was an abuse of discretion. A proportionality analysis considers “the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to
relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving
the issues, and whether the b urden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(b). The tax court reasoned that discovery of
detailed records concerning 26 properties was not proportional here because Chambers
could meet its prima facie burden for its unequal assessment claim by using the Department
of Revenue’s sales ratio studies.
The tax court’s conclusion on proportionality was not an abuse of discretion. As
the tax court correctly noted, the taxpayer can meet the prima facie burd en for an unequal
assessment claim by relying on publicly available Department of Revenue sales ratio
studies. See Short v. County of Hennepin, 353 N.W.2d 525, 531–32 (Minn. 1984); Minn.
Stat. § 278.05, subd. 4 (2020). Although Chambers is correct that Department of Revenue
13
sales ratio studies are not the only way to establish an unequal assessment claim, Chambers
did not argue to the tax court that it needed detailed data on the 26 other properties to
calculate the market value of the other self-storage facilities in the County to present
assessment ratios. See Walmart Inc. v. Winona County, 963 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Minn. 2021)
(“A claim of unfair or unequal assessment requires a court to compare the actual market
value and tax assessment of the property in question with the actual market value and tax
assessment of similarly situated properties.”). Rather, Chambers argued that it needed this
discovery to determine whether the County used a un iform process when assessing self-
storage facilities. But we have rejected unequal assessment claims premised on a pure
process theory, and instead require a taxpayer to prove that the process was prejudicial .
See Anacker v. County of Cottonwood, 302 N.W.2d 342, 344–46 (Minn. 1981). And, when
using Department of Revenue sales ratio studies, we do not require “a taxpayer to show
what special methods in the assessment process caused the resulting substantial deviation.”
Short, 353 N.W.2d at 532. The tax court therefore did not abuse its “considerable
discretion” when it determined that th e detailed discovery Chambers sought was not
proportional to the needs of the case , particularly when a better alternative —Department
of Revenue sales ratio studi es—was available to Chambers to attempt to meet its prima
facie burden of proof. See Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 N.W.2d at 305–06.
II.
We next address Chambers’s argument that the tax court erred when it denied
Chambers’s motion to amend its petition to add claims of unequal assessment and disparate
treatment under Article X of the Minnesota Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
14
to the United States Constitution. Generally, a “trial court has wide discretion to grant or
deny an amendment [of the pleadings], and its action will not be reversed absent a clear
abuse of discretion.” Fabio v. Bellomo , 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). But “[i]n
determining whether the tax court correctly applied Minnesota law, our review is de novo.”
Marlow Timberland, LLC v. County of Lake, 800 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Minn. 2011).
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01 provides that after an opposing party has
served an answer “a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party ; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” 8
Although leave to amend often hinges on the prejudice to the adverse party, we have not
required courts to grant leave to add “futile” claims. See Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers
Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 714 (Minn. 2012).
Here, after considering the motion for a new trial, the tax court concluded that
“Chambers cannot seek to belatedly add claims that identify no additional elements or
remedy when the case is trial ready.” Chambers concedes that the constitutional claims it
sought to add were a subs et of the statutory claims it had already pleaded under
chapter 278. See also Walmart Inc. , 963 N.W.2d at 200 (holding that the test to prove a
statutory unequal assessment claim “is the same as or broader than ” the test to prove
constitutional equal protection and uniform taxation claims, and that “chapter 278 provides

8 While the tax court has its own rules of p rocedure, see generally Minn.
R. 8610.0010–.0150 (2021), the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure “govern the
procedures in the Tax Court, where practicable,” Minn. Stat. § 271.06, subd. 7. The tax
court’s administrative rules do not address pleading amendm ents; thus, we rely on
Rule 15.01 here.
15
the exclusive remedy for such a challenge”). Because the constitutional claims Chambers
sought to add were already fully encompassed by its statutory unequal assessment claims,
the proposed amendments were futile. The tax court therefore did not abuse its discretion
when it denied the motion to amend.
III.
We turn next to Chambers’s argument that the tax court abused its discretion when
it denied Chambers’s oral motion concerning the County Assessor’s appearance at trial.
On appeal, Chambers argues that the tax court should have issued a protective order that
would have allowed for disclosure of the County Assessor’s home address, contending that
this order would have allowed it to su bpoena the County Assessor to call him as a hostile
witness. Chambers presents this issue in the context of a motion to compel discovery; thus,
we review the tax court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. See Montgomery
Ward & Co., 450 N.W.2d at 305–06.
As an initial matter, the County argues that Chambers forfeited this argument by
failing to raise the disclosure of the County Assessor’s home address before the tax court.
The County is correct that Chambers did not initially seek this relief in its motion to the
tax court. Rather, when initially pressed on what action Chambers wanted the tax court to
take, it responded that it “would like to be able to either have him appear or that [it] be
allowed to serve this subpoena on him so he does appear.” The tax court understandably
interpreted this request “as a motion to order service or a motion to order [the County
Assessor] to appear.” But Chambers also argue d that it believed the tax court had
“equitable powers” that would allow the tax court to provide it with the County Assessor’s
16
“address where he is working remotely during . . . his office hours.” We therefore conclude
that Chambers di d not forfeit its argument. See Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency ,
728 N.W.2d 510, 523 (Minn. 2007) (concluding that an issue was properly before the court
when a party “refined the argument he made to the district court,” as opposed to raising a
new issue).
Turning to the merits of this issue, Chambers argues that we should require
disclosure of nonpublic home addresses of public officials when th ose officials are not
working at government buildings, subject to a protective order , see Minn. R. Civ.
P. 26.03(a), thus allowing parties to serve the official with a subpoena. Chambers relies
heavily on our decision in Kmart Corp. v. County of Clay, 711 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 2006),
in support of its argument. That reliance is misplaced. Kmart dealt with attempts to serve
pleadings on public officials after business hours. Id. at 487–88. We noted that the failure
to serve the officials was not attributed to any refusal by the officials to accept service: the
process server “was never in close physical proximity to ” the government officials and
those officials did not take “any extraordinary step to avoid service.” Id. at 489. And we
rejected the assertio n “that the county officials had a statutory duty to make themselves
available for service after county business hours.” Id. We acknowledged that “county
officials may choose to make themselves available for service after business hours,” but
we held there was “no basis on which to conclude that they are legally obligated to do so.”
Id. Kmart therefore does not support Chambers’s argument.
And Chambers offers no other legal support for its contention that the tax court
abused its discretion. Here, Chambers failed to take basic steps to locate the County
17
Assessor and effectuate service . After attempting to serve a subpoena on the County
Assessor at his government office and discovering that he was working from home due to
the COVID-19 pandemic, Chambers did not hire a process server to locate the County
Assessor. Although Chambers did email the County Attorney to ask for the County
Assessor’s home address, Chambers concedes that this information is nonpublic and
therefore could not have been disclosed by the County Attorney. 9 Rather than hire a
process server, Chambers waited until trial h ad already begun to raise its motion seeking
disclosure of the County Assessor’s home address . Under these circumstances, we
conclude that the tax court’s denial of the motion to compel disclosure of the County
Assessor’s home address was not an abuse of discretion.
IV.
We last turn to Chambers’s argument that it met its burden of proof to show that its
property was unequally assessed. Our review of a final order of the tax court is “limited.”
S. Minn. Beet Sugar Coop v. County of Renville, 737 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Minn. 2007). We
ascertain “only whether the tax court lacked jurisdiction, whether the tax court’s order is
supported by the evidence and is in conformity with the law, and whether the tax court
committed any other error of law.” Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 271.10, subd. 1 (2020). The tax

9 Chambers appears to attach significance to the fact that it disclosed the County
Assessor as a witness on its witness list and the County had not objected to that witness.
But this disclosure does not change the nonpublic nature of the County Assessor’s home
address or excuse the obligation to properly serve a subpoena to ensure the Assessor’s
appearance at trial. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 45.02(a) (providing that “[s]ervice of a subpoena
upon a person named therein” is “made by delivering a copy” to the named person “or by
leaving a copy at the person’s usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein”).
18
court’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo and “factual findings are reviewed under
a clearly erroneous standard. ” S. Minn. Beet Sugar Coop , 737 N.W.2d at 551 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In its principal brief, Chambers argues that it met its burden of proof to show that
its property was unequally assessed because evidence in the record establishes that the
County’s alleged assessment method based on the number of storage units at a given
facility results in a high level of inconsistency.10 We are not persuaded.
A taxpayer has the burden of proof to establish unequal assessment. See Anacker,
302 N.W.2d at 345. Minnesota law is clear that to establish an unequal assessment claim
the taxpayer must present evidence that allows the “court to compare the actual market
value and tax assessment of the property in question with the actual market value and tax
assessment of similarly situated properties.” Walmart Inc., 963 N.W.2d at 198. Simply
comparing assessed values is insufficient. Anacker, 302 N.W.2d at 345. Similarly,
showing improper methodology is insufficient without evidence that shows some prejudice
to the taxpayer. Id. In other words, unequal assessment is only demonstrated “[i]f the ratio

10 In its reply brief, Chambers expands on this argument by identifying eight reasons
why it satisfied its burden to show that its property was unequally assessed: (1) the County
was unable to show consistency in its approach, (2) Chambers’s expert determined that the
subject property was an “outlier,” (3) the County’s expert admitted that input values used
in the County’s pro formas would result in lower values for similar properties, (4) the
County’s deputy assessor could not explain the County’s mass appra isal process, (5) the
County did not follow the Minnesota Property Tax Administrators Manual’s best practices,
(6) the International Association of Assessing Officers standard does not utilize a “number
of units” assessment method, (7) the County was evasive in discovery, and (8) the County’s
witnesses were unable to testify about how the County assured equal treatment when
assessing similarly situated properties.
19
of the assessed value to the actual market value of the property in question is less than the
ratio of the assessed value to the actual market value of other comparable properties in the
same taxing district.” Walmart Inc., 963 N.W.2d at 198.
Here, Chambers did not present data of the actual market value and assessed value
of its property compared to similar properties. This property value comparison is the type
of evidence required to establish an unequal assessment claim. See id. Further, the letter
from Chambers’s expert was not an opinion of property values; rather, that letter simply
showed the “valuation trend analysis” and compared the assessed value of the Chambers
property with similar properties. Simply comparing assessed values is not sufficient to
establish an unequal assessment claim. See Anacker, 302 N.W.2d at 345.
Moreover, Department of Revenue sales ratio studies are “prima facie evidence of
the level of assessment .” Minn. Stat. § 278.05, subd. 4. Generally, to establish unequal
assessment based on Department of Revenue sales ratio studies, the studies must show that
“the median ratio of the same classification of property in the same county . . . as the
subject property is lower than 90 percent.” Id., subd. 4(d). Here, the County introduced
Department of Revenue sales ratio studies for Washington County in 2016 and 2017, which
showed median ratios for the “commercial/industrial” classification of 99.6 percent and
96.1 percent, respectively. These studies provide prima facie evidence that, contrary to
Chambers’s argument, the properties were not unequally assessed. Although the burden
was not on the County to disprove unequal assessment, this prima facie evidence that there
was no unequal assessment created an additional hurdle for Chamber s. To be sure, the
sales ratio studies are not conclusive , and evidence of “un reliability” of this data may be
20
introduced. Minn. Stat. § 278.05, subd. 4. But Chambers did not offer any evidence that
called these studies into question. Based on this record, we cannot conclude that the tax
court erred in rejecting the unequal assessment claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the tax court.
Affirmed.