A21-0832

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A21-0829
A21-0832

Court of Appeals McKeig, J.

In the Matter of the Application of
Timothy D. Moratzka, Trustee of the
Nancy L. Mayen Residual Trust.
Filed: March 29, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter J. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for appellant Minnesota Department of Natural Resources.

Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Michael J. Haig, Chief Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Rapids, Minnesota; and

Kenneth H. Bayliss, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., Saint Cloud, Minnesota, for appellant
Itasca County.

Allen E. Christy, Jr., Julie N. Nagorski , DeWitt LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
respondent Timothy D. Moratzka.

Jay T. Squires, Rupp, Anderson, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for amici curiae Association of Minnesota Counties, Minnesota County
Engineers Association, and Minnesota Association of County Surveyors.

Patricia Y. Beety, Susan L. Naughton, League of Minnesota Cities, Saint Paul, Minnesota,
for amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities.

James J. Thomson, Michelle E. Weinberg, Kennedy & Graven, Chartered, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association of Townships.

Howard A. Roston, Devin T. Driscoll, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota,
for amicus curiae Minnesota Society of Professional Surveyors.
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Monte A. Mills, Aaron P. Knoll, Greene Espel PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus
curiae MN-FISH Sportfishing Foundation.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
The Marketable Title Act, Minn. Stat. § 541.023 (202 2), does not apply to land
dedicated to public use by plat.
Reversed and remanded.

O P I N I O N
MCKEIG, Justice.
This case concerns whether the Marketable Title Act (MTA), Minn. Stat. § 541.023
(2022), extinguished the public’s interest in an undeveloped road dedicated to public use
by plat over 100 years ago. Respondent Timothy D. Moratzka, trustee of the Nancy L.
Mayen Residual Trust, initiated a Torrens proceeding to register title to land including the
undeveloped road. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s summary judgment
ruling that the public’s interest in the road had been extinguished by operation of the MTA.
Appellants Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and Itasca County argue
that the MTA does not apply to roads dedicated to public use by plat. We agree with
appellants and therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the
district court.
3
FACTS
This appeal involves a dispute over a strip of land abutting Trout Lake in Balsam
Township in Itasca County. At issue is whether the land can be used by the public because
it was dedicated to public use over 100 years ago by plat or whether the public interest was
abandoned under Minnesota law because no “notice” was recorded under the process set
forth in the MTA, Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 1.
A.
The parcel of land at issue was part of the Plat of Trout Lake Park, which was created
in 1911. A plat is “a delineation of one or more existing parcels of land,” which “depict[s]
the location and boundaries of lots, blocks, outlots, parks, and public ways.” Minn. Stat.
§ 505.01, subd. 3(f) (2022). 1 The Plat of Trout Lake Park borders Trout Lake, which is a
lake fully contained within the Chippewa National Forest and is used for fishing, boating,
and camping. The plat, which has been on file since 1912, states that the dedicator does
“hereby dedicate to the public use forever the public roads [located on the plat].” The
1911–12 dedication included a north-south public road running between lots 15 and 16 of
the plat.

1 Plats in Minnesota are governed by Minnesota Statutes chapter 505 (2022). Those
seeking to create a plat must meet a number of requirements. See Minn. Stat. § 505.021
(2022). After a plat meets the preliminary requirements, the governing body of the area
where the plat is located must approve it. Minn. Stat. § 505.03 (2022). All validly created
plats “shall be recorded in the office of the county recorder or registrar of titles, or both, if
the plat contains both nonregistered and registered property.” Minn. Stat. § 505.04 (2022).
The recorded plat must “be open to inspection by the public.” Id.

4
Since dedication, some of the lots within the plat have been used as a resort—in
particular, Lots 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 (now known as Parcel 1), all of which abut Trout
Lake. In the 1980s, the then-owners of the resort filed a petition to vacate the north-south
public road that passes between Lots 15 and 16. As part of a settlement, the County agreed
to vacate the road north of County Road 326, and the resort owners agreed to exclude the
portion of the road south of County Road 326 from the petition to vacate. That portion of
the original dedication south of County Road 326 is what is now known as Parcel 3.
Although described in the plat as a “public road,” no physical road has been constructed
there; it is instead a sandy beach. The drawing below shows Lots 13 through 17 (Parcel
1), the original public roadway dedication that was vacated in the 1980s, and the remaining
portion of the original public roadway dedication (Parcel 3). Below is an illustration of the
current boundaries of Parcel 1 and Parcel 3, which have remained the same since the partial
vacation of the dedication in the 1980s.
2

2 The image here is not drawn to scale and is for reference purposes only.
Moratzka also sought to register Parcel 2, which is not at issue here, nor is it depicted in
the map above.
5

As part of resolving the dispute, the resort and the County created a license
agreement that allowed the public to access Trout Lake through the resort. The County
gave notice of its intent to terminate that license agreement in 1990 and decided to develop
Parcel 3 into a public access to Trout Lake. The County never did so, but despite the
termination of the license agreement, the resort continued to allow the public to access the
lake through the resort.
In 201 3, the resort’s then-owner Nancy Mayen pa ssed away. At that point,
Moratzka was appointed as trustee to wind up her estate, which included selling the resort.
In 2015, Moratzka entered into a contract for deed for the sale of the resort. The contract
for deed included a clause referencing Parcel 3, stating that “[t]he plat reflects a public road
apparently not abandoned.” The contract provided that “this burden must be resolved prior
to Closing.”

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The resort no longer permits the public to freely access Trout Lake through its
property. Therefore, Parcel 3 is currently the only year-round public access to the lake.
B.
In 2019, Moratzka filed an application to register Parcels 1, 2, and 3 as Torrens
property.3 He asserted that the t rust possesses a fee -simple interest in the land. He
acknowledged the platted public way on Parcel 3 but asserted that “no public road exists”
because neither Balsam Township nor Itasca County had recorded “any interest in the road
within 40 years of the road’s dedication,” which he claimed was required under the MTA,
Minn. Stat. § 541.023. The MTA generally provides that an interest subject to the Act
“cannot be asserted against a claim of title based on a source of title unless the interest is
preserved by filing a notice within 40 years of the creation of the interest.” State v. Hess,
684 N.W.2d 414, 427 (Minn. 2004); Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subds. 1, 5. And any such
interest barred by this 40-year requirement is presumed to have been abandoned. Minn.
Stat. § 541.023, subd. 5.

3 As we have previously explained:

In Minnesota, a parcel of land can be either “Torrens” or “abstract.”
Ownership of abstract property depends upon the traditional process of
researching the chain of title to determine who has the superior claim of right
to the property. See Hersh Props., LLC v. McDonald's Corp., 588 N.W.2d
728, 733 (Minn.1999) (describing the abstract system). Under the Torrens
system, by contrast, an owner can seek to “register” the property by
instituting a court action. See generally Minn. Stat. ch. 508 (2012). A
registration action allows the owner to cure any defects in the title, to clarify
the boundary lines of the property, and to establish conclusively its title to
the property in question. See Minn. Stat. §§ 508.06, 508.10, 508.22 (2012).

Mattson Ridge, LLC v. Clear Rock Title, LLP, 824 N.W.2d 622, 626 n.1 (Minn. 2012).
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The Itasca County Examiner of Titles issued a report and opinion on the application.
The Examiner determined that Moratzka was essentially seeking a road vacation, which
required him to notify the DNR, Itasca County, and Balsam Township of his intent to
extinguish the public’s interest in Parcel 3.
The DNR, County, and Township all objected to the registration of Parcel 3. They
moved for summary judgment, claiming that (1) the MTA does not apply to extinguish the
public interest to Parcel 3; (2) the road-vacation statute, Minn. Stat. § 505.14 (2022),
provides the sole means to extinguish the public interest in Parcel 3; and (3) Moratzka was
estopped from denying the existence of the public road. The district court agreed with
Moratzka that any public interest in Parcel 3 was extinguished by operation of the M TA
and therefore denied the summary judgment motions. Moratzka then filed his own motion
for summary judgment, which the court granted, concluding that the public interest in the
road was “abandoned” under the MTA, Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 5.
The DNR and the County both appealed, and the court of appeals consolidated the
appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment ruling in favor of Moratzka.
In re Moratzka, 974 N.W.2d 266, 278 (Minn. App. 2022). The court of appeals held that
“the plain language of the MTA unambiguously encompasses dedications made by
recorded plat.” Id. at 273. While recognizing that the landowner had created the public
interest in the land “by recording the 1911-12 dedication with Itasca County,” the court of
appeals stressed that “there was no act of acceptance by the claimant,” which under the
MTA would require “ ‘a notice sworn to by the claimant or the claimant’s agent or attorney’
identifying the interest, the transaction upon which the interest is founded, and a description
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of the property.” Id. at 274 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 1). The court of appeals
therefore concluded that the public interest had been “extinguished.” Id. at 276. Because
the MTA extinguished the public interest, the court of appeals determined that Moratzka
was not required to seek vacation of the public road under the road vacation statute, Minn.
Stat. § 505.14. 974 N.W.2d at 278. In addition, the court of appeals determined that
Moratzka was not estopped from invoking the MTA to challenge the continued existence
of the public interest in the land. Id. at 276.
The County and the DNR both filed petitions for review. Considered together, the
petitions raised three issues: (1) whether public roads noted on a plat are deemed
abandoned if no MTA preservation notice is filed; (2) whether a property owner can evade
the requirements of the road vacation statute, Minn. Stat. § 505.14, b y invoking the MTA
to extinguish a road dedicated to the public by plat; and (3) whether common-law estoppel
bars a property owner from using the MTA to extinguish the public’s interest in a road
dedicated to the public by plat. We granted both petitions.
ANALYSIS
This case is before us on a summary judgment motion. Summary judgment is
appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. We review grants of
summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Justice v. Marvel, LLC, 979 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Minn. 2022).
The district court’s decision to grant summary judgment was predicated on the
reasoning that the MTA applies to public interests dedicated by plat, that the road vacation
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statute is not the exclusive means to extinguish the public interest in a road, and that
estoppel did not bar Moratzka’s claim. Each of these three issues is now before us on
appeal. Because we conclude the MTA does not apply to interests dedicated by plat, it is
not necessary to consider the other arguments raised by the parties.
A.
The Legislature enacted the Marketable Title Act in 1943. Act of Apr. 20, 1943,
ch. 529, §§ 1– 5, 1943 Minn. Laws 752, 752–53 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat.
§ 541.023 (2022)). “The central tenet of the Marketable Title Act is that a determination
of title should be possible from an examination of documents in the chain of title recorded
in the 40 -year period preceding the title search.” Hess , 684 N.W.2d at 427. The stated
policy declared by the Legislature is that “ancient records shall not fetter the marketability
of real estate.” Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 5. The MTA forecloses an action affecting
the title of real estate that is commenced to enforce a right, claim, or interest in land, which
was “founded upon any instrument, event or transaction” that took place “more th an 40
years” before the commencement of the action, unless a notice was recorded in the office
of the county recorder within 40 years of the instrument, event or transaction:
As against a claim of title based upon a source of title, which source has then
been of record at least 40 years, no action affecting the possession or title of
any real estate shall be commenced . . . to enforce any right, claim, interest,
incumbrance, or lien founded upon any instrument, event or transaction
which was executed or occurred more than 40 years prior to the
commencement of such action, unless within 40 years after such execution
or occurrence there has been recorded in the office of the county recorder in
the county in which the real estate affected is situated, a notice . . . setting
forth the name of the claimant, a description of the real estate affected and of
the instrument, event or transaction on which such claim is founded, and
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stating whether the right, claim, interest, incumbrance, or lien is mature or
immature. . . .

Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 1. Any interest that falls under the language of subdivision 1
and is not recorded within the 40-year period is presumed abandoned. Id., subd. 5.
The parties dispute whether the MTA applies to interests dedicated to the public by
plat. The applicability of the MTA to public interests dedicated by plat is a question of
statutory interpretation. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Hyatt v.
Anoka Police Dep’t, 691 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 2005). 4 In interpreting a statute, our
purpose is to determine the intent of the Legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). We start
by determining whether the language in question is ambiguous, meaning that the language
is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Harkins v. Grant Park Ass’n , 972
N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn. 2022). “[I]f a statute is susceptible to only one reasonable
interpretation, ‘then we must apply the statu te’s plain meaning.’ ” Cnty. of Dakota v.
Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Minn. 2013) (quoting Larson v. State, 790 N.W.2d 700,
703 (Minn. 2010)).

4 The County appears to agree that this is a question of statutory interpretation, but
argues that this court has previously framed cases involving the MTA as focusing “on
whether applying the MTA would be inconsistent with the MTA’s purposes.” See
Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 1957). Although statutory purpose is
something this court may consider, it must first analyze the plain language of the MTA.
See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022) (“When the words of a law in their application to an
existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”).

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B.

We first determine whether the MTA plainly applies to interests dedicated by plat
or if it is ambiguous. We have previously observed that “[t]he MTA is not a model of
clarity.” Hersh Props., LLC v. McDonald’s Corp., 588 N.W.2d 728, 736 (Minn. 1999).
The parties focus their plain text arguments on the language that the MTA applies to “any
right, claim, interest, incumbrance, or lien founded upon any instrument, event or
transaction.” Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 1. Appellants claim that a plat is not an
instrument, event or transaction. Moratzka argues that a plat is plainly an instrument.
In determining the plain meaning of the statute, the court may turn to dictionary
definitions for terms not otherwise defined in the statute. See State v. Thonesavanh, 904
N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 2017). “[I]nstrument” is defined as “[a] written legal document
that defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities, such as a statute, contract, will,
promissory note, or share certificate.” Instrument, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
This term is extremely expansive, especially when combined with the word “any.” Cf.
White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n ex rel. State v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 946 N.W.2d
373, 379–80 (Minn. 2020) (concluding that the Legislature’s use of the word “any” was
intended to be “broa d” and “all -inclusive” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Therefore, one reasonable interpretation—the interpretation adopted by the
district court, court of appeals, and argued by Moratzka—is that th is term is broad and
extends to any document giving rise to a legal right or claim. Under this interpretation, the
MTA plainly applies to land dedicated to public use by plat because plats are documents
that give rise to legal rights and claims.
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Moratzka further supports this interpretation by pointing out that the MTA does not
specifically include platted interests in the exceptions listed in the MTA. See Minn. Stat.
§ 541.023, subd. 6. We have said that the expression of certain exceptions in a statute is
the exclusion of others . See State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn. 2011). The
absence of plats from the exceptions listed under the MTA therefore supports Moratzka’s
interpretation that plats are “instruments” subject to the MTA’s requirements. But it is not
dispositive. While Moratzka is correct in pointing out that the MTA provides specific
exceptions to the titles covered under the MTA, those exceptions relate to certain titles that
otherwise would fall under the MTA . See Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 6. Here we are
attempting to determine if plats fall under the MTA at all. It is just as reasonable to
conclude that, if plats are not instruments, the lack of a specific exception for property
dedicated by plat is due to the fact that plats are simply not subject to the MTA in the first
place.
Therefore, we must determine whether it is reasonable to read “instrument” as not
including property dedicated by plat. Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 1. We have said that
“[t]he broad definition of [a term within the MTA] provides a reasonable basis for more
than one interpretation.” Hersh, 588 N.W.2d at 736. In Hersh, we analyzed whether the
plain language of the MTA applied to Torrens property. See id. at 734–35. We noted that
the plain language of the MTA requires filing notice with “the office of the county recorder,
which handles abstract property, or the office of the registrar of titles, which handles
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Torrens property exclusively.”5 Id. at 735. Because of this recording requirement, which
specifically provided for filing with the office that exclusively handles Torrens property,
we held that Torrens property was subject to the MTA. See id. We have therefore
previously used the recording requirements of the MTA to determine which types of
instruments are covered by the MTA. Consequently, “instrument” can be read as
instruments that are recorded in the manner contemplated by the MTA. See Minn. Stat.
§ 541.023, subd. 1; see also In re Schmidt ex rel. P.M.S. v. Coons, 818 N.W.2d 523, 527
(Minn. 2012) (stating that we must construe a statute as a whole, with statutory phrases
interpreted in light of their context).
Unlike the recording requirement for Torrens property at issue in Hersh, which was
specifically included in the MTA, the process for recording plats at issue here is not
included in the MTA. Plats have extensive recording requirements that substantially differ
from the recording requirements under the MTA. Compare Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd.
1 (listing the MTA’s recording requirements), with Minn. Stat. § 505.04 (listing the
recording requirements for plats). For example, plats must be certified by a land surveyor
and approved by the county surveyor, Minn. Stat. § 505.021, subd. 9 (2022), approved by
the appropriate governmental body and certified by a city clerk or county auditor, Minn.
Stat. § 505.03, and recorded in the office of the county recorder or registrar of titles, open
to inspection by the public, Minn. Stat. § 505.04. The MTA, in contrast, requires a notice

5 After our decision in Hersh, the Legislature amended the statute and removed the
registrar of titles from the recording provision and added a provision exempting Torrens
property. Act of Apr. 26, 2001, ch. 50, §§ 31, 33, 2001 Minn. Laws 119, 137–38 (codified
as amended at Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subds. 1, 2a (2022)).
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containing the name of the claimant, description of the property and instrument giving rise
to the claim to the property, and a statement of whether the interest is mature or immature.
Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 1. In this way, the MTA’s requirements for recording are
altogether different from the more extensive recording requirements under chapter 505. It
is therefore reasonable to interpret “instrument” in the MTA as not applying to plats when
reading the phrase “instrument, event or transaction” in light of recording requirements
contemplated by the MTA. See Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 1. It would also be difficult
to understand why the Legislature would include such a rigorous process for recording
plats, only to put thousands of interests contained in those plats in jeopardy through
enactment of the MTA.
Reading recording requirements as limiting the word “instrument” in the MTA is
further supported by the stated purpose of the MTA. Though statutory purpose is typically
only considered after a statute is determined to be ambiguous, here, the statutory purpose
is part of the plain text of the MTA itself. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16; Minn. Stat. § 541.023,
subd. 5. The policy of Minnesota, as stated in the MTA, is that “ancient records shall not
fetter the marketability of real estate.” Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 5. But plats are not
“ancient records” in the way that an unrecorded interest in land based on a legal document
from over 40 years ago is. Plats must be kept available for inspection in the county offices
in which they are maintained. Minn. Stat. § 505.04. References to plats are typically
included in transfers of property interests within the plat. See Minn. Ass’n of Cnty.
Surveyors & Minn. Soc’y of Pro. Surveyors, Manual of Guidelines for Platting in
Minnesota 7 (Dec. 2009)
15
https://www.co.washington.mn.us/DocumentCenter/View/8141/MACS_MSPS_platmanu
al?bidId= (last visited Feb. 27, 2023) [opinion attachment] (providing examples of property
conveyances with references to plats); Joyce Palomar, Patton and Palomar on Titles § 120
(3d ed. 2003) (“It is so common in some states to be considered essential that a description
by lot and block shall not only name the plat, but also identify it by some phrase . . . .”).
Platted interests are not “ancient records” that “fetter the marketability of real estate,”
because they are highly visible and referenced when parcels within the plat are sold. Minn.
Stat. § 541.023, subd. 5. Therefore, “instrument” could also be limited by those
instruments that fit within the stated purpose of the MTA, which would not include interests
created by plat.
C.

Because the applicability of the MTA to dedications made by plat is subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation, we may look beyond the statutory language and
consider other indicia of legislative intent. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (describing the factors
the court may consider when a statute is ambiguous). In particular, we may consider “the
occasion and necessity for the law” and “the consequences of a particular interpretation.”
Id. Finally, we are guided by the presumption that the Legislature does not intend an
unreasonable or absurd result and intends to favor the public interest as against any private
interest. Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2022).
The occasion for the creation of the MTA was to simplify title searches, which as
time passes become “more cumbersome and uncertain.” Hersh, 588 N.W.2d at 732–33
(“The mounting difficulties associated with transferring real property and the uncertainty
16
of title gave rise to enactment of reform measures intended to promote efficiency and
certainty.”). These challenges gave rise to the creation of the MTA. Id. at 733. But
interests recorded on plats do not increase the costs of title searches, while requiring re-
recording would cut against the intention of the MTA to reduce burdens. See Restatement
(Third) of Property, Servitudes § 7.16 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 2000); see also 51 Am. Jur. 2d
Limitation of Actions § 111 (Feb. 2023 update) (“[A marketable title act] is designed to
decrease the costs of title assurance by limiting the period of time that must be covered by
a title search.”). The Restatement therefore does not include interests created by recorded
plat maps because “[e]xempting [interests] created by notation on a plat . . . will not
increase the costs of title searches and will preserve interests that frequently add significant
value to property.” Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 7.16 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst.
2000). In short, “[t]here is no reason to subject the beneficiaries of obvious [interests] to
the re-recording requirements of the marketable-title acts.” Id. The concern over
burdensome title searches that prompted the creation of the MTA is simply not implicated
by recorded, publicly available plats.
Moratzka argues that the MTA should apply to plats even in the case of ambiguity,
reasoning that we have repeatedly recognized that the MTA applies to public roads. See,
e.g., Twp. of Sterling v. Griffin , 244 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Minn. 1976) (“The fact that the
owner of an old, outstanding interest is a public body is not a sufficient public interest to
defeat the larger interest of the public in greater security in real estate transactions.”). But
Moratzka overlooks the broader context of Sterling. In Sterling, we were tasked with
determining whether the MTA barred an action by a township to enjoin respondents from
17
interfering with a road. Id. at 131–32. The Township argued that filing a copy of the order
establishing the road with the county auditor provided sufficient notice of their interest to
avoid application of the MTA. See id. at 132. We proceeded to conclude that the private
interest defeated the larger public interest in that case. Id. at 133. But the holding in that
case was based on the conclusion that no prudent person would have been put on notice
that a public road exist ed. Id. at 135. Sterling did not involve an interest recorded on a
plat, which clearly does put a party on notice of an existing interest.
The public interest is also particularly strong here, considering the consequences of
upsetting well-settled expectations of towns, cities, and counties that would result by
holding that the MTA can extinguish the public’s right to platted accesses. See Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16(6). As stated by both appellants and amici, these types of platted public interests
exist throughout the state, with few, if any, recorded as contemplated by the MTA. The
DNR points out that in Itasca County alone, there are 118 platted public accesses to lakes,
108 of which are undeveloped. Moratzka’s interpretation of the MTA has the potential to
imperil platted public accesses not only in Itasca County, but throughout the state.
Restricting the public’s access to Minnesota’s lakes is entirely contrary to the interests we
have recognized in several cases. See In re Baldwin, 15 N.W.2d 184, 186 (Minn. 1944)
(“The public rights in these lakes, with which this state abounds, are of great value and
importance . . . .” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Schaller v. Town
of Florence, 259 N.W. 529, 534 (Minn. 1935) (“Whether this very desirably located area,
solemnly dedicated to public use, should be restored to private ownership . . . is a matter
that should receive our most careful consideration. The present trend of public opinion is
18
directed toward restoring to the public access to our lakes, our parks, and our forests for
recreational and other proper uses.”); In re Krebs, 6 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Minn. 1942). We
elaborated on the importance of protecting the public’s ability to access Minnesota’s many
lakes in In re Krebs:
[W]e must not forget that the public includes persons other than those in the
immediate vicinity. The general public has a true concern in the recreational
facilities offered by the lakes which nature has so freely given us in this state.
Their generous sharing by all will make for a healthier and happier people.
The many not fortunate enough to be able to acquire the advantages of
ownership of lake shore properties should not be deprived of these benefits.
This we would do if we permitted streets leading to the lake shore to be
vacated as here proposed.

6 N.W.2d at 805. In short, the consequences of adopting Moratzka’s position relative to
Trout Lake would limit public access to the lake and potentially limit public access to many
of our public waters in Minnesota and, in some cases, cut off public access to public waters
altogether. These consequences of Moratzka’s interpretation are significant and support
the interpretation that the Legislature did not intend for the MTA to apply to platted roads.
Not only does the interpretation urged by Moratzka potentially negatively impact
access to our public waters, but it is also inconsistent with the flexibility that cities and
counties have in developing and using platted roadways. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1)
(explaining that, “[i]n ascertaining the intention of the legislature,” courts may presume
that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or
unreasonable”). Parties creating a plat must follow a list of extensive requirements,
including a statutory requirement to record and make the plat publicly available for
inspection. Minn. Stat. ch. 505. And, as the amici point out, towns and counties have
19
relied on the plat dedication process for over 100 years. We have repeatedly recognized
the flexibility that public entities have in developing dedicated land. See In re Stein, 99
N.W.2d 204, 206 (Minn. 1959) (“The dedication, being a good statutory dedication, did
not have to be formally accepted by the town board.”); Bryant v. Gustafson , 40 N.W.2d
427, 434 (Minn. 1950) (“[W]here land . . . is dedicated to public use as a street . . . long
continued nonuser of the street will constitute abandonment only if accompanied by some
affirmative or unequivocal acts of the trustee which are indicative of an intent to abandon
and which are inconsistent with a continuance of the easement.”); Vill. of Medford v.
Wilson, 230 N.W.2d 458, 459 (Minn. 1975) (“[W]hen a street is dedicated by plat, a city
may choose its own time to occupy, open, and use the street.”).
The statutory purpose, the consequences of Moratzka’s interpretation, and the
presumption of favoring the public interest over a private interest all weigh heavily in favor
of concluding that the MTA does not apply to platted roadways created under chapter 505.
We therefore conclude that the MTA does not operate to extinguish public interests
properly dedicated by plat.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.