A21-0832

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0829
A21-0832

In the Matter of the Application of Timothy D. Moratzka,
Trustee of the Nancy L. Mayen Residual Trust.

Filed April 11, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CV-19-1367

Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Michael J. Haig, Chief Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant Itasca County)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter J. Fa rrell, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant Minnesota Department of Natural Resources)

Allen E. Christy, Jr., Julie N. Nagors ki, DeWitt LLP, Minnea polis, Minnesota (for
respondent Timothy D. Moratzka)

Aaron Britton, Bovey, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Kelly Britton, Bovey, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Pres iding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

SYLLABUS
The Minnesota Marketable T itle Act applies to land dedicated by plat to public use
and extinguishes any public inte rest in such land that is not properly recorded under the
act.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In these consolidated app eals involving a parcel of la nd created via dedication “to
the public forever” in 1911, appellants Itas ca County and the Minne sota Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) challenge the distri ct court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of respondent trustee Ti mothy Moratzka. Appellants ar gue that the district court
erred in concluding as a matter of law that the public’s interest in the land was abandoned
under the Minnesota Marketable Title Act (M TA) because the interest was not recorded
within 40 years of the dedication. Because we conclude that the MTA creates a conclusive
presumption of abandonment where, as here, the public’s interest in a parcel of land created
by plat is not validly recorded by the relevant public auth ority within 40 years of the
dedication of any such interest, we affirm.
FACTS1
The dispute in this case centers on a 30-foot-wide strip of land abutting Trout Lake
in Itasca County. Appellants argue that this land, which is essentially a beach, can be used
by the public because it was dedicated to th e public long ago. But Moratzka, who
represents the trust that purchased the disputed land, contends that any public interest in
the beach was abandoned under Minnesota law. Before we address the parties’ dispute,
we examine the parcels of land at issue, the public dedication, and the procedural history
of the case.

1 Because we are reviewing a grant of summar y judgment, the facts are presented in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving parties. STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson,
L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002).
3
A. The Disputed Land
In 2008, the Nancy L. Ma yen Residual Trust (the trus t) purchased three parcels of
land in Balsam Township, Itasca County, which are near or abutting Trout Lake. Currently,
Britton’s Trout Lake Resort occupies much of the land.
Parcel one contains lots 13 through 17 of Trout Lake P ark, all of which abut the
lake, as well as a portion of a “vacated public platted roadway lying [between lots 15 and
16] North of the East-West road as it traverses the Plat of Trout Lake Park.”
Parcel two is not directly relevan t to the issues raised on appeal.
Parcel three, which contains the land in disp ute here, consists of “[t]hat part of the
road dedicated to the public by the Plat of Trout Lake Park” which lies “South of that
[vacated] portion of said road” described in parcel one.
Below is an approximate rendering of p arcels one and three, drawn from the abstract
of title provided by Moratzka.2 The disputed land—parcel three—is shaded.

2 This image is not to scale and is here only to provide the reader with a sense of the areas
in dispute.

4
The land that comprises the three parcels was platte d in 1911 and recorded the
following year. At that time, the land was owned by Healy C. Akeley. In 1911, Akeley
dedicated the strip of land running between lots 15 and 16 “to the public use forever.” The
dedication filed by Akeley described the dedicated land as “the public roads known . . . as
the Grand Rapids and Big Fork roads.” It incl uded all of what is now parcel three and a
portion of what is now parcel one.
Following the dedication, neither Balsam Township nor any other public entity took
any action in relation to the land. But ther e was occasional tension between the property
owners and the county regarding use of the public way.
In 1967, for example, the operators of the resort then loca ted on the parcels
attempted to vacate the public way but the county board voted to oppose their efforts.3 And
in 1985, when the county sought to develop the dedicated public way into an actual
roadway providing greater access to the lake, the then-owners of the property sued to block
the county’s plan.
Eventually, the county and the property ow ners reached a resolution. The county
agreed to allow vacation of the portion of the public roadway north of county road 326 and
the owners granted the county “a public acce ss located upon the most Easterly property
owned by the [owners], a portion of Lot Thirt een.” Given this agreement, only a portion
of the public-way easement running between lots 15 and 16 remained—the portion now in

3 “Vacation” is a procedure whereby interested landowners may apply to have the public’s
interest in platted land exti nguished. Minnesota Statutes section 505.14 (2020) provides
that, upon application from the owner of land included in a plat, a “district court may vacate
or alter all, or any part, of [a] plat” if specific requirements are met.
5
dispute. The remainder was formally vacated by court order. As a compromise, the public
was allowed to access the small remaining portion of the public way—the beach—by
proceeding south along the east side of parcel two along lo t 13, west down county road
326, then south through parcel three.
Although what is now known as parcel 3 was platted as a roadway, there is no
physical road there. And as noted, given the vacation of most of that roadway, the portion
of the land that is in dispute is a beach used by the resort, which is now under different
ownership.
B. Moratzka’s Application to Register Title
The current dispute arose when Moratzka, ac ting as trustee for the trust that owns
the three parcels, filed a Torrens application to register title in 2019.
4 He asserted that the
trust possessed a fee simple inte rest in the parcels, and he submitted three abstracts of
title—one for each parcel identified in his application.
The application acknowledged a public easement on parcel three, indicating that it
was encumbered by a “[p]lat dated June 12, 1911 filed of record in the Office of the County
Recorder in and for Itasca County, Minnesota, on January 12, 1912 . . . dedicating to the
public Grand Rapids and Big Fork roads.” Moratzka’s application further stated:

4 Moratzka sought to register title pursuant to Minnesota Statutes chapter 508, otherwise
known as the “Torrens Act,” which provides that “a party seeking to register an ownership
interest in property [may] appl[y] for a court adjudication of ownership and a court decree
that converts abstract property into Torrens property.” In re Collier, 726 N.W.2d 799, 804
(Minn. 2007). The Torrens syst em is notably different from the “abstract system,” under
which “transactions that affect real property ar e recorded with the co unty recorder in the
county where the property is located,” rather than title being registered by the registrar of
titles. Id. at 803-04.
6
Applicant seeks the determination that the public and the Town
of Balsam and County of Itasca have no right, title, or interest
in [parcel three] hereto under or by virt ue of the Plat dated
June 12, 1911 filed of record in the Office of the County
Recorder in and for Itasca County, Minnesota, on January 12,
1912 in Book “2” of Plats page 35.

The reason is that the Town of Balsam and County of Itasca
did not record any interest in th e road within 40 years of the
road’s dedication, the road wa s abandoned, the Marketable
Title Act’s presumption of abandonment applies, and no public
road exists thereon.

The application asked the district court to adjudicate the trust’s title to the three parcels of
land, including parcel three, free of any encumbrance.
Subsequently, the Itasca Co unty Examiner of Titles (the examiner) reported on
Moratzka’s application, determining that the township, the DNR, and the county should be
parties to the proceeding becau se (1) the township had jurisdiction over platted roads
within the town ship, (2) the DNR had an interest in maintaining public lake access, and
(3) the county had been involved in the prior road-vacation proceeding. Moratzka filed a
petition and order for summons re questing that the district court issue a summons for the
three public entities.
C. The District Court Proceedings
In the district court, appellants objected to Moratzka’s application and moved for
summary judgment.
5 They argued that Moratzka was estopped from denying the existence
of the public way and the only way to extinguish the public’s interest in the disputed land

5 The township initially objected to Moratzka’s applic ation. However, the township
withdrew its objection after the district cour t denied summary-judgment motions filed by
the township, the coun ty, and the DNR, and did not o ppose Moratzka’s subsequent
summary-judgment motion. The township does not participate on appeal.
7
was vacation under Minnesota’s road vacation statute. Moratzka responded that any public
interest in parcel three had expired 40 years after Akeley’s dedication because it had been
abandoned by operation of the MTA.
The district court denied appellants’ mo tion for summary judgment, concluding that
Moratzka had “source of title, arising from Healy C. Akeley’s interest in Parcel 3” which
“ha[d] been of record for at least forty (40) years” within the mean ing of the MTA, that
Minnesota’s road-vacation statute was inapplic able as vacation had not been raised by
Moratzka, that Moratzka was not estopped from claiming abandonment under the MTA,
and that the easement created by the 1911-12 dedication had been “abandoned” within the
meaning of the MTA.
Moratzka then moved for su mmary judgment. The district court granted the motion,
largely relying on the legal conclusions in its order denying appellants’ motion.
Appellants challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Moratzka.
ISSUES
I. Did the MTA extinguish the public interest created by the 1911-12
dedication?
II. Is Moratzka estopped from seeking a remedy under the MTA?
III. Is Moratzka required to seek v acation of the public way created by the
1911-12 dedication under Minnesota’s road-vacation statute?
8
ANALYSIS
Appellate courts review a district cour t’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
STAR Ctrs., 644 N.W.2d at 77. In doing so, the reviewing court views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Id. at 76-
77. The goal of appellate review is to dete rmine whether there are any genuine issues of
material fact and whether the district cour t erred in its application of the law. Id. at 77.
Insofar as appellants’ arguments present questions of law, we also review those questions
de novo. See Doe v. Minn. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs , 435 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Minn. 1989)
(stating that statutory-construction questions are subject to de novo review).
I. Because no public entity recorded the 1911-12 dedication within 40 years, the
MTA extinguished any public interest in the platted roadway.

A. The Minnesota Marketable Title Act
The MTA is a mechanism for landowners to “relieve a title from the servitude of
provisions contained in ancien t records which fetter the mark etability of real estate.”
Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800, 812 (Minn. 1957) (quotation omitted); Minn. Stat.
§ 541.023 (2020). To achieve this purpose, th e MTA provides that no interest can “be
asserted against a claim of title based on a source of title unless the interest is preserved by
filing a notice within 40 years of the creation of the interest.” State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d
414, 427 (Minn. 2004). In relevant part, the MTA states,
As against a claim of title ba sed upon a source of title, which
source has then been of record at least 40 years, no action
affecting the possession or title of any real estate shall be
commenced by a person, partnershi p, corporation, other legal
entity, state, or any political di vision thereof, to enforce any
right, claim, interest, incumbra nce, or lien founded upon any
instrument, event or transac tion which was executed or
9
occurred more than 40 years pr ior to the commencement of
such action, unless within 40 years after such execution or
occurrence there has been recorded in the office of the county
recorder . . . a notice . . . setting forth the name of the claimant,
a description of the real estate affected and of the instrument,
event or transaction on which such claim is founded . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 1. This provision “appl[ies] to every right, claim, interest,
incumbrance, or lien founded by any instrument , event, or transaction that is at least 40
years old.” Id., subd. 2(a). To invoke the MTA, a party must have a “source of title” which
has been “of record at least 40 years.” Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 427 (quotation omitted).
The failure to record an interest in land within 40 years establishes a conclusive
presumption that the interest has been abandoned. 6 Minn. Stat. § 541. 023, subds. 2, 5;
Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 427. Once abandoned, any interest in land is “extinguish[ed].” Id.
B. The MTA applies to land dedi cated by plat to public use.
Here, the district court conc luded as a matter of law that any public interest in parcel
three was extinguished under the MTA because neither the county nor any other public
entity claimed and recorded the interest. Appellants contend, however, that the MTA does
not apply to dedications that are made in recorded plats.
To address appellants’ argument, we must first interpret the MTA. Appellate courts
review questions of statutor y interpretation de novo. State v. Defatte , 928 N.W.2d 338,
340 (Minn. 2019). When interpreting a statute, the goal is to ascertain the legislature’s
intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020); Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc. , 820

6 There is an exception to this general rule where there is actual “possession” of the property
in question. Id. at 424 n.8 (citing Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 6 (2002)). Neither the DNR
nor the county has alleged “possession” of parcel three.
10
N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn. 2012). Reviewing courts first examine the language of the statute
and ask whether it is ambiguous or “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”
Tapia v. Leslie , 950 N.W.2d 59, 61 (Minn. 2020). In determining whether language is
ambiguous, reviewing courts give words their plain and ordinary meaning, unless the terms
are statutorily defined. See Broadway Child Care Ctr. v. Dept. of Hum. Res., 955 N.W.2d
626, 631 (Minn. App. 2021). If the statutory language is susceptible to only one reasonable
interpretation, reviewing courts apply the statute’s plain language and do “not explore the
spirit or purpose of the law.” Caldas, 820 N.W.2d at 836 (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.16
(2010)).
Applying these principles, we conclude that the plain language of the MTA
unambiguously encompasses dedications made by recorded plat. We first note that the text
of the MTA explicitly pronounces the legislat ure’s purpose in enacting the statute. The
MTA states that “it [is] hereby declared as the policy of the state of Minnesota that, except
as herein provided, ancient records shall not fetter the marketability of real estate.” Minn.
Stat. § 541.023, subd. 5.
We next observe that, to achieve this pur pose, the MTA is broadly drafted. It
“appl[ies] to every right, claim, interest, incumbrance, or lien founded by any instrument,
event, or transaction that is at least 40 years old.” Id., subd. 2(a) (emphasis added). When
the word “any” is used in a statute, the statute is broadly applied. In re Welfare of Child of
D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (M inn. App. 2009) (citing Olson v. Ford Motor Co. , 558
N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 1997)). The broad language of the MTA—which applies to every
11
interest founded by any instrument—seemingly includes an interest in a public way created
by a recorded plat.
The exceptions to the MTA’s recordin g requirement further support this
interpretation. A subdivision entitled “Limita tions; certain titles not affected” excludes
from the MTA specific entities, including the federal governme nt, and specific types of
interests, including “the record title or record interest, or title obtained by or through any
congressional or legislative grant, of any ra ilroad corporation.” Minn. Stat. § 541.023,
subd. 6. This subdivision does not exclude a dedication to the public made by plat. Id.
When a statute contains explicit exceptions to the statute, the exceptions “shall be
construed to exclude all others.” Minn. Stat. § 645.19 (2020). Because a dedication made
in a recorded plat is not excepted from the MTA, we interpret the statute to apply to such
an interest.
Given the unambiguous language of the MTA, which applies to all conveyances
with limited delineated exceptions, we conclude that it applies to land dedicated by plat to
public use. Thus, to claim such an interest, the claimant must properly record it.
But what if the claimant is the public? When the public is given an interest in land,
a public entity must affirmatively accept the interest by following the requirements of the
MTA. For example, a township abandons its in terest in a town road by operation of the
MTA when it does not record its interest in the road within 40 years. Sterling Township v.
Griffin, 244 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Minn. 1976); Township of Villard v. Hoting , 442 N.W.2d
826, 829 (Minn. App. 1989) (“[A] township must comply with the requirement that it
12
record properly its po ssessory interest in a public road within 40 years of the road’s
establishment or it will be presumed to have abandoned its right to the road.”).
Appellants argue that a dedication to the public in a plat is different, however. They
point out that township roads are typically created by town order. See, e.g., Griffin, 244
N.W.2d at 131 (“The road was established . . . by order of the Sterling Town Board.”);
Hoting, 442 N.W.2d at 827 (“[T]he township’s supervisors . . . executed a final road order
establishing a public road.” (quotations omitted)). And, according to appellants, the cases
concerning township roads involve the townships’ failure to record their interests with the
relevant county authority. Griffin, 244 N.W.2d at 133; Hoting, 442 N.W.2d at 829.
Appellants contend that “[p]latted public ways in recorded and admittedly valid land plats
simply are not the same as a township road order that has never been recorded under the
recording laws.” They note that the act of recording the plat provides “actual notice” of
the dedication and should preclude the statutory presumption of abandonment.
We are not persuaded by this argument, which is not supporte d by the caselaw or
the MTA. While it is true that Akeley created the interest by recording the 1911-12
dedication with Itasca County, there was no act of acceptance by the claimant. The MTA
requires the claimant to accept the interest by recording in the office of the county recorder
“a notice sworn to by the claimant or th e claimant’s agent or attorney ” identifying the
interest, the transaction upon which the interest is founde d, and a description of the
property. Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 1 (emphasis added). And we made clear in Hoting
that even a public entity—in that case a to wnship—“must comply with the requirement
that it record properly its possessory interest in a public road within 40 years of the road’s
13
establishment or it will be presumed to have abandoned its right to the road.” 442 N.W.2d
at 829 (emphasis added). Thus, neither actual notice nor the recording of a dedication by
plat satisfies the MTA’s requirement that a claimant record its interest. We therefore reject
appellants’ attempt to create an exception for platted public ways.
In sum, we conclude that the MTA applies to land dedicated by plat to public use.
C. Application of the MTA
We next consider whether the public interest created by Akeley’s 1911-12
dedication was abandoned under the MTA. To decide this issue, we must determine
whether the trust has a “source of title” that has been “of record for at least 40 years” and
whether a claimant of the public in terest abandoned that interest. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at
427.
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear wh ether appellants challenge the district
court’s conclusion that the trust owned parcel three in fee simple.
7 Because the undisputed
facts support the district court’s conclusion, we reject any assertion that the trust did not
have fee-simple ownership of the parcel c ontaining the disputed land. The examiner
concluded that the trust is the successor-in-interest to the parcels of land abutting and near
Trout Lake, as described in the title abstracts provided by Moratzka. Moreover, the trust’s
source of title for those parcels extends back at least as far as the 1911-12 dedication, when

7 The district court explicitly determined that the trust possessed fee simple ownership of
the land comprising parcel three subject on ly to an easement created by the 1911-12
dedication. Appellants do not directly challenge this determination. Instead, appellants—
in particular the DNR—generally argue that the trust cannot use the MTA to establish fee
title. Implicit in this argument is an assumption that the tr ust did not possess fee simple
ownership of parcel three despite the district court’s conclusion to the contrary, though
neither appellant directly addresses this apparent ambiguity.
14
Akeley dedicated the strip of land which would eventually become part of parcel one and
all of parcel three “to the public use forever.”
That dedication did not aff ect the fee-simple ownership of the land. Dedication of
land by a private landowner to the public does not convey fee title to the land, but rather
“only such an estate as the purpose of the trust requires.” Headley v. City of Northfield, 35
N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 1949); see also Huff v. Winona & St. Peter R.R. , 11 Minn. 180,
191-93, 11 Gil. 114, 123-25 (1866); Schurmeier v. St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 10 Minn. 82, 104,
10 Gil. 59, 78 (1865). A plat dedicatio n operates as a “convey ance in trust to the
municipality of a terminable easement only , in any area designated in the plat for public
use, and the fee title thereto remains in th e dedicator, subject to the easement.” Bolen v.
Glass, 755 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 20 08) (emphasis added) (quoting Etzler v. Mondale, 123
N.W.2d 603, 610 (Minn. 1963)). Accordingly, when Akeley dedicated the strip of land in
dispute “to the public use fo rever,” he conveyed an easement which, among other things,
allowed the public the use and enjoyment of the land, as well as access to Trout Lake. Id.
Notwithstanding the dedication, Akeley ma intained fee-simple ownership of the
land. And because the trust trac es its source of title at leas t as far back as the 1911-12
dedication, it satisfies the first requirement for invoking the MTA to extinguish an interest
in land—a source of title that has been of record for 40 years.
Citing Padrnos v. City of Nisswa , 409 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. App. 1987), the DNR
argues that Moratzka is improperly using the MTA as a “sword” to seek affirmative relief
rather than as a “shield” to defend against another’s action to enforce property rights. In
Padrnos, we examined the claims of a resort owner who owned property on both sides of
15
an unopened roadway and attempted to use the MTA to acquire title to the roadway itself.
409 N.W.2d at 37. The district court reject ed the resort owner’s attempt to use the MTA
to obtain title. Id. In affirming the decision, we observed that “the MTA was designed to
be invoked as a defense in a situation where a party claims title to property and another
party asserts a hostile claim to the same prop erty,” but it could not “provide a foundation
for a new title.” Id. at 38 (emphasis added). Because the resort owner lacked the requisite
“claim of title” required for an action under the MTA, using the MTA to establish that title
was improper. Id.
But unlike the re sort owner in Padrnos, who did not have source of title for the
roadway land, Moratzka has not invoked the MTA to esta blish “a foundation for a new
title.” Instead, the trust, as successor-in-interest to parcels one, two, and three, retained fee
simple ownership of the roadway, which was merely encumbered by the easement created
by the 1911-12 dedication. Thus, the Padrnos rationale does not preclude application of
the MTA here.
In addition to establishing the trust’s s ource of title to the land, the undisputed
evidence shows that no claimant recorded an interest in the disputed property within 40
years of the dedication. Neither the township (the public entity that had jurisdiction over
the public way created by the 1911-12 dedication) nor the co unty claimed the interest by
recording it in the office of th e county recorder. Therefore, the second re quirement for
invoking the MTA—that no claimant recorded an interest in the property within 40 years
of the creation of that interest, Minn. Stat. § 541.023, subd. 1—is satisfied. The conclusive
presumption of abandonment accordingly applies.
16
Because the trust possessed source of title of record for at least 40 years and the
public interest in parcel three was not recorded within 40 years of Akeley’s dedication, the
interest was abandoned. We ag ree with the district court that, pursuant to the MTA, the
public interest created by the dedication has been extinguished. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 427.
II. Moratzka is not estoppe d from invoking the MTA to challenge the existence
of the easement on parcel three.

Appellants argue that, even if the MT A applies, Moratzka is estopped from
challenging the existence of the easement on parcel three. Because the 1911-12 dedication
was included in the plat, they contend that th e principle of estoppel forecloses Moratzka
from denying its existence.
In support of their estoppel argume nt, appellants rely on our decision in Popp v.
County of Winona, 430 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 1988).
There, soon after new landowners acquired their property, the county widened a public
roadway abutting the property by seven feet, resulting in a 66-foot-wide road. Popp, 430
N.W.2d at 21. The landowners claimed that the project took 17 feet of their land. Id. But
an 1880 auditor’s plat, which was on file w ith the county record er, showed that the
dedicated roadway was 66 feet wide. Id. The county therefore believed that a 66-foot-
wide public dedication existed and that the road expansion project would conform to the
parameters of that dedication. Id. In a petition for a writ of mandamus, the landowners
challenged the county’s action, arguing that th e county had seized their property without
providing compensation. Id. The district court quashe d the writ of mandamus and we
affirmed. Id. at 22-24. Citing a 1908 Minnesota Supreme Court de cision, we stated that
“[w]hen a conveyance is made with reference to a plat, all lot owners are deemed to have
17
full knowledge and notice of everyt hing appearing on the plat.” Id. at 23 (citing Poudler
v. City of Minneapolis, 115 N.W. 274 (Minn. 1908)); see also Raines v. Village of Alden,
90 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Minn. 1958). We furthe r stated, “where, after platting lands, the
owner sells lots or blocks with references to the plat, the platters and their grantees are
estopped to deny the legal existence of such streets and public grounds as are described in
the plat.” Popp, 430 N.W.2d at 23-24. Although the 1880 plat did not satisfy statutory
requirements in dedicating a plat, we conclude d that the landowners were estopped from
denying the validity of the plat because it was incorporated into the legal description of the
property in the deed. Id. at 24. Because the deed exp licitly referred to the plat, the
landowners “were on notice and accepted all rights and easements, including the 66-foot
roadway.” Id.
The circumstances here do not implicate Popp’s reasoning. Moratzka is not
challenging the “validity of the plat.” Id. He accepts that the plat was validly created.
Instead, he argues that the roadway was subsequently abandoned by operation of the MTA.
This distinction is subtle, but determinative. While Mo ratzka would be estopped from
denying the validity of the easement created by the 1911-12 dedication, nothing in the Popp
case or its predecessors preven ts the application of the MT A to extinguish the dedication
because it was never accepted.8 We therefore reject appellants’ estoppel argument.

8 The county also presen ts this as an issue of the trus t “ratifying” the existence of the
easement upon parcel three when it took posse ssion. However, even assuming without
deciding that this is a separate legal basis for reversal, and not merely a restatement of the
estoppel argument (we note that the primary caselaw relied upon by the county for this
argument is Popp), the argument fails for the same reas on: Moratzka is not challenging
the validity of the underlying 1911-12 dedication. He merely seeks application of the MTA
to extinguish the unclaimed dedication.
18
III. Because the MTA extinguished the pub lic interest in parcel three, Moratzka
is not required to seek vacation under Minnesota’s road-vacation statute.

Finally, appellants argue that the only lawful means of eliminating the public
interest in the disputed land is through the vacation process provided by the road-vacation
statute, Minnesota Statutes section 505.14.
9 In relevant part, this statute states,
Upon the application of the owner of land included in any plat,
and upon . . . the notice hereinafter provided for . . . , the
district court may vacate or alter all, or any part, of the plat,
and adjudge the title to all streets, alleys, and public grounds to
be in the persons entitled thereto; but streets or alleys . . .
providing access for the public to any public water, shall not
be vacated between the lots, bloc ks, or plats as are not also
vacated, unless it appears that the street or alley or part thereof
sought to be vacated is useless for the purpose for which it was
laid out.

Minn. Stat. § 505.14.
Appellants contend that a landowner cannot use a Torrens proceeding or the MTA
to avoid the requirements of s ection 505.14. Invoking the rule of statutory interpretation
that a specific statute controls over a general statute, they argue that section 505.14 is a
specific statute that governs vacation of pl atted roadways whereas the Torrens and MTA
statutes are general.
As appellants note, generally, “specific te rms covering the given subject matter will
prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove
controlling.” Connexus Energy v. Comm’r of Revenue, 868 N.W.2d 234, 242 (Minn. 2015)
(quotation omitted). But, as appellants also acknowledge, this statutory-interpretation

9 While, of the two appellants, only the DNR made this argument in its appellate brief, at
oral argument the DNR presented this issue on behalf of both parties.
19
principle is particularly applicable when “the general and the specific provisions exist side
by side,” or where “the two are interrelated and closely positioned, both in fact being parts
of the same statutory scheme.” Id. at 242 (quotations omitted). For example, in Connexus,
the statutes at issue were two sequential ta x-assessment provisions providing separate
statutes of limitations. See id. at 241 (addressing Minn. Stat. § 289A.37, subd. 2 (2014),
and Minn. Stat. § 289A.38, subd. 1 (2014)).
Appellants contend that sec tion 505.14, which is a “law [] with reference to . . .
platting,” is implicitly referenced by the more general Torrens statute, which provides that,
in land registration proceedings, “[a]ll laws w ith reference to the subdivision and platting
of unregistered land shall apply with like force and effect to registered land.” Minn. Stat.
§ 508.46 (2020). As to the MTA, they argue that it is a general law because it “does not
expressly say that it applies to public interests founded upon a recorded plat.”
We are not persuaded by this analysis. The Torrens Act, the MTA, and the road-
vacation statute exist in separate chapters and are not part of the same statutory scheme.
Moreover, to accept appellants’ argument, we would be required to adopt an exception to
the MTA that does not exist. As discussed, the MTA, by its plain language, applies to
unclaimed public interests made by plat. Fi nally, appellants provide no authority that
reasonably supports their contention that the road vacation statute is a more specific
provision than the Torrens Act and the MTA under the circumstances here, which involve
an unclaimed ancient interest.10

10 The county also argues that the district court erred in failing to acknowledge the mandate
of Minnesota Statutes section 508.25(4) (2020)—a portion of the Torrens Act—which
states that “[e]very person receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a [Torrens] decree of
20
Although that interest was a platted public way, neither the township nor the county
recorded it with the county recorder. Because the interest was extinguished pursuant to the
MTA, the trust was not required to seek vacation of the extinguished interest under section
505.14.11
DECISION
The district court did not err in concl uding that there were no genuine issues of
material fact and that Moratzka was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the
public interest created by the 1911-12 dedication by plat was abandoned and extinguished
within the meaning of the MTA.
Affirmed.

registration . . . shall hold it free from all encumbrances and adverse claims, excepting . . .
all rights in public highways upon the land .” (Emphasis added.) It contends that this
language precluded Moratzka fro m discharging the public wa y in a Torrens registration
proceeding and required Moratzka to seek va cation under section 505.14. However, this
argument also fails. While it is true that Torrens actions do not allow for the elimination
of public rights in public roads, see Minn. Stat. § 508.25(4), Moratzka does not claim they
do. Rather, he (correctly) argues that th e MTA—wholly separate and independent from
the Torrens Act—has extinguished th e easement upon parcel three, see Hoting, 442
N.W.2d at 829, and his Torrens action merely seeks acknowledgement of that fact. Thus,
while a Torrens action cannot itself create an independent basis for elimination of a public
road, when the MTA provides an independent basis for elimination, such a fact may be
recognized in a Torrens proceeding.

11 Before this court, the DNR argues for th e first time that the “constitutional avoidance
canon” and “public interest presumption” support their general position. However,
although both appellants alleged in the distri ct court that the “public interest” supported
their position, neither appellant raised the above doctrines. Appellate courts generally
decline to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d
580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Because these issues we re not presented to the district court, we
do not address them.