In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: John Michael Thomey.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0834

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: John Michael Thomey.

Filed January 10, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-PR-21-866

Jean Gustafson, Brainerd, Minnesota (for appellant John Michael Thomey)

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Rockwell J. Wells, Assistant County
Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presid ing Judge; Florey, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this civil commitment case, appellant challenges the district court’s decision
revoking his stay of commitment. Because the record supports the district court’s factual
determinations that appellant violated material conditions of his release and met the
remaining requirements for commitment, we affirm.
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FACTS
On March 15, 2021, Crow Wi ng County (the county) filed a petition to civilly
commit appellant John Michael Thomey as a chemically dependent person.1 The petition
alleged that Thomey had shot himself in the chest. Thomey was taken to the hospital,
where he underwent a psychiatric evaluation. According to the petition, Thomey had a
history of depression and anxiet y, had been taking medication four times daily for years,
and had become delirious after his psychiatrist started tapering off his medication. Thomey
told the doctor that he was “confused and ha llucinating” when he shot himself and that it
was not a suicide attempt.
The court-appointed examiner conducted a forensic psychological examination of
Thomey and submitted a report to the district court. The examiner opined that Thomey
met the definition of a chemically dependent person. The examiner noted that Thomey
was diagnosed with severe sedative use disord er and severe opioid use disorder, and that
he was “incapable of self-man agement due to excessive use of these substances.” The
examiner determined that Thomey misused his medication by taking more than prescribed,
and after he ran out of medication, he experienced acute withdrawal symptoms, including
hallucinations and delirium. According to the examiner, the reas on for Thomey’s self-
inflicted harm was severe distress caused by drug-use withdrawal. Based on his “habitual
and excessive substance use,” the examiner opined that Thomey posed a substantial risk of

1 The petition also sought to commit Thomey as a person who poses a risk of harm due to
a mental illness, but the district court determined that the county failed to prove that basis
for commitment.
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harm to himself. Because Thomey appeared to understand that his self-injury was due to
his substance use and withdrawal, and he told the examiner he was willing to comply with
chemical dependency treatment recommendati ons, the examiner reco mmended a stay of
commitment.
The commitment hearing was held before a referee on April 2, 2021. The parties
told the referee that, based on the examiner’s recommendation, they had agreed to a stay
of commitment. The county’s attorney explained that the agreement was “with the
understanding that [Thomey] would follow the recommendations of his Rule 25 chemical
use assessment, which . . . is recommending residential treatment.” During questioning,
Thomey admitted that he was chemically dependent. He agreed that he intended to receive
a stay of commitment and expressly agreed to follow the recommendations of a chemical-
use assessment and to complete an inpatient treatment program. Thomey understood that
failure to comply with this condition could result in his commitment. The referee found
that Thomey suffered from a chemical dependency, that the chemical dependency created
a substantial risk of harm to himself as shown by the self-inflicted gunshot wound, and that
a stayed commitment, conditio ned on the completion of an inpatient treatment program,
was the least restrictive alternative for effective treatment.
The district court issued a stayed orde r for commitment, whic h incorporated the
referee’s findings. The district court found that there was clear and convincing evidence
that Thomey was a chemically dependent person, based on a r ecent threat to physically
harm himself. The district court determined that a conditional stay requiring inpatient
treatment was a reasonable alternative to civil commitment. Accordingly, the district court
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stayed commitment on certain specific conditions. One condition was that Thomey would
complete a chemical-use assessment and follow the recommendations of that assessment.
The district court noted that Thomey ha d already completed the assessment, which
recommended inpatient treatment. The distri ct court’s order provided that, if Thomey
failed to comply with a materi al condition of release, the di strict court could revoke the
stay of commitment.
Less than one month later, on April 26, 2021, Thomey’s case manager filed a
request to revoke the stay of commitment. The request alleged that Thomey had been
unsuccessfully discharged from chemical depe ndency treatment, in violation of the
conditions of the order. A revocation hearing was held before the referee on May 11, 2021.
Thomey’s case manager testified that, after Thomey was released from the hospital, he
went directly to inpatient treatment. However, Thomey resided at the treatment center for
just four days, when Thomey got into an altercation with anot her patient. As a result, he
was discharged from the treatment center and taken back to the hospital. The case manager
also testified that there was no other inpatient program available at that time, in part because
other programs did not allow for the type of medication that Thomey was prescribed.
Ultimately, the district court issued an order revoking the stay of commitment. The
district court found that there was clear an d convincing ev idence that Th omey had not
complied with the material cond itions of his release. The district court reiterated its
conclusion that Thomey me t the definition of a chemic ally dependent person and
determined that there was no less restrictiv e alternative to civil commitment. Thomey
appeals.
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DECISION
Thomey argues that the district court erred when it revoked his stay of commitment.
We affirm the district court’s decision because the record supports its determinations that
Thomey violated material c onditions of his release, that he remained a chemically
dependent person, and that there were no less restrictive alternatives to commitment.
The district court may civilly commit an individual if it finds by clear and
convincing evidence th at the individual is chemically dependent and less restrictive
alternatives to commitment are not appropriate for the individual. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09,
subd. 1(a) (2020). As an alte rnative to commitment, the district court may release an
individual to the custody of an individual or agency, on co nditions guaranteeing the care
and treatment of the individual. Minn. St at. § 253B.095, subd. 1(a) (2020). Upon a
showing that the individual “h as not complied with a materi al condition of release,” the
district court may revoke the release and commit the individual. Id., subd. 5 (2020).
On appeal from a civil-commitment decision, we review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and view the record in the light most favorable to those findings.
In re Civil Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Minn. App. 2014). “[Appellate
courts] will not conclude that a factfinder cl early erred unless, on the entire evidence, we
are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civil
Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 20 21) (quotations and citations
omitted). Additionally, appellate courts s hould not reconcile conflicting evidence or
“weigh the evidence as if trying the matter de novo.” Id. at 221 (quotation omitted). “When
the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal , it is immaterial that the
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record might also provide a reasonable ba sis for inferences and findings to the
contrary.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted).
In this case, Thomey challenges the factual basis for the district court’s decision to
revoke the stay of commitment: “Appellant claims that there was not a sufficient basis for
which the trial Court could make a finding that the revocation of the stay and the subsequent
order for commitment was proper.” 2 We are not convinced. The record supports the
district court’s determination that Thomey failed to comply with material conditions of his
release. The stay was co nditioned on Thomey comple ting an inpatient chemical
dependency treatment program. The record supports the district court’s factual conclusion
that Thomey violated these conditions when, after just four days, Thomey was discharged
after an altercation with another patient.
The record further supports the district court’s determinations that Thomey
remained a chemically dependent person and that there were no less restrictive alternatives
to civil commitment. Thomey’s stay was revoked just 39 days after the district court had
issued the stayed order for commitment. At the time it imposed the stay, the district court
relied on the examiner’s opinion that Thomey was a chemically dependent person. The
examiner’s conclusion was based on the determination that Thomey misused prescription
drugs, experienced severe withdrawal sympto ms when he stopped ta king the medication,
and posed a risk of harm to himself as a resu lt, as evidenced by his self-inflicted gunshot

2 The quoted sentence above represents Thomey’s entire ar gument to this court, and
Thomey does not identify any specific factual deficiencies. Nevertheless, we address
Thomey’s general challenge to the district court’s factual findings.
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wound. There was no evidence suggesting that Thomey’s condition had improved by the
time of the revocation order. 3 Additionally, at the revoca tion hearing, Thomey’s case
manager told the referee that the county ha d explored other potential placements for
Thomey but that none were available at the time. Based on the recency of the stayed order
for commitment and the county’s examination of alternative placements at the time of the
revocation, the district court did not err when it revoked the stay of commitment.
Affirmed.

3 We also note that this court has previously affirmed revocation of a stay of commitment
without further consideration of less restrictive alternatives at the time of revocation when
the revocation occurred 45 days after the en try of the commitment order and when there
had been no significant change in circ umstances since the commitment order. In re
Roberds, 473 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Minn. App. 1991).