Louis Reis, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0839

Louis Reis,
Appellant,

vs.

City of Nisswa,
Respondent.

Filed January 31, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CV-20-4258

Louis Reis, Nisswa, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Paul A. Merwin, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tr acy M., Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Louis Reis appeals from the district court’s rule 12.02(e) dismissal of his
complaint against respondent City of Nisswa, which asserts multiple claims, including due-
process and equal-protection vi olations, defamation, coerci on and extortion, and open-
record-law violations, all stemming from the city ’s actions in relation to Reis’s property.
2
Reis argues that the district court erred by de termining that his complaint failed to state a
valid claim upon which relief may granted. We affirm.
FACTS1
Reis owns a cabin home in Nisswa. Acco rding to Reis’s third amended complaint
filed on April 4, 2021 (the complaint), 2 he planned to make some improvements to his
property, such as “changes to the principal structure, adding an attached garage, landscape
improvements, adding a few new outbuildings, and more,” but beginning in approximately
2017 or 2018, the city prevented Reis from making those change s even though other
neighbors made similar improvements to thei r properties. Additiona lly, according to the
complaint, city officials and staff engaged in “ex parte communications,” declared that his
property was “hazardous” and “needed to be cleaned up,” extorted money from him by
allowing him to spend money on home-improve ment plans that were later blocked, and
refused to provide him with “a ll records . . . that are on f ile” for his property that he
requested under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). As a result of the city’s actions,
Reis alleges that he lost significant amounts of money, that the value of his home was
reduced, that he has no garage for storing his belongings, and that he has been deprived of
the use and enjoyment of his pr operty. Based on these facts, the complaint asserts five

1 In reviewing a dismissal under rule 12.02(e), we accept the facts alleged in the complaint
as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See DeRosa
v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019).

2 Reis—who was self-represented in the di strict court—filed a complaint and three
amended complaints. In considering the motion to dismiss, the district court relied on the
third amended complaint, whic h is the most comprehensive. We likewise focus on the
third amended complaint here.
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counts against the city: (I) violation of Reis ’s federal constitutional right to due process;
(II) violation of Reis’s federal constitutional right to equal protec tion; (III) defamation;
(IV) coercion and extortion under Minnesota’s cr iminal statutes; and (V) violation of the
state’s open records laws, “which are protected under [FOIA].” Reis’s complaint seeks
monetary damages and a court order requiring the city “to halt and reverse ‘any and all’
adverse actions . . . taken against [Reis]” a nd to “preserve all records including . . .
communications, public documents, meeting mi nutes (for internal and public meetings),
and emails pertaining to pl anning & zoning” for “all properties within [the city’s]
jurisdiction.”3
In lieu of filing an answer, the city move d to dismiss the comp laint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be grante d under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
12.02(e). The city argued that Reis’s “broad and conclusory allegations . . . provide[d] no
context or facts” from which the city could determine a legal basis for the complaint.
After a hearing, the district court grante d the city’s motion, concluding that the
complaint failed to articulate a claim suppor ting his requests for relief, and instead,
consisted solely of speculation and legal conclusions.
Reis appeals.

3 In addition to his complaints, Reis filed numerous documents in the district court,
including a subpoena duces tecum, a discovery plan that he unilaterally created, a motion
to compel, and discovery requests.
4
DECISION
A complaint must “contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for judgment for the relief sought.” Minn. R. Civ.
P. 8.01. The district court may, upon motion, dismiss a complaint that “fail[s] to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). Dismissal under rule
12.02(e) is only proper “if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced
consistent with the pleading, exist which would support gr anting the relief demanded.”
Finn v. All. Bank, 860 N.W.2d 638, 653 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). It is “immaterial
whether or not the plaintiff can prove the facts alleged.” Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg.
Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 739 (Minn. 2000).
Appellate courts review de novo whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient
claim for relief under rule 12.02(e). DeRosa, 936 N.W.2d at 346. In doing so, we consider
only the facts alleged in the co mplaint, accepting those facts as true and construing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.; see also Sipe v. STS Mfg, Inc.,
834 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn. 2013). We consider the complaint as a whole, “including the
facts alleged throughout the complaint and the attachments to the complaint.” Hardin Cnty.
Sav. Bank v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. , 821 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Min n. 2012). The reviewing
court is not bound by any legal conclusions stated in the complaint. Finn, 860 N.W.2d at
653-54.
Reis argues that the district court erre d in dismissing the complaint because he
pleaded sufficient facts to state his claims ag ainst the city. He ar gues that the complaint
5
“covers facts defining ‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘when,” and therefore establishes that he is entitled
to relief.
We first consider Reis’s due-process claim. Under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the state cannot “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1. Due process “imposes constraint s on governmental decisions which deprive
individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ inte rests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). The complaint alleges that the
city deprived Reis of due process by somehow preventing hi m from making certain
changes to his property. But beyond listing the property impr ovements that he hoped to
make, the complaint does not id entify the constitutionally protected property interest that
the city impaired. It does not identify what governmental actions were taken. See Minn.
Stat. § 462.361, subd. 1 (20 20) (stating that a person aggrieved by a municipality’s
“ordinance, rule, regulation, decision, or orde r” may challenge the action in the district
court). And it does not describe the process that the city should have followed. Thus, the
complaint did not adequately plead a due-process violation.
Next, we turn to Reis’s equal-protecti on claim. The Equal Protection Clause
provides that “[no state shall] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause “direct[s] that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike,” but “only invidious discrimination”
violates the Constitution. In re Estate of Turner , 391 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. 1986)
(quotation omitted). Thus, unle ss the discrimination involves a suspect classification or
6
fundamental right, the state need only have a ra tional basis for the differential treatment.
Id. As a factual basis for Reis’s equal-protection claim, the complaint alleges that the city
allowed his neighbors to ma ke property improvements but blocked him from making
similar improvements. Although Reis alleges that the city treated him differently from his
neighbors, this allegation alone is not enough to establish an equal-protection claim. The
complaint does not explain how Reis and his neighbors were similarly situated. It does not
illuminate how the city treate d his neighbors and how it trea ted him. And it does not
specify what action the city to ok that was discriminatory. The complaint therefore failed
to adequately plead an equal-protection claim.
Count III of the complaint a lleges that the city defame d Reis and his property by
making “false & defamatory statements over a long period of time” and by stating that the
property was “hazardous” and “needed to be cleaned up.” To esta blish defamation, a
plaintiff must prove:
(1) the defamatory statement was communicated to someone
other than the plaintiff; (2) th e statement is false; (3) the
statement tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and to lower
the plaintiff in the estimation of the community; and (4) the
recipient of the false statemen t reasonably understands it to
refer to a specific individual.

McKee v. Laurion , 825 N.W.2d 725, 729-30 (Minn. 2013) (quotations and citations
omitted). The complaint does not identify the statements that the city allegedly made about
Reis. It simply asserts that “false” and “defamatory” statements were made. A plaintiff,
in specifying the basis for a cl aim, must provide more than legal labels and conclusions.
Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
7
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see also Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 953
N.W.2d 496, 501 (Minn. 2021) (clarifying that legal conclusions (but not factual
conclusions) in a complaint may be insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss). Because
Reis’s complaint does not articulate what st atements the city made about him and only
offers a legal conclusion that the city defamed him, it is insufficient to establish his claim
for defamation. See Halva, 953 N.W.2d at 503 (s tating that a pleading must provide fair
notice of the incident that gave rise to a claim). Moreover, a statement is only actionable
as defamation if it is about the plaintiff. Huyen v. Driscoll , 479 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Minn.
App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 10, 1992). Any stat ements about Reis’s property,
which are not about Reis, are not actionable as defamation. Thus, the complaint failed to
adequately plead a defamation claim.
The complaint’s fourth count alleges that the city engage d in the criminal acts of
extortion and coercion and cites to Minnesot a Statutes section 609.27 (2020), a criminal
statute entitled “Coercion.” As a factual basis for Count IV, the complaint alleges that the
city “published documents to their website stating that [Reis] owes . . . $5,000 for
services.” This factual asse rtion does not alone support a cau se of action. We also note
that the Minnesota Supreme Court recently stru ck down subdivision 1(4) of the coercion
statute on constitu tional grounds. See State v. Jorgenson , 946 N.W.2d 596, 605 (Minn.
2020) (invalidating Minn. Stat. § 609.27, subd. 1(4) (2018)—which proscribed “a threat to
expose a secret or deformity, publish a defama tory statement, or otherwise to expose any
person to disgrace or ridicule”—because it penalized some constitutionally protected
activities and therefore was facially overbroad). The invalidated subsection of the coercion
8
statute is the only portion of the statute that corresponds to the complaint’s factual claim.
Moreover, a criminal statute does not “give rise to a civil cause of action unless the statute
expressly or by clear implication so provides.” Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 47 n.4
(Minn. 1990). Section 609.27 does not provide for a civil action.
Finally, Count V of the complaint a lleges that the city violated FOIA 4 and the
“state’s open records laws” by not responding to the discovery requests and subpoenas that
Reis prepared in connection with his first tw o complaints. Reis’s discovery requests and
subpoenas were not public records requests that could form the basis for a civil cause of
action. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 4 (2020) (providing that a person seeking data
under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act may bring an action in district court
to compel compliance). Rather, they were discovery requests made by a party to litigation,
which are governed by the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules provide a
remedy for a party’s failure to comply with discovery. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.01
(providing process for addressi ng a party’s failure to comp ly with discovery requests). 5
Because Count V concerns an alleged violation of the civil-procedure rules and not an
independent cause of action, it is not a valid claim.

4 FOIA outlines the information that federal agencies must make available to the public,
and it provides the public the right to request access to such information from any federal
agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).

5 Here, the record shows that Reis attempted to avail himsel f of this remedy by filing a
motion to compel. The district court’s dismissal of the case obviated the need for a ruling
on Reis’s motion.
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We conclude that none of the allegations in the complaint set forth a legally
sufficient claim for relief. See DeRosa, 936 N.W.2d at 346. Thus, the district court did
not err in granting the city’s rule 12(e) motion to dismiss.
In addition to challenging the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, Reis argues
that the district court erred in granting the city’s motion to quash his discovery requests, in
denying his request to remove the district court judge for bias, and in failing to
accommodate him as a self-represented litigant . Generally, on appeal from a district
court’s order dismissing a complaint for failur e to state a claim under rule 12.02(e), “the
only question before [the review ing court] is whether the complaint sets forth a legally
sufficient claim for relief.” Barton v. Moore , 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997). But
because two of Reis’s claimed errors may have affected the judgment, we elect to consider
these issues.6 See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 (providing that, on appeal from a judgment,
this court “may review any order involving the merits or affecting the judgment”).
Reis argues that the judge’s expeditious decision on the city’s motion to dismiss and
the fact that the judge “ultimately granted everything that the [city] requested,” demonstrate
the judge’s bias. “A judge is disqualified ‘due to an appearance of partiality’ if a
‘reasonable examiner, with full knowledge of the facts and circumstances, would question
the judge’s impartiality.’” State v. Finch, 865 N.W.2d 696, 703 (Minn. 2015) (quoting In
re Jacobs, 802 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Minn. 2011)). Bu t “a judge who feel s able to preside

6 We do not consider Reis’s argum ent that the district court erred in dismissing the city’s
motion to quash his discovery requests after dismissing the complaint because this ruling
did not involve the merits or affect the judgment. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04.
10
fairly over the proceedings should not be required to step down upon allegations of a party
which themselves may be unfair or which simply indicate dissatisfaction with the possible
outcome of the litigation.” McClelland v. McClelland, 359 N.W.2d 7, 11 (Minn. 1984).
Reis’s allegations of bias, which are solely related to his dissatisfaction with the judge’s
rulings, do not support any claim that the judge was disqualified to preside in his case.
Additionally, Reis argues that the distri ct court should have accommodated him
because he was a self-represented litigan t. While courts may make “some
accommodations” for self-represented litigants, we have “repeatedly emphasized that pro
se litigants are generally held to the same standards as atto rneys and must comply with
court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald , 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). Even
though self-represented litigants are often given some “leewa y in attempting to comply
with court rules, [they are] still not relie ved of the burden of, at least, adequately
communicating to the court what it is [the y] want[] accomplished and by whom.”
Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987). Here, the record shows
that Reis was accorded significant leeway in the district court. His first request to remove
a judge as of right was granted even though it was likely untimely. And in considering the
city’s rule 12(e) motion to dismiss, the dist rict court reviewed Re is’s second and third
amended complaints, which were also untim ely and filed without leave of opposing
counsel or the court. We therefore reject Re is’s argument that the district court failed to
appropriately accommodate him as a self-represented litigant.
Affirmed.