In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Jackie Barritt.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0850

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Jackie Barritt.

Filed November 15, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-21-598

Kurt M. Anderson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, A nnsara Lovejoy Elas ky, Julia Hillel,
Assistant County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges her civil commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm
due to mental illness, arguing that the reco rd does not support the district court’s
determination that she poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to herself or others.
We affirm.
FACTS
Police officers found appellant Jackie Ba rritt sleeping or passed out in her car
around 2:00 a.m. with her fi ve-and-a-half-month-old son on her lap. The child had a full
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diaper and was “covered” in feces. When awakened, Barr itt was “confused,”
“disoriented,” unable to answer questions, and denied having a baby. She stated that she
wanted to “drive her vehicl e into a brick wall.” Becaus e Barritt was uncooperative and
threatened to run away, paramedics put her in restraints and transported her to the hospital.
At the hospital, Barritt refused to answer qu estions, yelled at staff, refused medications,
appeared paranoid, and had poor insight into her mental illness. At the time of this incident,
Barritt was living in a hotel after previously being homeless and living out of her car.
At a commitment hearing, Ba rritt denied being recently homeless and testified that
she was sleeping in her car b ecause she was tired and did not want to risk driving to the
hotel. She testified that she was unaware that the child had feces on him. She also testified
that her statement about driving into a brick wall was not suicidal. The district court found
that Barritt was not credible. A court-appo inted examiner who interviewed Barritt and
reviewed her records opined that Barritt poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to
herself or others as a result of her mental illn ess. The district court found the examiner’s
opinion persuasive.
The district court determin ed that Barritt suffers from a mental illness, and because
she threatened to driv e into a brick wall and required re straint due to her agitation, she
poses a substantial likelihood of causing physical harm to hers elf or others. It therefore
ordered that Barritt be civilly committed as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental
illness. This appeal followed.

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DECISION
Barritt challenges the district court’s co mmitment order, arguing that the record
does not support the district court’s determination that she poses a substantial likelihood of
physical harm to herself or others due to her mental illness. We disagree.
In reviewing a district court’s order for commitment, we examine whether the
district court complied with the statute and whether its findings based on the evidence
justify commitment. In re Knops , 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). We review the
district court’s findings of fact for clear er ror and give “due rega rd” to its credibility
determinations. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court r ecently clarified the clear-error
standard, stating that appellate courts “vie w the evidence in a li ght favorable to the
findings” and “will not conclude that a fa ctfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire
evidence, [the court is] left with a definite and firm convi ction that a mistake has been
committed.” In re Civil Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)
(quotations and citations omitted). Further, we may not rewe igh the evidence, engage in
fact-finding, or reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22 (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, we “need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or
demonstrate the correctness” of the district court’s findings. Id. Instead, we must consider
all the evidence and determin e whether it reasonably tends to support those findings. Id.
at 223. And when the record reasonably sup ports the district court’s findings, “it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings
to the contrary.” Id. (quotation omitted).
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Whether the evidence is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that
the statutory commitment criteria are met is a question of law that we review de novo.
Knops, 536 N.W.2d at 620; In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Minn. 1994). The clear-
and-convincing-evidence standard requires “m ore than a preponderan ce of the evidence
but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “is met when the truth of the facts
asserted is highly probable.” In re Civil Commitment of Kropp , 895 N.W.2d 647, 654
(Minn. App. 2017) (quotations and citation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2017).
A district court will civilly commit a pers on if it finds by cl ear and convincing
evidence that, among other things, the person poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1( a) (2020). A person poses a risk of harm due to a mental
illness if the person
has an organic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric
disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory
that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize
reality, or to reason or unders tand, that is manifested by
instances of grossly disturbed be havior or faulty perceptions
and who, due to this impairment, poses a substantial likelihood
of physical harm to self or others.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17a(a) (2020) (emphasis added). A substantial likelihood of
physical harm may be shown by, among other things, the person’s “recent attempt or threat
to physically harm self or others.” Id., subd. 17a(a)(3). But neither the person nor others
must come to harm before commitment is justified. In re McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d 621,
623 (Minn. 1995).
Here, the district court found that Barritt’ s statement that she wanted to drive her
vehicle into a brick wall was a legitimate threat to harm herself and her child. When Barritt
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made the threat, she was agitated and resist ing assistance from first responders. She was
confused and denied having a child with her in the car. The child had a full diaper and was
covered in feces. Although at the hearing Barritt denied that the statement was suicidal,
the district court did not find that testim ony credible. We defer to that credibility
determination. See Knops , 536 N.W.2d at 620. These circumstances, taken together,
support the district court’s determination th at it was highly probable that Barritt’s threat
was a serious one. Kropp, 895 N.W.2d at 654. The district court did not clearly err by so
finding, and it therefore did not err by determin ing that Barritt met this statutory criterion
for commitment.
Barritt relies on a nonprecedential opinion to argue that verbal threats alone are
insufficient to show a substantial likelihood of physical harm to herself or others. Barritt’s
reliance on the nonprecedential opi nion is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First,
nonprecedential opinions of this court are not binding authority . Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
136.01, subd. 1(c). Second, our review of the opinion shows it to be factually
distinguishable.
Finally, Barritt argues that the district court erred by giving weight to the fact that
she was found sleeping in her car with her infant child, who had a full diaper and was
covered in feces. She argues that these circ umstances are relevant to a child-protection
matter but not to commitment proceedings. But the district court did not order commitment
based on the conditions in wh ich law enforcement found Barritt and her child. Rather, it
recited those conditions as context for the circumstances supporting Barritt’s commitment:
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her threat to drive her vehicle into a brick wall and her need for physical restraints. The
district court did not err by considering this relevant context.
Affirmed.