State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0854

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Randip E. Satoskar,
Appellant.

Filed May 31, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-20-146

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney , Jessica Bierwerth, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Pres iding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Randip E. Satoskar challenge s his conviction for first-degree arson
following a jury trial. He argue s that the district court violated his right to a speedy trial,
that the trial evidence was insu fficient to support his convic tion, that the district court
2
committed reversible error by failing to forma lly enter a competency finding after his
competency evaluation, that his waiver of tr ial counsel was invalid, and that the district
court plainly erred in its jury instructions. We affirm.
FACTS
Emergency workers responded to a report of a fire at Satoskar’s house in West
St. Paul on July 12, 2019. The fire department searched the house for occupants and
initially found no one inside. But during a second search, they found Satoskar crawling
out from under a bed in the nort heast bedroom. Satoskar asked the firefighters what they
were doing in his house. He was taken outside where police observed that he was “soaking
wet, . . . covered in soot, [with] scratches on him, he was bleeding from several spots . . . ,
and he was unable to sit still.” Officers found Satoskar’s behavior to be “very suspicious.”
A fire investigation revealed that the fi re started in the northeast bedroom where
Satoskar was found. Investigators found unburned fire starter and an unburned matchstick
near the fire’s point of origin. Initially, inve stigators deemed the caus e of the fire to be
“undetermined,” but they u ltimately classified it as “incendiary,” meaning it was
intentionally started.
Two days after the fire, on July 14, 2019, Satoskar’s neighbor called 911 to report
a fire alarm and large quantities of smoke bi llowing from Satoskar’s window. While the
neighbor spoke to the 911 dispatcher, he obser ved Satoskar in the backyard. He reported
that Satoskar “was not wearing a shirt, was walking around in . . . sort of a stupor, carrying
a red container, and making no attempt to either extinguish the fire or get help.”
3
Police officers found Satoskar hiding in the rafters of his detached garage and
attempting to ignite the structure with a blowtorch. When Satoskar did not follow orders
to come down from the rafters, officers “pointed firearms at him, sprayed pepper spray at
him, and shot non-lethal bullets at him” before finally getting him to comply using a stun
gun. After arresting Satoskar, officers fo und two torch devices—one in the rafters and
another in his pocket.
During the investigation of the second hous e fire, officers looked for accelerants in
the northeast bedroom, which was again identifie d as the point of origin. The baseboard
contained a “medium petroleum distillate,” an accelerant that exists in “thousands” of
everyday products. Investigators conclude d that the July 14 house fire was also
intentionally started. They also determined that it was a different fire than the one that had
occurred two days before.
On January 17, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged Satoskar with two
counts of first-degree arson for “unlawfully by means of fire or explosives, intentionally
destroy[ing] or damag[ing] any building that is used as a dwelling” on July 12 and July 14,
respectively. See Minn. Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (2 018). The state later amended the
complaint, with the dist rict court’s permission, to charge just a single count of arson for
4
both fires.1 Id. Although Satoskar wa s initially represented by counsel, he later waived
counsel and represented himself, including at trial.2
Satoskar demanded a speedy trial on Marc h 25, 2020 and eight times thereafter.
Various factors delayed the trial, including th e suspension of all jury trials in Minnesota
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a motion by Satoskar’s counse l for a rule 20.01
competency evaluation, the prosecutor’s de velopment of COVID-19 symptoms, and an
additional 60-day pause on jury trials in the state due to COVID-19. While awaiting his
trial, Satoskar remained in jail and made multiple requests for release pending trial due to
the delay, all of which were denied. The trial eventually commenced on January 4, 2021,
but when a juror fell ill, the district court declared a mistrial. A second jury trial began on
January 25, 2021. Satoskar moved for a c ontinuance so that he could pursue private
investigative services to aid in his defense. The district court denied his motion.
The jury found Satosk ar guilty of the charged offe nse of first-degree arson.
Following the jury’s verdict, th e district court sentenced Sato skar to 48 months in prison
and ordered him to pay $151,162.15 in restitution.
Satoskar appeals.

1 Satoskar, who was represented by counsel when the state amended the complaint, did not
object. But a few months later, while Satoskar was representing himself, he orally moved
to “sever” the single arson count into separa te counts, expressing concern about jury
unanimity if the case proceeded to trial on just one count. The district court denied the
motion.

2 Satoskar had access to advisory counsel for the duration of his trial.
5
DECISION
I. The district court did not violate Satosk ar’s constitutional right to a speedy
trial.

Satoskar argues that the 285-day delay in bringing him to trial after his speedy-trial
demand violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The federal and Minnesota constitutions provide criminal defendants the right to a
speedy trial. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. The Minnesota Rules
of Criminal Procedure also provide that:
A defendant must be tried as soon as possible after entry
of a plea other than guilty. On demand of any party after entry
of such plea, the trial must start within 60 days unless the court
finds good cause for a later trial date.

Unless exigent circumstances exist, if trial does not start
within 120 days from the date the plea other than guilty is
entered and the demand is ma de, the defendant must be
released under any nonmonetary conditions the court orders
under Rule 6.01, subd. 1.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b).
Appellate courts review alleged violations of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial de novo. State v. Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 2009). To
determine whether a delay rises to the level of a violation of the constitutional speedy-trial
right, reviewing courts use the balancing test set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 244 (Minn.
2021); State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999). This test requires courts to
consider the following factors, known as the Barker factors, in determining whether the
right was violated: “(1) the length of the de lay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether
6
the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced
the defendant.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315; Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33.
A 60-day delay is presumptivel y prejudicial and requires a weighing of the latter
three factors. Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315-16. None of these factors alone is “either a
necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.”
Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. An evaluation of the Barker factors “is not a check-the-box,
prescriptive analysis,” and instead involves an assessment of “how the factors interact with
each other in a difficult and se nsitive balancing process.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 245
(quotation omitted). Reviewing courts may also consider “other circumstances as may be
relevant.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
To determine whether the delay in brin ging Satoskar to trial violated his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, we now consider each of the Barker factors in turn.
First, as noted, “[t]he length of the delay is a triggering mechanism which
determines whether further review is necessary.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315 (quotation
omitted). Here, Satoskar made his first spee dy-trial demand on March 25, 2020 and later
reasserted that demand. Satoskar’s first ju ry trial began on Janu ary 4, 2021—285 days
after his first speedy-trial demand. After that trial ended in a mistrial due to a juror’s
illness,3 Satoskar’s second jury trial began on January 25, 2021. Because the delay

3 The district court informed Satoskar that he could agree to proceed with 11 jurors, rather
than the 12 jurors required by the rules of criminal procedure. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02,
subd. 9. Satoskar requested a mistrial.
7
Satoskar experienced exceeded 60 days, which triggered a pr esumption of prejudice, we
must address the other Barker factors. See Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315.
The second factor is the reason for delay. If there is good cause for the delay, there
may be no violation of the speedy-trial right. Griffin, 760 N.W.2d at 340.
Here, there were multiple cau ses for the delay, many of which were related to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Between Satoskar’s initial speedy-trial demand on March 25, 2020
and July 20, 2020—a total of 118 days—the delays were attributable to COVID-19-related
court closures. The district court initially scheduled a trial for Ma y 11, 2020, which fell
within the 60-day speedy-trial window under the rules of criminal procedure. See Minn.
R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). But by May 11, an order issued by the Chief Justice of the Minnesota
Supreme Court barred jury trials in the interest of public health. See Continuing Operations
of the Courts of the State of Minnesota Under a Statewide Peacetime Declaration of
Emergency, No. ADM20-8001 (Minn. Mar. 20, 2020). Satoskar’s trial was rescheduled to
June 22, 2020, which still fell within the 60-day window, but jury trials had not yet resumed
due to statewide pandemic restrictions. See Order Governing the Continuing Operations
of the Minnesota Judicial Branch Under Emergency Executive Order Nos. 20-53, 20-56 ,
No. ADM20-8001, at 2-3 (Minn. May 15, 2020) (continuing the suspension of jury trials
in criminal cases until July 6, 2020). Once again, the trial was rescheduled, this time for
July 20, 2020. The district c ourt, the prosecutor, and Satosk ar’s attorney prioritized the
trial, with plans to begin jury selection on July 21.
8
But on July 21, 2020, Satoskar’s counsel moved for a competency evaluation4 based
on his belief that Satoskar was not “able to [rationally] consult with us with respect to the
facts of this case and forming a defense at trial.” The district court ordered a competency
evaluation and suspended the proceedings until it was completed. The evaluation was filed
on September 18, 2020, and Satoskar was deem ed competent to proceed to trial at a
September 23, 2020 hearing. Following another speedy-trial demand, the district court and
parties set a new trial date for November 16, 2020. The delay attributable to the
competency-evaluation reques t and corresponding rescheduling procedures totaled 118
days.
Pandemic-related issues caused the remaining delays. On November 16, 2020, the
parties once again appeared for jury trial. At this time, the prosecutor had experienced
COVID-19 symptoms within the preceding 12 hours, so the di strict court continued the
trial to November 30. By November 30, however, jury tr ials were again paused until
February 1, 2021 by order of the Chief Justice due to a statewide surge in COVID-19 cases.
See Order Governing the Continuing Opera tions of the Minnesota Judicial Branch , No.
ADM20-8001, at 2 (Nov. 20, 2020). Nonethele ss, the district court granted an exception
to allow Satoskar’s trial to occur as soon as possible. The trial was rescheduled to
January 4, 2021, and commenced that day, although, as not ed, it ultimately resulted in a

4 The rules require that a district court or der a competency evaluation if it “doubts the
defendant’s competency” at a ny point during the proceedings. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01,
subd. 3.
9
mistrial when a juror became ill. The delay attributable to the prosecutor’s illness and the
statewide order pausing all jury trials totaled 49 days.
Satoskar contends that the state caused th e delay in bringing him to trial. He
correctly observes that the state bears the burden of vindicating a defendant’s speedy-trial
rights. Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 316. But the state responds that it was not responsible for
the delays because they “wer e caused by public health ma ndates and precautions during
the pandemic and by [Satoskar’s] counsel’s request for a competency evaluation.”
Moreover, the state contends that “[t]he delays were justified by good cause.”
Although “[a] more neutral reason [for dela y] such as negligence or overcrowded
courts should be weighted less heavily” agai nst the state, such a reason “nevertheless
should be considered since th e ultimate responsib ility for such circum stances must rest
with the government rather than with the defendant.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. However,
this court recently held that the pandemic is a “neutral” reason for 77-day and 105-day trial
delays and can be attributable neithe r to a defendant nor to the state. State v. Paige, No.
A20-1228, 2021 WL 3716663, at *3 (Minn. App. Aug. 23, 2021), rev. granted (Minn.
Nov. 16, 2021); State v. Jackson, 968 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. granted
(Minn. Jan 18, 2022). Accordingly, Satoska r’s argument that the st ate caused the delay
resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic fails. Additionally, good cause justified the delay
related to Satoskar’s compet ency evaluation because ensu ring that a defendant is
competent to proceed safeguards the right to a fair trial. See State v. Bauer, 245 N.W.2d
848, 854-55 (Minn. 1976). Because the reasons for the delays in bringing Satoskar to trial
10
were either neutral (the COVID-19 pandemic) or justified by good cause (the competency
evaluation), this factor weighs against Satoskar.
The third Barker factor requires us to consider wh ether Satoskar formally asserted
his right to a speedy trial. Satoskar formally asserted his right to a speedy trial on March 25,
2020, and he raised concerns about speedy-tri al violations throughout the proceedings.
Continuous and adamant assertions are “e ntitled to strong evid entiary weight.” Barker,
407 U.S. at 531. Such demands are “likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of the
prejudice which has resulted.” State v. Friberg , 435 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn. 1989).
Despite Satoskar’s multiple speedy-trial reques ts, the state contends that his continuance
request on January 25, 2021—when he reque sted additional time for investigation—
waived his speedy-trial right or should weigh against him in the Barker analysis. See State
v. Hahn, 799 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Minn. App. 2011) (“ Appellant’s attempts to delay the trial
after requesting a speedy trial weigh against him for the purposes of a Barker analysis.”),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011). Because Satoskar consistently invoked his speedy-trial
right while his case was pending, however, we elect not to hold his (unsuccessful) January
2021 continuance request against him. We conclude that this factor weighs in Satoskar’s
favor.
Finally, the fourth Barker factor requires us to evaluate whether Satoskar was
prejudiced by the delay in bringing him to trial. Barker provides that
[p]rejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the
interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was
designed to protect. This Co urt has identified three such
interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit
11
the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the
most serious is the last, becau se the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system.

407 U.S. at 532. Satoskar argues that the 285-day delay in commencing his trial implicated
each of these interests.
We disagree. Although Satoskar remained in jail before trial, he also posed a unique
risk to public safety. We therefore cannot conclude that his pretrial incarceration was
“oppressive.” On the other hand, we ackno wledge that Satoskar likely experienced
heightened anxiety while in jail due to the health risks of COVID-19 and other stressors
caused by the pandemic and inca rceration in general. Ultimately, however, the prejudice
factor weighs against Satoskar because the record shows that the delay in bringing him to
trial did not impair his defense, which is the most significant consideration.
Satoskar argues that the delay informed his decision to represent himself; he
believed that he would be trie d more quickly if he was not encumbered by an attorney’s
schedule. The record offers some support for that assertion. At one hearing, Satoskar
stated, “[i]f it is a delay in the trial, I’ll continue as pro se.” Satoskar further contends that
he struggled to prepare for hi s trial while in custody. Barker acknowledges that, “if a
defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses,
or otherwise prepare his defense.” 407 U.S. at 533. However, Satoskar was provided with
advisory counsel after he discharged his attorney. And the record shows that Satoskar ably
represented himself. Thus, the final Barker factor weighs against Satoskar.
12
The delay in bringing Satoskar to trial was presumptively prejudicial. But because
the delay was primarily attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and to the suspension of
the proceedings for a competency evaluation—and because it did not impact the trial that
eventually occurred—we conclude that it did not violate Satoskar’s constitutional right to
a speedy trial.
II. To convict Satoskar of arson, the st ate was not required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he acted unlawfully.

Satoskar next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his first-degree
arson conviction, arguing that the state failed to prove beyond a reas onable doubt that he
unlawfully destroyed or damaged a dwelling with fire.
“Due process requires that every element of the offense charged must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution.” State v. Cross , 577 N.W.2d 721, 726
(Minn. 1998). Minnesota’s first-degree arson statute provides, “Whoever unlawfully by
means of fire or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building that is used as
a dwelling at the time the act is committed . . . commits arson in the first degree.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1. Satoskar contends that the unlawful nature of a fire is an element
of the offense that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
We recently considered whether the unlawful nature of a fire is an element of first-
degree arson. State v. Beganovic, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2022 WL 1073237, at *1 (Minn.
App. Apr. 11, 2022). In Beganovic, which we decided while Satoskar’s appeal was
pending, a defendant convicted of arson argued that the state failed to establish that he
unlawfully started the fire at issue, necessitating reversal of his conviction. Id. Conducting
13
a plain-language analysis of the first-degree arson statute, we determined that the term
unlawfully, as used in the arson statute, means “without authorization” provided by a
permit statute that excludes certain fires from being categorized as arson. Id. at *3 (quoting
Minn. Stat. § 609.564 (2016)). The permit statute states that an individual does not commit
arson when a fire is set “pursuant to a valid ly issued license or permit or with written
permission from the fire department of the jurisdiction where the fire occurs.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.564. We further determined that the term “unlawfully” in the arson statute provides
an exception to liability and is not an element of the arson offense. Beganovic, 2022 WL
1073237, at *4. Accordingly, we concluded that “[t]he burden of proving that exception
(that the defendant’s act is lawful because it is authorized by the permit statute) falls on the
defendant, not the state to prove the opposite.” Id. In other words, a defendant may raise
the lawfulness of a fire as an affirmative defense to first-degree arson. Id. at *5.
Based on our decision in Beganovic, we reject Satoskar’s foundational assertion that
the state was required to prove that he unlawfully set a fire. And because unlawfulness is
not an element of first-degree arson, his sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument fails.
III. The district court’s failure to formally enter a competency finding as required
by the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Proc edure, while error, does not require
reversal of Satoskar’s conviction.

Satoskar contends that his conviction must be reversed because the district court
failed to issue an order finding that he was competent to stand trial.
Requiring an individual who is not competent to stand tr ial violates due process.
State v. Curtis , 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018) (citing Drope v. Missouri , 420 U.S.
162, 171-72 (1975); Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011)). A defendant is
14
competent if the defendant has a “‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding ’ and has ‘a rational as well as factual
understanding of the procee dings against him.’” Godinez v. Moran , 509 U.S. 389, 396
(1993) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)); see also Minn. R. Crim.
P. 20.01, subd. 2 (“A defendant is incompetent and must not plead, be tried, or be sentenced
if the defendant due to mental illness or cognitive impairment lacks ability to: (a) rationally
consult with counsel; or (b) understand the proceedings or participate in the defense.”). To
proceed to trial, “[t]he state must show the defendant’s competence by a fair preponderance
of the evidence.” State v. Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 2007).
Under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, if either party or the court at any
time doubts a defendant’s competency, the issue must be raised. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01,
subd. 3. The court then must appoint at least one examiner, and the examiner must provide
the court with a written report discussing the defendant’s mental condition and an opinion
regarding the defendant’s competence to stand trial. Id., subd. 4. Once the competency
examination has been completed, if no objecti on is properly made, the rules provide that
“the court may determine the defendant’s competency on the examiner’s report.” Id., subd.
5(b). Then, “[i]f the court finds by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant is
competent,” the rules require the court to “enter an order finding the defendant competent.”
Id., subd. 5(c). Alternatively, “the court must enter an order finding the defendant
incompetent.” Id.
Here, the district court ordered a comp etency examination at the request of
Satoskar’s counsel. In a written report, th e examiner concluded Satoskar was competent
15
to stand trial. Satoskar di d not challenge the ex aminer’s competency finding in written
filings or at the hearing that occurred before the district court once the examination was
complete. At the hearing, the district court confirmed the absence of competency concerns
on the record, stating that “a Rule 20 had previously been ordered, and that came back, and
it looks like there are not any competency issues,” and that “the examiner did find
competency.” The district cour t then set the case for trial. But the district court did not
state on the record that it was entering a formal finding of competency. And the district
court did not issue a written order to that effect . The district court’s failure to enter an
order finding that Satoskar was competent violated rule 20.01, subdivision 5(c).
Satoskar argues that the error requires re versal of his conviction. He does not
explain the legal theory that would dictate this remedy. But in support of his request, he
cites Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), and State v. Bauer, 245 N.W.2d 848 (Minn.
1976). In Pate, the defendant relied on an insanity defense and his counsel repeatedly
asserted that the defendant was still “insane” at trial, yet no competency examination was
requested or performed. 383 U.S. at 378-85. And in Bauer, the district court denied
defense counsel’s request for a reassessment of a defendant’s competency midtrial where
there was substantial evidence suggesting that the defendant was no longer competent. 245
N.W.2d at 853-58. In both cases, reversal of the resulting convictions was necessary
because there was evidence in the record suggesting that the defendants were not competent
during their trials, implicating their due process rights. Pate, 383 U.S. at 384-86; Bauer,
245 N.W.2d at 853-58.
16
But the rationale of these cases does not apply here for two reasons. First, although
the district court did not enter a formal finding of competency, the record makes clear that
it implicitly found that Satoskar was competent. The competency examination concluded
that Satoskar was competent. Following the examination, the district court asked the
parties whether they wished to challenge that conclusion; neither party did. The district
court then scheduled Satoskar’s tr ial. At the trial, the distri ct court told Satoskar, “[y]ou
have been determined to be competent.” Satoskar again did not challenge the district
court’s statement. He then went on to represent himself at trial, and no one raised any other
concerns about his competence for the duration of the proceedings.5
Second, the record amply supports the district court’s implicit finding of
competence. An appellate court independently reviews the record “to determine if the
district court gave proper weight to the evidence produced and if its finding of competency
is adequately supported by the record.” Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d at 238 (quotations omitted);
see also Curtis , 921 N.W.2d at 346-48 (reaffirming Ganpat). Here, the only evidence
produced was the unchallenged examination finding Satoskar competent to proceed.
Because the district court implicitly foun d that Satoskar was competent and the
record fully supports that finding, we are conf ident that, despite the district court’s rule
violation, there was no constitutional violation. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (“Any error

5 During trial, when Satoskar waived his cons titutional right to testify, the district court
also stated, “I’ve noticed throughout the proceedings that you’re very engaged. You know
what’s going on. You’ve asked questions. Your behavior has been completely appropriate
before me.”
17
that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”). We therefore decline
Satoskar’s request to reverse his conviction based on the rule violation.
IV. The district court obtained a valid waiver of trial counsel from Satoskar before
he commenced self-representation.

Satoskar argues that his waiver of trial c ounsel was invalid because (1) the district
court failed to make a formal competency finding, as previously discussed and (2) he was
not advised of the restitution consequences of his conviction before waiving counsel.
Both the federal and state constitutions gua rantee criminal defendants the right to
the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. A defendant
may waive the right to counsel, but the waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975); State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 279
(Minn. 1998). The district court should ensure that a defendant waiving counsel is aware
of the “possible punishments, mitigating circumstances, and any other facts relevant to the
defendant’s understanding of the consequences of the waiver.” Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at
276 (quotation omitted). “When a defendant has consulted with an attorney prior to waiver,
a trial court could ‘reasonably presume that the benefits of legal assistance and the risks of
proceeding without it had been described to defendant in detail by counsel.’” Id. (quoting
State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn. 1978)).
On review, an appellate court “will only over turn a ‘finding of a valid waiver of a
defendant’s right to counsel if that finding is clearly erroneous.’” State v. Jones , 772
N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009) (quoting Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 276).
18
We first turn to Satoskar’s argument that his waiver of counsel was invalid because
the district court failed to issue an order finding him competent in violation of the
applicable criminal procedure rule. He seems to contend that, because there was no formal
competency finding, he was incapable of ma king a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of counsel. A criminal defendant wh o is incompetent cannot make a valid waiver
of the constitutional right to counsel. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399-4 00 (citations omitted).
But as we previously conclude d, notwithstanding the district court’s rule violation, the
district court implicitly found Satoskar to be competent before he waived counsel and the
record, including the competency evaluation, fully supports that finding.
We are also not persuaded by Satoskar’s argument that the validity of his waiver is
somehow undermined by the fact that the judge who accepted the waiver was not the judge
involved in the competency proceedings. As Satoskar acknowledges, the judge who
accepted the waiver was aware of the earlier competency proceedings. Indeed, the judge
directly addressed those proceedings during the waiver. The judge stated, “when I did look
at what was on the file, a Rule 20 had previous ly been ordered and that came back and it
looks like there is not any co mpetency issues.” The prosecutor affirmed the judge’s
statement. The judge then asked Satoskar whether he understood the outcome of the
competency proceedings, and Satoskar responded, “I do understand the conclusions.”
The record also shows that the judge took great care in explaining the implications
of Satoskar’s decision to waive counsel and ensured that Satoskar fully understood what
he was doing. During a lengthy discussion of Satoskar’s decision to forgo counsel, the
judge covered the statutory maximum sentence, the presumptive sentence, the benefits of
19
being represented by counsel, the obligations of a self-represented defendant, and the role
of advisory counsel, and the judge repeatedly checked in with Sato skar to confirm his
understanding of these things. The judge assured Satoskar that the decision to discharge
the public defender’s office “ doesn’t mean it’s forever,” a nd that if Satoskar requested
counsel, the judge would likely reappoint the public defender’s office. In addition to the
courtroom discussion, Satoskar reviewed an d signed a written petition to proceed pro se.
Based on our review of the record, the district court did not clearly err in determining that
Satoskar validly waived counsel.
We turn next to Satoskar’s argument that his waiver of counsel was invalid because
the district court did not apprise him of the restitution consequences of a conviction.
Specifically, he contends that th e “district court failed to ensu re that [he] understood the
consequences of proceeding to trial without counsel because [he] was not informed that he
would be required to pay over $150,000 in restitution” if convicted.
Satoskar cites no case or statute that direc tly supports this argument. Instead, he
analogizes restitution to a crim inal sentence, contending that the failure to advise a
defendant of potential restitu tion consequences in conjunction with a waiver of trial
counsel is the equivalent of not addressing sentencing.
As Satoskar notes, we have held that payment of court-orde red restitution is a
component of a defendant’s sentence. See State v. Hughes, 742 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Minn.
App. 2007), aff’d, 758 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. 2008). But Satoskar’s analogy ultimately fails
because sentencing and restitution differ in some critical respec ts. Unlike the sentencing
consequences of conviction, which are ascertainable well in advance of a trial, the potential
20
restitution consequences of a conviction are often unknown until after a trial. Under
Minnesota law, a victim can submit a restitution request after sentencing. See Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.04, subd. 1 (2018) (governing timing of a victim’s restitu tion request). And a
district court can even order restitution sua sponte without a victim’s input. See State v.
Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 652 (Minn. 2011) (holding that a district court has authority to
sua sponte order restitution under Minnesota Statutes sections 609.10, 611A.04, and
611A.045).
Given this legal framework, information about restitution may not be available
when a defendant is making decisions about trial representation and strategy. As a practical
matter, informing a defendant of the specific amount of restitution at stake cannot be
required for a valid waiver of trial couns el. Moreover, separate from any sentencing
proceeding, a defendant is entitled to challenge requested restitution at a restitution hearing,
see Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3 (2018), and has a corresponding right to be represented
by counsel at that hearing, see State v. Maddox, 825 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Minn. App. 2013).
Here, even though Satoskar waived counsel for the purpose of his trial and sentencing, he
could have request ed counsel to challenge any restitution. The record shows that, at
sentencing, the district court advised Satoskar of his right to challenge the restitution and
gave him the opportunity to consult with advisory counsel. Satoskar did not challenge the
district court’s restitution order.
We reject Satoskar’s argument that his waiver of trial counsel was not knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent. He was initially represented by counsel, which allowed the
district court to presume that he understood the perils of self-representation. See Worthy,
21
583 N.W.2d at 276. And befo re accepting Satoskar’s decision to waive trial counsel, the
district court provided a thorough and clear advisory. Thus, the district court did not clearly
err in determining that Satoskar’s waiver of trial counsel was valid.
V. The district court did not commit plain error in its jury instructions.
Finally, Satoskar argues that the district court erred in its jury instructions. First, he
contends that the district court’s arson instruction erroneously failed to inform the jury that
the unlawful nature of a fire is an element of the offense. Second, he argues that the district
court’s failure to sua sponte provide a specific-unanimity instruction deprived him of his
constitutional right to a unanimous verdict.
Satoskar did not raise his objections to the jury instructions at trial. When there is
no objection to jury instructions at trial, the appellate cour t has discretion to consider a
claim of error on appeal only “if there was pl ain error affecting substantial rights or an
error of fundamental law in the jury instructions.” State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433,
437 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted); State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 158 (Minn. 2020).
The burden is on an appellant to show that (1 ) error existed, (2) the error is plain, and
(3) the error affected substantial rights. State v. Griller , 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.
1998). If the appellant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court “may correct
the error only if it ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.’” Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d at 437 (quoting Johnson v. United States , 520
U.S. 461, 467 (1997)).
22
A. The district court did not plainly err in following the pattern jury
instruction for first-degree arson.

Attendant to Satoskar’s argument that the unlawful nature of a fire is an element of
first-degree arson, he argues that the district court should have instructed the jury on this
element. The district court provided the jury with the pattern instruction for the offense of
first-degree arson, which does not identify the unlawful nature of the fire as an independent
element. See 10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 18.01 (2018). But as we previously
discussed, our decision in Beganovic holds that “the state doe s not bear the burden of
proving that the defendant acted unlawfully as a separate element.” Beganovic, 2022 WL
1073237, at *5. Thus, the district court did not err by providing the jury with the pattern
instruction.
6
B. Although the district court plainly erred in failing to provide the jury
with a specific-unanimity instruct ion, the error did not prejudice
Satoskar.

Satoskar contends that the district court plainly erred by failing to provide the jury
with a specific-unanimity instruction. He ar gues that the district court was required to
instruct jurors that they ha d to unanimously agree about wh ich of the two alleged fires
constituted the arson offense. According to Satoskar, the district court’s failure to provide
such an instruction likely led to disagreement among jurors about which of the two fires he
started, violating his right to a unanimous verdict.

6 Because Satoskar failed to ra ise lawfulness as an affirmativ e defense, the district court
also did not err in not giving an affirmative-defense jury instruction. See State v. Johnson,
719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn. 2006) (“It is an abuse of the district court’s discretion to
refuse to give an instruction on the defendant’s theory of the case if there is evidence to
support it.”).
23
Satoskar’s claim of error relies on State v. Stempf, where we addressed the district
court’s denial of a specific-unanimity instru ction. 627 N.W.2d 35 2, 358 (Minn. App.
2001). There, the state alleged that the defendant was guilty of one count of drug
possession but presented evidence of two separate acts of possession that occurred on two
different occasions and in two different locations. Id. at 354. We reaffirmed in Stempf that
jury instructions that “allow for possible significant disagreement among jurors as to what
acts the defendant committed” violate a defe ndant’s right to a unanimous verdict. Id.
Under the circumstances presented in Stempf—where the state alleged two “separate and
distinct culpable acts, either one of which could support a conviction” that “lack[ed] unity
of time and place”—we determined that the district court erred in denying the defendant’s
request for a specific-unanimity instruction. Id. at 358-59. Because the jury could have
disagreed about which act of possession the de fendant actually committed, we concluded
that a new trial was required. Id.
We agree that under the circumstances here—where the state presented evidence of
two separate and distinct acts, either of which could support a first-degree arson
conviction—a specific-unanimity instruction was warranted. The district court’s failure to
provide such an instruction was plain error.
Next, we must determine whether that error affected Satoskar’s substantial rights.
To evaluate whether a plainly-erroneous jury instruction affected substantial rights, the
reviewing court “look[s] to all relevant fact ors including, but not limited to: (1) whether
[the defendant] contested the omitted elements at trial and submitted evidence to support a
contrary finding; (2) whether the State pres ented overwhelming ev idence to prove those
24
elements; and (3) whether the jury’s verdic t nonetheless encompassed a finding on those
elements notwithstanding their omission from the jury instructions.” State v. Peltier, 874
N.W.2d 792, 800 (Minn. 2016).
We conclude that the error did not impact Satoskar’s s ubstantial rights. Satoskar
argued to the jury that the state’s evidence was insufficient to establish that he started either
fire. With such a defense, there is a greater potential for disagreement among jurors. But
given the truly overwhelming evidence that Satoskar intentionally set both fires, we cannot
conclude that there was any appreciable risk of disagreement here. On July 12, Satoskar
was found under a bed in the be droom where the fire started, covered in soot, and in the
vicinity of fire starter and a matchstick. On July 14, Satoskar was observed in his backyard
with a red container while smoke billowed from his house; he ma de no attempt to
extinguish the fire or to seek help. Police found Satoskar hiding in the rafters of his
detached garage, where he was attempting to start another fire with a blowtorch.
Given the significant evidence that Satoskar started both fires, he cannot satisfy his
burden of showing error that affected his substantial rights. We therefore conclude that the
district court’s error was not plain error requiring reversal of Satoskar’s conviction.
Affirmed.