A21-0873

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0862
A21-0873

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tyreese Eugene Roberson, Defendant,

Midwest Bonding LLC,
Appellant.

Filed March 14, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-19-2172

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney , Heather Pipenhagen , Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

James McGeeney, Doda McGenney, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Tyreese Roberson, St. Cloud, Minnesota (pro se defendant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment under Minn.
Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this consolidated appeal , appellant challenges the district court’s decision to
impose penalties for the reinst atement of bail bonds that had been forfeited when the
defendant failed to appear. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it reinstated and discharged a portion of the forfeited bail bonds.
FACTS
In February 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged defendant Tyreese
Eugene Roberson with second-d egree burglary of a dwelling in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.582, subd . 2 (2016); threats of violence in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.713, subd.1 (2016); violation of a Domestic Abuse No Contact Order
(DANCO) in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subd. 2(b) (2016); and fifth-
degree assault in violation of Minnesota St atutes section 629.224, subd. 1(2) (2016)
(together, the 2018 charges). In August 2019, the State of Minnesota charged Roberson
with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.342, subd. 1 (2018). Over the course of the proceedings in Roberson’s cases,
appellant Midwest Bonding, LLC (Midwest Bonding) posted two bail bonds on his behalf,
one in the amount of $40,000 relating to the 2018 charges, and a second in the amount of
$325,000 relating to the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charges from 2019. Roberson
was subject to several conditions of release and fitted with a GPS monitor.
The first-degree criminal sexual conduct charges proceeded to a jury trial on August
10, 2020, but the trial ended in a mistrial on August 20, 2020. The retrial began on
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September 21, 2020, and the jury was sworn on September 25, 2020. On September 30,
2020, Roberson failed to appear at trial in violation of the court’s order. After “a significant
morning delay,” the court recessed for the da y and sent the jurors home. The state
rescheduled two witnesses to appear the next day. One of the witnesses was an expert who
traveled from out-of-state to testify. The district court i ssued a warrant for Roberson’s
arrest. The monitoring sta ff for Roberson’s GP S equipment located the equipment in a
ditch near the courthouse and observed that the equipment had been cut off and
intentionally removed. Robe rson failed to appear again on October 1, 2020. The trial
resumed in Roberson’s absence; he was absent for the final witnesses in the state’s case as
well as for closing arguments, jury instructio ns, and verdicts. The jury found Roberson
guilty and concluded that the state proved the presence of aggravating factors.
On October 2, 2020, the district court forfeited both bail bonds. On October 12,
2020, Dakota County Sheriff’s Deputies arrested Roberson at a hospital in Minneapolis.
Midwest Bonding did not apprehend Roberson.
On December 9, 2020, Midw est Bonding petitioned for re instatement of the two
forfeited bail bonds. Midwest Bonding detaile d its efforts to locate Roberson, which
consisted of calling him, el ectronically searching all Mi nnesota jails, and hiring a
professional fugitive recovery agency (the agency). According to Midwest Bonding’s
petition, the agency investigated Roberson’s contact information and used investigative
software to search until Midwest Bondi ng learned Roberson was apprehended in
Minneapolis.
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In February 2021, the district court denied Midwest Bonding’s petition to reinstate
the entire appearance bond in the amount of $325,000 relating to the first-degree criminal
sexual conduct charges and ordered 50% of th e appearance bond, or $162,500, to be
reinstated and discharged. The district court ordered Midwest Bonding to pay the
remaining 50%, or $162, 500, within 30 days. For Robers on’s 2018 charges, the district
court denied Midwest Bonding’ s petition to reinstate the entir e appearance bond in the
amount of $40,000 and ordered 90% of the appearance bond, or $36,000, to be reinstated
and discharged. The district court then ordered Midwest Bonding to pay the remaining
10%, or $4,000, within 30 days.
In considering a petition for reinstatement a nd discharge of bail, the district court
considered the fact ors identified in In re Shetsky , 60 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn. 1953). The
district court found that because Roberson ab sconded during his jury trial and given the
severity of the charges against him, his absence weighed against reinstatement. Although
the length of Roberson’s absence was shorter th an in other cases, the district court found
that his absence interrupted and delayed the ad ministration of justice. The district court
also found that Roberson cut and removed his GPS bracelet, absconded during trial, and
Midwest Bonding did not provide any eviden ce to suggest the cause and purpose of
Roberson’s absence was anything but willful. The district court found that these actions
weighed heavily against reinstat ement. The district court also found that Roberson’s
apprehension did not result from any actions of Midwest Bonding. The district court
considered the nature of the charges and the conditions of release, concluding that this was
not a “routine case,” but that Midwest Bonding “made no more than ‘r outine’ efforts to
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assure” Roberson’s appearance. The district court found that this factor weighed in favor
of reinstatement, but “only minimally.”
As for whether the state was prejudiced in it s administration of justice, the district
court found that, for the bond corresponding to the August 2019 charges, the state incurred
undue expenses in retrieving and prosecuting Roberson because the trial was performed in
absentia for three days. In addition, the dist rict court determined that the state incurred
costs of apprehension and increased costs of prosecution. The district court took judicial
notice that the jury was paid an additional day while the court decided whether to proceed
with the trial and that the presentation of the state’s case was disrupted. The state’s expert
witness returned to her home state and had to te stify the next day remotely, rather than in
person. The district court found that the state was adversely affected because of the delay
and this factor weighed against reinstatement. For the bond corresponding to the charges
filed in February 2018, the district court fo und that this factor weighed in favor of
reinstatement because that bond was associated with the criminal sexual conduct case and
Roberson was not in trial for the 2018 charges. Midwest Bonding appeals.
DECISION
Midwest Bonding challenges the district court’s order denyi ng its petition to
reinstate and discharge its forfeited bonds an d imposing penalties, arguing that the court
abused its discretion in weighing the Shetsky factors. Because the district court’s
conclusions are not against logic or the facts in the record, the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it reinstated and discharged a portion of the bail bonds.
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When a bail bond is forfeited, the district court “may forgive or reduce the penalty
according to the circumstances of the case and the situation of the party on any terms and
conditions it considers just and reasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 629.59 (2020); see also Minn.
R. Gen. Prac. 702(f) (specifying procedure for petitioning for reinstatement and discharge
of forfeited bail bond). But in considering a petition for reinstatement and discharge of
bail, the district court must consider the four factors identified in Shetsky. State v. Askland,
784 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Minn. 2010). The first fact or is “the purpose of bail, the civil nature
of the proceedings, and the cause, purpose and length of a defendant’s absence.” Id. Bail
serves several purposes, including minimizi ng pretrial incarcerati on, ensuring penalty
payment, and encouraging sureties “to locate , arrest, and return defaulting defendants to
the authorities.” State v. Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Minn. 2003). The second factor
is “the good faith of the bo nd company as measured by th e fault or willfulness of the
defendant.” Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. This factor imputes the “[d]efendant’s willfulness
or bad faith . . . to the surety.” State v. Vang , 763 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Minn. App. 2009).
Third, the district court must consider “t he good-faith efforts of the bond company to
apprehend and produce the defendant.” Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. The final factor is
“any prejudice to the State in its administration of justice.” Id. (citing Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d
at 46).
The bonding company bears the burden of showing that the first three factors weigh
in its favor, and the state bears the burden of proving prejudice. Askland, 784 N.W.2d at
62. We review a district court’s decision on the reinstatement and discharge of a forfeited
bail bond for an abuse of discretion. Id. A district court abuses its discretion when its
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decision is against logic or the properly establis hed factual findings of the district court.
See State v. Hallmark , 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 20 19). To determine whether the
district court abused its discretion, we examine each factor in turn.
Midwest Bonding argues that the first Shetsky factor favors reinstatement of the
bond because Roberson was a pprehended approximately 13 days after fa iling to appear,
and in three other cases, appellate courts have reversed forfeitures of bond where the
defendant was at large for more than 13 days. We are not convinced by this argument.
First, Midwest Bonding focusses on only one component of the first Shetsky factor: the
length of the absence. The other components, such as “the purpose of bail, the civil nature
of the proceedings, and the cause, purpose, and length of a defendant’s absence,” Askland,
784 N.W.2d at 62, support the district court’s conclusion that Roberson’s absence affected
the scheduling and presentation of witnesses, caused inconvenience to the jury, and delayed
the administration of justice.
In addition, although Midwest Bonding cite s three cases to support its argument,
none of the three cases directly applies to the facts of this case. They do not involve persons
absconding midtrial, but rather after entry of a guilty plea or prior to arraignment. See
Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 63 (reversing forfeiture of bond where defendant failed to appear
at arraignment and where the st ate “did not ev en argue, much less atte mpt to prove, that
any witnesses or evidence were lo st during Aksland’s absence”); State v. Stellmach, No.
A14-0920, 2015 WL 134174, at *1, 3 (Minn. App. Jan. 12, 2015) (reversing forfeiture of
bond by district court where defendant entered a guilty plea, failed to appear at sentencing,
and was at large for 64 days); Farsdale v. Martinez, 586 N.W.2d 423, 424-26 (Minn. App.
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1998) (reversing forfeiture of bond where defendant entered a guilty plea, failed to appear
at sentencing, and was at large for approximately “two months”). Our analysis of the effect
of Roberson’s absence is necessarily di fferent from that of the defendants in Askland,
Stellmach, and Farsdale because of the important purpos e of imposing bail for serious
charges, such as the criminal sexual conduc t charges in this case , and because Roberson
contested these charges through a jury trial. For these reasons, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discre tion in concluding that the fi rst factor weighs against
reinstatement and discharge and in favor of imposing penalties.
Midwest Bonding next challenges the dist rict court’s evaluation of the second
Shetsky factor, arguing that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to
consider Midwest Bonding’s good faith efforts to apprehend Roberson. Again, we are not
convinced.1 The district court found several facts indicating Roberson willfully absconded,
including the undisputed fact that he cut o ff his GPS bracelet befo re doing so. Based on
these facts, the district court’s analysis of the second Shetsky factor is not against logic.

1 In its arguments to this court, Midwest Bo nding does not assert th at the district court
clearly erred in making any factual findings. To the extent that the argument here
necessarily contests the factual findings, we conclude that the district court did not clearly
err. Under this standard of review, we view the record in the light most favorable to the
findings and will not set them aside unless we are left with a firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. E.g., In re Civil Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn.
2021) (quotations and citations omitted). A dditionally, we do not reconcile conflicting
evidence or “weigh the evidence as if trying the matter de novo,” and “[w]hen the record
reasonably supports the findings at issue on appe al, it is immaterial th at the record might
also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. at 221, 223
(quotations omitted). In our review of the record, Midwest Bonding presented no evidence
that Roberson’s failure to appear was anything but willful and in bad faith. In fact, much
of the evidence presented by Midwest Bonding supports the district court’s factual findings
regarding willfulness, and given our standard of review, we must defer to the district court.
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Midwest Bonding also argues that the district court abused its discretion regarding
the third Shetsky factor, but we remain unpersuaded. Midwest Bonding is correct to
observe that the defendant was not at large for a long period of time and that Midwest
Bonding had only “just begun to commence efforts to locate the defendant.” Nevertheless,
Midwest Bonding makes no argument and presente d no evidence that its efforts directly
facilitated law enforcement’s ability to find the defendant, as occurred in Farsdale, 586
N.W.2d at 424-25. In addition, the district court also considered the absence of any
evidence presented by Midwest Bonding to show specific costs incurred by the bonding
company in trying to locate Roberson, as occurred in Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d at 541. For
these reasons, on this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that the third factor weighs minimally in favor of reinstatement and
discharge.
Finally, Midwest Bonding contests the district court’s analysis of the fourth Shetsky
factor, arguing that the state presented no ev idence that it was prejudiced by having to
finish the trial without Robers on present. Midwest Bonding also argues that the one-day
trial delay does not justify the penalties impos ed. While the state could have made a
stronger case by itemizing costs and presenting additional evidence to support its claim
that Roberson’s absence caused prejudice, we discern no error in the district court’s
decision to find prejudice or to take judicial notice of the costs of delaying the trial. The
district court correctly determined that the costs of prosecution were increased and the jury
was paid for an additional day while the trial was suspended. In addition, there is no dispute
that the state’s presentation of evidence was disrupted and that when trial recommenced,
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the state’s expert witness had returned to her home state and testified remotely rather than
in person. Based on our review of the applicable authorities, the state identified sufficient
adverse impact to carry its burden regarding this factor, and we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discre tion when it determined that this factor weighed against
reinstatement and in favor of the penalties imposed.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it reinstated and discha rged 50% of the bo nd imposed for the 2019 first-degree
criminal sexual conduct charges and 90% of the bond imposed for the 2018 charges.
Affirmed.