Felix Kasper Piah, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0867

Felix Kasper Piah, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 2, 2022
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-2187

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Adam E. Petras , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Pres iding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Felix Kasper Piah filed a pos tconviction petition seeking withdrawal of
his guilty plea based on ineffective assistan ce of counsel. The postconviction court
summarily denied relief, and Piah appealed. We determined that Piah’s trial counsel
performed deficiently, and we remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
prejudice. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court determined that Piah
failed to show the requisite prejudice. Piah now challenges that determination. We affirm.
DECISION
We review a postconviction court’s denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse
of discretion. Eason v. State, 950 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Minn. 2020). A postconviction court
abuses its discretion if “its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review the postconviction
court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. Id. at 264.
To prevail on an ineffectiv e-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show
that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that
“a reasonable probability exists that the out come would have been different but for
counsel’s errors.” State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).
To satisfy the prejudice prong, Piah needed to show a reasonable probability that he
would not have pleaded guilty if he had been properly informed of the consequences of his
plea. See Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d at 842. A
reasonable probability is a pr obability “sufficient to unde rmine confidence” in the
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challenged outcome, in this case, the guilty plea. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d at 842 (quotation
omitted).
In determining that Piah suffered no prejudice, the postconviction court relied on a
prior motion in which Piah a sserted that a conviction “of any kind” would prevent him
from obtaining immigration asylum. The pos tconviction court reasoned that Piah was
therefore aware that his plea would make deportation “more likely,” and as such, there was
no reasonable probability that he would have changed his decision to plead guilty if
properly informed of the plea’s consequences. Piah challenges that reasoning. Indeed, the
state declined to endorse the postconviction court’s reasoning and instead raised alternative
arguments to support the postconviction court’s conclusion on the prejudice prong.
While the postconviction court’s reliance on the language in Piah’s motion is
questionable, the postconviction court’s findings nonetheless support its determination that
Piah failed to show the requisite prejudice. We may consider alternative arguments raised
by the state on appeal in defense of the po stconviction court’s decision when there are
sufficient facts in the record to support th e arguments, there is legal support for the
arguments, and the alternative ground s would not expand the relief granted. 1 State v.
Grunig, 660 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn. 2003); State v. Bennett, 867 N.W.2d 539, 543 n.1
(Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2015).
Piah was the only witness who testified at the evidentiary hearing. He testified that
he would not have pleaded guilty if he knew of the increased risk of deportation. The

1 Piah acknowledges that the state is permitted to raise alternative legal arguments.
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postconviction court did not find Piah’s testimony to be credible, and the record supports
that credibility determination. See Bobo v. State , 860 N.W.2d 681, 684 (Minn. 2015)
(stating that we review a postc onviction court’s credibility determination for clear error).
Piah therefore points to the circumstances surrounding his plea to satisfy his burden on the
prejudice prong. “[S]ufficient contemporaneous evidence” may substantiate a defendant’s
post hoc assertion that he would not have pleaded guilty if properly informed of the plea’s
consequences. Dat v. United States , 920 F.3d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 2019). However, in
this case, the circumstances su rrounding the plea indicate th at Piah’s decision would not
have changed.
Piah entered the United States on a tempor ary visa, which had expired at the time
of his plea. As he concedes, he was theref ore “deportable” based upon his immigration
status, but he hoped to obtain asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2018). He pleaded
guilty to the misdemeanor char ge to avoid a conviction for second-degree assault with a
dangerous weapon, which would have rendered asylum an impossibility. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (2018). Piah received a general warning about his
plea’s immigration consequences, as the plea petition stated that a guilty plea may result in
deportation. Although Piah sought plea withdrawal at sent encing, as we noted in our
previous opinion, he did not raise immigration consequences as a basis for that plea
withdrawal. Given the circumstances surrounding Piah’s plea, including his desire to avoid
a conviction on the more serious charge to retain the possib ility of asylum, there is no
reasonable probability that Piah would not have pleaded guilty.
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The postconviction court found Piah’s testimony to be not credible, and the record
supports that determination. While Piah points to the circumstances surrounding his plea
as evidence of prejudice, those circumstance s fail to show a reas onable probability that
Piah would not have pleaded guilty if he had been informed that his plea would render him
presumptively deportable. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Piah’s petition.
Affirmed.